Austerlitz: Napoleon and the Eagles of Europe (35 page)

‘let the formidable masses approach within range and then with my nine guns suddenly unmasked, the whole line poured in the most destructive fire … Imagine my satisfaction when I saw each discharge cutting great square holes in the regiments … and these regiments … dispersing in fleeing masses.’
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In another version, Thiébault described the effect of his close-range fire as: ‘entire lines fell with every blast. These troops which, with the help of their ruse, hoped to reach us unharmed, tried in vain to spread out: it was no longer possible. Retreat was their only hope of survival.’
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However, despite their limited training and experience, these beleaguered Austrian battalions did not disintegrate. Instead they rallied and reformed further to the south, closer to Kamenski.
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But Kutuzov remained unimpressed. He later wrote: ‘Indeed this reserve corps took the position which was assigned to them, but withdrew themselves with the first discharges of the enemy and completely uncovered the left flank of the column [Miloradovich’s].’
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The distance between Morand’s half of the French force and Kamenski now closed to less than 200 paces and Langeron described the moment that the 10ème Légère and 1/14ème:

‘began a very sharp musket fire, very well directed and extremely murderous. Our soldiers replied with a less accurate independent fire: I desired to put an end to this and commence battalion volleys, but I was never to succeed there, in spite of the efforts of count Kamenski and those of [Podpolkovnik] Bogdanov, who, with sword raised, passed across the front of the soldier’s muskets.’
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While Saint-Hilaire stood with Thiébault and Morand on the Pratzeberg, isolated from the rest of the French army, back on the north side of Pratze, Vandamme had finally overcome Miloradovich’s opposition.

Vandamme’s methodical advance towards the Russian positions brought his 7,600 men ever closer to Miloradovich’s line, and the addition of Varé’s brigade – about 3,200 men – provided the French line with a great numerical advantage. The Russian component of IV Column amounted to less than 5,000 men and from his twelve battalions, two from the advance guard had already dispersed, while the great losses suffered by a third battalion meant it could no longer be considered an effective force. The four battalions led forward by General Maior Berg towards Pratze continued to fight hard for a while, but after Berg was wounded their determination rapidly evaporated. Stutterheim commented that Berg’s troops ‘had lost that confidence in themselves, without which nothing is to be done in war’.
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Without direction this part of the Russian line gave way and fell back, leaving Miloradovich with just five battalions. The Russian commander did his best to inspire his men, galloping about wildly, although some less charitable observers suggested his posturing was ineffective and merely designed to draw him to the tsar’s attention.

Despite his best efforts, the strength of Vandamme’s force, with GB Candras’ brigade (46ème and 57ème Ligne) leading the attack, was too much. Although the Russians inflicted heavy casualties on the approaching brigade it continued to advance undaunted until deploying within 60 paces of their line, when it ‘unleashed a devastating fire that consumed the Russians’. These last five battalions gave way and the colonel of the 46ème recalled that: ‘With a shout of “Vive l’Empereur!” the regiment resumed the advance and passed over the debris of the enemy’.
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With stories of the actions of Russian wounded at Schöngrabern well-known throughout the French army, none were left alive in their wake. Reporting later on the collapse of his command, Miloradovich recalled that:

‘the tiredness of the men, shortage of ammunition, the difficult position and heavy firing by the enemy on all sides, brought the soldiers, who were up until this point fighting hard, into disorder during their retreat.’
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Kutuzov added a little more in his summary of the action to the tsar:

‘Though this IV Column was the weakest of all (made up of troops weakened by the retreat from Braunau), it however defended with courage and maintained its position for a long time, keeping up a very sharp fire; but when the Generals Berg and Repninsky were wounded and thereby their brigades remained without command, the disorder set in.’
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The Russians had defended their front line for perhaps forty-five minutes, from the moment Thiébault sent his first battalion against Pratze to the retreat of Miloradovich’s command. The time was now around 10.00am.

The Russians’ spirited defence had, however, gained enough time for IV Column to set up a second defensive line. With its right resting on Staré Vinohrady and the left extended southwards, GM Rottermund’s Austrian brigade formed a solid line, while Jurczik’s brigade headed south to prevent the French capturing the Pratzeberg. Behind Rottermund’s line Miloradovich was able to halt his fleeing men and rally them on the battalion of Izmailovsk Guards that had just arrived on the plateau, in response to the tsar’s earlier order.

Even as Candras was driving off the Russians to his front, Vandamme’s other two brigades, those of generals Schiner and Ferey, were closing on the newly formed Austrian line. At about this time – approximately 10.00am – the northern extreme of the battlefield, astride the Brünn–Olmütz road, also thundered into life.

The late arrival of V Column cavalry into their assigned position between Blasowitz and Krug resulted in Grand Duke Constantine finding his Imperial Guard, considered the army reserve, occupying the front line on high ground east of Blasowitz at around 9.30am. It was not immediately obvious that this was the front line, as Constantine could see movement near Blasowitz that he naturally considered to be Austrian troops. And so he contented himself with forming up the Guard. In the first line he placed the Preobrazhensk and Semeyonovsk Regiments with an artillery battery in the centre, and the Izmailovsk Regiment and Guard Jäger battalion in the second line. Each of the seven battalions also had two pieces of artillery with them. At the rear of the infantry he formed two regiments of cavalry: the Guard Hussars and Horse Guards. Some distance further back were the Chevalier Garde and the Guard Cossacks, and a long way to the rear the Guard Grenadier Regiment, forming the rearguard of the army.
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No sooner had Constantine completed his arrangements than a cannon ball smashed into the Preobrazhensk Guard, ripping away a file of the regiment.
Suddenly it was clear: the troops near Blasowitz were not allies at all, they were French. Constantine recognised his exposed position and took immediate action to remove this threat. He ordered the Guard Jäger to advance, drive off the opposition and occupy Blasowitz. As they attacked this force, composed of artillery and light troops sent forward from GD Rivaud’s division of Bernadotte’s I Corps, it melted away. With Blasowitz seemingly secure, Constantine grew concerned by the increasing noise of battle from the plateau and pushed forward a battalion of the Semeyonovsk Guards to support his
jäger
, positioning them just to the rear of the village. About this time the order arrived from the tsar on the heights for reinforcements, and in response, Constantine despatched a battalion of the Izmailovsk Guards. In less than thirty minutes the Imperial Guard infantry on the heights east of Blasowitz reduced from seven to four battalions. However, Prince Liechtenstein was now hustling his tardy cavalry into position between Blasowitz, Krug and Holubitz. It was not a moment too soon, for about two miles to the west Lannes, with V Corps, and Murat, with the Cavalry Reserve, had set their men in motion.

Lannes’ men were drawn up with their left resting on the Santon and extending southwards across the Brünn–Olmütz road. On the left stood Suchet’s division, with 34ème and 40ème Ligne forming the first line, and 64ème and 88ème Ligne the second. Lannes detached the 17ème Légère from the division to defend the Santon and its approaches, thereby shielding the left of V Corps. To Suchet’s right, Caffarelli aligned his division. The 17ème and 30ème Ligne formed the first line with 51ème and 61ème Ligne the second. The 13ème Légère was tasked with protecting the right flank of the corps. GD Walther’s dragoon division was held in reserve.

Murat’s cavalry consisted of two divisions of heavy cavalry, two of light cavalry and an additional light cavalry brigade. The two heavy cavalry formations, commanded by Général Nansouty and d’Hautpoul, formed behind Lannes’ corps. Kellermann’s light cavalry division took up a position on Lannes’ right, while the remaining light cavalry (Treillard’s division and Milhaud’s brigade) floated on the left.

Napoleon considered that Lannes and Murat would face little opposition on the northern flank. He had not anticipated any strong formations remaining in the sector of the battlefield when the Allied army swung its full weight against his right. As such, they were to hold their position until Soult was established on the plateau, then they were to sweep forward and cut off the Allies’ retreat towards Olmütz. To Napoleon’s surprise, Lannes and Murat were about to face the dogged and aggressive Prince Bagration.

The orders for Bagration’s command specified he should not advance until the columns on the left made significant progress. However, the growing sound of battle and reports from his advanced left flank (6. Jäger and five squadrons each from the Mariupol and Pavlograd Hussars) around Holubitz warned him of the strong French presence building to the west.
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He therefore left his
position on the high ground near the post house and advanced to a position close to the road junction that led to Austerlitz. His right extended onto the high ground north of the road towards Kowalowitz, with his left resting on Krug and Holubitz. As his men drew up, Bagration arranged them for battle. He left the battle-weary 6. Jäger holding Krug and Holubitz, screened by Cossack detachments drawn from three regiments. The Elisavetgrad Hussars, the first of Adjutant-General Uvarov’s cavalry regiments to arrive, took up a position to protect Bagration’s left flank.
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North of Holubitz, Bagration arranged his infantry in two lines, the Old Ingermanland and Pskov Musketeers in the front line, with the Arkhangelogord Musketeers behind. The remaining five squadrons of Pavlograd Hussars formed to the right of the line with 5. Jäger and five squadrons of the Mariupol Hussars occupied a position further out towards Kowalowitz. Behind the main body Bagration formed his reserve: five squadrons of the Tsarina Cuirassier, five of Tver Dragoons, and three squadrons of St Petersburg Dragoons.

With the news that Soult had gained a foothold on the Pratzen Plateau, Napoleon issued the order for Lannes to commence his forward move around 10.00am. With Kellermann’s light cavalry screening the infantry, Lannes began to edge forward. For the Guard Jäger occupying Blasowitz, the most forward position in the northern sector of the battlefield, this was a worrying time. As well as Lannes’ approach, Rivaud’s division of I Corps was completing its disposition outside Jirschikowitz, from where it could threaten their position. Soon Lannes’ would draw near to Blasowitz and inevitably attack the village before advancing again. And with his left flank protected by Bosenitz and his right by Blasowitz, Lannes would occupy a strong position, ideally suited to defence or offering a springboard from which to launch an assault on the Russian line.

Liechtenstein decided he needed to take action to stop Lannes’ advance and ordered the Russian cavalry to form for battle. At the same time he sent the Austrian 7. Lotheringen-Küirassiere, with a cavalry battery, to a position between Blasowitz and the plateau to protect the open left flank of the
jäger
. To protect their right, the commander of V Column intended throwing his four Russian cavalry regiments at the French horseman shielding their infantry, but even before he completed forming his men for the attack the plan disintegrated. The Grand Duke Constantine Uhlans, an impressive regiment of lancers numbering almost 1,000 men, formed the head of this attacking force. However, instead of waiting until all regiments were in position, General Leitenant Essen II, the senior Russian cavalry commander, ordered General Maior Müller-Zakomelsky, commanding the lancers, to attack immediately, without waiting for support. This unexpected move forced the Russian artillery supporting the cavalry, which had opened on the French line, to cease firing. Seeing the Russian cavalry closing on his division Kellermann gave the order to retire. For a moment it appeared Kellermann was about to be crushed
between the onrushing lancers and the solid wall of French infantry, but as the retreating horseman approached Caffarelli’s division they: ‘opened up their intervals as coolly as if they had been on a parade ground. Immediately Kellermann’s cavalry passed through they closed up again and opened fire on the enemy.’
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Encouraged by the sight of Kellermann’s cavalry falling back before them, the Grand Duke Constantine Uhlans pressed them closely, just catching the rearmost squadrons before they escaped through the French lines, leaving themselves confronted by the resolute front line of Caffarelli’s division. The storm of musketry and grapeshot that ripped through the air at very short range decimated the lancers. They veered away from the carnage, leaving Müller-Zakomelsky badly wounded and perhaps as many as 400 men killed, wounded or dazed upon the ground. Also amongst the seriously wounded was Essen II who later died of his wounds.
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The survivors fell back in great disorder to reform behind Bagration.