Austerlitz: Napoleon and the Eagles of Europe (34 page)

Soult’s original orders were for Saint-Hilaire to bypass the village, in order to prevent him being drawn into a potentially time-consuming battle for its control, but during the advance Soult received some spurious information that Pratze was only lightly defended by the Allies. Consequently, he ordered Saint-Hilaire to sweep it clear as he advanced: in response, the 1/14ème moved against the village. Not expecting any significant resistance, the battalion approached the village without detaching skirmishers. As it approached Pratze in line, Colonel Mazas discovered the wide stream bed to his right. Then, without warning, the battalion of the Novgorod Regiment appeared from its concealed position ‘and poured such a murderous fire at almost point-blank into him that in their surprise and alarm the entire 1/14ème broke and fled’.
³

Observing the mayhem ahead of him, Thiébault immediately organised his other three battalions to remove this threat to his brigade, while Colonel Mazas rallied his battalion. At the same time, the 10ème Légère, keeping well-clear of
Pratze, crossed lower down the stream and continued to climb the slope towards the high ground south of the village – the Pratzeberg – its summit about 1,200 yards from the church. The cold early morning air then resounded with cries of ‘Vive l’Empereur!’ as the remaining 2,400 men of Thiébault’s brigade advanced. With 2/36ème on the left, heading for the southern part of the village, supported by 1/36ème, and 2/14ème on the right marching towards the bridge and stream, these men closed on Monakhtin’s advanced battalions.

Just over 11/2 miles away to the south, General Maior Kamenski marched down the slopes of the Pratzen Plateau towards Sokolnitz at the head of Langeron’s missing brigade. Some movement near Pratze caught his attention and he brought his brigade to a halt. In front of him he could see I, II and III Columns all engaged along the Goldbach, but this movement towards Pratze was puzzling. The closer he looked, the more worrying the situation became. The sound of gunfire breaking out near Pratze suggested the disturbing scenario of a French attack rolling towards the plateau and into the undefended rear of the Allied army. Kamenski quickly dashed off a warning note to Langeron, his column commander, at about 9.15am, and then turned his brigade back towards the high ground he had just vacated.

The 2/14ème Ligne dashed forward, changing from column to line as it rapidly advanced. Unfazed by the musketry of the Novgorod battalion behind the stream, the 2/14ème threw itself into the steep-sided watercourse and scrambled up the opposite bank to attack the Russians with the bayonet. The 2/36ème also stormed across the stream and entered the southern end of Pratze, which consisted only of the church and a couple of houses. Following in reserve, the 1/36ème opened fire on the defenders of the village but did not follow across the stream. Aware of the growing storm to the front, Miloradovich sent General Maior Repninsky forward with the grenadier battalion of the Novgorod Regiment towards the south of Pratze, to support the two musketeer battalions. But by the time he arrived both battalions were already in disordered retreat and fled past him, having been thrown back by Thiébault’s aggressive assault.

Alexander was now close at hand, and he personally attempted to rally the two fleeing battalions, which rushed on without even recognising their tsar. He never forgave the regiment. Repninsky, who had advanced in a supporting role, now found himself in the front line, engaged in a vicious firefight with 2/36ème.
⁴
While this action took place on the south side of Pratze, Kutuzov and Alexander, to their horror, saw another large French formation heading towards them from the north. This was Vandamme’s division, marching towards Staré Vinohrady (the old vineyard), the high point on the northern extent of the Pratzen Plateau, just over a mile north-east of Pratze village. Encouraged by this forward movement, Varé’s brigade, temporarily detached from Saint-Hilaire’s division, rushed forward towards the north side of Pratze
and engaged two Russian battalions near the village (possibly the grenadier battalions of the Novgorod and Apsheron Regiments). These battalions, assaulted on two sides and already disrupted by the fleeing Novgorod musketeer battalions fell back on the main body, the Novgorod grenadiers were ‘almost destroyed’. Repninsky remained wounded on the field, struck down by three musket shots. Keenly aware of their predicament, Kutuzov and Miloradovich hurried the remaining Russian battalions to occupy the high ground to the north of Pratze to face this onslaught.

Some distance behind Miloradovich, the Austrian brigades commanded by FZM Kolowrat were making slow progress through the vineyards. They had spent the night camped furthest back and had first to ascend part of the way on to the plateau. Aware of the escalation of firing to the front, a certain Hauptmann Tell of IR49 Kerpen went forward to ascertain what was happening. He swiftly returned with the news that the French were attacking on both sides of Pratze and closing like a pincer on IV Column. Then orders arrived from Kutuzov for Kolowrat to deploy to the left to prevent the French attack succeeding in claiming the Pratzeberg. It was a desperate decision because Kutuzov knew that half of the Austrian infantry were new recruits with limited training, but he had no choice if he was to have any chance of saving the situation and deny the plateau, the key to the battlefield, to the French. The surviving accounts express something of the confusion that existed on the plateau. Whether Kutuzov intended all the Austrian infantry to march for the Pratzeberg, or just a portion of it, is unclear. Certainly, Jurczik headed off southwards with his brigade: but whether all his battalions followed is uncertain. Rottermund’s brigade, with its strongest component concentrated in the full six battalions of IR23 Salzburg, remained at the northern end of the plateau and moved forward to occupy a position on the Staré Vinohrady to the rear of the Russians but extending beyond the right of Miloradovich’s new line. Austrian accounts mention battalions becoming separated from their brigades as they were rapidly pushed into battle.

As the surprised Austrians moved off, shocked by this sudden change of circumstances, Vandamme, supported by Varé’s brigade, was closing menacingly on the plateau. His men, advancing steadily without firing, gradually narrowed the gap. Behind Vandamme’s division, anyone still with the presence of mind to look beyond the immediate danger would have seen the ominous sight of the leading division of Bernadotte’s I Corps passing through Jirzikowitz and reforming outside the village. The situation was clearly critical and the tsar sent off a request to Grand Duke Constantine to despatch a battalion of Imperial Guard infantry to the plateau.

Encouraged by Vandamme’s advance, Varé’s brigade began to threaten the left flank of the Russian line, causing Miloradovich to order General Maior Berg to take the Little Russia Grenadiers, supported by the grenadier battalion of the Apsheron Regiment to drive them back. The rest of the Russian line, the
Smolensk Musketeer Regiment and two musketeer battalions of the Apsheron Regiment, faced Vandamme. The fighting between Varé’s Regiments (43ème and 55ème Ligne) and Berg’s men was both desperate and stubborn. The Russians launched at least two bayonet charges, during one of which the Apsheron grenadier battalion, led by Kapitan Morozov, captured two French artillery pieces, later retaken.
⁵
The 55ème also repulsed an attack by the two squadrons of Austrian dragoons attached to IV Column before Vandamme’s relentless march finally came to a halt about 100 paces from the Russian line. With Bernadotte able to offer support if needed, he formed his division in one line, maximising his firepower, and ‘opened a fire of musketry which became general, and very destructive’.
⁶
One musket ball seared across Kutuzov’s cheek as he stood a short distance behind the front line, causing a bloody wound. As soon as the tsar heard of this, he sent Dr James Wylie, his personal physician, forward: but as he rode up Kutuzov dismissed him saying, ‘Thank His Majesty, assure him that my wound is not dangerous,’ then waving an arm towards the French he added, ‘that is where it is mortal’.
⁷
Away to the south, the danger to the Allies was mounting too.

While Thiébault cleared the Russian advance guard from its positions around Pratze, the 10ème Légère, supported by three artillery pieces, skirted the village and marched towards the Pratzeberg, the highest point on the southern extent of the plateau. As Général de brigade Morand led the men forward up the slope under their regimental commander, Colonel Pouzet, they found themselves in a dramatic race for the summit with Kamenski’s brigade of II Column. Recognising the danger developing behind him, on his own initiative, Kamenski had turned the brigade and marched back to the plateau with the Phanagoria Grenadier Regiment and Ryazan Musketeers, about 3,800 men in all. Against them, the 10ème Légère could muster some 1,500. Forming the Phanagoria Grenadiers on the right and the Ryazan Musketeers on the left, Kamenski advanced directly against the 10ème. The single French regiment opposed this onslaught as best it could, but with the Russian line threatening to overwhelm its right flank and get around its left, it began to fall back.

The men of the 10ème were in great danger of being surrounded when help arrived, Saint-Hilaire leading forward the 1/14ème at the run, having rallied after their failed attack on Pratze. Wasting no time, Colonel Mazas placed his battalion in the front line to the right of the 10ème and prevented the Ryazan Musketeers from turning the flank. More help was on the way too. The two battalions of the 36ème were ordered to abandon the attack on Pratze and advance with all speed to support the 10ème, leaving 2/14ème to drive away the retreating Russians.

At about the same time General Leitenant Langeron arrived on the heights and he could not believe what he saw. On receiving Kamenski’s message he handed temporary command of the fighting around Sokolnitz to General Maior Olsufiev, and went to see for himself what was happening. He did not
intend being away for long. When he got there he found the French occupying the bivouac area that II Column had left only a couple of hours earlier and Kamenski involved in a full-scale battle. He approached the Phanagoria Grenadiers and noticed some of the men ducking to avoid artillery fire. Langeron noted that perhaps only 10 per cent of the regiment had ever been in battle before but he shouted to them: ‘Raise your heads, remember that you are Russian grenadiers!’ and then unwisely found himself drawn into the battle too.

Langeron recalled that in an effort ‘To impose on the French and to animate the courage of our soldiers, and besides, not believing the enemies as strong as indeed they were … I resolved to march forward.’ The attack coincided with the arrival of 1/36ème, which entered the line to the left of the 10ème. The Russian line moved forward in a ‘furious attack’, their deep battle roar ‘Oorah! Oorah!’ resonating in the air as the French line fell back before them. In the attack, ‘the first battalion of the Phanagoria Regiment, commanded by an excellent officer, Maior Brandt, who was wounded, advanced so close to the French that they took two guns.’
⁸
But the French were not to be outdone. Major Perrier, at the head of the newly arrived 1/36ème, inspired his men by his coolness and great courage before he crashed to the ground, felled by two bullets. Then Adjudant-Major Labadie of the 1/36ème grabbed the battalion’s eagle standard and advanced on the Russians shouting: ‘Let brave men follow me!’ Arming themselves with muskets, captains Raoul and Duhil threw themselves immediately in front of the eagle to defend it, rallying the French line and pushing the Russians back again.
⁹

Thiébault now rushed up from Pratze with the two remaining battalions of his brigade and three guns. But sometime around 10.00am, before he could push them into the line, a movement of unidentified troops was detected approaching from the north-east, which both the French and Russians observed with great concern. Langeron could not make out who they were, but to him they appeared to be in retreat. He sent an officer to discover their identity and found to his relief that they were Jurczik’s Austrian battalions, ordered towards Pratzeberg by Kutuzov.

At the same time, Saint-Hilaire and Thiébault, positioned closer than Langeron to this new force, watched through their telescopes as the sound of their military music grew louder, until an officer closed to within shouting distance and cried, ‘Do not fire; we are Bavarians.’
¹⁰
Both Saint-Hilaire and Thiébault viewed this information suspiciously but could not open fire and risk killing their allies. With his divisional commander’s approval, Thiébault pivoted the line back on 1/36ème until it stood at right angles to the 10ème and 1/14ème. Then he aligned 2/36ème to the left of the first battalion with the three guns between them and positioned 2/14ème on the extreme left in column to face this potential threat. Just as he finalised these dispositions he welcomed the fortuitous arrival of a battery of six 12pdr guns, the reserve
artillery of IV Corps. Three guns were placed on both flanks of the 36ème and he quickly masked all nine guns with squads of infantry. With his troops in place Thiébault crawled forward to take a closer look at these ‘Bavarians’, joined on the way by Morand. The two officers advanced about half way and as Thiébault studied them closely: ‘an officer belonging to those regiments was joined by one who I saw come from Kamenski’s brigade. They talked for a minute, and then each went quickly back to whence he came.’
¹¹

It was Langeron’s man that Thiébault saw. Convinced that they now faced a new hostile threat, the two French officers returned to their men, Thiébault ordering the commander of the newly arrived reserve artillery to double-load his guns, much to his dismay, and stockpile rounds by his guns for rapid fire. Meanwhile, Kamenski and Morand, their lines now about 300 paces apart, kept up an exchange of artillery fire while their men prepared for the next attack. Once their attempted ruse was uncovered, the Austrian units swung into position to launch an attack against Thiébault’s three battalions. Despite their inexperience, the leading Austrian battalions ‘made their attack on the enemy with coolness and intrepidity’.
¹²
Ahead of them Thiébault ordered his men to hold their fire and allowed the Austrians to gradually close the gap, having instructed the gunners to sight their guns at about 40 yards. With final instructions for his men to aim at the cross belts of the advancing infantry and at the centre of formations, to avoid wasting shots, Thiébault recalled that he: