Aachen: The U.S. Army's Battle for Charlemagne's City in World War II (18 page)

“I had learned in the hedgerow country [of Normandy] that if you sat still you got mortars and artillery, and so there and here too I said to my men to keep moving fast and they will have less casualties,” Frankland added, putting Lieutenant O’Neil's recollections in perspective. “Several of the 1st Battalion officers seconded this thought. I told the men we'd have to get down to the river somewhere between a fast walk and a dog trot. And that's just what they did in battle.”
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By this time the 1st Battalion was already well acquainted with the attack zone. Lieutenant Colonel Frankland's S-2, Lt. Ernest R. Morgan, and Staff Sgt. Claude L. Flow Jr. had constructed an elaborate sand-based
model of the area by boarding up the sides of an existing 5- by 12-foot table in an old German headquarters building that the battalion was using as its command post. A composite description of the sand table arrangement was provided in interviews with battalion officers at the time, and sheds light on its value in the continuing preparation for the operation:

Cabbage leaves were used for vegetation, inked wooden blocks for houses, and numerous other expedients showed space relationships and strength of pillboxes, wire, the Wurm River, the ridge west of the river, the railroad and other terrain features. Pillboxes were numbered in red and company and platoon responsibilities were clearly drawn on the sand table. Everybody understood and visually saw his mission.

From a planning standpoint Company A had the toughest job. Its commanders and men could not concentrate on certain, specific pillboxes, terrain and points along the Wurm River because they could not be sure they would be operating in the B or C Company sector; so they had to prepare for everything. Night after night while we were waiting in Scherpenseel, Captain John Kent would pull his support platoon out of the line and come back to the battalion CP to pore over the sand table until close to midnight.
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The impact was appreciated through the ranks. “The men knew the big and little picture so well that they conversed freely by number about the enemy pillboxes, and frequently showed in their arguments that they knew their flank units and their missions,” stated Lt. John M. Maloney, leader of Company A's Weapons Platoon.
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After dark on 26 September the 1st Battalion returned to its positions around Scherpenseel and went back into the line. Training continued around the sand table until D-Day. As the day of the attack approached, patrols brought back further information that changed some of the plans. One such patrol on 27 September, led by towering, 225-pound Lt. Donald A. Borton of Company B, obtained additional information about the routes of approach to the river and up to the railroad track.
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Earlier reconnaissance had revealed that there was an impassable
hedge along the side of the railroad line but Borton's patrol discovered a gap where the barbed wire ended, allowing for easier passage. Another change resulted from air reconnaissance missions Lieutenant Colonel Frankland and his S-3, Capt. David Easlick, made in their Grasshopper Piper Cub. The conclusion was drawn that Company B did not have sufficient width of area to maneuver across the open space down to the river; the company's zone was subsequently widened and indicated as such on the sand table.
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Major Ammons's 2nd Battalion companies, as well as their tanks and supporting tank destroyers, withdrew from their positions near Grotenrath and entered the training area on 27 September. The battalion used the identical location the 1st Battalion had occupied, jumpstarting their training because the men were able to use the in-place simulated pillbox fortifications, foxholes, and other mocked-up fixed defenses that had helped serve Frankland's companies’ training so well.

By this time the artillery preparation for the attack had already started. The mission, which began on 26 September, had four objectives. The first was the destruction of all visible pillboxes in the assault zone and outlying areas. Second was the prevention of any enemy buildup. The third objective was the destruction or neutralization of German artillery, antiaircraft guns, and mortars; the last was marking targets in preparation for the planned air strike. The observable results were mixed. The 105mm howitzers fired by the supporting field batteries lacked the velocity, weight, and accuracy required to destroy the pillboxes. The 155mm self-propelled (SP) guns used by Lt. Col. Bradford Butler's 258th Field Artillery Battalion produced the best results. The battalion succeeded in neutralizing some of the visible pillboxes in the division zone prior to the jump-off, but the overall effect on the enemy troops was again mixed.

Lt. Charles B. Robinson was a forward observer with Company B of the 117th Infantry Regiment; he remembered:

For nearly a week we managed static OP's and did considerable firing on the pillboxes; the effect was almost negligible. At one time a self-propelled 155mm gun was pulled up at the OP I was on and fired direct at a range of 1500 yards. In 12 rounds fired it
scored 7 hits. The only effect on the pillbox was about four feet of concrete removed and some dirt off the top. The enemy inside was probably shaken up by the impact, but otherwise unhurt.
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The 258th Field Artillery Battalion used T-105 concrete penetrating fuses to inflict damage. After very careful prior planning and extensive reconnaissance, the battalion's pieces had been brought into positions under the cover of darkness. Operational security was a priority. In order not to disclose the zone of attack, this mission was extended into a number of sectors outside of the 30th Infantry Division's planned assault zone. From 26 September to 2 October the battalion fired on a total of forty-six pillboxes. Capt. Harley M. Force of the 197th Field Artillery Battalion recalled how using a mixture of the 258th's SP 155mm artillery tubes in conjunction with his batteries of 105mm guns proved helpful:

We fired on pillboxes several times and knocked the camouflage material off, exposing the pillbox for adjustment by heavier artillery. Another effective system we used was to adjust on boxes and stay laid on them while the heavies or mediums fired at them. When the heavier artillery hit a box, the survivors (if any) often ran out of the box in an attempt to get away. We would then fire on them and the effect was usually very gratifying.
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Preventing a buildup of enemy forces in the 30th Infantry Division's attack zone, the second objective of the pre-assault missions, proved more problematic. Overcast skies and rain practically every day during the last week of September prohibited the air forces from effectively spotting or interfering with enemy troop movements. In the assault area of the 117th Infantry Regiment, the 3-inch M10 guns of the 803rd Tank Destroyer Battalion nevertheless fired three hundred rounds per day at suspected enemy outpost positions. “We fired at six possible enemy outposts, including the two slag piles on the east edge of Palenberg, the church steeple in Ubach, a smokestack to the right of the slag piles, a cement fort outpost which we could see in the foreground 3,200 yards out, and what turned out to be a shrine on the south edge of Palenberg,” remembered Company C's Captain Sinclair.
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The slag piles were particularly important to his battalion; a catwalk from which enemy artillery
fire might be called down could be seen about one-third of the way up. Lieutenant Cooper's Company D rendered additional assistance, firing another three hundred rounds of 81mm mortars into areas along the route of Company B's planned advance. All combined actions of the pre-assault missions still did not prevent the arrival from Düsseldorf of four companies of the 42nd Fortress Machine Gun Battalion when they reinforced the 1st Battalion of the 183rd Division's 330th Regiment on 30 September; three of the new arrival's companies each had sixteen heavy machine guns and the fourth was a bazooka company.
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The results of the third objective—destruction or neutralization of enemy artillery, antiaircraft artillery, and mortars—were also mixed. Corps and Division artillery carried out the first two missions jointly, the former placing the emphasis on counter-battery and neutralization of antiaircraft artillery. DIVARTY accepted responsibility for counter-mortar fire. The Germans practiced effective deception by intermingling their mortar and artillery fire to such an extent that it all appeared to be artillery fire. When the sound base failed to pick up the source of fire, the extent of the deception was apparent; however, in the time available it was impossible to locate the mortar positions and substantially neutralize them. The Germans constantly changed their mortar placements and by this practice greatly hindered the counter-mortar mission. Counter-battery strikes were thought to be more successful; however, the same enemy practice of firing their artillery and then displacing to another location made the mission a difficult one.

Aerial observers were assigned the primary task of spotting enemy antiaircraft artillery during the air strikes when the weather permitted. Active positions were promptly taken under fire with notable success and their locations were retained for use during the enemy antiaircraft artillery blackout preceding the saturation bombing on D-Day. Light battalions of DIVARTY found more success in marking the air support targets. Later reports of XIX Corps noted:

The marking mission was assigned to particular battalions; data was computed and the mission assigned to a battery within the battalion. This battery was then given the requisite smoke for the mission, although violet smoke proved of no value as target
marking agencies because it had a tendency to blend with the predominantly green background of the foliage in late September. White phosphorous, while discernible, was not used to any great extent because of the concern that the enemy would nullify the effort by firing like smoke to cover the targets. Communication between the Division Air Support Party officer, Division Artillery Fire Direction Center and the battalion was continuous during the mission. In most instances direct lines were used, then as the planes approached the area the Air Support Party Officer coaxed the planes over the target area by use of his air-ground radio set. Smoke was fired at his command and an “on the way” was given for retransmission to the pilot. The method of fire was one battery volley, followed up with one round per minute until the target was identified by the air.
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During the time of the preparatory artillery strikes the men of the 30th Infantry Division experienced no strong enemy offensives. When they were not in the line, units were sent in trucks to Heerlen where hot showers were available at a coal mine installation. The men received hot meals and were shown movies at a schoolhouse in Scherpenseel. A cigarette shortage developed as D-Day approached, but normal allotments arrived before the men prepared to move into position for their first assault on a fortified line since arriving in Europe. On 30 September the 29th Infantry Division arrived from Brest and relieved General Harmon's 2nd Armored Division in its zone to the north of the 30th Division.

Maj. Ernest F. Jenista's 1st Battalion of Col. Paul A. Disney's 41st Armored Infantry Regiment moved from Jabeek to Waubach, arriving just after 0300 that morning. Here Jenista's tanks and other vehicles coiled to await the crossing of the Wurm River by the 2nd Battalion of the 67th Armored Regiment, commanded by Lt. Col. John D. Wynne. Jenista's battalion was to follow Wynne's and destroy the pillboxes before the Wurm River. Lieutenant Colonel Wynne's armored vehicles would follow directly behind Frankland's infantry, cross the Wurm, and then drive to Ubach before wheeling northward on the Ubach-Noverhof road, protecting the north flank of Jenista's armored infantry after they crossed the river.

On 1 October, plans were completed for the coming operation. All of Jenista's and Wynne's officers joined with officers of the 17th Engineer Battalion's Company C, the 3rd Platoon of the 702nd Tank Destroyer's Company B and the 92nd Field Artillery; they met with Colonel Disney and his regimental staff officers at the 41st Armored's command post. Disney's liaison officer established contact with Frankland's G-3, Captain Easlick, and reconnaissance was made by all of Disney's units along the routes to the air saturation area. All day, very heavy rain covered the entire front. This had changed D-Day to Monday, 2 October, when clearer weather was forecasted.
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By this time four 20-foot ladders and eight 15-foot ladders had been hidden by the 117th Infantry's Pioneer Platoon in a haystack along the field between Scherpenseel and Marienberg. “Half of these were for Company B; the other half for the support of Company A and for the 2nd Battalion following along the same route; 250 yards directly south of this haystack, we hid 12 more ladders of the same types, covering them over with mud and straw. These were for Company C initially, and then whichever outfit followed,” remembered Lieutenant O’Neil.
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Farther southward in the attack zone of the 119th Infantry, patrols from Captain Simmons's Company A had also accomplished an important mission. Every pillbox in the company's zone of attack before the Wurm had been physically located, including those as far eastward in the woods on the near side of the railroad line across the river. “[Our] patrols had actually knocked out two of these pillboxes on the extreme right of the company's sector,” Simmons reported in a later interview. “Every platoon in the company ran patrols up into the sector they were to assault.”
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Some reconnaissance missions were not successful; one seven-man patrol led by Technical Sgt. Wade J. Verweire of Company C on 27 October was supposed to blow up a pillbox across the Wurm just east of Rimburg by the railroad line.
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It was believed that this box was not occupied, but three German machine gunners fired upon the men when they reached the railroad cut. In an effort to help his trapped men, Capt. Earl C. Bowers was killed. Sergeant Wade, Pfc. Anthony T. Drabecki, and Pfc. John W. Kreigh were among the missing; despite desperate efforts well into the night by survivors of the patrol to find these Americans, they were never found nor were their bodies ever recovered.