The Battle of Britain (19 page)

Unfortunately, parachutists over England were almost automatically judged to be German, and many RAF fighter pilots were shot at or in other ways attacked by the Army and newly formed Local Defence Volunteers (later named Home Guard). The most famous example was Fighter Command's F/Lt J. B. Nicolson VC, who was almost burned to death in the air and did not really need sustained rifle fire (fortunately inaccurate) as he descended. Another task of ‘the Brown Jobs' was to guard crashed aircraft, though when convenient this was also done by armed RAF personnel. Every recognisable Luftwaffe wreck was carefully examined by Intelligence Officers. Indeed, it was a single scrap of paper examined by British Intelligence which alerted the RAF to the fact that the Luftwaffe bombers were using radio beams for precision guidance.

Intelligence plays a central and crucial role in any modern war. Through abysmal intelligence in the late 1930s the aircraft of the Luftwaffe were largely unknown in Britain. Even their designations were often invented, such as ‘Me 109' and ‘He 111K Mk Va'. Quite suddenly, from the summer of 1940 southern England became littered with the aircraft themselves, and there was no ignorance any more. In particular, each type was found to have weaknesses, which the RAF quickly learned to exploit. But at an even higher level, British Intelligence surpassed itself, in a way that perhaps can never be repeated. Thanks in part to the Poles and French, the ultra-secret Enigma machines, used by the German armed forces to encode all radio messages, were ‘broken' by a combination of brilliant thinking, fantastic electro-mechanical devices and, at Bletchley Park, Buckinghamshire, the ceaseless labours of large teams of cryptoanalysts. In his book
The Ultra Secret
former RAF intelligence officer F. W. Winterbotham explained how glad Lord Dowding was to avail himself of
the content of Luftwaffe operational messages, which in effect gave him, on a daily basis, the policy of Goering himself.

In the 1930s the RAF controlled all repairs to aircraft, and did a great deal itself in 43 Group. On May 14, 1940 the Ministry of Aircraft Production (MAP) was established under the dynamic Lord Beaverbrook, who personally masterminded the expansion of a gigantic Civilian Repair Organisation (CRO) which was dispersed even more widely than the parent aircraft factories. MAP also created order out of chaos and by the time of the Battle of Britain had more or less solved countless problems and shortages and got airframes, engines and accessories not only made at maximum rate but also – and this was vitally important during the Battle – repaired at maximum rate. It is on record that one Hurricane was shot down three times during the Battle, while a Spitfire got through the Battle with five different propellers.

With such a massive programme of aircraft production and repair it was recognised in 1939 that tremendous manpower would be needed merely to ferry aircraft from one place to another and to deliver them to Britain's Service units. The answer was the Air Transport Auxiliary (ATA). It was formed on September 1, 1939 by G. (later Sir Gerard) d'Erlanger, and made use of amateur and quasi-professional pilots, men and women, and mostly aged 30 to 50. Naturally the authorities were horrified at such a novel idea, and poured the ATA candidates into the front seats of Harvards and Blenheims in the hope that they would fail. Nearly all made the grade, and indeed on January 1, 1940 an all-female Ferry Pool was opened at Hatfield. The ATA eventually numbered 650 pilots who, though civilian, wore distinctive dark blue uniform. During the war they made over 300,000 deliveries of every kind of RAF and RN aircraft, in every kind of weather, with no armament and no radio. In summer 1940 the ATA was really getting into its stride, and it played an important part.

Of course, other important roles were played by ground-based defensive systems, notably anti-aircraft (AA) guns and the balloon barrage. At this time the RAF Regiment had yet to be formed, and all AA units were part of the Army. AA Command covered the whole country, large sub-areas being allocated to particular divisions. Heavy AA (HA) guns, notably the 3.7in (94mm) and 4.5in (114mm), could engage Luftwaffe aircraft of 1940 up to their practical ceiling, but even when targets were visible it was difficult to aim accurately, and actual expenditure of
ammunition per kill was higher than the figures recorded at the time. Firing on unseen targets (above cloud or at night) had essentially no more than a morale-boosting effect. In the same way, searchlights served a useful purpose at night in giving a general indication of where targets were to be found, to night fighters, but because they were linked with sound locators they had little hope of illuminating targets (it was a very different story later when individual lights had their own target-tracking radar).

Engagements during the Battle took place at all heights from 35,000ft (10,670m) down to sea level. At lower levels what was later to be called ‘light flak' was very important, but Britain suffered from lack of weapons. Had it not been for belated adoption in 1938 of the Swedish 2pdr (40mm) Bofors the situation might have been called ridiculous. As it was, Bofors guns were available in pitifully small numbers, and – hand-loaded with clips of four – could get off only a few rounds against a fast low-flying target. Britain had no equivalent of the deadly light flak that travelled with the German armies, notably twin-37mm and quad (flak-vierling) 20mm guns, available in thousands.

The balloon barrage was deployed in increasing numbers from 1938 onwards. The primary purpose of the barrage, formed by kite balloons moored by strong steel cables, was to prevent hostile aircraft from attacking at low level. The balloons seldom rode above 5,000ft (1,524m), and were disposed around London and such cities as Southampton, Portsmouth, Dover and the Medway towns, and from coastal convoys. Later in the war they were responsible for the loss of numerous Allied aircraft and almost none of the Luftwaffe, but in the autumn of 1940 their presence did exert a significant extra demoralising effect on Luftwaffe aircrew. The balloons were organised into RAF squadrons, numbered from 900 upwards, each sub-divided into flights and with balloon spacing a compromise between the ideal, on the one hand, and the available and accessible sites on the other.

This matter of sites was crucial, yet at no time did any branch of the armed forces use high-handed tactics and commandeer sites. During the year between Munich and the war, sufficient sites had been obtained through the laborious legal processes to satisfy almost every need of the defence forces throughout the Battle. This was especially important in the case of airfields, which of course (even in 1940) were much larger than sites for AA guns or balloon vehicles. Time and again it was demonstrated
that the best way to allow aircraft to survive on the ground was dispersal. In 1940 repeated and prolonged attacks on airfields destroyed remarkably few aircraft, and the large numbers of satellite fields enabled operations to be maintained even after heavy damage to the main airfields. Fortunately the Battle took place at a time of year when personnel could live under canvas and work on aircraft in the open without discomfort.

The RAF had just begun to construct paved (invariably tarmac) runways at the start of the war. Fighter Command's aircraft did not need runways, and almost all take-offs during the Battle (on both sides, in fact) were from grass. Bomb craters in grass are relatively easy to fill in, but large craters in the paved areas around the hangars – which is where most bombs were aimed – were another matter. Despite stockpiling of hardcore months beforehand, during the most crucial phases of the Battle, when the Luftwaffe was concentrating its attacks on the fighter airfields, craters were being made faster than they could be filled and resurfaced. Modern earthmoving machinery did not exist, and the first bulldozers arrived with US forces in 1942.

Damage to houses and other civilian property did not begin in earnest until near the end of the Battle, and repairing such damage was not then a serious drain on resources. Thus, until late September almost all efforts could be directed towards repairing, or at least rendering usable, such vital structures as radars, hangars and telephone lines (which formed the links between all parts of the air defence system).

The Battle of Britain was the first time the RAF had been called upon to attend to injuries to its personnel on a large scale. Casualties now included not only aircrew but also personnel on the ground. From the formation of the Service it had possessed a Medical Branch, under an Air Vice Marshal, and in 1919 an RAF hospital was opened at Halton, greatly enlarged and improved in 1928 as part of the Princess Mary's RAF Nursing Service (PMRAFNS). Suddenly in 1940 it was overloaded, and in particular, it was inundated with serious burn cases. A special burns unit was opened at Halton during the Battle, and it grew rapidly in size and skill, soon becoming a world leader alongside the civilian unit at East Grinstead under Sir Archibald McIndoe. Another major PMRAFNS hospital was opened near RAF Wroughton, Swindon. The RAF also became famous for its Institute of Aviation Medicine at Farnborough, but this is concerned primarily with physiological research rather than treatment.

With hindsight we know that Hitler had not expected to find Germany at war with Britain (at least, not yet) and genuinely wanted to find an ‘out' – some kind of negotiated settlement which would leave him in undisputed control of the European continent. The summer of 1940 found Germany's armed forces totally victorious throughout mainland Europe; the untried philosophy of Blitzkrieg – lightning war, ironically invented and described in detail by British officers who were ignored in their own country – had proved itself unstoppable. Hitler's real ambitions lay to the East, but quite unexpectedly he found he had a foe separated by 21 miles (34km) of water. On June 25, 1940 his troops were exhausted, but their morale was sky-high. There seemed to be just about time to invade and subdue this unexpected enemy before the bad weather of the winter set in.

With his eyes fixed on the Soviet Union it was also a surprise to Hitler to find his forces in command of the whole of northern France, the Low Countries, Denmark and Norway. This was especially gratifying to the Luftwaffe, which was thus placed in a perfect position to carry out the orders of Goering, its bombastic leader, to eliminate the RAF as a fighting force. Strategically, the situation was ideal. The Luftwaffe had at its disposal over 120 airfields within Bf 109E range of southern England, and after surveying all of them more than 50 were selected as main airfields for Luftflotte 3, in the west, and Luftflotte 2, in eastern France and the Low Countries. Many other good airfields in Denmark and Norway became home to Luftflotte 5, and this forced the RAF to maintain substantial fighter forces in northern England and Scotland.

Virtually the whole strength of the Luftwaffe ranged against the RAF No. 11 and No. 10 Groups comprised units of Luftflotte 2 (Fliegerkorps I, II and IX, and the fighters of Jagdfliegerführer 2) and Luftflotte 3 (FlKps IV, V and VIII and the fighters of Jagdfliegerführer 3). Either of these ought to have been a match for RAF Fighter Command. By mid-July their 50 main bases and approximately the same number of satellite airfields had been made fully operational and stocked with preliminary supplies of fuel and ordnance. Supplies continued to be built up, using trains and Ju 52/3ms, until the main assault began on 8 August. For the longer term, a modest programme of airfield improvements began, concerned chiefly with providing paved runways and taxiways and luxurious living quarters, but the West was not expected to be more than a garrison theatre. All the long-term campaign plans continued to be directed towards the East.

The propaganda ministry of Josef Goebbels incessantly stated that the war in the West had already been won, and their view was actually reflected in German decisions and planning. Aircraft production was increased in early 1940 in readiness for the attrition of the campaign in Scandinavia and especially, in the West. Monthly output after the battles in Poland was 495 aircraft in February 1940, with single-shift working and a 40-hour week. Without altering the working week, output was boosted in April to 990, and to a peak of 1,205 in September. This peak resulted from the inevitable lag between issuing orders and getting results; it had nothing to do with the Battle of Britain. In fact, orders had gone out to reduce production in early July, just after the fall of France, and output fell to 930 in October 1940 and a mere 693 in November. It stayed around the 700 mark until the forthcoming campaign in the East forced it to rise to over 1,000 once more. Subsequently, gigantic fighter production was to push the figure beyond 4,300 in 1944. Thus, there was never any expectation of any real problem in subduing the RAF, and the 1,653 front-line combat aircraft actually shot down in the Battle of Britain took a long time to replace. All of this took place at a time long before the political frictions and traumatic upheavals that were to afflict German production later in the war.

From the start, the Luftwaffe was to some extent an élite force. It concentrated upon war in the air, a mission which it saw as including training of most of its personnel. This broad mission also included the provision of flak (AA artillery). Nearly all secondary functions were assigned to a secondary force, the Luftdienst (air service). This was essentially a civilian organisation, though it came to include large numbers of personnel from the Luftwaffe and other forces who were wounded or in any other way medically unfit for combat duty. The Luftdienst's aircraft were often indistinguishable from those of the Luftwaffe, and could be seen wearing theatre bands. The Luftdienst grew in strength throughout the war, carrying out such tasks as transport and liaison, front-line supply, aircraft ferrying, target towing, rescue and casualty evacuation, photography and surveying (not over enemy territory) and increasing duties brought on by RAF bombing, such as dispersal of industry.

In such matters as intelligence, command and control, raid warning and medical services the Luftwaffe generally paralleled the RAF. The main difference was that in 1940 the Luftwaffe was doing the attacking and the
fighting was over England and the Channel. There was not much need for intelligence or raid warning, and the chain of command could hardly have been simpler. Policy was decided by Goering (or, on 4 September, Hitler himself in the case of opening the Blitz on London) and orders sent by Enigma to Albert Kesselring (Luftflotte 2) and Hugo Sperrle (Luftflotte 3). Though almost all the crews were experienced in battle, a great deal had to be learned by experience; but the Luftwaffe never expected to fail to subdue the Royal Air Force.