Aachen: The U.S. Army's Battle for Charlemagne's City in World War II (13 page)

The morning proved very problematic. When the 3rd Platoon of Company F tanks first started down the small valley to reach the river,
the tankmen in the lead vehicle quickly discovered that they had read their maps in error when the original order was given. There was no road on the near side of the Vicht River on which the eight tanks of the platoon could skirt around the woods. Upon this discovery, a Sergeant Watson returned in his tank to meet with Major Mills and discuss the situation. Mills, in turn, elected to personally reconnoiter for an alternate route that would bring the task force into Stolberg, but found that none existed without having to cross the river. Since the only bridge in the area was blown, this was impossible for his tanks.

By this time Mills's infantry had moved out. One platoon from Captain Vaughn's Company I had been attached to the task force the previous night, and these men joined with what remained of Company F's infantry, itself not much more than half a platoon in strength. Meeting little opposition, this small combined force managed to reach the river. Even though the tanks could not cross, the infantry was ordered to ford the river, attack across the woods on the opposite side, and move into Stolberg. Mills, meanwhile, had decided to send his Company F tanks over the ridge near Burgholzerhof where they could pivot and join the infantry forces.

After crossing the Vicht, the infantry drew small-arms fire when they swung west into the adjacent wooded hills; this made further advances impractical without additional support. Sergeant Watson, who was in charge of the light tanks trying to cross the ridge at Burgholzerhof, took it upon himself to conduct another reconnaissance. He soon reported to Mills by radio from a position in partial defile near the outskirts of Stolberg, telling him that there were no visible antitank guns. Soon after this conversation took place, however, the Germans announced their presence with rifle, machine-gun, and bazooka fire, followed by grenades. This had all come from buildings on the edge of the factory town. Still, this did not deter Sergeant Watson. Again he got on the radio to Major Mills, this time informing him that while the ground down the open hill fronting Stolberg was marshy and deploying the tanks here would be difficult, it was still possible for them to get through.

Mills agreed; he ordered the Company F platoon to cross the ridge and join Sergeant Watson. But when the lead tank moved over the crest, “difficult” immediately became the operative word to describe the mission. This armored vehicle drew antitank fire and was knocked out; the
rest of the platoon then withdrew behind the ridge into an orchard. Watson, still observing from his advance position on the edge of Stolberg, reported that the enemy was “shooting out his periscopes, firing bazookas and throwing grenades at close range.” He was unable to fire back without exposing himself, so Mills decided to lay down a smoke screen to allow the sergeant to withdraw. However, “it became too hot before the artillery could lay down any smoke, so [Watson] pulled out from his forward outpost and ran the gauntlet of enemy fire up over the hill back to safety.”
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Three of his tank commanders had been wounded by enemy small-arms fire by this time, but during his own time at the edge of Stolberg Watson had been able to direct artillery and mortars on his platoon's opposite numbers perched on the buildings in town. It was 1130 hours when he safely returned.

While Task Force Mills was attempting its ill-starred foray into Stolberg earlier that morning, Major Adams's 1st Battalion of the 26th Infantry Regiment had worked its way farther into Diepenlinchen. Accompanied by tanks, Captain Simons's Company B had secured the factory during the early going, and then proceeded through approximately 100 yards of rock piles, crumbled wall, and other obstacles while receiving bazooka, grenade, machine-gun, and mortar fire from the companies of the 89th Grenadier Regiment's 1st Battalion still in the village. Company B had to break off the attack and pull back.

The 89th Grenadier Regiment's Sgt. Hans Martens of 13Co was still in front of Diepenlinchen that morning. He remembered:

The US [forces] attacked and pushed the 1st Battalion, which had settled in Diepenlinchen, back to its marshalling area of the previous day after hard fighting. The battalion did not tell us of this because we were kept very busy by the enemy. We were approached by a tank mounted by infantry and equipped with a machinegun fastened to the hatch of its turret. Its fire, which was served from a distance of only 75 meters, gave us a great deal of trouble.

Dismounted infantry, deployed in the terrain, also fired at us. Despite a large expenditure of ammunition, the results were not very successful. We had taken cover against the tanks in foxholes,
which due to the rocky underground were only half a meter deep. Shelling continued until [our] counterattack was launched in the late morning. Covered by a smoke screen, the enemy withdrew.
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Captain Anderson's Company A also jumped off for Weissenberg again at noon. Two of his platoons, as well as another two tank platoons, deployed into the 400 meters of open but level ground in front of the village only to be deluged with German weapons of every caliber, including 20mm cannon fire. Adams, grimly facing the costly losses his battalion had taken in the past few days, had sent the following message just hours earlier to his commanding officer, Colonel Seitz:

It is recommended that my battalion be returned to the unit so I can get replacements and re-equip. My unit has suffered heavy battle casualties, and yesterday and today I am beginning to get men suffering from combat fatigue. As of this AM my fighting strength was as follows: A-99, B-91, C-62, D-96. Yesterday I suffered very heavy casualties as follows: 8-KIA, 50 WIA, 57 MIA. I am still attacking today against an objective that is very difficult to take. I shall undoubtedly suffer further heavy casualties. At the present rate I am rapidly losing my combat effectiveness. Yesterday Company C was placed on an independent mission and was caught in a trap. The company commander is MIA; Lieutenant Emory Jones is in command. He has one other officer. The company has 55 MIA's.
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This request could not be granted on 19 September; the urgencies of war prevailed. In the new scheme of operations, Lieutenant Jones's undermanned Company C, accompanied by Task Force Hogan's Company G and Company H tanks, was to swing around to the east in an effort to envelope the enemy positions in Diepenlinchen. Simons's Company B would continue through the rock piles toward the eastern part of the stronghold, and Captain Anderson's Company A was to make another frontal attack toward Weissenberg. Lieutenant Colonel Hogan had previously considered this envelopment, but he had rejected it
because his personal reconnaissance had convinced him that the ground to the south and southeast of the factory area was boggy and therefore unsuitable for his tanks. Lovelady's task force was to also go to the northwest across the field to the left of Anderson's men and secure the woods bordering the western edge of Diepenlinchen. This would prevent any counterattacks by the Germans from the direction of Weissenberg, which remained the final objective of the day's plans.

When the initial attack began at 1600, Company C quickly lost two of its tanks to heavy artillery, antitank, and mortar fire. Another tank was mired down and then abandoned, only to be destroyed in place when the tankmen and Lieutenant Jones's infantry withdrew. Captain Simons's Company B managed to gain another 200 yards after struggling across the rock piles, but his men could not make any further gains due to the intense fire they received from nearby enemy forces who were protected by a maze of thick walls and supporting pillars. “It was like a trap,” Hogan later recalled. “The advance stopped and the troops pulled back at dark. Enemy mortars and artillery from 1600 on plastered the area.”
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[Our Company G and H] tanks could not advance because of the terrain; in part they were exposed to fire and elsewhere the piles of stone and slag were too steep. During the attack the tanks moved without infantry up into the open field southwest of Weissenberg, hoping that the mortar and artillery fire would shift to them and away from the infantry. This did not succeed, however, and at 1830 the tanks withdrew to the south of Diepenlinchen. By this time the two companies combined had 20 tanks; Company H having lost six of its fifteen and Company G having lost two of its thirteen.

Lt. Hans Zeplien of 14Co remembered 19 September as a harsh day that inflicted losses on his tank destroyer company in the fight for Diepenlinchen and also wounded the 89th Grenadier's 1st Battalion commanding officer:

The enemy tank and infantry counterattack [was] partly directed towards the open flank of the 1st Battalion. In the course of that
counterattack they reinforced both of their attacking units. The battalion, now weakened by losses, had to evacuate the foremost streets of Diepenlinchen [in the morning], and withdraw to the Weissenberg slag piles, leaving behind about 30 wounded, including Captain Gronboldt, the commander of the battalion. The wounded had to wait until the next night before they could be taken out of the tunnel at Diepenlinchen by the regiment's engineering platoon who transported them to the village of Werth.

The 14 Co had to register 11 wounded near Diepenlinchen (7 of the 1st Platoon; 4 of the 2nd Platoon) and 14 men were missing. This made the personnel set out of action the past two days amount to 16 men out of 48 in the 1st RPzB Platoon (bazookas), 31 out of 48 of the 2nd RPzB Platoon, and 4 out of the 3rd “AT” Platoon (Type 37, 7.5cm trench guns).

Losses in terms of personnel and equipment were high on the American side as well, as could be realized by the marked slackening of their pressure in the course of 19 September.
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Major Adams had held up Anderson's Company A while the action was taking place in Diepenlinchen, waiting until Task Force Lovelady could move up to his left and provide support. Just before 1900, all VII Corps artillery within range delivered a ten-minute preparation in advance of this offensive, concluding with smoke to conceal the movement of the infantry and tanks. Anderson's men became victims of this fire when a number of rounds landed short, causing tree bursts that fell on the rear of the company. All of his men sought cover while a thirty-minute delay was called so forward observers could register again on the enemy targets. Tree bursts still hit the area when the artillery fire renewed, once more sending Anderson's infantry for cover. Adams's concern about more casualties in his message to Colonel Seitz was founded. On 19 September he lost another twenty-two men.
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Task Force Lovelady did not fare much better when they attacked. First, Captain Amborst's Company D was hamstrung by a shortage of Browning automatic rifles (BARs), and his men had no radios; they also lacked mortars and did not have a single bazooka available to them. The company got thirty replacements during the day, but a likely grateful
Amborst did not enter the fight. Instead, he took his men nearer to Dorff with the mission of strengthening defenses in that area.

Captain Getter's Company H saw far more action during the day. After the second VII Corps’ artillery preparation, two of his platoons attempted to jump off, with one leading and a second following right behind. Lieutenant Hulstedt commanded the latter unit, Getter's 3rd Platoon. Smoke had aided the first platoon, which was led by Sgt. Francis X. Bell in their attack, but Hulstedt's men were quickly pinned down by enemy fire that came in from the direction of tiny Hochwegerhof. Vaughn's Company I faced a similar fate; his men got about a hundred yards into the field fronting their line of departure, and then enemy artillery and mortar fire rained down, forcing the soldiers to retreat back to their start line.
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Several enemy tanks were also firing into the wooded area where Getter's platoons had been stopped, so a change in plans came about. His men moved over to the orchard occupied by Task Force Mills. Here Lieutenant Hulstedt was given the mission of cleaning out Hochwegerhof and the hedgerows near a house that was burning. This attack was unsuccessful. They captured an enemy bazooka team, but by nightfall Hulstedt's men were back in a defensive position in the orchard. Sergeant Bell's 2nd Platoon was to their right, stretched out toward the enemy-held woods, looking at the site of Company H's untaken objective that afternoon.
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Heavy smoke that had been laid down at 1600 by 81mm mortar fire proved more helpful to Task Force Mills when they first started their attack. While these mortars, joined by assault guns and three tank destroyers from Company B of the 703rd Tank Destroyer Battalion, protected his left flank, Mills's armored vehicles advanced up to the orchard area near another house in Hochwegerhof. Here hotter-than-hell enemy mortar and artillery fire thwarted the attack; one of Company F's light tanks was quickly knocked out by antitank fire. A later report describing the day's continued action noted:

Mills and [Captain] McGeorge roved the area firing on [our] infantry in the orchard and [from the] house where the enemy continued to counterattack by fire. Mills had the tree immediately in front of his tank blown up by a shell, but the attack was repulsed. Heavy explosive, anti-phosphorous and smoke were
again fired into the house, but it was hard to get the enemy out. In the meantime, [our] tanks took hits from the enemy bazooka fire. There was little order to the fighting. Tanks and infantry mixed and infiltrated amongst the enemy.
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The same report shed more light on the plight of Captain Getter's Company H that afternoon. He held command of both his platoons, as well as Captain Vaughn's twenty men already with Task Force Mills. At 1900 Mills also put his own Company F infantry—all fifteen men—under Getter's command, telling him to organize a defensive position for the night in the orchard. Earlier, Captain McGeorge had brought up an engineer platoon, and he put these men along the high ground facing in this direction. This line was extended farther by McGeorge's reconnaissance platoon. One platoon of Mills's Company A light tanks also remained on the line while the rest pulled back into Niederhof. The remainder of Vaughn's Company I forces could not move over until later that night.