The Battle of Britain (25 page)

Sunday September 8 was relatively quiet as the Luftwaffe rested from their exertions. For the first time, No. 11 Group used paired squadrons for an interception, Nos. 253 and 605 combining to attack one of the handful of small raids mounted. As dusk fell, the night assault on London resumed. It was to continue every night for the next seven weeks.

On the next day, the German invasion date was fixed as September 20, but the executive order had to be given as early as September 11. Time was running out for the Germans.

Daylight activity continued at a moderate level during September 9, with airfields and aircraft factories the main targets, then a break in the weather brought relief to the defenders.

A black day for Fighter Command was September 11, with combat losses exceeding those of the Luftwaffe. Two major coordinated attacks by the Luftwaffe were launched, both in the afternoon. The first, comprising He 111s of KG 1 and KG 26, headed up the Thames Estuary towards London, with a fighter escort 200 strong. The defending squadrons made little impression on the escorts at first and lost heavily; some of them had been scrambled too late and were caught on the climb. As on the 7th, the Bf 110s formed a holding pattern in the Croydon area, while the single-seaters ran themselves low on fuel. As a result, the Heinkels were quickly left without an escort and suffered in consequence, losing 10, plus four more which force landed in France while a further 120 were damaged.

Meanwhile Luftflotte 3 mounted a raid on Portsmouth and Southampton, causing little damage. Luftwaffe combat losses for the day totalled 21, and another six force landed. Of these, only four were Bf 109s, although a fifth crashed as a result of a midair collision over France. Collisions were not that unusual; four Ju 87s were lost to this cause on a training mission also. Six Spitfires and nineteen Hurricanes were lost and a further six fighters crash landed. Twelve pilots were killed and four severely injured. This was an exchange rate that Fighter Command could not afford.

Activity during the next two days was minimal, due to adverse weather conditions, but picked up a little on September 14, when radar stations and some south coast towns were attacked. Once again, the decision to launch Sealion was deferred, this time until the 17th.

Then came the day now celebrated as ‘Battle of Britain Day'; Sunday, September 15, 1940. Extensive redeployment had taken place in Fighter Command during the previous few days, with fresh units replacing tired and depleted ones. The lessening of attacks on their airfields, and the low rate of aerial activity over the past few days had allowed the British pilots to rest. Some squadrons in the battle area even managed to devote time to training their replacement pilots; a rare luxury during that hectic summer. When Sunday, September 15 dawned, a reconstituted and rested British fighter force awaited the day's events . . .

As on many other days, the action was slow to develop. Not until nearly 1100hrs did a massive raid build up behind Calais, as the German bombers joined formation and awaited the arrival of their fighter escort.
The first wave, consisting of Dorniers of KG 3 and III/KG 76 crossed the British coast near Dungeness at about 1130hrs, with a strong fighter escort.

Air Vice Marshal Park was to make extensive use of paired squadrons on this day; no fewer than 10 of his 21 squadrons operated in pairs against this first raid. The remainder of the No. 11 Group squadrons were quickly airborne, and reinforcements were on the way from No. 10 Group to the west, and No. 12 Group to the north, this last consisting of the ‘Big Wing' from Duxford, now five squadrons strong, and led by the fire-eating Douglas Bader.

The first British units to engage were the two Spitfire squadrons from Biggin Hill; Nos. 72 and 92, who intercepted near Maidstone. They were quickly joined by other units, and a large whirling battle commenced. As the German formation lumbered towards London, its escort fighters were peeled away from the bombers, and ran low on fuel. So fierce was the opposition that by the time that the leading bomber formations reached the outskirts of London, their fighter escorts had vanished.

They were then confronted with the awesome sight of the Duxford Wing in perfect formation, three squadrons of Hurricanes covered by two squadrons of Spitfires 5,000 feet (1,525m) higher. At the same time, half a dozen other squadrons from No. 11 Group approached from all sides, and a huge mêlée developed. Some German bombers jettisoned their loads at random; others were hunted all over the London suburbs, and their bombing runs spoiled.

Damage was widespread, although little of military value was hit. Spitfires and Hurricanes were elbowing each other out of the way in order to get a shot in. For once they had numbers on their side. Shortly after noon, the German armada was streaming back down the Thames Estuary and across the coast of Kent in extreme disarray.

Back on the other side of the Channel, the Luftwaffe prepared for the next stage. Two hours later they tried again, preceded by a fighter sweep. Again they met with fierce resistance, and huge dogfights developed. If anything, the level of confusion was even higher than in the earlier action. The Duxford Wing had come forward again, but this time had scrambled late. They were hit by 109s before they could get at the bombers and split up.

Faced with the unrelenting attacks by the British fighters, many bombers jettisoned their loads more or less at random and headed homewards.
By I600hrs, all that remained were smoking wrecks littering south-eastern England. Two further raids took place on the day. He 111s of III/KG 55 made an ineffective attack on Portland, while EprGr 210, making its first appearance for several days, raided the Spitfire factory at Woolston.

The BBC announced that evening that 183 German aircraft had been shot down on the day. The actual combat loss was 56. Twelve more had force landed, and ten had limped home damaged, often with dead or wounded crewmen on board. In detail, 22 Bf 109s, three Bf 110s, 19 Do 17s, nine He 111s, and three Ju 88s had been destroyed. The force landed figures were three 109s, three Do 17s, five He 111s and one Ju 88. British losses totalled 27: 20 Hurricanes and seven Spitfires, with five and two force-landed respectively. The ratio of damaged aircraft was high; 12 Hurricanes and four Spitfires. Pilot losses were 12 killed, one prisoner of war, and four severely injured.

In terms of the scoreboard, September 15 was not exceptional, although it was thought to be at the time. The reason for the overclaiming, which it must be said was equally rife in the Luftwaffe, lay in the high level of confusion, where several fighters would take a shot at a single aircraft in a very short space of time. In several individual actions, the British outnumbered the Germans, which increased the probability of this happening.

The true importance of September 15 lay in the morale of the two opposing air forces. For the first time, many of the British fighter squadrons had a positional advantage over the Germans; for the first time many of them fought with numbers on their side. By contrast, the Luftwaffe, and especially the fighter arm, were becoming disenchanted with their commanders. The refrain for many days past had been that the Royal Air Force was reduced to its last 50 Spitfires. On September 7, the defences had been fairly ineffective, and victory at last looked as though it might be in sight. Then on September 15, they had been met by a revitalised force. Not only were the British fighting harder than ever, but there seemed to be more of them than ever before. The Germans felt themselves outnumbered and beset on all sides. Suddenly victory looked farther away than ever. To the British, September 15 felt like a great victory. The mood had changed on both sides.

Adverse weather restricted operations during the next few days, although a small daylight raid on London was mounted on September 18.
The night bombing campaign continued unabated. On September 19, the invasion was quietly cancelled, although the British had no way of knowing this at the time. The Reichsmarschall directed that airfields and aircraft factories were again to be the priority targets, and many German bomber units redeployed westwards from September 25. There were two days of intensive fighting before the month ended; on September 27 and 30.

September 27 started with the usual reconnaissance sorties, then a formation of Bf 110 Jabos escorted by 109s raided southern England in what appeared to be a fairly purposeless incursion. Intercepted, they lost eight of their number. This was followed by the Ju 88s of I and II/KG 77 heading for London who, due to an error in timing, came in unescorted. They were met by 10 squadrons of RAF fighters and very roughly handled, losing 12 aircraft before Bf 109s came to their rescue. Fierce fighter battles were fought as a result of both these actions. In the west, Luftflotte 3 launched a raid on the Bristol Aeroplane Company works at Filton with EprGr 210, which lost four Bf 110s, including that of their third Kommandeur in six weeks, Hptm Martin Lutz, and ZG 26, which lost seven aircraft. Total German casualties for the day were 54: 18 Bf 109s, 21 Bf 110s and 15 Ju 88s were written off. Two further Ju 88s crashed after a midair collision over France. British losses totalled 28: 15 Spitfires and 13 Hurricanes were written off and yet others force landed. More seriously, 20 RAF pilots were killed and a further five badly hurt.

September 30 started with fine weather, and two raids estimated as 200-plus headed for London. Intercepted, they turned back, and a ferocious fighter battle took place. Heinkels of I and II/KG 55 launched a raid on the Westland Aircraft factory at Yeovil in the afternoon, turning back after losing four of their number. Sixteen Spitfires and Hurricanes were lost on this day, but only four pilots were killed. Total German losses amounted to 44 aircraft written off, including 28 Bf 109s; a resounding success for the British fighters.

Early October saw a distinct shift in the emphasis of the Luftwaffe attacks. While the night offensive was to continue until May 1941, with London, Liverpool, Coventry and other industrial centres as the main targets, the mass daylight attacks virtually ceased, and were largely replaced with nuisance raids by Bf 109 Jabos. The rationale behind this was to keep the
defenders extended and weaken them if possible, pending a resumption of the offensive in the spring of 1941. As had been found earlier in the Battle, the British fighters would not rise to oppose a sweep by Bf 109s alone, and it was no longer a viable proposition to use bombers as
Lockvogel
, or bait. Only bombs on England could get the defences to react, and bomb-laden Bf 109s could immediately revert to being fighters once they had dropped their load.

The month of October started cloudy with little activity, although fighter sweeps over south-eastern England included a handful of Bf 109E-7 Jabos of LG 1.This was to set a new pattern. The Luftwaffe High Command had issued instructions that one Gruppe in every Jagdgeschwader was to be so equipped for Jabo operations. This did not do much for the morale of the Jagdflieger. It also posed RAF Fighter Command's No. 11 Group a different problem inasmuch as the Jabos would come in very fast and very high and, realistically only the Spitfire squadrons could catch them. The Hurricane, good though it was lower down, simply did not have the performance at 25,000ft (7,620m).

Things remained fairly quiet until October 7, when a plethora of small raids and sweeps were mounted over the south-east and south coasts. Portsmouth and Yeovil were raided. The Yeovil raid was expensive for the Luftwaffe: their losses on this mission amounted to seven Bf 110s of II and III/ZG 26, and a Ju 88 of II/KG 51. Things would have gone even worse with them had it not been for the arrival of 109s to cover their withdrawal.

Much the same pattern continued, interspersed with bad weather breaks when daylight operations became minimal. Damage caused by the Jabos was light, the average 109 pilot being unable to obtain the same results as the highly trained specialists of EprGr 210. That the strain was beginning to tell on both sides there can be no doubt, as shown during this period by the spate of operational accidents, due to a combination of fatigue and bad weather.

Fighting flared up again on October 15, and some vicious little skirmishes developed over the Thames Estuary. The Jagdflieger had marginally the better of the action, losing 10 Bf 109s and a Ju 88, for four Spitfires and eight Hurricanes. Several British fighters force landed. Two other German losses on this day were Bf 110 night fighters of NJG 1 and NJG 2, both shot down during the hours of darkness by British bombers. Also on this night, Greater London was badly hit, with 512 civilians
killed, nearly 1,000 injured, and an estimated 11,000 made homeless. Most of the major rail termini, at Waterloo, Victoria, Liverpool Street and Paddington, were badly damaged in this raid, and rail services were severely disrupted.

Daylight activity during the rest of October slowly petered out. October 21 was a foul day with little activity. It was notable because for the first time in a very long while, Fighter Command suffered no combat casualties, an occurrence repeated on October 23 and 24. October 26 was notable only for the belated entry of the Italians into the battle, when 16 Fiat BR 20s of the Regia Aeronautica made a half-hearted raid on Harwich.

Some indication of the strain on Fighter Command at this late stage was the fact that no fewer than 1,007 sorties were flown on October 27, for very little result. The raids were by Jabos, plus small formations and even single bombers trying to penetrate the defences under cover of cloud. The targets were mainly airfields, ranging from Hawkinge in Kent to Driffield in Yorkshire, The scoreboard for this day was seven Bf 109s, two Ju 88s, two He 111s and one Do 17 lost, plus two 109s force landed, set against four Spitfires and four Hurricanes written off. Poor weather conditions persisted until the last day of the month, when there were no combat casualties on either side, although two Dorniers of III/KG 76 were lost over France when they ran out of fuel after a mission.

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