The Fall of Carthage (49 page)
Getting into a city did not ensure its fall. It took time for the attackers to get many men into the city through narrow entrances or still using assault ladders and there was always a danger that the defenders would rally and, using their better knowledge of the city's layout, counter-attack and drive them out. As more and more troops entered the city, Scipio kept 1,000 men tightly in hand and led them to secure the citadel, where Mago surrendered after a brief resistance. The remainder were let loose into the streets with orders to kill anyone they met. Polybius tells us that he had witnessed the aftermath of the Roman sack of a city - probably when he accompanied Scipio Aemilianus on campaign in Africa or Spain - and had seen the dismembered bodies of men and even animals lying in the streets. There is some later archaeological evidence to support this picture of widespread atrocities. He believed that the practice was intended to inspire terror, both to overawe the population and prevent further resistance, but also to deter other cities from opposing a Roman army. The Roman sack of a city was brutal even by ancient standards, which assumed general massacre of men and rape of women. However, it is important to remember that the Roman soldiers who behaved with such brutality had undergone two major assaults against the city, during which they had suffered grievous casualties whilst making no headway or being able to injure the enemy. The skeletal evidence from towns sacked by the Romans suggests more wild frenzy than calm murder. In addition, the citizens of New Carthage were not peaceful neutrals, but active participants in the defence. This does not condone the Romans' behaviour, but it in part explains it.
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It may well be that Polybius exaggerates the tight control Scipio exercised over his men, who did not begin to plunder until a given signal, but the Republican army had a tightly controlled system for the central distribution of booty. The system may have had its roots in the old predatory warfare of archaic Italy, but had been reinforced as the army grew more organized and required men to remain to guard the camp or stay under arms when others were free to plunder. All legionaries were more likely to perform their duties if they knew that they would receive a fair share of the profits of victory. The collection of plunder into a central spot and its careful distribution under the supervision of the tribunes emphasized the communal spirit of the Roman army as representative of the entire State under arms. This distribution was carried out the day after the capture of the city. Later Scipio also took care to reward those who had distinguished themselves. The
corona civica,
the crown given to the first man over the wall and the additional prizes Scipio had promised for this deed were fiercely contested by a centurion of the Fourth Legion, Quiritus Trebellius, and a marine, Sextus Digitius, who had presumably attacked under Laelius from the seaward side of the city. After a detailed investigation and fierce rivalry between soldiers and sailors, Scipio gave the crown to both.
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corona civica,
the crown given to the first man over the wall and the additional prizes Scipio had promised for this deed were fiercely contested by a centurion of the Fourth Legion, Quiritus Trebellius, and a marine, Sextus Digitius, who had presumably attacked under Laelius from the seaward side of the city. After a detailed investigation and fierce rivalry between soldiers and sailors, Scipio gave the crown to both.
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There has been much debate over the precise nature of the information Scipio had about the level of the lagoon, whether the drop was caused by tide or wind, and whether it was a daily or occasional phenomenon. It is unlikely that these issues will ever fully be resolved. The Roman commander had used the knowledge that the lagoon was fordable with great care. Had the party attacking from this direction found the wall held in any strength at all, it is unlikely that they would have been able to force an entry by escalade. The initial Roman attack concentrated on the southern and eastern approaches, focusing enemy attention on these areas. The renewal of this assault with increased force confirmed Mago's belief that these were the sole points in danger and drew in his reserves. Scipio was willing to accept the high casualties inevitable in these direct frontal assaults to draw the enemy's attention away from the wall running along the side of the lagoon. Had Mago possessed a larger garrison this plan would have had far less chance of success, but Scipio had fairly accurate knowledge of the enemy forces and was willing to gamble on stretching the garrison so thinly that his unexpected attack had a good chance of succeeding.
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New Carthage contained considerable stores of material and war engines, as well as housing a rich Punic treasury, carefully catalogued by the quaestor Flaminius, son of the consul killed at Trasimene. Prisoners included Mago and several distinguished Carthaginians. Of the 10,000 men captured, the citizens were released, the non-citizen artisans of the type found in many mercantile cities were made public slaves but promised release at the end of the war, and from the remainder, who were mostly slaves, suitable men were selected to serve as rowers in the Roman fleet. Perhaps the most important prize was the more than 300 hostages taken from the noble families of the Spanish tribes to ensure their good behaviour. Scipio treated the hostages with great courtesy, rewarding them and sending them back to their families as a way of opening negotiations with the tribes. Several stories grew up concerning Scipio's chivalrous treatment of the noble women numbered amongst the hostages, similar in many respects to Alexander's treatment of captive women from the Persian royal family. Many, including the sister-in-law of the prominent chief Indibilis of the Ilergetes, were taken under his personal protection. When the soldiers brought an especially beautiful young woman to offer to their commander, Scipio thanked them, but took care to hand the girl back to her father. In
Livy's version the girl was betrothed to a young nobleman and Scipio is supposed to have reassured the man that the girl's honour was intact. This is typical of the romantic embellishments which grew up around the charismatic figure of Africanus. The good treatment given to the hostages served a practical purpose, furthering the Roman cause with the tribes, but that does not mean that we need believe that Scipio was acting against his true nature.
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The Battle of Baecula, 208
BC
BC
Soon after the fall of the city Laelius sailed in a quinquereme to carry the news to Rome, Scipio anticipating that this great success should coax more support from the Senate. He remained at New Carthage for some time, subjecting his army to a rigorous training programme, before retiring to winter at Tarraco. The situation in Spain was beginning to change. The loss of New Carthage was a major blow to Carthaginian prestige as well as depriving them of resources and a vital base. Since the Punic victories in 211 their treatment of the Spanish tribes had become harsher, since there was less need to keep them content and prevent defections to Rome. Many leaders responded to the Roman diplomacy, including Indibilis of the Ilergetes who had remained staunchly loyal to the Carthaginians up until this point, in spite of his capture in 218. Scipio seems to have planned to confront one of the main Punic armies in the next campaigning season, drawing men off from the fleet to bolster the strength of his field army. Carthaginian objectives are harder to reconstruct. Hasdrubal Barca was clearly already planning the expedition to Italy which he would in fact lead later in the year. He resolved to seek a decisive encounter with Scipio, although it is hard to credit Polybius' statement that he only definitely planned to move on Italy if he lost the battle.
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When Scipio led his army out of Tarraco in the spring of 208 he found Hasdrubal near Baecula, almost certainly the modern town of Bailen, in an area famous for its silver mines. It was in the same rugged country that Napoleon's army suffered one of its first serious defeats when General Dupont was forced to surrender to a Spanish army in 1808. As soon as he received reports of the Romans' approach, Hasdrubal camped on high ground, his rear protected by a river, and his flanks by rocky hillocks. In front, at the top of the slope, he positioned a strong guard of formed troops to protect the camp. In was a very strong position, one which no general would relish attacking, which makes it a strange choice if Hasdrubal actually wanted to fight a battle. Perhaps he was hoping to keep the Romans occupied until Mago or Hasdrubal Gisgo could arrive to overwhelm them with numbers, or possibly that the fear of this would make the Romans fight in such unfavourable circumstances. For two days Scipio observed the enemy from the valley below, before deciding that he must attack in case the other Punic commanders were approaching.
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Scipio sent some
velites
supported by formed infantry in battle order straight up the slope to engage the Punic covering force. Attacking with great enthusiasm, the Romans slowly drove the enemy back. Livy even claims that the army's slaves, the
calones,
joined in the advance, picking up stones from the ground and lobbing them at the enemy. As they approached the more level summit, the willingness of the
velites
and the formed maniples to close to hand-to-hand combat proved too much for the Punic light troops, persuading Hasdrubal to order out the remainder of his army and begin forming them in a line near the top of the ridge. Scipio had already divided the remainder of his army into two halves, leading one himself and putting Laelius in charge of the other. It was now that the months of training began to prove their value as the two Roman columns marched to outflank the enemy. Scipio led his section of the army to the left, climbing the high ground and reaching the summit where they deployed into a fighting line threatening the enemy flank. Laelius troops performed the same manoeuvre on the right. The Romans had gained the high ground before Hasdrubal had fully formed his army up and there was no time to alter his orders and place some of the troops to face either flank. As the Romans attacked, the Punic army rapidly gave way, Hasdrubal ordering the unengaged troops to withdraw.
velites
supported by formed infantry in battle order straight up the slope to engage the Punic covering force. Attacking with great enthusiasm, the Romans slowly drove the enemy back. Livy even claims that the army's slaves, the
calones,
joined in the advance, picking up stones from the ground and lobbing them at the enemy. As they approached the more level summit, the willingness of the
velites
and the formed maniples to close to hand-to-hand combat proved too much for the Punic light troops, persuading Hasdrubal to order out the remainder of his army and begin forming them in a line near the top of the ridge. Scipio had already divided the remainder of his army into two halves, leading one himself and putting Laelius in charge of the other. It was now that the months of training began to prove their value as the two Roman columns marched to outflank the enemy. Scipio led his section of the army to the left, climbing the high ground and reaching the summit where they deployed into a fighting line threatening the enemy flank. Laelius troops performed the same manoeuvre on the right. The Romans had gained the high ground before Hasdrubal had fully formed his army up and there was no time to alter his orders and place some of the troops to face either flank. As the Romans attacked, the Punic army rapidly gave way, Hasdrubal ordering the unengaged troops to withdraw.
Livy claims that 8,000 Carthaginians fell in the pursuit, although Polybius gives figures of 10,000 foot and 2,000 horse for the prisoners. Both he and Polybius state that Hasdrubal began to withdraw very early in, or even before, the fighting, sending away his slow-moving elephants and his treasury. Rallying as many fugitives as possible, he then led them north towards the valley of the Tagus and began his long march to Italy. His actions must raise the question of whether or not he had really wished to fight in the first place. Even if he had, the reverse at Baecula does not seem to have been a serious enough defeat to upset his plans, unlike Ibera in 215. Scipio did not attempt to block Hasdrubal's escape and it seems unlikely that his small army could have done this. Even after Hasdrubal had left the Peninsula Scipio was still outnumbered by the Punic forces there. The victory at Baecula certainly encouraged more Spanish leaders to join the Romans, some of them saluting Scipio as king, a title so alien to the Roman system that he was at pains to stop its use.
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It may be that the scale of Scipio's success at Baecula has been exaggerated by sources favourable to his family. Even so, the battle demonstrated once more his boldness and imaginative tactics. The manipulation to his advantage of the formal manoeuvring before a battle and the ability to wrong-foot the enemy commander were to be a feature of several of his later battles. This was made possible by the tactical flexibility of the legions under his command, the product of long and careful training.
The Battle of Ilipa, 206
BC
BC
After two aggressive campaigns, Scipio appears to have been far less active in 207. A Roman column seems to have had a success when it surprised Hanno, the Punic officer sent to replace Hasdrubal Barca, whilst he was recruiting soldiers amongst the Celtiberians. The Carthaginians were still as concerned with maintaining their control over the Spanish tribes as they were with defeating the Romans. When Hasdrubal Gisgo made a demonstration of force in Baetica, in the far south of Spain around Gades, Scipio concentrated his forces and advanced towards him. Hasdrubal dispersed his men to garrison the region's cities and refused to be drawn into a pitched battle. As in the earlier campaigns when Scipio had lunged deep into Punic-held territory, he could not afford to stay there for any length of time, as supply would become a problem and the enemy's numbers would steadily increase and eventually overwhelm him. He sent his brother Lucius, serving as his
legatus,
to capture the city of Orongis to ensure that the Romans achieved a token victory, before they withdrew north and returned to winter quarters in and around Tarraco.
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legatus,
to capture the city of Orongis to ensure that the Romans achieved a token victory, before they withdrew north and returned to winter quarters in and around Tarraco.
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The next year the Carthaginians decided on a major effort and massed a large army with which to overwhelm the bold young Roman commander. Polybius tells us that Hasdrubal Gisgo led out 70,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry, supported by thirty-two elephants, although Livy says that there were only 50,000 foot and 4,500 horse. He camped near a town called Ilipa, placing his camp on readily defensible high ground with an open plain in front of it. This was probably in the region of modern Seville, near Alcala del Rio. It was a clear message to the Romans that this time Hasdrubal was ready and willing to fight. When Scipio had called in the various detachments of his army, they mustered around 45,000 foot and 3,000 horse. Only just over half of these were Romans or Italians, the two legions and two
alae
composing the standard consular-sized army which he seems to have had since 210. The remainder were allied troops, many recentiy raised from Rome's new allies amongst the Spanish tribes, similar to the warriors whose desertion had precipitated the disaster suffered by his father and uncle. Even with these additional men, Scipio had at best rough parity with the enemy and may even have been significantly outnumbered. Nevertheless, eager to fight the decisive action which had eluded him the year before, he advanced to confront Hasdrubal.
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alae
composing the standard consular-sized army which he seems to have had since 210. The remainder were allied troops, many recentiy raised from Rome's new allies amongst the Spanish tribes, similar to the warriors whose desertion had precipitated the disaster suffered by his father and uncle. Even with these additional men, Scipio had at best rough parity with the enemy and may even have been significantly outnumbered. Nevertheless, eager to fight the decisive action which had eluded him the year before, he advanced to confront Hasdrubal.
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