The Battle of Britain (17 page)

The principal shortcomings of the Do 17 revealed over Spain were its limited warload and its poor defence against attack from below and to the rear, and the Do 17M did little to remedy these defects. General re-equipment of the Do 17E-mounted Kampfgruppen was therefore held in abeyance pending availability of the much improved second generation Do 17Z which was following the Do 17M by less than a year and utilised most of the jigs and tools employed by the earlier model. The same considerations did not apply to its reconnaissance equivalent, the Do 17P, however. Production of this model was launched in 1938 by Henschel, Hamburger Flugzeugbau and Siebel, a total of 330 being built for the Aufklärungsgruppen.

The Do 17Z, the design of which began early in 1938, featured an entirely new forward fuselage owing everything to the dictates of operational efficiency and little to aerodynamic refinement. The downward-firing MG 15 machine gun which was poked through a hatch in the floor of preceding Do 17 versions had too limited a field of fire to provide anything approaching satisfactory protection from below and to the rear. Furthermore, crew accommodation had always been somewhat cramped for maximum operational efficiency. Thus, for the Do 17Z, the cockpit roof was raised and fully glazed. The nose containing the bombardier's station was also extensively glazed with a series of small, flat panels, or ‘facets', and the lower part was bulged and extended aft to a point just forward of the wing leading edge, terminating in a position for an aft-firing MG 15 machine gun.

The pre-series Do 17Z-0, which appeared late in 1938, was a four-seat bomber, defensive armament comprising three 7.9mm MG 15 guns – one on a pillar-type mounting at the rear of the flight deck, a second protruding through the starboard panels of the windscreen and the third on a hemispherical mounting firing below the fuselage. This armament was augmented on the production Do 17Z-1 by a fourth MG 15 protruding through the nose cone. Appearing before the end of 1938, the
Do 17Z-1 was somewhat under-powered by its two 900hp BMW-Bramo 323A-1 radial engines when carrying its full 2,205lb (1,000kg) bomb load. Accordingly, bomb load was reduced to 1,100lb (500kg), but was restored to the full load early in 1939 with the appearance of the Do 17Z-2 with 1,000hp Bramo 323P engines with two-speed superchargers. Restoration of the full bomb load dictated some reduction in fuel load, however, reducing depth of penetration in maximum loaded condition to a mere 205 miles (330km).

The Do 17Z rapidly proved popular with its air and ground crews, establishing a reputation as the most reliable Luftwaffe bomber, but it lacked the load-carrying capability of the He 111 and the speed of the Ju 88, and production was already tapering off by the end of 1939, and was finally to terminate during the early summer of 1940 with some 500 delivered. These shortcomings notwithstanding, the Do 17Z-2 was to perform the first operational sortie of World War II when aircraft of III/KG 2 took-off from Heiligenbeil, East Prussia, 45 minutes after the official outbreak of war, to bomb the approaches to the railway bridge at Dirschau, a major link across the Polish Corridor.

Equipping nine Kampfgruppen of KG 2, KG 3, KG 76 and KG 77, the Do 17Z-2 was in the forefront when the first attacks on Channel convoys took place in July 1940, and the Kommodore of KG 2, Oberst Fink, was, in fact, assigned the title of Kanalkampfführer with the task of clearing the Channel of British shipping, his Do 17Z-2s providing the principal component of the battle group entrusted with this mission. On Adler Tag the Do 17Z-2s of KG 2 bombed Eastchurch as the sole Kampfgeschwader failing to receive Goering's postponement order, losing four aircraft in the process.

The Do 17Z-2s of KG 3 bombed Eastchurch and Rochester two days later, and on the 16th those of KG 76 attacked West Malling, following up this mission with attacks on Biggin Hill and Kenley on the 18th.

The incursions over Britain of the Do 17Z rapidly revealed the deficiencies of its defensive armament, forward maintenance units first adding two machine guns which could be fired laterally from the radio operator's position and then yet another pair to provide a total defensive armament of eight machine guns. The Dornier bomber possessed good manoeuvrability and its structural integrity enabled diving attacks at speeds in excess of 370mph (590km/h), but it carried no armour protection for its crew. The element of surprise was employed by the Do 17Z formations whenever
possible by recourse to low-level, terrain-following attacks, but attrition remained high, and, by mid-September, the numerical importance of the Dornier bomber in the front-line operational strength of the Luftwaffe had begun to dwindle.

Created to fulfil a 1935 demand for a so-called Schnellbomber, or high-speed bomber, the Junkers Ju 88A was the newest aircraft in the inventory of the Luftwaffe to participate in the Battle of Britain. Although conceived as a bomber in the design of which there was no need to compromise performance by considering potential in other roles, the Ju 88 was to prove itself extraordinarily amenable to adaptation and modification for a variety of tasks unforeseen at its conception. Even though at the time it participated in the Battle it had barely crossed the threshold of its operational career, it was tacitly recognised by the RAF as the most formidable warplane in its category extant.

First flown on December 21, 1936, the first prototype, the Ju 88 V1, was a low-wing cantilever monoplane powered by two 1,000hp Daimler-Benz DB 600Aa 12-cylinder inverted-vee engines with annular radiators. The Junkers-Werke at Schönebeck began the manufacture of production tools and jigs early in 1938, by, which time contracts had been placed for 20 pre-series Ju 88A-0 and 50 series Ju 88A-1 bombers, these shortly being followed by a further contract for 100 of the latter. Manufacture was highly dispersed and such was the scale of the programme that, by the late spring of 1938, contracts had been placed for a total of 1,060 Ju 88As and by October 1 of that year 53 per cent of the total German airframe industry workforce was committed to the programme.

With the third prototype, the engines had been changed from DB 600s to Junkers Jumo 211s which were standardised for the series model, the Ju 88A-1 having Jumo 211B-1 engines each rated at 1,200hp for take-off. Its four crew members were closely grouped in the fuselage nose forward of the front wing spar: two internal bomb bays were provided, these being capable of accommodating a maximum of 28,110lb (50kg) bombs, and two external carriers were fitted beneath each wing, each capable of lifting a 1,102lb (500kg) bomb, but normally carrying a 220lb (100kg) bomb when maximum internal load was being lifted. Initially, defensive armament comprised a single forward-firing 7.9mm MG 15 machine gun in the starboard side of the
cockpit windscreen and two similar weapons firing aft, one from the rear of the cockpit and the other from the rear of the offset ventral cupola. This armament was hurriedly augmented, a second aft-firing MG 15 being added while forward maintenance units improvised mountings for a pair of lateral-firing MG 15s. As these weapons had each to be operated independently, no great weight of fire could be brought to bear.

The first production Ju 88A-1s were delivered in August 1939 to the I Gruppe of Kampfgeschwader 25, this unit being redesignated as I Gruppe of Kampfgeschwader 30 on September 22. Like most new combat aircraft, the Junkers bomber suffered its share of teething troubles. For example, the slatted dive brakes hinged beneath the front spar presented serious problems when extended. The fuselage was already highly stressed and limitations had to be imposed on high-speed manoeuvres. The undercarriage, too, was beset by problems, and the first 10 Ju 88A-1s delivered by Arado's Brandenburg factory were all damaged during landings as a result of one or other oleo leg failing. Most of these shortcomings had been ironed out, however, by the time that the Ju 88A was committed to the Battle of Britain.

On Adler Tag, all three Gruppen of KG 30 were fully equipped with the Ju 88A, as were the three Gruppen of KG 51 and both Gruppen of Lehrgeschwader 1. The I and II Gruppen of KG 54 had converted, with the III Gruppe still in process of conversion, and the III Gruppe of KG I had also converted to the Ju 88A. The Luftflotte 2 included the Ju 88As of III/KG 1 under I Fliegerkorps, III/KG 4 under IX Fliegerdivision, the Gruppen of LG 1 under IV Fliegerkorps, and KG 51 and KG 54 under V Fliegerkorps.

Ju 88A highlights during the Battle included the mass attack by 63 aircraft from KG 51 and KG 54 on Portsmouth on the day preceding Adler Tag, with 15 aircraft detached to bomb radar installations at Ventnor, and, on August 15, an unescorted attack by 50 Ju 88As of KG 30 on Driffield in which seven aircraft were lost to British fighters. On the same day, LG 1 despatched from Orléans-Bricy 12 aircraft from I Gruppe against Middle Wallop and 15 from II Gruppe against Worthy Down. The Ju 88As of I/LG 1 took Middle Wallop entirely by surprise, a number of Spitfires suffering damage on the ground, but only three aircraft of II/LG 1 found Worthy Down, and of the seven aircraft of this Gruppe's 4 Staffel participating all but two were shot down.

Although the Ju 88A fared better than other Luftwaffe bombers participating in the Battle, its high diving speed enabling it to evade even the Spitfire, combat attrition was by no means inconsiderable. Manoeuvrable for its size, the Ju 88A was a very efficient warplane and its innate sturdiness enabled it to withstand considerable battle damage and remain airborne. But it was deficient in both defensive armament and armour protection, and although some effort was expended during the Battle to rectify these deficiencies, the Junkers bomber was still considered by RAF fighter pilots to be comparatively ‘easy' prey when the epic aerial conflict drew to its close.

T
oday, every front-line combatant who goes into battle against the enemy is supported by people who stand behind him. The further back you look, the greater the number of supporters. Even 50 years ago every pilot of RAF Fighter Command was probably immediately backed up by about 100 people, with many times more in other places.

When a nation is totally at war almost everyone can be said to have a supporting role, but in the Battle of Britain this stage had not yet been reached. Despite grave reverses, the British nation had sky-high morale and not much else. Even the Army was still largely shocked and lacking weapons left behind at Dunkirk. So the effective support to ‘The Few' was provided by organisations that had been set up years beforehand. Politicians love to think that one can ignore war and then make good the deficiency by a few days of intense effort. Even in 1940 that was nonsense. Had crucial decisions not been taken years beforehand the battle would unquestionably have been lost.

To some degree Britain enjoyed many giant strokes of good luck. The dying R. J. Mitchell at Supermarine (Aviation) designed the Type 300, later named Spitfire, as a purely private venture (PV). Indeed, his boss, Sir Robert McClean, wrote to the Air Ministry, ‘After unfruitful discussions with the Air Ministry, my opposite number in Rolls-Royce, the late A. F.
Sidgreaves, and I decided that the two companies together should themselves finance the building of such an aircraft. The Air Ministry was informed of this decision, and were told that in no circumstances would any technical member of the Air Ministry be consulted or allowed to interfere with the designer.'

Hawker's chief designer, Sydney Camm, would never have dreamed of writing such a letter, but the fact remains that Britain's most important Battle of Britain fighter, the Hurricane, was likewise a PV design. Though he kept the Air Ministry informed, Camm's design was entirely his own and, like the Spitfire, the Hurricane had an Air Ministry specification written around it after it had been completely drawn by Camm's ‘young gentlemen' at Canbury Park Road. Had the two firms merely built to the official specification – the uninspired F. 7/30, using a 680hp Goshawk engine – there would have been no chance of Fighter Command winning in 1940.

In the case of the Hurricane a further factor was that, showing unprecedented nerve in an industry not yet used to massive financial risk, the Board of the newly formed Hawker Siddeley Group decided in March 1936 to produce all the drawings, factory plans and everything else needed for production of 1,000 Hurricanes. Land was found at Langley, near Slough, Buckinghamshire, and a large new factory built specifically for the Hurricane. This unprecedented act, long before the Air Ministry had drawn up any contract, was later estimated to have resulted in Fighter Command receiving between 400 and 600 essential extra Hurricanes by August 1940.

What about the Merlin engine, which powered both the Hurricane and Spitfire, as well as the Defiant and many other RAF aircraft? Without it RAF Fighter Command could hardly have existed, yet it too owed nothing to any Air Ministry requirement. Whereas in 1925 Air Marshal Trenchard had almost forced Rolls-Royce to get back into aviation with a new engine for the RAF, in the early 1930s the official view was that the Goshawk, a steam-cooled version of the old Kestrel, would be the preferred engine for the next generation of fighters. With a capacity of 21 litres (1,292 cu in), the Goshawk was unlikely to get much beyond 700hp. Sir Henry Royce could see that more power would be needed, and authorised the go-ahead on a bigger and newer engine, the PV 12 (private venture, 12 cylinder). Royce died on the day the last PV 12 drawing was issued (April 22, 1933). The first engine ran on October 15, 1933. Only
at this point did the Ministry offer to finance detailed development, the PV 12 thereupon becoming the Merlin.

The company extended the factories at Derby several times, and in 1938 began building an enormous new works at Crewe just in time for Crewe-built Merlins to fly in the Battle of Britain. Other Merlin factories got into action later.

One vital factor often overlooked in accounts of the Battle of Britain was the power increase RAF aircraft gained from using 100-octane fuel. To get to an octane rating of 100 demanded a very complicated process which, done on a commercial scale, called for large and expensive refinery plant. Though Dr S. F. Birch, of Anglo-Iranian's laboratory at Sunburyon-Thames, was the pioneer of this ‘alkylation' process, it was the US Army Air Corps that pioneered 100-octane aviation fuel. Probably nothing would have happened in Britain had it not been for a great engine man, Air Commodore Rod Banks, who in January 1937 urged that RAF engines should be able to use 100-octane ‘even if the supply of such fuel were limited, because the use of high-duty equipment might prove decisive in the air in the early stages of a war'.