Aachen: The U.S. Army's Battle for Charlemagne's City in World War II (41 page)

Regiment also warned Corley at the time not to push more aggressive patrolling because his battalion could be needed to help beat back a large-scale enemy thrust that had started up across the 18th Infantry's entire front lines.

The 12th Infantry Division's mission that day was to probe the regiment's newly won positions on the Ravelsberg, recapture Crucifix Hill, throw the Americans out of Verlautenheide, retake the bunkers north of Quinx, and finally sweep into the northern section of Haaren and
reinforce the few Germans that were still holding out in houses here. The attacks were conducted by the 1st Assault Engineer Regiment, the 27 Fusilier Regiment, and the newly activated Sturm Pioneer Regiment 1.

Every unit eventually failed in achieving its mission;
Oberst
Engel explained why:

In a dashing attack, the Haarener Steinkreus [Crucifix Hill] and the pillboxes located on the heights were recaptured, but things looked all the worse with the left battalion of the Sturm Pioneer Regiment 1 [with] respect [to] the attack diverted at Haaren-Verlautenheide. This battalion failed. Over-hasty organization, poor cooperation between officers and men, and the fact that they lacked their own heavy weapons all made themselves seriously felt. The gap to the houses in Haaren was closed, but the battalion itself lost it again, and by evening was back in its initial positions and no longer fit for combat.

The 27 Fuesiliers [
sic
]held out heroically against fierce American counterattacks carried forward with a vast expenditure of ammunition in Verlautenheide…the Haarener Steinkraus itself; i.e., the summit, was recaptured by the Americans during the evening.
²⁶

Nor were Engel's efforts any more successful against the Americans holding onto the Ravelsberg. Just before dark, two enemy tanks, accompanied by twenty grenadiers, attacked Captain Miller's and Captain Hess's positions from the southern edge of Würselen, but the tanks made a hasty departure when artillery fire came down on them; four of the grenadiers were killed in the melee, another was captured, with the rest retreating in a rush under the protective cover of their armored vehicles’ machine guns. “They were stopped cold, with no ground lost,” the 1st Battalion's after-action report noted.
²⁷

Lieutenant Colonel Peckham also earned his pay that afternoon. Earlier in the morning, he had moved the other two Company K platoons into Haaren; along with Captain Folk's Company L, the attack by the 27 Fusilier Regiment was cut off. Their men in two pillboxes just outside of Haaren were the first to cave and surrender; after Russell's men
hustled down to the railroad tracks, they took more prisoners, set up roadblocks, and removed mines from the roadways. They also stopped two enemy motorcycle crews escorting three horse-drawn wagons with rations into Aachen. The entire roadway from Haaren up to Verlautenheide was reopened by dark; antitank guns and tanks were moved up to offer more protection. Peckham moved his CP into Haaren. The two companies promised to him by a liaison officer from Lieutenant Colonel Corley's 3rd Battalion who had come over to the new CP to coordinate the move learned they were not needed. At 2100 hours Corley instead ordered renewed patrolling into the factory district.

By this time a grim
Oberst
Wilck had passed by the red brocade wall hangings and the grand gilt frescos on the pillars supporting the entryway into the Palast Hotel Quellenhof lobby and settled into his command post on a lower level. Before his arrival he had attempted to convince
Generalfeldmarschall
Model to simply surrender Aachen, or at the very least to allow him to fight his way out of the city; Model vigorously turned down both requests. Now his adjutant, a veteran from earlier fighting in North Africa, told him about his opponent in Aachen; the 1st Division was going to be a “tough nut” as they are “probably the best division in the American army,” he said.
²⁸
Wilck would begin to see this for himself the very next day.

Two flight groups of P-47s and one group of P-38s dropped another 5,000 shells and 99 tons of steel bombs, hammering Aachen again on the cloudy morning of 12 October. Then, at 1100 hours, Corley's 3rd Battalion opened the 26th Infantry's preliminary assault by heading for the foundry and rolling mills in the factory district.
²⁹
Capt. Lucien L. Corwell of Marshall, Kentucky, commander of Company K, led the battalion down Julicherstrasse with his platoons in columns. Lt. Walter F. Nechey's Company M followed, with his heavy machine gunners prepared to set up and fire as the rifle companies needed them. Corley's command group was right behind these men. Capt. Seth S. Botts, a University of Kentucky ROTC graduate, with his Company I tanks and TDs, made up the rear guard.

Corwell had planned to take his Company K down a side street to attack the foundry, but as soon as the men began to make their turn here
two enemy machine guns hidden behind wire barricades suddenly opened fire; a tank was called forward, and twelve rounds of 75mm fire from the Sherman knocked down both emplacements. Captain Corwell and his soldiers started down the street only to find themselves confronted by sturdy foundry walls, reinforced with sheets of steel normally used to make German tank parts; direct cannon fire was now useless. Corwell had no choice but to deploy his men into the punishing enemy fire, where they first had to clear paths through barricades and obstacles before they could even storm the buildings in the foundry.

By this time Lieutenant Colonel Corley had made the decision to shift Botts's Company I and Lieutenant Nechey's heavy weapons company to the right of Company K; he assigned these men to nearby streets and other buildings so that the battalion could eventually link up at the local railroad station. Through the afternoon, the German defenders launched numerous counterattacks, most directed at Corwell's men in the foundry. Vigorous hand-to-hand fighting and loud, rapid small-arms fire answered these savage assaults as the skirmishes raged on. When an entrance to a building was finally forced and the ground floor secured, the Germans had to be pried out of the cellars with hand grenades and mortars. Tunnels between buildings were discovered; these also had to be cleared. Many desperate Germans found temporary refuge in the patchwork of stinking sewer pipes that connected to the different buildings. In the prolonged bloody fighting, the Americans prevailed; few Germans wanted to become prisoners. Most of the defenders chose to hold their posts to the end. Corwell's riflemen or Nechey's machine gunners shot the ones who tried to run.

At 1345 hours Companies K and I made contact near the railroad station; a little over an hour later Lieutenant Colonel Corley reported to the regiment's S-3, Maj. Henry N. Clisson, and told him that the factory area had been cleared. Total prisoners taken reached 125; American casualties were amazingly low with just one man killed and eleven wounded, but nine others were missing and likely captured.
³⁰
Later that evening, Company C was released from its assignment with the 3rd Armored Division in Stolberg, by which time it “looked like a section of Pittsburgh planked down with slag heaps.”
³¹
These men took over positions held by Company L, commanded by Capt. William F. Chaplin, a twenty-seven-year-old native of Altoona, Pennsylvania, permitting his soldiers to join up with the rest of the 3rd Battalion that night.

While this move was taking place, Lieutenant Colonel Daniel was assembled with all of his company commanders and their platoon leaders. The time had arrived for a last-minute review of the 2nd Battalion's plan of attack for the next morning; they still needed to work out the details. Exchanges to determine friend from foe were given; the password would be “Texas,” with the proper reply, if friendly, “Star.” Jeeps and aid trucks had been getting flat tires faster than they could be fixed, so to facilitate medical evacuations Daniel had obtained some fully tracked Studebaker-built M29 cargo carriers; the soldiers called them “weasels.” But the biggest concern everyone shared was just how the tanks and TDs would fare when they tried to get over the railroad embankment. “We didn't want to be without these weapons any longer than necessary,” Daniel explained that night.
³²

This concern was justified. The railway tracks were at different elevations around Aachen, but on Daniel's immediate front they were 30 feet high to his left, and about 15 feet on his right. The armored vehicles needed a spot where they could get over the tracks, otherwise the only means of ingress would be through the debris-filled underpass at the Rothe Erde railway station; even here, any breakthrough would be delayed while engineers cleared the obstructions. All agreed this was not an acceptable risk, so Daniel made a decision. He sent the tank platoon leader out with a strong patrol, and they returned around midnight with word that they had found a spot where the three tanks would not get bogged down in the mud, and still be able to get up enough speed to climb over the embankment and down the other side. The far side of the bank was indeed steep; the tank platoon leader even wisecracked about expecting to reach enough speed while climbing up the embankment so the 35-ton tanks could somersault and land upright if they had to. This undoubtedly lightened the mood in the CP, but Daniel decided two tanks would be plenty under the circumstances; others would go in when the underpass was cleared out. They continued going over last-minute details well into the night.

Outside of Aachen, the Germans again focused on the Ravelsberg during 12 October. At about 0800, twelve of their tanks came down the Aachen-Würselen road and turned into the woods on the southeast corner of the hill. More armored vehicles arrived during the day. Company B's Captain Miller made frequent calls for artillery fire, but results could
not be observed because more and more tanks were able to find cover under the trees; air support requests were answered, but the planes arrived too late to spot any of the enemy tanks. By afternoon, hostile artillery fire was adding to the growing tension, and just before dark about a hundred Germans were observed advancing from the woods, well extended in columns of twos. This time the Americans unleashed their more mobile “goon guns,” 4.2-inch chemical mortars with 25-pound heavy explosive shells and a payload-on-target rate far faster than the 105mm artillery shells had been providing; they quickly broke up the attack. The rest of the night was quiet, interrupted by only occasional enemy mortar fire and a call Captain Miller received from Lieutenant Colonel Learnard. He wanted Miller to know that division had reported there was now a possibility he was going to be hit by the 116th Panzer Division.

This was good intelligence, but on the night of 12–13 October the 116th Panzer Division was ordered to release only Combat Group Rink for the Aachen fight; the division itself was entangled in bitter fighting near Birk. Battalion Rink was named for its commander, high-spirited
Obersturmführer
Herbert Rink; he would not get into Aachen with his men for another two nights. “The presence of the division and Combat Group Rink created some worry in the heads of the American leaders,” noted the 116th Panzer Division's postwar historian, to which he added quite correctly, “Nevertheless, the commanders insisted on continuing the attack on Aachen.”
³³

H-hour for Colonel Seitz's 26th Infantry on 13 October was delayed one hour to 0930 to accommodate final coordination for artillery support and to wait out yet another air strike. The weather had improved; it was clear but much colder than it had been for the past several days. Flight groups appeared in the brilliant sunshine just ahead of 0900 and began dropping what would become 11.5 tons of bombs on Aachen, this time avoiding the 500 yards of frontage by the railroad embankment that Daniel's forces would use as their avenue of advance into the city. When it became the artillery's turn, three battalions of light, medium, and heavy guns bracketed on the 400 yards closer to the 2nd Battalion's line of departure. Captain Fuller's 81mm mortar sections launched their explosives into the nearest 100 yards at the same time. Then at exactly 0930 the men of Companies E and F heaved about 1,000 hand grenades
over the bank, removing any doubt in the minds of German soldiers in the 6th, 8th and 14th Companies of the 352nd Regiment that American infantry would be next.
³⁴

Indeed they were. The men of Captain Weeks's Company F scrambled over the top of the embankment down into the city where they quickly spread out along Stolbergerstrasse, and headed for a section of block houses where fifteen stunned Germans of the 6th Company were taken prisoner. Avoiding exposure on the open street, Weeks's platoons then started moving through an orchard off to the right side of the roadway. They experienced little return fire, but when the 3rd Platoon emerged from this cover, the men started receiving heavy machine-gun fire from the direction of Hohenzollern Platz. It was fortunate the two tanks that had concerned the commanders the previous night had by this time been able to negotiate the steep descent into the city; the 3rd Platoon scout on point was killed by the enemy fire, but a tank was now close enough to open up on the German machine-gun location, killing its gunner and ammo bearers. By 1115 hours Company F was close to the old limestone mausoleum at the Karhol Friedhof cemetery, the site of Catholic graves dating back to the early 1800s.
³⁵
The cemetery was located at a bend where Stolbergerstrasse came into Adalbertstein Weg at St. Josefs Platz, where the great gothic church here would be casting shadows over bullet-pocked grave markers bruised by German and American gunfire in the fighting ahead.