Austerlitz: Napoleon and the Eagles of Europe (32 page)

With no sign of III Column, Langeron sent forward 8. Jäger to skirmish with French light troops he could see near Sokolnitz, while artillery from both sides bombarded the village. Finally, at about 8.30am, III Column came into view, having made slow progress through the confines of Pratze and across ploughed fields that further retarded their march. All but two of these battalions had marched to Braunau and back. As these two columns began their march Sokolnitz was only lightly defended but, even as II and III Columns prepared to attack, the two battalions of 26ème Légère ordered from Kobelnitz were taking up their positions. The first battalion moved into the smouldering village while three companies of the second occupied the castle – in effect a large fortified country house – and its grounds, some 600 yards to the north. The remaining companies of the second battalion drew up on rising ground west of the castle, alongside two artillery pieces.

With support in sight, Langeron curtailed his artillery bombardment, and even though Kamenski’s brigade had still not joined him, he set his column in motion, aligning his right on Sokolnitz. Leading with the 8. Jäger and the Vyborg and Permsk Musketeers, II Column encountered stiff opposition along the Goldbach right up to the edge of Sokolnitz, suffering many casualties in the process. The first battalion of 26ème Légère in the village – taking advantage of any cover it could find – opened a heavy fire on Langeron’s leading troops, and instead of marching between Telnitz and Sokolnitz as directed by his orders, Langeron allowed himself to be drawn to attack and clear the village.

Further to the north, Przhebishevsky approached the castle, sending a battalion of 7. Jäger out to his right to protect his flank and hopefully make contact with IV Column, which should by now have been moving down from
the plateau towards Kobelnitz. To clear the castle, he ordered General Maior Müller III to advance with his brigade, the remaining battalion of 7. Jäger and three battalions of the Galicia Musketeers: in all about 2,000 men swarmed across the muddy banks of the Goldbach towards the castle, anxiously watched from behind the walls and outbuildings by around 250 men of the 26ème Légère.

Despite their experience, there was little the soldiers of this tiny garrison could do in the circumstances, and they withdrew before the Russians were able to surround them. The retiring light infantry fell back on the main body of their battalion west of the castle, and once they had cleared the field of fire, the two artillery pieces opened up with canister on the disorganised mass below them. This fire added to the disorder, and when Müller fell severely wounded this confusion increased. At this moment the 2/26ème Légère charged forward and drove the bewildered Russians back.

Przhebishevsky, who until the day before had served under Langeron in II Column, knew neither his men nor officers, but rode forward in an attempt to rally them. In this he was successful and then called forward General Maior Strik, with the Butyrsk Musketeer Regiment, to take local command. Strik handled his men well and threw the 26ème Légère back to the high ground once more. Then, making another push, he drove the battalion off the slopes completely and took the two artillery pieces. The 2/26ème fell back to the north-west, towards Maxmiliandorf. Then, while Strik began to reorder his men, Przhebishevsky formed the Narva, Azov and Podolsk Musketeer Regiments as a reserve under General Leitenant Wimpffen, east of the Goldbach and close to the walled Pheasantry.

While the fighting around the castle intensified, Langeron launched his men into Sokolnitz. Two battalions of 8. Jäger and the Vyborg Musketeers stormed the village from the south, while the Permsk and Kursk Musketeers waited in reserve on the eastern bank of the Goldbach. Here, by the bridge, the stream widened and became a difficult obstacle. The battalion of 26ème Légère in the village fought stubbornly, but already outnumbered almost 3-to-1 by the determined Russians, their position became even more vulnerable when part of III Column entered the northern end of Sokolnitz. With casualties rapidly mounting and the Russians closing in on all sides, the 1/26ème abandoned the village and took flight southwards, in the direction of Telnitz. It was now around 9.00am and I, II and III Columns had achieved their initial goals.

But Weyrother’s plan had anticipated little or no opposition at this stage, with the formations advancing in column and only deploying into battle formation once across the Goldbach. Instead, Langeron and Przhebishevsky needed to commit over 5,000 men to clear the determined 1,500 men of the 26ème Légère from Sokolnitz. To the south, Kienmayer and Dokhturov used almost 4,000 troops to drive approximately 2,000 men of 3ème Ligne and the weak battalion of the Tirailleurs du Pô from Telnitz. In effect – adding the
Tirailleurs Corses to the defenders along the Goldbach – 4,000 French had delayed the march of some 28,000 Allied troops for about an hour.

Even though the Goldbach now appeared secure, both Langeron and Przhebishevsky cast concerned glances towards the vast empty space on their right, where IV Column should have been, and of which there was still no news. Although there was little opposition in front of I Column, Buxhöwden refrained from ordering it forward. His orders were specific: each of his three columns should align on one another, and for the moment, II and III Column needed to reform after the battle for Sokolnitz before they could press on. It was the high water mark of the battle for the Allies.

While Napoleon awaited the arrival of his marshals at headquarters at 7.30am, the sound of gunfire from Telnitz confirmed his assumptions on Allied strategy were correct. At the same time the army shuffled into their final positions. Descending from the high ground and destined to lead the attack, Soult’s two divisions passed through the villages of Puntowitz (Saint-Hilaire) and Jirzikowitz (Vandamme). Once in position, they stood silently on the eastern bank of the stream, eagerly awaiting the order to attack, their presence shrouded from the enemy by the fog and campfire smoke that blanketed the valley.

As Napoleon discussed his plans, reports began to arrive with news of the movements of the Allied army. Although some fog still clung to the Pratzen Plateau, a stream of messages revealed that those troops camped near Pratze overnight were marching toward Sokolnitz, and confirmed that fighting was already underway around Telnitz. Napoleon waited: his plan called for an assault on the plateau denuded of troops.

Then, close to 8.00am, the sun rose clean above the heights. It was an extraordinary sunrise – one that many observers later recalled in their accounts – which climbed slowly in the sky, ‘as pure and radiant as in the brightest days of spring’. Then the fog on the heights began to disperse and the assembled officers peered into the glaring light, searching for any sign of enemy formations.

A report arrived soon after, finally confirming that the Allies had abandoned the plateau. It was the news Napoleon desperately hoped to hear. He dismissed his officers back to their men, keeping an ADC from each at headquarters who would carry the word when each corps was to commence its attack. But Maréchal Soult remained with the emperor. Soult, the 36-year-old commander of IV Corps, was extremely ambitious – as well as selfish, avaricious, and difficult to get along with – and also brave. He had excelled in the organisation and training of his corps at Boulogne, and Napoleon had entrusted to him the largest corps of La Grande Armée.

With one of Soult’s divisions – Legrand’s – already engaged along the Goldbach, the responsibility of carrying out the emperor’s great plan fell to the
marshal’s other two divisions. Turning to Soult, Napoleon asked: ‘How long will your troops take to ascend the Pratzen Plateau?’ Soult, considering that Saint-Hilaire now occupied a position in front of Puntowitz, only about 11/2 miles from Pratze, replied confidently ‘Twenty minutes at the most.’ ‘In that case,’ Napoleon pondered, ‘let us wait another quarter of an hour.’ The time was approaching 8.30am.

However, contrary to the information Napoleon had received, the plateau was not clear of Allied troops. Out of sight on the eastern edge of the plateau, above Krzenowitz, IV Column still manned its camp. Under the joint command of the Russian General Leitenant Miloradovich and the Austrian Feldzeugmeister Kolowrat-Krakowsky, the column was strong in numbers but wanting in strength. All the Russian battalions had endured the long march to Braunau and the Austrian troops were a mixed bag. They included only one full regiment, the rest a gathering of individual battalions, many scraped together for the aborted defence of Vienna with only a few weeks training under their belts. Kutuzov attached his own headquarters to this column and in accordance with Weyrother’s plan it was not to move until all three columns forming the left wing were well underway. Until III Column cleared its front, opening the route towards Kobelnitz, there was little for it to do. Due to the disruption caused by the Russian cavalry, Przhebishevsky’s III Column marched late and had only just moved off the plateau when Tsar Alexander and Kaiser Francis arrived with their extensive entourages. Although neither monarch had attended Weyrother’s meeting, they received copies of the plan and Alexander fully expected the march to have commenced at 7.00am as specified and to find the plateau clear of Allied troops. The presence of IV Column still in camp with stacked arms, as well as the presence of Kutuzov himself, surprised Alexander greatly. As Kutuzov approached the imperial party, the tsar, unaware of the delays experienced by II and III Column, demanded: ‘Mikhail Larionovich,
¹⁶
why do you not advance?’ ‘I wait,’ answered Kutuzov, ‘until all the troop columns are united.’ The tsar retorted: ‘We are not on the field of exercise where one awaits the arrival of all the troops to begin the parade.’ ‘Sire,’ responded the old warrior, ‘it is precisely because we are not on the exercise field that I do not begin … Unless you order it!
¹⁷

Already out of favour with the tsar and unprepared to oppose his will, Kutuzov, gave the command for IV Column to take up their muskets, assemble and prepare to march towards Pratze. The time was probably a little after 8.30am. As the column got underway, unknown to them, Miloradovich’s weak and weary Russian battalions and Kolowrat’s largely untried Austrian recruits were on a collision course with Soult’s experienced and battle-hardened veterans.

Meanwhile, back along the Goldbach the situation was also about to change dramatically.

The Allied attacks along the Goldbach had, after a struggle, met with success and Buxhöwden’s wing of the army prepared for the next stage of the plan, to execute the great right wheel against the flank of La Grande Armée. Patches of fog still swirled along the valley as the men regrouped, but there was a distinct absence of urgency. Buxhöwden offered little direction other than ordering two artillery batteries to form up on a spur of high ground overlooking the Goldbach between Telnitz and Sokolnitz, while he settled down to wait. He passed the time drinking heavily.

In complete contrast, 5 miles west of Telnitz at Gross Raigern, urgency was definitely the order of the day. After their marathon march from Vienna it took a little longer than usual for Maréchal Davout to get his depleted corps (Friant’s infantry division, Bourcier’s dragoon division and with 1er Dragon Regiment operating separately) ready to march on the morning of 2 December. However, sometime between 5.30am and 6.00am they started on the road running north-east towards Turas. About 2 miles into the march, at the village of Rebeschowitz, Davout received a message from Napoleon, sent in the early hours of the morning, redirecting him towards Sokolnitz to take command of the right. Accordingly, Davout redirected his command eastwards. He had not progressed far when a second message reached him from Général de brigade Margaron, commanding the light cavalry between Sokolnitz and Telnitz. Margaron called for support for the 3ème Ligne, which was losing its grip on Telnitz. The sound of gunfire was clearly audible and Davout did not hesitate to send the 1er Dragons and GB Heudelet’s brigade (108ème Ligne and the detached
voltigeurs
of 15ème Légère) to their aid, while the rest of his command pressed on towards Sokolnitz.

After these delays and redirections it was about 9.00am when Heudelet approached within cannon range of Telnitz. Corporal Blaise of the 108ème recalled that his regiment:

‘…began to encounter a great number of wounded of [3ème Ligne]. At this moment they made us double forward. Thus I was prevented from biting into a leg of goose which I had ready on top of my knapsack. I had intended to eat it there and then, knowing full well that I would scarcely have the leisure later in the day.’
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This sudden appearance of fresh and determined French troops caused consternation amongst the Allies. Kienmayer got off a few rounds with his artillery but the great cloud of smoke they produced further reduced visibility, already limited by patches of fog, completely obliterating the French advance from view. Then, emerging from the fog and smoke, Heudelet appeared, rushing towards Telnitz with around 900 men in two columns. The right hand column burst into the village and threw back the 7. Jäger, which in turn threw a battalion of
grenz
infantry into utter confusion. Fleeing from this unexpected
onslaught, they fled in great disorder back on to the New Ingermanland Regiment. Generalmajor Stutterheim, who witnessed the rush, was unimpressed with what followed. He observed that this regiment: ‘ought to have supported them; but retreated in a manner, which combined with the fog, threw a part of the column into confusion.’
¹⁹

In their enthusiasm to close with the Russians, the right hand column pursued the fleeing allies beyond the confines of the village, while the left hand column, having advanced against an unfordable stretch of the Goldbach, veered towards a bridge on their left. Determined not to miss out on the chance ‘to come to grips with the vaunted enemy infantry’, these men rushed for the bridge, ignoring the pleas of their officers, and became greatly disordered in their attempt to cross the stream.