The Battle of Britain (36 page)

Meanwhile the German Navy and Army had been arguing acrimoniously about Operation Sealion. Hitler had decreed that ‘The landing operation must be a surprise crossing on a broad front from Ramsgate to a point west of the Isle of Wight.'

In what manner he supposed that a surprise could be sprung on the British is obscure. The few hours of darkness on a summer night would not have been enough to conceal the approach of a fleet of over 2,000 tugs towing barges at a speed of some four knots. Nor would the other vessels have gone undetected. The shortest crossing would have taken perhaps five hours, the longer ones up to three times as much. Add to that the propensity for soldiers to succumb to seasickness, amply demonstrated during many landings later in the war; a quarter of those who got ashore would not have been fit for combat.

Plans, he demanded, must be complete by the end of August and the invasion carried out by September 15. The Army had compromised by making such a
massive reduction in the estimated size of the necessary force that the grasp of reality displayed by its Generals must have caused the Admirals and Air Generals some dismay. But in an autocracy, where seasoned professionals had to bend to the whims of an unqualified dictator or lose their livelihoods at the least and their lives at the worst, these shifts of attitude were an obligation. The Army had reduced its requirement to 13 Divisions; but insisted on a broad front of 200 miles (320km) from Ramsgate to Weymouth. The Navy would not agree to more than a 50-mile (80km) front, from Dover to Eastbourne. The Army wished to land 90,000 men and 650 tanks on the first day. The Navy agreed but said that carrying the remaining 170,000 men and 34,000 vehicles would take two or three days. The Army demanded swifter transportation. The Navy claimed that assembling 155 ships, 470 tugs, 1,700 barges and 1,000 motorboats must delay the invasion until some time between September 19 and October 15. The autumn weather made this unacceptable to the Army and the Luftwaffe. The wrangling dragged on ...

Thursday, August 1:
Channel and Dover Straits overcast, improving later, low cloud over east coast, fair generally.

Day:
Two bombers off east coast intercepted. Two raids intercepted off Sussex coast; Norwich bombed, goods yard hit.

Night:
Minelaying north-east Scotland and Thames. Bombers over widely separated parts of England, Scotland and south Wales, many of them dropping leaflets headlined ‘The Last Appeal To Reason', a translation of Hitler's speech to the Reichstag on July 19 when he had appealed to Great Britain to sue for peace.

Aircraft losses:
RAF 1, Luftwaffe 5.

Hitler issued Directive No. 17, in which he said: ‘I have decided that war against Great Britain will be pursued and intensified by sea and by air with the object of bringing about the country's final defeat.

1. The Luftwaffe must deploy its full strength in order to destroy the British air force as soon as possible.

2. When command of the air has been achieved, even on a local or temporary basis, the air attack will be directed against the ports and special attention will be given to food depots, particularly those that serve London.

3. Attacks on shipping, whether naval or merchant, will be accorded a priority second only to the efforts directed against the destruction of the enemy's power in the air.'

The order went on to define how the objective was to be achieved . . .

First the aircraft, then their ground support organisation and fuel supplies would be destroyed. Afterwards the aircraft industry, including the factories producing anti-aircraft weapons would be attacked.

The intensification of the war in the air should begin on August 5, but the Luftwaffe General Staff would determine the exact date nearer the time, and bearing in mind the state of combat preparedness of men and aircraft and the vital long-range weather forecasts.

Friday, August 2:
Cloud and drizzle in Channel, elsewhere fine.

Day:
East coast and Channel convoys attacked.

Night:
Bombers over RAF School of Technical Training, Halton (Buckinghamshire), Catterick (Yorkshire), Farnborough (Hampshire) and Romford (Essex) airfields, and Forth Bridge, in Scotland, Mines laid.

Aircraft losses:
RAF 0, Luftwaffe 3.

Goering issued orders for Adlertag, Eagle Day, the day on which both Luftflotten 2 and 3 would begin the all-out – and, it was intended, final – air assault on Britain. The first objective was to destroy the whole Fighter Command organisation: aircraft in the air and on the ground, airfield buildings and landing areas, and radar stations. This was expected to take three days, so 72 consecutive hours of fine weather were essential. The meteorological experts predicted that these would occur at the beginning of August. But the air fleets needed six days' preparation, so August 10 was the chosen date.

Saturday, August 3:
Dull with bright intervals.

Day:
No ships in the Channel, so no dive bombers to try to lure RAF fighters into battle.

Night:
Raids on Bradford (Yorkshire), Crewe (Cheshire), Liverpool (Lancashire), south Wales, Orkney, Firth of Forth.

Aircraft losses:
RAF 0, Luftwaffe 4.

RAF Fighter Command strength at this point was 708 aircraft serviceable, 1,434 pilots.

Sunday, August 4:
Fair to fine, becoming cloudy. Bright intervals.

Day:
Bristol Channel and south coast reconnoitred.

Night:
No raids.

Aircraft losses:
RAF 0, Luftwaffe 0.

Monday, August 5:
Channel misty, otherwise fine.

Day:
Enemy patrolling Channel in strength to seek shipping.

Night:
Mines laid east coasts England and Scotland.

Aircraft losses:
RAF 1, Luftwaffe 6.

Tuesday, August 6:
Cloudy.

Day:
Reconnaissance over Channel.

Night:
Mines on east and south-east coasts.

Aircraft losses:
RAF 1, Luftwaffe 1.

Wednesday, August 7:
Fair, some thunder and cloud.

Day:
East coast convoy attacked, shipping reconnaissance over Channel.

Night:
Bombers over many areas of England and Scotland.

Aircraft losses:
RAF 0, Luftwaffe 4.

Thursday, August 8:
Clouds over Channel. Generally showery with bright intervals.

Day:
At 0900hrs, Ju 87s and Bf 109s attempted an attack on convoy of 20 ships in Channel met by six Hurricane and Spitfire squadrons. Second raid by 60 Ju 87s at 1245hrs approaching Isle of Wight in battle with 4½ RAF squadrons. At 1700hrs, over 80 Ju 87s and Bf 109s made third attack. Seven RAF squadrons in position to intercept them.

Photographic reconnaissance of southern harbours and airfields.

Night:
Minelaying and small bomber raids.

Aircraft losses:
RAF 19, Luftwaffe 31.

RAF Order of the Day promulgated: ‘The Battle of Britain is about to begin. Members of the Royal Air Force, the fate of generations lies in your hands.'

Goering confirmed August 10 as Adlertag.

Friday, August 9:
Cloudy in Channel, rain between bright intervals.

Day:
East coast convoy attacked, sporadic raids inland, Sunderland shipyard hit.

Night:
Minelaying and attacks on east coast shipping.

Aircraft losses:
RAF 3, Luftwaffe 5.

Saturday, August 10:
Channel cloudy, thunderstorms, windy, bright patches.

Day:
Norwich bombed. Reconnaissance inland and over coastal waters.

Night:
Minelaying.

Aircraft losses:
RAF 0, Luftwaffe 0.

Weather forced postponement of Adlertag by 24 hours.

Sunday, August 11:
Cloudy, but fair morning.

Day:
By 0700hrs, No. 74 Squadron was on patrol, led by Squadron Leader Malan, They met two formations of 15-plus Bf 110s and Bf 109s attacking Dover balloon barrage. A second attack on the same target was a diversion while 150 Ju 88s, He 111s, Bf 110s and Bf 109s raided Portland naval base. Five Hurricane and two Spitfire squadrons scrambled to engage them. Channel and east coast ships bombed.

Night:
Minelaying. Raids on Mersey area. Mines in Bristol Channel.

Aircraft losses:
RAF 27, Luftwaffe 36.

Adlertag was again postponed. Goering announced that 0530hrs on August 13 was Zero Hour for Adlertag. Meteorological forecast favourable.

Monday, August 12:
Fine with patchy mist.

Day:
Raids on radar stations, and Thames Estuary convoys and ships in the Channel. Ventnor radar put out of action but Germans not aware of it. Dunkirk (Kent) radar station damaged. Some damage to Dover aerial towers. Buildings in Rye demolished but technical installations undamaged. Pevensey hit and electricity supply partly affected. Heavy attacks on Manston, Hawkinge and Lympne airfields. Fires in Portsmouth docks and town. Dover and Hastings bombed.

Night:
Minelaying, and indiscriminate bombing of villages and towns.

Aircraft losses:
RAF 22, Luftwaffe 31.

Weather was deteriorating, instead of expected improvement, during the night.

Tuesday, August 13:
Overcast at dawn. Foggy at French airfields, Channel under thick cloud. Mist and scattered drizzle, some cloud, otherwise fair.

Goering postponed Adlertag Zero Hour to afternoon.

Day:
Some formations had already taken off before the order reached their units. One of these was led by Oberst Johannes Fink, Commander of KG2. He kept his rendezvous with the fighter escort at 0530hrs, but there were no 109s in sight, only a few Bf 110s. They kept closing on him, then diving away. He could not understand their message, nor did he share a radio frequency with them. Puzzled, he set course for his target with Nos. II and III Gruppen following. They crossed the English coast at 1,640ft (500m). The RAF radar had misread the strength of the 55-strong formation as ‘only a few', so only No. 74 (Spitfire) Squadron had been scrambled. Meanwhile the Do 17s had found RAF Station, Eastchurch. Their bombs cratered the airfield, damaged hangars and other buildings and
destroyed five Blenheims. The Spitfires, joined by Nos. 111 and 151 Sqns' Hurricanes, caught them on their homeward journey. Before the bombers could hide in cloud, four were shot down and four damaged.

Goering's new Zero Hour was 1400hrs. By then the weather had worsened further. Hauptmann Liensberger took off with 23 Bf 110s of V/LG1. His orders were to make landfall at Portland, then decide what to do next. Immediately his formation was over the English coast they saw Spitfires astern. British accounts state that this operation misfired because no bombers arrived to meet the 110s. In fact, the 110s were not intended as an escort, but as a decoy to draw fighters away from the bombers who would follow. The ruse was successful: two Spitfire squadrons were scrambled (the German version claims that there were 55 aircraft). The Messerschmitts sent three down, but lost five and many of the rest were badly damaged. The Germans failed to take advantage of having drawn the Spitfires: the first wave of follow-up bombers, Ju 87s, did not arrive until three hours later, by when the Spitfires had refuelled and rearmed. There was thick cloud down to 3,000ft (914m), so dive-bombing was impossible. The Stukas returned to base with their bombs. General von Richthofen's diary entry reads, ‘The attack was a failure. The weather forecast had been wrong and the attack ordered from “on high”. Thank goodness the English fighters came too late.'

Raids on Odiham and Farnborough airfields were driven off. Southampton docks and Detling airfield were severely damaged. Six bombers reported that they had hit tents and sheds around the landing field at RAF Middle Wallop. Twelve bombers damaged nearby RAF Andover, but this was not a fighter station. A raid bound for RAF Rochford (not Rochester as alleged in some British accounts) failed to find the target and jettisoned over Canterbury.

Night:
Norwich, Midlands, West Country and Scotland raided.

Aircraft losses:
RAF 13, Luftwaffe 34.

Wednesday, August 14:
Cloud with bright intervals.

Day:
The weather limited Luftwaffe operations to less than Gruppe strength. The designated targets were fighter airfields, radar stations and aircraft factories. Single bombers made many nuisance raids. Sixteen Bf 110s dived on Manston from cloud and destroyed four hangars, while a spoof raid on Dover was diverting the defence. Barrage balloons at Dover and Folkestone were shot down and the Goodwin lightship was sunk. Hawkinge, Colerne (Somerset), Sealand (Cheshire) and Lympne airfields were bombed. At Southampton and elsewhere railway lines were attacked.

Maintaining civilian morale was as important as shooting down the enemy and increasing the output of aircraft and munitions factories. The town and harbour of
Dover, the Straits and RAF Manston were prime targets for the Luftwaffe and all had been considerably bombed and strafed. Only No. 60 Squadron, flying Blenheims, was stationed at Manston, but Spitfire and Hurricane squadrons used it as a forward base during daylight. If anxiety was felt most acutely in and around the extreme south-east corner of England, Kent as a whole was expectant of an attempted German landing at any moment. Not only for the benefit of this population, but also of the entire country, the world's news reporters congregated at Dover, an appearance of confidence had to be kept up. To forbid the Channel to shipping by day would have been taken as a sign not of prudence but of timidity: so ships – albeit lightly laden – continued to traverse it. To ensure that Fighter Command's meagre force was seen to be present, aircraft taking off from, or landing at, Manston were required to fly low over its neighbouring towns, Ramsgate and Dover, to reassure the inhabitants that enemy claims about the RAF's allegedly crippling losses, broadcast daily by the traitor Lord Haw-Haw from Berlin, were false.