The Battle of Britain (24 page)

On August 15, usually described as the hardest fought day of the Battle, the Luftwaffe flew 2,199 sorties and was opposed by 974 Fighter Command sorties. The fighting was intense, and casualties were heavy. German losses totalled 75, including those that returned but were written off. They were seven Bf 109s; no fewer than 28 Bf 110s (six from EprGr 210, eight from I/ZG 76 in the north-east, and another 12 from II and
III/ZG 76 in the south); six Ju 87s, 17 Ju 88s, including eight from I and II/LG 1 in the south and seven from KG 30 in the north-east; 12 He 111s, eight of them from KG 26 in the north-east; three Do 17s, and one each He 59 and Arado Ar 196.

It was also another bad day for Gruppen Kommandeurs. In addition to Hptm Rubensdorffer of EprGr 210, Restemeyer of I/ZG 76 and Dickore of III/ZG 76 went down, while Brunstellin of I/JG 51 and von Wechmar of I/KG 3 were wounded.

British losses totalled 29, including those written off, or 30 if a Blenheim shot down by a friendly fighter is included. The split was 21 Hurricanes against eight Spitfires. Thirteen RAF pilots lost their lives; seven were wounded; while three ended up as prisoners of war. Eight Hurricanes and two Spitfires force landed, while 13 Hurricanes and three Spitfires were damaged.

The next day followed fairly much the same pattern but at a reduced intensity; only 1,715 Luftwaffe sorties were mounted. Many airfields were raided, but with the exception of Manston, and Tangmere, which was badly hit, they had little bearing on the Battle. A day of quiet then followed, as though both sides were gathering strength for a further effort.

Sunday, August 18 was another day of hard fighting, with about 800 Luftwaffe sorties in daylight matched by 886 Fighter Command sorties. This did not mean that the same numerical balance was achieved in the air. In the south, where the bulk of the action took place, the British fighters were still outnumbered in individual actions.

At lunchtime, Luftflotte 2 launched a heavy coordinated attack on the sector stations at Kenley and Biggin Hill. Kenley was badly hit; three of its four hangars were destroyed and its operations room was put out of action. The nine Dorniers of low-flying specialist Staffel 9/KG 76 caused heavy damage during this raid, but was almost wiped out while doing so; only two aircraft, both damaged, returned to base.

The raid on Biggin Hill made a mess of the adjoining golf course but achieved little else. It was, however, the first in a series where Biggin Hill was raided daily and sometimes twice a day for an extended period, and was nearly put out of action. Croydon and Manston were also hit on this day.

Further down the coast another huge multiple raid was launched by Luftflotte 3, aimed at Thorney Island, Gosport and Ford airfields, and Poling radar station. Like the earlier incursion, this series of raids was
strongly opposed by defending fighters, who took a heavy toll of the slow Stukas.

Later in the afternoon, Luftflotte 2 launched another major attack, this time against the sector stations of Hornchurch and North Weald. Defending fighters were up in force and action was joined, but then deteriorating weather obscured the target area and forced the bombers to turn back.

The loss ratio was not so far in the British favour on this day, but the Bf 109s had taken a beating with 18 lost. Most significant of all were the losses of the Bf 110s, Goering's famed Zerstörers, 17 of which were struck off charge, and the Stukas, of which 18 were lost. From this point on, Zerstörer operations were restricted, while the dive bombers were withdrawn from the battle altogether. British losses were 26 Hurricanes and five Spitfires written off, for 10 pilots killed.

The weather broke during the afternoon of August 18, and it remained poor, with heavy cloud and rain for the next few days. This gave the opposing commanders time to think. Goering issued instructions that the bombers must be escorted more closely. Air Vice Marshal Keith Park, commanding Fighter Command's No. 11 Group, arranged for help to be given by the neighbouring Nos. 10 and 12 Groups when requested.

Meanwhile, the occasional German incursion was made. A large fighter sweep over Kent on August 19 was recognised in time and ignored by the defenders. Cloud cover allowed small formations of bombers to penetrate over England on harassing raids, with airfields as the prime targets. The night offensive continued, with raids on centres including Liverpool, Sheffield, Derby, Coventry and Hull.

The weather improved on August 24, and heavy raids resumed, although apparently with a little more circumspection than had previously been shown. Airfields at Hornchurch, North Weald and Manston were again targets. Manston, with its proximity to France and Belgium, was the favourite alternative target for the Luftwaffe and, although well equipped with underground shelters, thanks to its Royal Navy origins, was rapidly becoming unusable. The Defiants of No. 264 were operating from there, and on this day they were badly mauled. A heavy raid on Portsmouth took place in the late afternoon. That night over 100 aircraft were tracked heading in over London, and bombs were dropped in the City, Finsbury, Bethnal Green, Stepney and East Ham, among other places. This was a new and sinister turn of events.

RAF Bomber Command attacked Berlin on the night of August 25/26 as a reprisal for bombs that had fallen on London. This was the first in a series of events that was to provoke the Germans into switching their attack to London. But at this moment that could not be foreseen. During the day, the pattern persisted as before. Continued attacks on the British fighter airfields were beginning to tell as damage accumulated.

The pace began to slacken on August 27, when no major raid was mounted, despite clear skies in the afternoon. Something else was afoot. The single-seater fighter units of Luftflotte 3 had begun to move into the Pas de Calais, which meant that massive escorts for the bombers could be provided in the Luftflotte 2 area. Fighter Command's No. 11 Group, concerned at certain plotting inadequacies that had become evident, introduced a scheme whereby formation leaders would radio a situation report on sighting the enemy and before engaging.

During the morning of August 29 all was quiet, then in mid-afternoon radar plots showed a build-up behind Calais. This proved to be a handful of bombers, covered by an estimated 650 fighters drawn from JG 3, 26, 51, 52 and 54; and ZG 26 and 76. No. 11 Group put 13 fighter squadrons up; first into contact were the Hurricanes of No. 85, who were told to disengage, and the other squadrons held back. There was literally no point in risking a massive fighter battle when realistically only bombers could cause serious harm.

The fine weather persisted, and the attacks on airfields continued, mingled with fighter sweeps and attacks on other targets. Rarely were the German intentions clear from the radar plot. A lucky hit on the electric grid supplying the radar stations put Beachy Head, Whitstable, Rye, Fairlight, Foreness, Pevensey and Dover off the air for a few hours on August 30. On this day, Fighter Command sorties reached 1,054 which was their peak during the Battle.

Activity was very high on the next day also, the Luftwaffe mounting 1,450 sorties opposed by 987 by Fighter Command. During the next few days, North Weald, Biggin Hill, Kenley, Hornchurch, Tangmere, Eastchurch, Croydon, Detling and Debden were all attacked, some many times. Biggin Hill in particular was badly damaged, and the third raid of the day on September 1 saw a direct hit scored on the Ops room. A temporary Ops room was set up in the village. For a few days, only one squadron could be based there. In an attempt to halt the incessant raids the Station Commander, Group Captain Grice, took the drastic step of
having what remained of the hangars demolished, reasoning that from the air they still looked valid targets.

The cumulative effect of the damage on many airfields was rapidly becoming critical. Had it got much worse, the only solution would have been to pull the fighter bases back beyond the range of the escort fighters. This was to be avoided if at all possible, as in the event of an invasion the reaction time from airfields farther back would have been longer, while the endurance of the British fighters over the German bridgehead would have been much less.

Casualties among British squadron and flight commanders had been heavy. Aircraft reserves were still adequate, but the standard of replacement pilots was low. Extensive redeployment of squadrons was a feature of the first two weeks of the month. Attacks on factories producing fighters started now, a little late in the day. Brooklands was raided on September 2, but the Vickers works producing Wellington bombers was hit instead of the Hurricane factory.

Defence of the invaluable sector airfields was difficult. Often the RAF had little or no prior indication of the Luftwaffe target, and No. 11 Group fighter squadrons scrambled only when it was clear that a raid including bombers was imminent and that the radar plot was not just a decoy. With large formations moving in before splitting into several individual raids, interception was a nightmare. Exhaustion was fast setting in among the pilots of Fighter Command, who were outnumbered and had often to cede height and position to the enemy.

Fairly typical of the problem was a midday raid on September 4, when 70-plus He 111s and Do 17s crossed the coast between Hastings and Dover, escorted by about 200 Bf 109s. They then split to attack five targets between Reigate and Canterbury, and nine British squadrons met them, with varying degrees of success. Meanwhile, a small force of Bf 110s, including some Jabos, was reported north of Guildford at low level, having penetrated thus far unnoticed. They were then intercepted by nine Hurricanes of No. 253 Sqn and badly mauled, but the survivors reached their target at Brooklands, but again hit the Vickers factory rather than the Hawker site.

As part of this general raid, which had the defenders running about in all directions, EprGr 210 attacked the radar station at Poling, but were intercepted, losing their new Kommandeur, Hptm von Bolternstern. The entire series of attacks was coordinated to exploit the factor of confusion.

Losses this day were nearly equal, the Germans losing six Bf 109s, 13 Bf 110s, most of them on the ill-fated Jabo sortie, and one He 111. British losses were six Hurricanes and nine Spitfires, with nine pilots killed. A further four Hurricanes and two Spitfires force landed.

The margin was closing. What the RAF desperately needed was some respite for the fighter airfields, and some pressure taken off the British pilots. Further heavy fighting took place on September 5 and 6, but on the very next day, from a most unlikely source the respite came.

The day (September 7) started much as any other, with German reconnaissance aircraft snooping about, and being harassed by defending fighters. But then activity died away until shortly before 1600hrs. Hermann Goering had taken personal command of his much vaunted Luftwaffe and, throwing subtlety to the winds, launched the largest raid ever. No fewer than 348 bombers escorted by 617 fighters started across the intervening water. Twenty-one British squadrons were scrambled to meet them, but their controllers were in a quandary. Guessing which were the targets was an impossible task. It looked like an all-out attack designed to smash No. 11 Group. Expecting the assault on airfields to continue, most squadrons were ordered into positions to protect the vital sector stations and other likely targets such as the Thameshaven oil refinery.

The inevitable result was that comparatively few British fighters made contact before the first wave of bombers reached London, and these were swiftly embroiled with the escorting Bf 109s. Led by Oberst Fink's Dorniers of KG 2, the juggernaut rolled on, and bombs rained down on the docks from Rotherhithe to Tower Bridge. By the time that Fighter Command realised what was happening, and vectored the remaining British squadrons towards it, the German Goliath had bombed and was on its way home, leaving behind roaring conflagrations and a pall of smoke darkening the sky.

Nor was the ordeal over. Shortly after 2000hrs, the second wave of bombers came up the Estuary, guided by raging fires on the ground. For the next eight hours they stoked them up, leaving the fire fighting services almost helpless due to the sheer scale of the devastation.

But that day, September 7, had seen the combat début of the No. 12 Group ‘Big Wing' from Duxford. Consisting of Nos. 242 and 302 Hurricane and No. 1 Spitfire squadrons, and led by the indomitable Douglas
Bader, its purpose was to meet force with force; numbers with numbers. Bader's idea was that his wing of 36 fighters should be scrambled early and meet the enemy forward in the Maidstone/Canterbury area. A mass assault would disrupt the enemy formation and leave it an easier target for the single squadrons of No. 11 Group. In practice it was never to be used in this manner. 11 Group asked for reinforcements only when the situation was getting desperate, and the Duxford Wing was inevitably scrambled late as a result.

The Wing was often criticised as taking too long to form up. In practice, Bader used to set course immediately after take-off, without first orbiting base, and climb out on course throttled back just enough to allow the others to join up. From the scramble order to 20,00ft (6,100m) over the Thames Estuary took little longer for the Wing than for a single squadron. On September 7, they scrambled late and were caught on the climb by the escorting 109s. They were thus denied the chance of making a mass attack on an unbroken Luftwaffe formation.

The fact that much of the combat had been between fighters was reflected in the relative casualties. Just 13 German bombers were shot down plus two more which force landed. At least four of these were not involved in the main daylight raid. By contrast, the Bf 109s lost 16; the Bf 110s eight, plus two more that force landed.

Six Spitfires and 17 Hurricanes were lost, but another 12 of the former and five of the latter force landed in varying states of disrepair. Eleven other fighters suffered damage. When one considers that many aircraft that force landed took many weeks, if not months, to repair, it can be seen that in material terms, Fighter Command had slightly the worst of things. Another 19 British pilots were out of the Battle, 14 of whom were killed.