The Battle of Britain (21 page)

Kenley was hit by a low-level raid of nine Dorniers, followed immediately by a bombing attack from 12,000 feet (3,660m). The high attack was intercepted, and some bombers were brought down. However, the low attackers, who flew just above the tree-tops, reached their target without loss and proceeded to carry out some extremely effective low bombing and strafing, during which a Dornier was brought down by the ground defenders. In all about one hundred bombs were dropped on this sector station, which cratered the runways and destroyed hangars, workshops and sick quarters, badly damaged many other buildings, wrecked several fighters, lorries, refuellers and transports, and killed some personnel.

Between August 13 and 18 some 34 airfields and five radar stations were attacked and some, such as Manston and Hawkinge, were bombed several times. Raids on the forward airfields were often made by Stukas, which approached at their usual height, flew once round the circuit for a quick survey, peeled-off, and made steep attacks from the sun. Dorniers, and Junkers 88s, escorted by fighters, penetrated farther inland and released their bombs from medium altitudes.

In mid-August, owing to their heavy losses, the Stukas were temporarily withdrawn from the Battle. Concentrating against the twin-engined bomber raids, which usually came in between 11,000 and 18,000 feet (3,350-5,490m) according to cloud cover, RAF fighters exploited the gap of a few thousand feet between the bombers and their escorting Messerschmitts, and sometimes trounced the bombers before the higher 109s could interfere.

RAF fighter tactics were slowly improving and 54 Squadron were flying in a wider formation – still a vic of three but no longer wing-tip to wing-tip with about fifty yards (45m) between fighters; and the admirable ‘Sailor' Malan, our greatest Battle of Britain pilot, was beginning to lead 74 Squadron in a more flexible line-astern formation.

As Fighter Command's tactics gradually improved, enemy bomber casualties increased, and the bomber crews were highly critical of their Fighter Arm because they wanted their escorting fighters to fly close to the bombers where they could be seen. The Kommodoren of course, were totally opposed to such suicidal tactics, and the dispute once again came to Goering's notice. He called Kesselring of Luftflotte 2 and Sperrle of Luftflotte 3 to Karinhall; thus on August 20 the Reichsmarschall issued more instructions about the conduct of the air battle.

A bomber wing had always to be supported by three fighter wings, he instructed, one of which would fly ahead and clear the target area, while the second and third carried out the duties of close escort and high escort respectively. But only part of the Fighter Arm was to be employed as escort to the bombers: the remainder were to fly free-lance operations so that they would engage British fighters on favourable terms and indirectly protect the bombers.

Whenever possible fighters were to attack RAF aircraft on the ground, and these low-level attacks were to be protected by other fighter formations. Attacks by single aircraft using cloud cover were to be flown only by highly trained volunteers. Fighter pilots were to pay less attention to the shooting down of balloons. New pilots, led by veterans, were to gain experience over the Channel before flying over England.

Luftwaffe stocks of twin-engined fighters were low, and they were only to be used when the range of single-engined fighters was inadequate or to cover 109s during their withdrawal. There must never be more than one officer in any crew.

No radar site, the Reichsmarshall instructed, had yet been put out of action, and the attacks were to cease.

Because of their limited range the 109s sometimes had to leave the bombers escorted only by the vulnerable 110s until the ‘beehive' was met over the Channel by the reception escorts. Thus more bombers fell to the guns of RAF fighters, and their crews were far from happy: they foresaw heavier losses as the air battles moved farther inland, and their fears were justifted when, on August 26, 19 bombers failed to return
from raids against Folkestone, the sector stations at Hornchurch, Debden, and North Weald and, once more, Portsmouth town and dockyard. Further, many bombers returning to France were well shot-up and several contained badly injured crews. Thus the recent ugly dispute about escort tactics again flared up, the bomber commanders alleging that the fighter pilots were failing in their clear and first duty to protect the bombers.

Goering supported the bomber commanders and ruled that in future the bombers would have close, high, and top fighter escorts – three fighters for every bomber – and the fighter escorts were ordered to fly closer to the bombers. This increased the gulf between Goering and his Kommodoren who firmly believed in Manfred von Richthofen's doctrine . . . ‘The fighter pilots have to be able to rove in the area allotted to them in any way they like!' The Kommodoren wanted freedom of action for their fighters – just as we had in the great daylight battles over Germany, later in the war. For the fighter must not wait until it is attacked – it must be used offensively where it can seek and destroy its opponents.

During the following days the bombers hammered at RAF sector airfields (Biggin, Hornchurch, Kenley, Northolt, North Weald and Tangmere) with their vital operations rooms and communications, and the Luftwaffe's strong fighter formations made life much more difficult for RAF fighters.

Park's squadrons usually fought singly because he did not have time to form his squadrons into wings. However, the genial Leigh-Mallory, with bases in Cambridgeshire, did have the time, and well-supported Douglas Bader's strong views about meeting strength with strength. And so it was that Douglas, aching to get at the ‘Krauts' (his words), often headed south from Duxford leading three, four and sometimes five fighter squadrons and inflicted much damage on the bombers.

This bombing of RAF sector airfields was the most critical phase of the Battle. Between August 24 and September 7 there were 33 major bombing attacks, and 23 were concentrated against the RAF's vital nerve centres – the fighter airfields and sector stations of 11 Group whose job was to defend London and the south-east. By September 5 Park was reporting to Dowding that the damage by bombing was having a serious effect on the fighting efficiency of his group.

Thanks to their large fighter escorts the enemy bombers were getting through to RAF airfields and their casualties were reduced. During a four
day period of fighting the RAF shot down 106 enemy aeroplanes, including a small proportion of bombers, and lost 101 fighter pilots.

During the first three days of September the bombing attacks, with packs of escorting fighters, continued and 90 enemy aeroplanes were shot down with the loss of 85 pilots. The total wastage in RAF fighter pilots was about 120 pilots each week. The RAF's operational training units produced 65 inexperienced pilots each week and it was quite apparent to Dowding and Park that they were fighting a battle of diminishing returns. They realised that if the Luftwaffe kept up the pressure the control and reporting system would gradually disintegrate, and it would be only a question of time before the Germans dominated the air over southern England.

Fortunately at this time the conduct of the Battle changed. On the night of August 24/25 the first bombs fell on central London. Winston Churchill ordered a retaliation raid against Berlin, and during the next week there were four more. Hitler demanded immediate reprisals and shouted in an hysterical broadcast: ‘If they attack our cities, we will rub out their cities from the map. The hour will come when one of us two will break, and it will not be Nazi Germany.'

Goering eagerly responded and, late in the afternoon of Saturday September 7, sent over 372 bombers and 642 fighters to make two concentrated attacks against London in rapid succession. Dowding, however, anticipating daylight attacks against the capital, made more use of the big wings from 10 and 12 Groups, and Park instructed that whenever time permitted his squadrons were to be used in pairs.

The attacks on London and its suburbs continued with little respite from September 7 until October 5. It was the crux of the Battle and its turning point, for it gave Park the opportunity to repair his battered airfields and restore his communications.

On Sunday September 15, Goering provided the strongest escort so far, five fighters for every bomber, to try and saturate Britain's defences. These big enemy formations took a long time to assemble; the RAF's radars gave ample warning, and Park had the precious time to form his squadrons into wings and to ask for reinforcements from the flanking groups.

The defensive arrangements, so carefully tended throughout the long weeks of fighting by Keith Park, worked so well that the Biggin Hill Wing fought escorting 109s south of Canterbury, the Kenley Wing made a
head-on attack near Maidstone, and two squadrons were in action over Gravesend. Nevertheless, the three German formations forged on and were met, over south London, by the North Weald Wing, who sorted out the bombers with surprisingly little interference from enemy fighters.

The Duxford Wing, big even by Teutonic standards, were next in action, but Bader had to delay his attack until some friendly fighters had cleared away; then, as carefully rehearsed, the three Hurricane squadrons went for the bombers while the two Spitfire squadrons held off the 109s.

Some bombs were dropped, but they did only little damage to property, an electricity station, and a bridge or two: an unexploded bomb lodged near Buckingham Palace. Thirty Germans were brought down at a cost of seven RAF pilots. The arithmetic was improving.

After a two-hour break, which gave the defending squadrons ample time to rearm and refuel, the Luftwaffe put in its second big attack, again consisting of three heavily escorted bomber formations which crossed the coast on a 20-mile (32km) front between Dover and Dungeness, within five minutes of each other. This time the radar warning was shorter, but nine wings and several independent squadrons came into action over south London, where there was some stiff fighting.

Once again, the defenders had the best of the exchange. There were fewer 109s than usual and these seemed less aggressive, so that some of the bombers were very roughly handled. Two formations were broken up near London – one retiring after a head-on attack by a lone Hurricane – and bombs were scattered over a wide area.

The Germans were harried by more Spitfires and Hurricanes as they withdrew. During this action RAF pilots claimed to have destroyed 59 bombers and 21 fighters at a cost of 11.

The fighting over London was at its height when about 20 Heinkels bombed Portland harbour. Only one squadron succeeded in intercepting, and that after the bombing. The final daylight operation was an attempt by 20 bombers to hit the Supermarine Works near Southampton, but the anti-aircraft gunners put up a heavy barrage and the factory was not damaged. At dark the bombers returned to London and continued their work throughout the night.

During this furious fighting the Luftwaffe lost 56 aeroplanes against 26 RAF pilots. More bombers struggled back to France, on one engine, badly shot-up, and with many crew members dead or injured. At the debriefings the bomber captains complained bitterly of incessant Hurricane
and Spitfire attacks from squadrons that had long ceased to exist – if they could believe their own Intelligence and the Berlin radio.

The fighting on this day, September 15, clinched the victory, for two days later, on Hitler's instructions, the German invasion fleet left the Channel ports for safer places, and Operation Sealion was called off, never to be repeated.

However, the offensive continued and again the bomber commanders complained bitterly about their fighter escorts, which because of the relatively slow speed of the bombers at 21,000 feet (6,400m), had to weave continuously to maintain the required close escort. This weaving sometimes took the fighters away from the bombers and once more Goering intervened with the absurd order that both Bf 109s and Bf 110s could not leave the bombers until they were attacked by RAF fighters!

As September drew to its close, there was another change of German tactics involving smaller bomber forces of about 30 Ju 88s escorted by between 200 and 300 fighters; but from the beginning of October enemy bombers operated only at night and the Blitz, in all its fury, was upon Britain. These raids, flown at great heights and taking every advantage of cloud cover, set Dowding new problems about high altitude interception, but they achieved little else, and Fighter Command continued along the path of recovery which had begun on September 7.

During his long tenure as Commander-in-Chief in the pre-war years, Dowding had recognised that radar would give him the ability to defend his island home and pressed hard to get the system completed before the inevitable war against Germany.

‘Stuffy' Dowding's pilots knew that behind that bleak and melancholy countenance was a man utterly devoted to his Command and his country. Few men in British history have shouldered such a burden of responsibility and he must be included in the great commanders of all time. His character and impeccable integrity flowed down the RAF's simple chain of command, through the groups to fighting men in the squadrons, and to all those airmen and airwomen who laboured on the ground to service the fighters, and who manned the essential control and radar system. Dowding's great qualities of leadership produced that priceless pearl, high morale, the most important single factor in the Battle of Britain.

Goering, unlike Dowding, had not done his homework. His Messerschmitt 109s should have had long-range tanks and he failed to realise the importance of radar. He cannot be blamed for Hitler's order to attack
London, but he did not conduct himself well with his harsh words and his ever changing orders which baffled and dismayed his fighting airmen.

Goering had been a drug addict and his integrity was, therefore, suspect. He was, according to ‘Dolfo' Galland, and ‘Macky', Steinhoff, something of a bully and when some of his more intrepid fighter leaders complained about his foolish tactical instructions he displayed the gangster-like methods which he and his evil cronies had used on their way to the top and threatened to have them shot – a habit not conducive to developing high morale. Indeed, the morale of the German Fighter Arm deteriorated as the Battle progressed.