Aachen: The U.S. Army's Battle for Charlemagne's City in World War II (17 page)

South from Rimburg, five battalions were operating under the 49th and 275th Divisions. He estimated that the Germans had four battalions of light and medium artillery capable of firing into the 30th Infantry zone, plus a battery of 210mm. guns and one or two larger caliber railroad guns. Observers had detected only an occasional tank in the vicinity. In the matter of reserves, Platt predicted the Germans would have at least one battalion from each of the three regiments of the 183rd Division available for quick counterattacks, while the 116th Panzer Division and contingents of an infantry division recently identified near Aachen might be backing up the line.
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The 183rd Division's 330th Regiment 1st Battalion rifle companies in the Palenberg-Rimburg area were indeed supported by Artillery
Regiment 219, comprised of one battalion with at least three antitank batteries, another battalion with three batteries of 105mm howitzers, and a third battalion with 155mm artillery pieces. The regiment's reserve battalion, the 2nd Battalion commanded by Hauptman Labs, was located just behind Palenberg in the village of Beggendorf and could be used as a counterattacking force. Two regiments comprised
Generalleutnant
Sigfrid Macholz's 49th Division in the attack zone south of Rimburg: the 148th and 149th Regiments. This division was estimated to have 5 battalions with about 450 men in each.
Oberstleutnant
Leyherr's 246th
Volksgrenadier
Division, which Colonel Platt thought might be backing up the 49th and 183rd Divisions, had been ordered to Aachen on 28 September.

The tactical mission for Wolfgang Lange's 183rd
Volksgrenadier
Division, directly opposite the 30th Infantry Division zone of attack, was defense, and above all to hold the
Westwall
. A German Order of the Day captured later sheds keen insight into the thinking of its leaders and men at the time:

Soldiers! Offensive spirit in defense shall not be relaxed. You must show the enemy we are masters of the no man's land. Only he [who] is the strongest who can fulfill this requirement. Prisoners must be brought in who can tell us what is going on on the other side. I know this inspires many soldiers. Whoever is successful will reap the reward. Go to it soldiers: Bring me an American! Comrades, act accordingly because we defend our holy, beloved Fatherland against an opponent who does not belong here and whose greed started this war.

We have many obligations toward our comrades who, in their belief in the future, have given the most that a human being can sacrifice. That should spur us on to pay our debt to them, to hate our enemy, to stop him wherever we can. Some day we again will take the offensive; we again will be the hammer and the enemy the anvil.
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Despite their call to be masters of the no man's land, the grenadiers would be caught flat-footed as defenders of the German border. The division never anticipated that the Americans were going to attack across the Wurm River on the boundary of their left wing. As Lange later noted:

The 183rd Division made feverish defense preparations, expecting that any time after September the enemy would continue [his] attacks. Because of the especially lively reconnaissance activity of the enemy at Geilenkirchen, the division anticipated the main part of the effort to be there.
¹³

To accomplish the task of penetrating the
Westwall
where
Generalleutnant
Lange least expected it, Colonel Johnson's 117th Infantry plans called for an attack in column of battalions from positions near Scherpenseel, and then eastward to capture Ubach, the D-Day objective. Lieutenant Colonel Frankland's 1st Battalion, leading the assault, would strike south of the village of Marienberg, force a crossing of the Wurm River, and then capture the pillboxes between the railroad line and the western edge of Ubach. After gaining this objective, the battalion would take up a defensive position facing south. Company E of Tennessean Maj. Ben T. Ammons's 2nd Battalion, commanded by Capt. Harold F. Hoppe, would attack on the left of the 1st Battalion during the initial assault and clear the village of Marienberg.

Ammons's remaining companies would then move through the gap made in the pillbox belt by Frankland's forces and swing northward to clear Palenberg. Ammons was also assigned the important task of seizing the high ground studded with pillboxes on the north edge of town, as well as taking possession of the slag piles. Lt. Col. Samuel T. McDowell's 3rd Battalion would render fire support at the start of the attack, follow Ammons's companies through the gap created by Frankland's forces, then thrust eastward toward Ubach. Once the bridgehead was firmly secured, the 1st and 3rd Battalions would strike southward toward Alsdorf.

Company A of South Dakota native Lt. Col. William D. Duncan's 743rd Tank Battalion would follow closely behind Frankland's 1st Battalion to the Wurm River, then cross using a separate improvised bridge constructed of hallow culverts reinforced with logs. A tank dozer would push the bridge into the river, cross over and cut the bank on the east side, then return and if necessary prepare the approaches to permit passage of the assaulting armor; a tank would first pull the bridge to the river on a specially made sled.
¹⁴
The 743rd Tank Battalion's continuing mission would be to assist the infantry in assaulting the pillboxes. Company C of the 803rd Tank Destroyer Battalion, commanded by Capt.
Robert Sinclair, would also provide direct support to the infantry. The company would initially assist in the operation from the west side of the river before crossing behind Duncan's tanks to render additional assistance in reducing the pillboxes.

Maj. Antonin Sterba's 105th Engineer Combat Battalion would also support Frankland's breakthrough. Company A, commanded by Capt. James F. Rice, would provide demolition crews and the portable bridges originally conceived by Lieutenant Cushman the night he reconnoitered the Wurm River. In addition, Captain Rice would supply the assault weapons, to include flamethrowers, pole-charges, and satchel charges. His men would also clear mines and other obstacles, as well as physically destroy or fill the pillboxes with dirt after Frankland's companies first had their way with the Germans in them.

The 92nd Chemical Battalion would provide a rolling barrage of 4.2-inch mortars just ahead of the assaulting infantry companies. Capt. Robert Cole would be the forward observer with Company B; these men were responsible for seizing five pillboxes in their sector. Captain Spiker's platoons would follow the rolling barrage, which would move at predetermined distances and time intervals in front of his advancing troops. The mission for the mortars was to keep a wall of high-explosive shells just in front of the moving Americans, forcing any Germans in the assault area to keep their heads down and seek cover until U.S. soldiers were literally on top of them.

Capt. Morris A. Stoffer's Company C would attack to the right of Company B and capture four pillboxes; each company would have two platoons attacking abreast. They would be supported by an assault detachment, a sixteen-man unit carrying the flamethrowers, pole charges, grenades, and bazookas. Lieutenant O’Neil's three squads of seven men each from the Pioneer Platoon would carry the specially constructed ladder boards designed by O’Neil with the help of Staff Sgt. Oliver Pointer of the 105th Combat Engineer Battalion. Pointer supervised the building of these ladders; they were 15–20 feet long and 4 feet wide. They were painted green and would be thrown into the water when the soldiers reached the Wurm. Two would be placed into the banks of the river, forming a V-shaped base. A third, the longer one, would become the actual foot bridge when it was wedged in.

Lt. Stanley W. Cooper's heavy weapons Company D would have its heavy machine gunners split between Companies B and C; one platoon would be on the left flank of Captain Spiker's men and the other on the right flank supporting Stoffer's Company C. Cooper's 81mm mortar platoon would remain in Scherpenseel and participate in the regimental fire plan. Their first mission was to fire along the river line near the left of the battalion sector when the attack jumped off, and then shift to the pillbox area across the railroad track when the assault waves started descending toward the river. Company A, under the command of Capt. John E. Kent, would also remain in Scherpenseel. His men were designated as the reserve company in Lieutenant Colonel Frankland's scheme of operations. If called upon, Kent's men would take over any mission assigned to them.

The plans for Col. Edwin M. Sutherland's 119th Infantry Regiment initially called for Lt. Col. Robert Herlong's 1st Battalion to attack with two companies abreast and first seize Broekhuizen, a tiny village settled in the 1400s, before crossing the Wurm River and securing Rimburg. Company C, commanded by Salt Lake City, Utah, native Lt. Ferdinand Bons, was to attack on the left. Oklahoman Capt. Ross Y. Simmons's Company A would strike to the right. A platoon of Lt. John Lehnerd's Company D heavy machine guns would be assigned to both assault companies. Lehnerd's 81mm mortar platoon would provide general support by firing concentrations on call from a position on the high ground 200 yards south of the east-west Groenstratt-Rimburg road. Herlong's Company B, commanded by Somerset, Kentucky, native Capt. Edward E. McBride Jr., would initially remain in battalion reserve.
¹⁵

Colonel Sutherland, hardened from previous combat in Normandy, later decided to mount the attack with two battalions abreast, instead of sending Herlong's 1st Battalion across the Wurm alone. In order to tie in with the 117th Infantry Regiment assault to the north, Sutherland tasked Lieutenant Colonel Cox's 2nd Battalion, along with a third platoon of the 743rd Tank Battalion's Company C, with attacking to the left of the 1st Battalion toward Rimburg. With this change in plans, Sutherland decided against initially attacking through Rimburg because, as an obvious crossing site, it would be heavily defended from the castle. In this new scheme of operations, Lt. Col. Courtney Brown's 3rd Battalion
would be echeloned to the right rear of the 1st Battalion, protecting the southern flank of the regiment.
¹⁶

Maps supplemented by vertical and oblique photos had been important tools in the regimental- and battalion-level planning for the upcoming assault. The oblique photos taken from ground locations revealed details about the pillboxes that verticals taken from the air could not show. Combined with local terrain reconnaissance of the assault area, this permitted the troops to become thoroughly familiar with their zone of operations.

The previous postponement of the attack on 20 September also gave the 30th Infantry Division ample time for special training in order to succeed at its mission. Preparations were actually divided into three phases, the first being the continuing effort to obtain all possible information on the enemy defensive positions. The second phase, training the assault troops, was carried out during the last week of the month even though the battalions were in the line. Using a rotation system, assault companies and all supporting units were given a two-day training period in the rear. This was followed by the third phase, even more detailed orientation and briefing for every man taking part in the operation.

Rotations began for the 119th Infantry Regiment on 24 September when elements of the battalions were relieved to start this intensive training and tactical planning. During the hours of darkness that night, both platoons of tanks and every man with Companies A, C, and D of Lieutenant Colonel Herlong's 1st Battalion, as well as his headquarters company, withdrew from their positions and moved approximately two miles to the rear. Here they received instruction and training on the use of flamethrowers, demolition charges, and bazookas; tactics and techniques of river crossings and assaulting fortified positions were stressed.
¹⁷

Every element of Lieutenant Colonel Brown's 3rd Battalion underwent similar preparations starting on 25 September, and only Capt. Melvin Reisch's Company F of the 2nd Battalion participated in this training; Lieutenant Colonel Cox's other companies remained in the line. Brown, a veteran of very tough fighting with the 1st Division in North Africa, remembered, “This training was of value to the men, mainly because it included work with tanks and they got to know the armored tactics better.”
¹⁸

Preparations were comparable for Colonel Johnson's 117th Infantry Regiment. Major Ammons's 2nd Battalion relieved Lieutenant Colonel Frankland's 1st Battalion on the night of 24 September and his men withdrew to positions 3 kilometers west of Scherpenseel early the next morning. The first half of that day was spent familiarizing the men with the detailed plans of the attack, and then more specialized training followed. Some of the men practiced extensively with pole and satchel charges, flamethrowers, and Bangalore torpedoes and made dry runs assaulting pillboxes. Others focused on river crossings. This latter training was repeated again and again in a gully with stagnant water about the width of the Wurm River.

“When the battalion went out to the area, only one man knew how to operate a flamethrower,” Lieutenant Colonel Frankland remembered. “All the prior training we had in the states and England was now useless because all of our assault elements had been wiped out in previous battles and there was a complete turnover in battalion personnel. We had to start from scratch. I had learned a lesson. This time instead of training only the assault detachments, we set out to familiarize all personnel with the tools.”
¹⁹

“I think the biggest thing we got out of the training period was Colonel Frankland's speech,” Lieutenant O’Neil of the Pioneer Platoon remembered. “We had gotten a lot of replacements, and the battalion had been in the line for so long that this was one of the first opportunities for the colonel to speak to the whole battalion at once. The keynote of his speech was speed, speed, and more speed across all the terrain up to the pillboxes. He told us we would be home by Christmas if we cracked this line. But the emphasis on speed was what stuck in the boys’ minds.”
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