Austerlitz: Napoleon and the Eagles of Europe (14 page)

During the day Ney passed on the intelligence he had gathered from his prisoners to Napoleon, who received it in Augsburg. Gradually, Napoleon began to recognise the possibility of a force stronger than a rearguard in Ulm. By evening he began to doubt whether the Austrians were making for Tirol at all and issued new orders. Writing to Murat, he directed the Cavalry Reserve and V Corps to cancel the march on Mindelheim and move towards Ulm via Burgau. Should the Austrians manage to evade Murat’s wing, Napoleon felt sure that Marmont at Augsburg and Soult at Landsberg would halt them on
the Lech. Elsewhere, Bernadotte and the Bavarians were to continue to march on Munich with Davout in support, while the Garde Impériale was to join Marmont at Augsburg. Napoleon remained at Augsburg, having abandoned his plans to travel to Munich, and ended his orders to Murat by exhorting him to ‘march upon the enemy wherever you find him, but with precaution, and keeping your troops in hand. Take no chances, for the first rule of all is to have a numerical superiority.’ But Napoleon had again misjudged Allied intentions and the great blow he planned to unleash on the retreating Austrian formations threatened nothing but thin air. No Austrian forces of any strength remained south of the Danube.

As the Austrians struggled back to Ulm on the night of 9–10 October, the dissension amongst the officer corps increased. The animosity that existed between Archduke Ferdinand and Mack since the Landsberg meeting erupted as Mack refused to be shaken from maintaining his presence at Ulm, while Ferdinand demanded that the army break free from the tightening French noose. The situation worsened further when Ferdinand received a letter that evening from the kaiser, which, following up his recommendation to the archduke at Landsberg, put in writing that he should follow the advice of Mack. In response Ferdinand declared that now, deprived of all initiative, he would no longer accept any share of responsibility. A feeling of suspicion and distrust permeated throughout headquarters. Confirmed as holding supreme command, Mack now busied himself reorganising the structure of the corps under his command and instructed Ferdinand to forward all reports to him. In a despatch sent to the British government on 1 November, Sir Arthur Paget, the British special envoy in Vienna, reviewing the situation wrote that:

‘there existed a degree of jealousy and misunderstanding among the General Officers in that army which led to fatal consequences … By degrees it arrived to such a pitch that no communication took place between the Commander-in-chief (the Archduke Ferdinand) and General Mack, but in writing: No General Officer would attend General Mack unless accompanied by another General Officer to bear witness of what passed. Councils of War were held, and questions of importance were agitated, but General Mack had the means of reducing every body to silence. He had in his pocket a Carte Blanche signed by the emperor to act as he pleased.’
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Mack received a report on the condition of the city’s decaying defences. It declared that the city could not withstand a determined French assault, but while Mack recognised the problem, he affirmed that there was little likelihood of Napoleon attacking Ulm in the immediate future: ‘It rains, it snows, the enemy stays calmly in his dwellings and we will do the same.’
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While Mack remained in Ulm, content to wait for the Russians, his troubles were about to take a turn for the worse with the arrival in the city of Charles Schulmeister. Having left Stuttgart on 10 October, Schulmeister wasted no time in gathering information in inns and eating houses along the way, where his generous budget provided the wine that loosened tongues. Elsewhere in the city two of his trusted colleagues were at similar work. Schulmeister then searched out an old hunting friend, Hauptmann Wendt, head of Mack’s intelligence gathering staff. Having renewed their friendship, Schulmeister wasted no time and infiltrated the Austrian command structure with ease by offering his services to Wendt as a spy, which were accepted, probably on 11 October. But before he could begin to influence matters another battle took place, where Napoleon had least expected it.

Following the day of confusion in VI Corps, Ney finally issued orders for the 11 October, in response to instructions received during the evening ordering the capture of Ulm: ‘It remains the aim to take possession of Ulm, which is important under all circumstances. His majesty gives you a free hand to arrive at this goal before the end of tomorrow (11 October). The dismounted dragoons will be subordinated to you.’
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Accordingly, Ney ordered Dupont to lead his division towards Ulm, where, having taken up a threatening position on the heights behind Haslach, he was to demand the surrender of the city. Ney also informed Dupont that Baraguey d’Hilliers’ division of dismounted dragoons would march forward from their positions on the Brenz river and form his reserve at Albeck. South of the river, Ney’s other two divisions also received orders to advance on Ulm. Malher’s division was to lead with Loison in support. Unfortunately, Ney’s orders suffered a serious delay in transmission.

Unusually, the orders for Dupont and Baraguey d’Hilliers were entrusted to one staff officer. He left Günzburg at 3.00am on the morning of 11 October in a storm of rain and snow and soon became disorientated in the dark. It was only after daybreak that he regained his bearings. Although he was required to deliver the orders to Baraguey d’Hilliers first – to allow this reserve some time to close the gap – finding himself closer to Albeck, he decided to deliver Dupont’s orders first, arriving there at about 9.00 or 10.00am. He then set off to locate Baraguey d’Hilliers and encountered the leading elements of his division at Stötzingen, roughly 10 miles to the rear. Although the reserve division received its orders at around 11.00am–12.00 noon, with his division spread over a wide area, it was not until around 3.00pm that the commander could begin to march in support of Dupont.

In the meantime, Dupont had rapidly assembled his men and was on the road towards Ulm by 11.00am. Around an hour later he approached Haslach, where his leading men encountered an Austrian cavalry patrol. After an exchange of shots the cavalry retired to the Michelsberg with this new intelligence. The senior Austrian army commanders were all in Ulm when
these first shots alerted them. According to Mack’s account, as soon as the gunfire was heard, Archduke Ferdinand, with Feldzeugmeister Kolowrat, several other generals and their ADCs, all immediately rode out of Ulm without requesting Mack to join them or leaving instructions as to where they were heading. Mack presumed Ferdinand would make for the Michelsberg, ‘the key of our position’, as he called it, but when he arrived on the hill, there was no sign of the archduke or his entourage. Then, while Mack surveyed the scene from the left of the position, information reached him that Ferdinand was in an entrenchment far away on the right. During the ensuing battle, with no communication possible between the two most senior officers, the left and right operated completely independently of each other. Despite having established his seniority over Ferdinand it seems Mack still considered his role mainly to formulate and dictate strategy, not to direct the army in battle, for he later wrote: ‘Our right remained inert, because it was not my place to send orders to his Imperial Highness.’
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From his position at Haslach, Dupont could clearly observe that the Austrians were in force on the Michelsberg – perhaps 20,000-strong. This was not the rearguard garrison he expected to encounter. Malher too, approaching Ulm from south of the river, discovered the strength of the force ahead of him and halted. However, despite orders to avoid combat with superior forces, Dupont decided that if he drew back his force of about 5,000 men the Austrians may recognise his weakness, encouraging them to pursue him aggressively. Alternatively, if he confidently took up a position and prepared for battle, he hoped the Austrians would presume him to be the advance guard of a much larger force and delay their own preparations before committing to battle.

Dupont formed the first line of his division in front of Unter- and Ober-Haslach. The two battalions of the 32ème Ligne to the left of the Ulm road and two battalions of the 9ème Légère to the right of it with artillery across the road and protecting the left flank. The two battalions of the 96ème Ligne formed a second line behind the twin villages. He placed the 1èr Hussards on the extreme left flank and his other two cavalry regiments, 15ème and 17ème Dragons on the right behind the 96ème Ligne. Then, as Malher had done at Günzburg, Dupont formed a composite battalion from the grenadier and
carabinier
companies of his regiments and despatched them to defend the village of Jungingen on the western approaches to Haslach. Finally, with battle fast approaching, Dupont directed an aide to find Baraguey d’Hilliers and urge his arrival on the battlefield. It was rapidly approaching 1.00pm, and unfortunately for Dupont, it would be another two hours before this reserve even began to march.

Having been surprised, it took a while for the Austrians to form themselves for battle. FML Loudon moved forward on the left toward Jungingen in what developed into the main aggressive thrust. He commanded IR8 Erzherzog
Ludwig (three battalions), IR11 Erzherzog Rainer (two battalions), IR20 Kaunitz (three battalions) and IR54 Froon (three battalions). However, all were well below strength and Kaunitz was still recovering from the heavy casualties suffered at Günzburg less than forty-eight hours before – Loudon probably commanded around 6,000 men.
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On the right, Ferdinand was indeed apprehensive of Dupont’s position, believing it must herald a major attack. As such the right appears to have taken much longer to get into a position between the villages of Örlingen and Böflingen. Ferdinand, commanding close to 6,500 men from four regiments, then awaited the French onslaught. Dupont’s bold strategy was working.

FML Loudon’s column closed with Jungingen where it first encountered skirmishers outside the village. After brushing these aside he pushed ahead with IR8 and IR20 until discovering the main body of the composite battalion, some 400 men, aggressively defending every building, wall and feature, but particularly the barricaded church. More and more Austrian infantry poured into the village, effectively clearing it except for the church, which proved impossible to overcome. And all the time the defenders were exacting a heavy toll on the frustrated attackers.

Dupont, aware of the importance of Jungingen to the stability of his position, decided that with the Austrians now disorganised by the fighting in the village, and encouraged by the lack of movement shown by the Austrian right, he should launch a counter-attack. For this he ordered forward both battalions of the 9ème Légère, supported by both battalions of 96ème Ligne and a few artillery pieces, leaving just the 32ème Ligne, the rest of the artillery and hussars to oppose Ferdinand.

The 9ème Légère stormed forward with the 96ème Ligne in echelon to their left – some 2,300 men in all – with bayonets fixed. This dramatic onslaught swept up those Austrians emerging from the village and threw them back into the confused struggle around the church. Now surrounded in the village, with little chance of escape, the Austrians surrendered in great numbers. Those who did get away were in no condition to take part in renewed Austrian assaults. Determined to clear Jungingen, Loudon ordered forward IR11 and IR54, leaving just the grenadier battalion of IR54 as a reserve, making repeated assaults against the village during which it changed hands five times. With all his infantry on the right now fighting desperately, Dupont continued to gamble on the inaction of Ferdinand. To support the struggle, he ordered one of his only two uncommitted battalions of the 32ème Ligne to plug the open gap on his right flank between two isolated woods. This move prevented the gap being exploited by the 4. Latour Chevaulegers, who were moving up in support of the infantry attack on Jungingen. Instead, the Latours attacked a battalion of the 96ème Ligne, which formed square and repulsed the attack but then suffered badly from the fire of an Austrian cavalry battery.

In an effort to remove the pressure on the battalion of the 96ème Ligne, Dupont ordered forward his last reserve, the 15ème and 17ème Dragons. With the 15ème leading, the dragoons passed between the woods and emerged into the open just as FML Schwarzenberg arrived with two heavy
cuirassier
regiments, 3. Erzherzog Albert and 6. Mack. Although the Austrian squadrons were probably only at half strength, they still outnumbered the dragoons: first the 15ème were overthrown, then the 17ème. However, both regiments fell back, reformed, and bravely charged again. The ensuing mêlée swirled around with neither side appearing to gain the upper hand, French aggression going some way to balancing their shortage of numbers. However, the Latour Chevaulegers now threw themselves into the combat and their numbers swung the matter decisively in favour of the Austrian cavalry as the Chevaulegers captured an eagle standard of the 15ème Dragons, the first lost by La Grande Armée.

During the actions around Jungingen Mack had inexplicably advanced with the cavalry and become involved in the fighting around the village. During this engagement he sustained a bullet wound, forcing him to retire from the field. With the French cavalry retreating in disorder, Schwarzenberg lost control of his victorious horsemen who careered off in pursuit. They did not stop until encountering the baggage of Dupont’s division near Albeck, which they preferred to ransack rather than using their strength to threaten the rear of Dupont’s command. Meanwhile, some three hours after the first move against Jungingen, Archduke Ferdinand finally began a tentative advance towards Haslach, leading with just one regiment, IR15 Riese. These men quickly became the target of concentrated artillery fire, followed by an attack against its right flank by 1èr Hussards before it marched into musket range of the lone battalion of 32ème Ligne facing them. Assailed on all sides IR15 fell back, pursued by the battalion of 32ème Ligne with artillery support.