The Fall of Carthage (60 page)
In spite of the Carthaginians' acceptance of their demands, the consuls still sailed across to land at Utica. Still uncertain of the Romans' intentions, another delegation was formed at Carthage and sent to the consuls, who received them in great state, seated on a tribunal flanked by their senior officers and with the army paraded behind them. It was a daunting display of Rome's might, intended to persuade the ambassadors that any resistance to the consuls' demands was hopeless. Censorinus, elected first by the
Comitia,
probably older and a better orator, spoke in answer to their appeal, demanding that the city hand over all of its stocks of arms and armour. Once again, despite their nervousness at the Roman proposal, the Carthaginians submitted. They are said to have delivered 200,000 panoplies of armour, 2,000 torsion engines, and huge numbers of javelins, arrows and catapult ammunition. As usual the reliability of these numbers is questionable and it is obvious that Roman sources would be inclined to exaggerate the military preparedness of the city they were about to destroy, but it is clear that very large stocks of weaponry were surrendered to the Roman representatives.
Comitia,
probably older and a better orator, spoke in answer to their appeal, demanding that the city hand over all of its stocks of arms and armour. Once again, despite their nervousness at the Roman proposal, the Carthaginians submitted. They are said to have delivered 200,000 panoplies of armour, 2,000 torsion engines, and huge numbers of javelins, arrows and catapult ammunition. As usual the reliability of these numbers is questionable and it is obvious that Roman sources would be inclined to exaggerate the military preparedness of the city they were about to destroy, but it is clear that very large stocks of weaponry were surrendered to the Roman representatives.
The arrival in the Roman camp of the convoy containing this equipment was the preliminary to another, even harsher command. Censorinus informed the ambassadors that the Carthaginians must abandon their city, the entire population moving to a new settlement which they could place anywhere they chose, providing that it was at least 10 miles from the sea. Carthage itself would then be razed to the ground, although the shrines and cemeteries associated with it would not be touched and the
Carthaginians would be allowed to visit them in future. It was an appalling blow, for the city was the physical, spiritual and emotional centre of the State. Severing the link of any new community with the sea, which had for so long been the source of Punic wealth, made it doubly so. Censorinus is supposed to have employed Platonic arguments to support the view that the sea had an unhealthy influence of the political and social life of a city. At the end of this, the ambassadors were roughly ejected by the consuls' lictors, but promised to present these terms to their own government. They even suggested that the Roman fleet demonstrate in the bay outside the city to remind the citizens of the alternative to acceptance of the Roman demands.
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Rumours had spread rapidly in Carthage and a nervous crowd surrounded the ambassadors when they entered the city and waited outside as they reported to the Council of 104. The Roman demand was immediately rejected. Men who had argued for the conciliation of Rome were lynched, as were any Italian traders unfortunate enough to be in the city. The 104 voted for war with Rome and began preparations to find the means with which to fight. Slaves were freed and conscripted into the army, whilst Has-drubal was pardoned and messages sent pleading with him to aid his ungrateful fellow citizens. Another Hasdrubal, son of one of Masinissa's daughters, indicating again the close links between Carthaginian and Numidian nobility, was given command inside Carthage itself. For once, the whole Punic citizen body threw itself wholeheartedly into the war effort. Weapons were hastily produced, women sacrificing their long hair to twine into the ropes needed for torsion catapults.
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The Third Punic War had begun. In many ways the Romans were surprised that the Carthaginians finally decided to fight, after meekly submitting to each outrageous demand made of them. The Romans' behaviour had been cynical in the extreme, concealing their intention to destroy the city until after they had extracted as many concessions as possible. Carthage now appeared to be at their mercy, unprepared and unarmed. Yet the war was to last until 146 and prove far harder than the consuls expected.
CHAPTER 15
The Third Punic War
C
ARTHAGE WAS A LARGE
and well-fortified city, surrounded by over 20 miles of circuit walls. Difficult to approach and with its own harbours, the city was very hard to surround and blockade. An especially strong triple line of defence, based principally on a wall 30 feet
(c. 9
m) wide and
c.
50-66 feet (15-20 m) high, but fronted by a 60 feet (20 m) wide ditch and a timber palisade, ran across the 2-3 mile wide isthmus approaching the city from the landward side. This was constructed as a casemate wall with two storeys of rooms containing on the ground floor accommodation for 300 elephants and above stabling for 4,000 horses and barracks for 20,000 foot and 4,000 cavalry. In 149 the defenders lacked the animals and a well-organized army, but numerous volunteers from the population ensured that the defences were adequately manned.
The Romans had assembled a large expeditionary force to attack this formidable position. Appian claims that there were 80,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry supported by fifty quinqueremes and 100 lighter galleys. If these figures are correct, then this was the largest Roman army to take the field since Cannae, but most scholars have assumed that Appian was exaggerating, or perhaps counting servants and camp followers as well as soldiers. A common suggestion is that there were in fact four legions, so that the army may have mustered between 40,000 and 50,000 men including allies. This would still make it a significantly larger force than even the highest estimates for Africanus' army in 204. In marked contrast to the reluctance of citizens to serve in Spain in 151, there had been a burst of enthusiasm for this war, with no shortage of recruits and many volunteers coming forward to swell the ranks of the legions. The prospect of a swift, relatively easy campaign and plentiful booty doubtiess encouraged many men to come forward, but there was probably also a far greater romantic appeal to fighting Rome's greatest adversary than risking life and limb fighting against some uncouthly named Celtiberian tribe. The army in 149 was large, enthusiastic and confident, but it was not well-trained. Scipio had spent over a year in Sicily preparing his forces for the forthcoming campaign, even though most of his troops were old soldiers with many years' experience. The consuls in 149 spent only a few months in creating from scratch an army whose officers and men were on average far less experienced. It was typical of the poor preparation of Roman campaigns in this period. As the army waited at Utica for the fighting to begin it began to run short of supplies, for the consuls had expected to obtain most of their requirements locally, but found their foraging restricted by the presence of Hasdrubal's 30,000 strong army. Unlike Scipio, they do not appear to have stockpiled large reserves of grain in Sicily and arranged a system of convoys to convey this to Africa. The legions which pitched their camp on the same site as
C
astra Cornelia
in 149 made a poor comparison with its first occupants.
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C
astra Cornelia
in 149 made a poor comparison with its first occupants.
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The consuls moved quickly on Carthage as soon as it was clear that the Roman ultimatum had been rejected. Even at this late stage, they seem to have expected the city to capitulate and that little more than a display of strength was needed. Manilius led the army against the wall protecting the isthmus. Censorinus brought the fleet to attack a weaker stretch of wall near a narrow spit of land edging the Lake of Tunis to the south of the city. Some men landed and set ladders by hand against the wall, whilst other ladders were mounted directly on the prows of the Roman warships. Both attacks were greeted by a hail of missiles from the defenders. Surprised by this stiff resistance, the assaulting parties gave way. A second attempt was equally unsuccessful and as the confidence of the defenders grew, the Romans constructed camps outside the walls. Hasdrubal brought his army to the other side of the lake and harassed the Roman lines. A party sent by Censorinus to gather wood was ambushed by Himilco Phameas and some Punic cavalry: 500 men were killed. A third attempt to assault the city from both sides also failed. Manilius had managed to cross the outer ditch and breach the stockade, but failed to make any impression on the main wall across the isthmus.
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Since the attempts at escalade had achieved no success, Censorinus constructed two battering rams, filling in a portion of the lake to create a broad and solid enough road to bring these up to the wall. Each was supposedly crewed by 6,000 men, probably both to move them and to swing the rams. One crew was provided by legionaries commanded by tribunes and the other by sailors under their own officers, and rivalry between the two services spurred on both parties to be first to create a breach.
Two breaches were made, but the Carthaginians managed to drive the Romans back late in the day and did their best to repair the damage during the night. Under cover of darkness, a raiding party went out and managed to set fire to both of the Roman engines. Although they were not destroyed the damage was sufficient to make both rams inoperable. Daylight revealed that in spite of their best efforts, the defenders had failed to fill the gaps in their wall and at least one of the breaches was still practical. Aware of the danger, Carthaginian soldiers had formed up behind the gap in the wall, whilst a crowd armed only with missiles thronged the roofs of the nearby houses. The Romans rapidly formed an assault party and launched a furious attack through the breach. The onslaught was badly organized and after initial success bogged down. One of the military tribunes, the same Scipio Aemilianus who had served with Lucullus and begged elephants from Masinissa, had kept his men under tight control. Instead of following the main body into the city, he had stationed them to defend the wall around the breach. When Carthaginian pressure grew too much and the assaulting parties were chased back out of the city, Scipio's men prevented them from being cut off and covered their retreat.
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Scipio was the only senior officer to win distinction in the early phases of the Third Punic War. The youngest of four sons of Aemilius Paullus, he had first seen service as a teenager at Pydna. Missing at the end of the battle, he was just about to be added to the list of casualties when he returned with a few friends, all of them heavily bloodstained from an enthusiastic pursuit of the enemy. Whilst the older brothers remained to continue the family name, the two younger boys were adopted into famous families who lacked a male heir. The third brother became Quintus Fabius Maximus Aemilianus, whilst the youngest was adopted by Publius Scipio the son of Africanus, whose ill-health had denied him a significant political career. Both of the elder brothers died before their father. The Roman aristocracy took adoption very seriously and men like Scipio Aemilianus were considered to combine the reputation of both families and were expected to live up to the standards of behaviour of both real and adopted parents. In 151 Scipio had helped to encourage volunteering for the Celtiberian war by coming forward as a military tribune. In Spain he won renown by killing an enemy champion in single combat, a deed reminiscent of the young Marcellus in the First Punic War. It was perhaps his service in Spain which taught Scipio the importance of maintaining a reserve and cautious pursuit, for the tribes of the Peninsula were quick to punish careless attackers. It was a lesson which few of the other Roman officers seem to have learned.
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Censorinus' camp by the lakeside was placed in an unhealthy spot. By late July disease started to spread in the camp, forcing the consul to withdraw to a position near the sea. Whenever the wind was right, the defenders sent fireships down towards the Roman fleet, causing serious losses. They also prepared a sally against Manilius' camp on the isthmus, some men being detailed to carry fascines and beams to fill or bridge the ditch surrounding it. Delivered at night, the sudden attack caused panic amongst the surprised Romans. Once again Scipio Aemilianus restored the situation, leading a body of horse out of the rear gate of the camp and bringing them round to attack the Carthaginians in the flank, driving them back in confusion. The consul subsequently strengthened the defences of his camp to prevent a repeat of this near disaster. Another fort was built near the shore to cover the landing of Roman supply ships.
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The Romans had failed to make any impression on the city's defences. With winter approaching and his colleague returned to Rome to hold the next year's elections, Manilius drew off a column of 10,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry and led them in an expedition to ravage the rural areas loyal to Carthage. In part this was another means of putting the enemy under pressure, but the main purpose was to gather food for men and horses and wood for cooking and building, laying in supplies for the winter which would now be spent in the siege lines around Carthage. Once again the Romans displayed their inexperience as the tribunes leading foraging parties carelessly allowed their men to disperse. Himilco Phameas, probably leading some of the Numidian and Moorish cavalry who had deserted from Masinissa in 150, ambushed and raided the Roman foragers, inflicting heavy losses. Scipio Aemilianus avoided such attacks by ensuring that his troops did not disperse too widely and that there were always groups of horse and foot kept formed and ready to cover the unarmed parties of foragers. Malicious rumours circulated in the Roman camp, claiming that Himilco was deliberately avoiding Scipio because of a bond of hospitality between one of his ancestors and Africanus. This may well suggest that Phameas was of mixed Punic and Numidian or Libyan blood. When Manil-ius brought his column back to the main camp, the Numidians mounted another night-time raid from within the city. This time the target was the smaller fort guarding the landing site for the transport ships. On this occasion Scipio led out the ten
turmae,
about 300 men and perhaps the cavalry element of his own legion, but this time did not directly attack the sallying force. Instead the Roman horsemen carried lighted torches and moved and manoeuvred near the Carthaginians, trying to create the impression of far larger forces massing to attack. The ploy worked and the nervous raiders withdrew.
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turmae,
about 300 men and perhaps the cavalry element of his own legion, but this time did not directly attack the sallying force. Instead the Roman horsemen carried lighted torches and moved and manoeuvred near the Carthaginians, trying to create the impression of far larger forces massing to attack. The ploy worked and the nervous raiders withdrew.
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