Aachen: The U.S. Army's Battle for Charlemagne's City in World War II (19 page)

October 2 dawned bright and clear; the heavy rains had stopped and the skies became a brilliant blue. At 0845, combined XIX Corps Artillery, VII Corps Artillery, and 30th Infantry Division Artillery started delivering the thundering first blows of the assault. The known enemy positions across the Wurm were sealed off by tremendous concentrations on crossroads and along the avenues of approach to the river. “The whole landscape seemed alive with the winking flashes from their muzzles and when the big 240mm weapons fired, the sound hit one on the chest like the blow of a fist,” remembered war correspondent Drew Middleton.
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The 62nd Armored FA Battalion fired 360 rounds of 105mm destructive volleys into the left flank of the 117th Infantry's zone of attack.
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The 118th FA, in direct support, launched 1,000 rounds, covering the triangle bounded by Palenberg-Rimburg-Ubach.
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The 258th FA Battalion fired the first of what would be 136 rounds at the pillboxes marked in both the 117th and 119th Infantry zones, scoring hits on every one of them.
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Lt. Col. Patrick E. Seawright's 197th Field Artillery Battalion reinforced this fire with their 105mm guns. Through midmorning, Captain Sinclair's M10s of Company C, 803rd Tank Destroyer Battalion, fired another 300 heavy explosive and antiphosphorous rounds at the slag piles on the east edge of Palenberg.
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At H-120 (0900) the air strike began. During the fifteen minutes prior to the fly-in, XIX Corps artillery also fired on a total of fifty-one different enemy antiaircraft installations, while VII Corps artillery concentrated on another forty-nine. DIVARTY participated by firing at antiaircraft positions plotted by the Photo Intelligence Team and the Air OPs of the division. The effort was greatly restricted because of an ammunition shortage. Instead of firing five to six battalion volleys on each enemy battery location, it was only possible to put down one or two volleys.
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The enemy's artillery fire was consequently not silenced.

Nor was the air strike particularly effective. Of the nine groups of medium bombers (A-20 Havocs and B-26 Marauders), just four dropped their bombs on the targeted area after flying in from the southwest. The other five groups made their approach more from the west, flying in over the assembled masses of 30th Infantry Division friendly forces. This caused considerable confusion among the pilots; they were unable to obtain corrected approaches through ground contact. “Consequently, the medium bombing was almost a total failure, as all ground observers
agreed,” noted a later report.
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Beggendorf, location of the 330th Infantry Regiment's reserve 2nd Battalion command post, was in the saturation area; it was not hit.
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There was one important instance where the mediums did do the job, however. “The last bunch that came along, seeing the red smoke and not knowing what else to do, dropped two loads and took the back half of Palenberg off the map,” noted Colonel Johnson, the 117th Infantry Regiment's commanding officer.
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When the two groups of fighter bombers (distinctive twin-boom P-38 Lightnings and P-47 Thunderbolts) came in, they met with somewhat better success. Their gasoline “jelly bombs” landed in close proximity to their pillbox targets, the pilots aided in some cases by red marking smoke still being laid down by the artillery. Since most of the enemy troops were inside the pillboxes, however, the fighter planes’ overall effect was also judged to be “negligible.” Later, platoon leaders of Captain Stoffer's Company C agreed. “Fire bombs were seen dropping from three or four planes, but no appreciable damage appeared.”
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In the 119th Infantry zone, the intended burning of the woods and routing of the enemy forces from this stand of trees by numerous jelly bombs failed; the dampness from the heavy rains the day before and the wet, rich green foliage were the two main reasons the bombs’ oil failed to ignite in the area.

Immediately following the air bombardment, other supporting weapons began delivering more preplanned fires. In the 119th Infantry zone, Lt. Michael Baran's Company M mortars fired 1,100 rounds, mostly into pillbox locations to keep their occupants inside their boxes.
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Lieutenant Lehnerd's Company D 81mm mortars fired supporting rounds, even though they lacked good observation from the hillside where they were emplaced west of Groenstratt; it was impossible to see the pillboxes along the west edge of the woods on the right of the 1st Battalion's route of advance.
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The mortars of the 117th Infantry's Company D fired the first of what would become 1,525 rounds on 2 October, initially at the river line in Frankland's zone and then at pillbox locations and their outlying trenches across the river.

It was now up to the infantry; H-hour was minutes away. Along the line of departure on the right flank of the 1st Battalion of the 117th Infantry, Captain Simmons's Company A and Lieutenant Bons's Company C of the 119th Infantry were abreast. Simmons was on the right; his
1st and 3rd Platoons were the assault elements. Bons's Company C was in the center. To the left, Capt. Buford C. Toler's Company E was arrayed in preparation for their attack on Rimburg; his 1st and 3rd Platoons would lead in the assault with Captain Reisch's Company F following.

Lieutenant Colonel Frankland's companies were also very eager to attack. Captain Spiker's Company B was on the left flank; Borton's 2nd Platoon was the leftmost unit while Lieutenant Cushman's 1st Platoon was on the right. To their south, Captain Stoffer's Company C was in line with Lt. Clarence J. Johnson's 1st Platoon and ready to jump off on the left; Lt. Thomas E. Stanley's 3rd Platoon was on the right. To their front across the wide-open beet fields all of the men could observe the brink of the hill, beneath which the Wurm River would eventually come into view. Farther northward stood Captain Hoppe's Company E; his men were set to attack through Marienberg to the river, protecting the 1st Battalion's left flank.

At precisely 1100 hours, the first rolling barrage was laid down by the 4.2-inch chemical mortars in both regiments’ zone of attack. The barrage delivered two rounds of heavy explosive per mortar, and was timed at five-minute intervals to be “rolled” another 100 yards ahead of the infantry. Twelve grids marked each attack zone. When Captain Simmons's Company A left its line of departure, the assaulting platoons received just three rounds. Lt. Raymond C. Filipino, the 92nd Chemical Battalion's forward observer with the 119th Infantry, later stated “the infantry did not push forward fast enough to have it roll. Concentrations were then repeated at the first line.”
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Lieutenant Bons's Company C received a few incoming artillery shells after his soldiers jumped off. They carried three heavy footbridges, which interfered with their ability to maneuver and, combined with the confusion accompanying the first enemy artillery volleys, slowed their advance over the road at Broekhuizen down to the Wurm River. It was nearly an hour before Lt. Sylvester G. Shetter's 2nd Platoon started to place its bridge in position; the far end of it was underwater. At the time enemy machine-gun fire was already coming in from two pillboxes just west of the railroad line, near where a road crossed the railroad; some of the Germans could be seen firing with their machine guns strapped to their hips. Then another pillbox camouflaged as a house opened with heavy small-arms and automatic-weapon fire on the platoon's left.

Lt. Victor B. Ortega's 3rd Platoon at first fared a bit better; his men got their bridge in with less difficulty and crossed over the river under lighter machine-gun fire. Then as Ortega worked his men up to the open field near the railroad line, fire from another two pillboxes on the platoon became heavier. Sporadic hostile mortar and artillery fire also landed on the troops. Thirteen casualties were suffered and suddenly no further advance was possible by either platoon.
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As Bons's men engaged in a firefight in the scattered patches of woods just to the east of the river, the right platoon of Captain Simmons's Company A advanced to the railroad tracks. It was now 1200 hours. Two German companies of the 42nd Fortress Machine Gun Battalion manned the defenses in the immediate area, including the pillboxes and the extensive network of field fortifications in the woods. Friendly artillery and mortar fires proved ineffective; as it started to fall, the enemy took shelter in the pillboxes. When the barrages lifted the Germans would rush out and repel their attackers. “Primarily, it was the quick enemy small arms fire that resulted any time anyone so much as poked his head above the railroad embankment,” Simmons later recalled. “Then, too, as the men became pinned down mortar and artillery fire began to take considerable casualties.”
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A later account detailed just how harsh the conditions had become:

Throughout the woods the camouflage on the pillboxes and emplacements were superior, thus making it virtually impossible to locate these positions at distances greater than 25 to 50 yards. Both assault companies had been stopped by the final protective fires of the enemy. They were receiving enemy fire not only from their front, but also from the Rimburg Castle on their left flank and from the wood line and anti-tank ditch to their right front.
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Captain Toler's Company E met a similar fate. Lieutenant Lehnerd's 81mm mortars had been set up on the crest of the hill overlooking the river, and along with the rolling barrage these combined fires permitted Toler's platoons to first approach Rimburg in the face of little small-arms fire. As they got closer to the river, however, his 1st Platoon suffered considerable casualties. While there did not seem to be too many Germans in Rimburg itself, enemy artillery fire had increased; mortar fire also
came in. The company nevertheless moved even closer to the river, availing themselves of what little cover that could be found, but as they advanced they ran into heavier small-arms fire that came in from the Rimburg Castle. While one platoon did manage to work its way down to the river bank, its men had to wait another hour until Toler's support platoon brought foot bridges to them; the assault platoons had dropped them on their way toward Rimburg when the German shelling started.
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During the wait, Captain Reisch's Company F had come down to the right of Toler's men. They had expected to use Company E's bridges, which were not in, so Reisch's attached engineers improvised an overpass from doors and fences that they had gathered; the Company F platoons were soon able to start across the river. Their move was greatly facilitated by the presence of a barn across the Wurm, which protected the troops from enemy fire as they crossed. Right after this, Captain Toler's support platoon arrived with the foot bridges and they were able to quickly place them across the river. Using the company's light machine guns and 60mm mortars as a base of protective fire, Toler gradually worked his riflemen across the Wurm; the machine gunners followed while the mortar men stayed back. “All we did was get the men across,” Lt. Warne R. Parker recalled. “Then we were pinned down by automatic fire from the wall of the castle.”
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It would now be hours before the 119th Infantry Regiment's assault could move forward. To their left, Lieutenant Colonel Frankland's attack had made better progress but not without costly setbacks. Captain Hoppe's Company E, meantime, was having its own difficulties reaching the Wurm River. The company did not have the benefit of a rolling barrage when these men jumped off and only one heavy machine-gun section accompanied them in direct support. Hoppe had moved his company out in platoon columns. The 1st Platoon was on the left with his own light weapons platoon and the Company D machine-gun section right behind them. The 2nd platoon was on the right; the 3rd Platoon followed in support.

Minutes after the company left its line of departure, heavy enemy mortar and artillery fire dropped among the haystacks as the men crossed the 400-yard open field on their way toward Marienberg. Then, as the 1st Platoon got closer to the western edge of the village, small-arms fire came
in from a row of houses. Captain Hoppe ordered the heavy machine gunners to emplace their weapons, and these men started to work over the buildings from window to window. The main body of the company quickly reached a road parallel to the village, where the sniping fire increased in volume. Hoppe then decided to turn his 2nd and 3rd Platoons sharply southeastward while the 1st Platoon attacked through a wooded area beside the row of houses delivering the fire. These men met the heaviest resistance; one squad forked off to the left to clean out the houses on the north side of Marienberg. Another started to mop up closer to the Marienberg-Palenberg road. But as both squads began to move through the village an enemy shell landed among a bunched-up group of men, killing five, including Sgt. Joseph A. McPartland, one of the squad leaders.
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Then, at 1145 while Captain Hoppe was a mere 75 yards away, a church in the center of Marienberg suddenly blew up. He later recalled:

Evidently the initial sniper fire which we received on the outskirts of Marienberg was from a small delaying force which was giving the enemy time to set off their prepared mines and dynamite in the church. The explosion was just like Hollywood, with timbers and bricks hurtling hundreds of feet into the air and the huge square steeple toppling. It must have taken plenty of dynamite because the brick walls were more than seven feet thick. I had used the steeple as an OP, but found it unsatisfactory because the walls were too thick for unrestricted vision through the holes. It's hard to tell whether or not there were many 1st Platoon casualties as a direct result of the explosion, or why the Germans blew it up, except to prevent its use as an OP, or because they thought we already had people in it observing.
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Right after the church was reduced to rubble, enemy artillery volleys screamed in more intensely. The 1st Platoon also received renewed small-arms fire from three brick houses on their left. They dug slit trenches right along a hedge just 50 yards north of the ruined church, and many men took cover. Soon afterward, the situation changed dramatically when the platoon leader became a casualty; minutes later the heavy weapons machine gunners arrived. These men quickly ganged up in the
cellar of a house just north of the church, where fifteen to twenty American soldiers who were wounded had already been moved to safety.