Aachen: The U.S. Army's Battle for Charlemagne's City in World War II (15 page)

The engineers removed a few mines that were in front of the gap by the dragon's teeth and then the gunner of a tank, as well as Russell's own jeep driver, opened up with their machine guns, pinning the enemy infantry to the ground. Only a few scattered rifle shots answered, so Miller came over to join Captain Russell. After looking the situation over, Miller decided to pin this enemy group down with more fire while
attacking the second pillbox. Some of his tanks turned immediately toward this box and fired directly on it with 75mm antiphosphorous ammunition. The shells hit hard. The tankmen then turned their turrets toward the first pillbox and poured fire into the emplacements; again very little return fire came from the Germans. Miller's tanks then attacked a third pillbox, approaching more slowly this time and furnishing a base of fire to support each one as they advanced.

“In the attack, the engineers—acting as infantry—followed closely behind the tanks,” Russell noted. “As the tanks moved up to the 20 Germans, those who were still alive surrendered. Shortly thereafter the enemy also came out of the [other two] pillboxes. A total of 81 prisoners were taken.”
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Antitank fire began to come in on Miller's armor as they pushed a little farther north, but none of the twelve medium tanks in the attack were hit. They secured a total of six pillboxes before the force halted; five were on the right side of the road and one was on the left. The 83rd Reconnaissance Battalion made a sweeping circle to the east to mop up, and held about a thousand yards off the Busbach-Munsterbusch road for the night. Other U.S. forces on the move were also slowed. Sniper fire had kept stalling the advance of Driscoll's infantry and Captain Folk's Company L; they also consolidated on line for the night. Driscoll's 1st Battalion had suffered numerous casualties. Earlier that morning, his S-3 had reported to the 16th Infantry Regimental S-3:

Here is our [rifle company] strength: Company A—4 officers and 98 men; Company B—110; Company C—110. We lost about 300 men in the last five days.
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Oberst
Engel maintained that “on 21 September the first battle for Aachen died away. The battle could, at least for the sector of the 12th Infantry Division, be considered finished. Neither the envelopment of Aachen, nor the quick breakthrough in the direction of Duren-Julich had succeeded, and the fighting strength of the enemy had decreased.”
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Engel's assessment was actually quite correct. In addition to losses suffered by Huebner's 1st Division over the past several days, back on 18 September Major General Rose's 3rd Armored Division had just 153 medium tanks out of an authorized strength of 232. The numbers
increased slightly by 21 September to 158, but 19 armored vehicles were undergoing repairs in unit shops. Many tanks still in action could not shift into high gear; others desperately needed new engines. Col. Eugene C. Orth, the division's S-4, declared at the time that the number of tanks effectively available for front-line duty was “in the neighborhood of 75-85.”
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Supply shortages had also become problematic. Sufficient gasoline was available, but there was a dearth of ammunition—particularly 105mm shells. These shells had to come from distant 1st Army dumps since the depots at nearby Liege were not yet fully operational. Orth maintained that the shortage of other necessary ammunition never became critical, as the basic load was 273 rounds of 75mm ammunition per mounted machine gun on the division's armored vehicles. This was available. It was cut into, but Orth could not recall any action where a shortage of ammunition played a decisive role in the fighting.

In the last analysis, [I] believe that it was the enemy resistance rather than supplies that halted the division. In the general picture, the shortage of tanks and the exhaustion of the troops were obviously important. Nevertheless, it was the stubborn action of the enemy, fighting on his own soil that slowed down and finally halted the attack.
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There was also some debate about troop morale at the time. “The strain of the long advance on the armored [personnel], especially the armored infantry, was a factor that was very important, although difficult to measure accurately,” Colonel Orth maintained. He and other officers were of the opinion that the infantry “had just about reached the limit of their endurance.” Major General Rose, however, believed that the infantry could have continued.

This would have been difficult for the 36th Armored Infantry Regiment.
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During a late-afternoon meeting an enemy shell fell in front of a pillbox in the woods west of Mausbach, killing Company H's Captain Getter, Captain Vaughn of Company I, the battalion's S-2 and S-3, Lt. Edward Rosenfeld, an artillery liaison officer, and two enlisted men. Major Dunn and a number of others were also wounded.

The tankers and infantry of Task Force Mills also might not have agreed with Rose the next day. Wounded had lain on Hill 287 since the day before, and it was not until 1030 hours that Lt. Paul R. Long led a medic half-track onto the hill to retrieve the injured. The morning was warmer and the weather had cleared after days of rain and fog, so urgent requests for air support were also made at this time. One flight came in, but had to return for fuel after making just one pass at the hill; other flights already had other missions. Another flight, whose targets were first marked by the artillery with red smoke, abandoned its effort because it was determined that friendly vehicles were too close to the drop area. Thus enemy fire, particularly from one dug-in tank still atop Hill 287, continued to harass Task Force Mills throughout the morning and many of the wounded remained where they fell.

Company E had been reconstituted, but it was noted at the time that “one platoon was so fresh that some of the men had done little more than fire their M-1 rifles.”
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Attempts to move onto Hill 287 by this platoon were thwarted by machine-gun fire from houses at Duffenter in the early afternoon. A friendly artillery concentration was followed by a smoke screen at 1400 before the platoon moved out again toward the hill to dig in and outpost the position. During this move, the platoon leader was wounded, and the remaining men got bogged down.

At 1520 Colonel Boudinot radioed Mills with a new mission. In light of the situation on Hill 287, the task force was ordered to move to the northwest along the road joining Donnerburg with Birkengang, then pivot southwest to make contact with Task Force Hogan in Stolberg. During the previous night, Boudinot had ordered Hogan to attack into Stolberg with Major Adams's depleted rifle companies, now just 404 men strong with many of his wounded still not evacuated. Accordingly, Mills withdrew his infantry, where they mounted the decks of their tanks for the attack. Colonel Boudinot had also ordered Lieutenant Colonel Lovelady to come forward with elements of his task force to relieve Mills's infantry. They were greeted rudely. Just as these men arrived a terrific enemy artillery barrage scattered the Americans.

Enemy antitank fire also exacted a toll when Lovelady's armored vehicles reached the road junction south of Duffenter at about 1800. His Company D was down to just five tanks and no officers; Company E
had only one officer and six tanks. Two platoons of Company I had also joined in the relief effort; these men were able to retake two pillboxes and capture six prisoners while suffering three casualties. Company H, now commanded by Lieutenant Burdick, reached the crossroad later in the dark, but quickly lost an accompanying tank. Two pillboxes on Hill 287 were joined by enemy artillery and together they rained fire and shells on the company throughout the night, compelling Burdick's force of just sixty-seven men, nineteen of whom were replacements that day, into defensive positions.

Major Mills had started his new attack late that afternoon with just four tanks in his Company F, the three remaining in Company I, and fourteen light tanks from Company A. He opted to take a circuitous path just to the northwest of Birkengang after departing Duffenter, forgoing the direct route suggested by higher headquarters. It proved to be a costly decision. German tank fire came in from the west, hitting the left flank of the moving armor and forcing two of Company A's light tanks to get stuck in some off-road mud. Then as the remainder of the column advanced farther, enemy fire opened up from the rear; it was ineffectual and the armored vehicles kept going. But as they turned southwest toward Stolberg after passing the Birkengang area, more fire came in frontally from bunkers populated with German infantry. These combined enemy actions forced Mills to start coiling his tanks and infantry in a defense huddle. He eventually turned his armored vehicles back toward the factory district in Birkengang where he strung the column along some zinc slag piles for added protection that night.
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In order to hold Munsterbusch on 21 September, it was necessary for Lieutenant Colonel Orr to establish a defensive position north and east of the factory area on the brow of a hill that overlooked Stolberg. Orr's Company B and Captain Merendino's Company B of the 16th Infantry Regiment were employed to accomplish this. After an assault with bayonets fixed, they took the hill at 1530 hours with a loss of ten men. They renewed the attack at 1600, this time to reach into the factory area in the northern part of Munsterbusch. Medium tanks supported the attack while the infantry used their bazookas to blast at the walls of the buildings before moving closer to take out the Germans with grenades and rifles. The tanks could not move because of the close quarters, but the
infantrymen fought from building to building and knocked out two enemy tanks in the process. Snipers were particularly difficult to deal with; they hampered the attack by staying behind as the enemy forces retreated from one building to the next. Tunnels that ran from cellar to cellar were also problematic. “Every house was contested,” one soldier remembered. “Holes had to be blasted, and passageways sealed to prevent the enemy from appearing in the rear of the advancing Americans.”
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Still, by 1830 all of the factory area was cleared out and two of Orr's companies moved over to claim the slag piles to the north and northeast. Staying here became difficult, however, as fire from the direction of Hamm impeded the worn-down infantry. Orr decided to organize defensive positions where these piles afforded some protection. They took many prisoners; among the 460 civilians that interfered with operations that day were several Germans who had clearly changed out of their uniforms to avoid capture. Captain Merendino's Company B sent out patrols to comb the downward slope of the hill overlooking Stolberg, and with little effort cleaned out the Germans in this area. By nightfall, Lieutenant Colonel Driscoll had taken over the entire sector to the railroad tracks on the outskirts of Stolberg, tying in with Captain Briggs's Company C on the left.

On 21 September First Army finally ordered VII Corps to go on the defense. The Army historian noted:

On the surface General Collins's order to consolidate looked like sorely needed rest for most of the troops of the VII Corps. Yet the divisions were in the delicate situation of being through the Westwall in some places, being half through in others, and at some points not having penetrated at all. The line was full of extreme zigs and zags. From an offensive standpoint, the penetrations of the Schill Line were too narrow to serve effectively as springboards for further operations to the east.
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Orr's 1st Battalion of the 36th Armored Infantry was relieved of its positions and moved to a defensive area near Busbach. Task Force Miller saw resistance vanish in the built-up section of Munsterbusch that they defended; his force moved to the divisional reserve area near Brenig. After
knocking out a Tiger tank among the houses south of Munsterbusch, Lieutenant McDonald's Company D of the 32nd Armored Regiment reached a position where his platoons could dominate the Munsterbusch-Busbach Road.

Lieutenant Colonel Peckham's 3rd Battalion of the 18th Infantry Regiment was brought up to the western flank of the American position at Munsterbusch, and Captain Folk's Company L was returned to Peckham's command. His reunited companies relieved the 83rd Reconnaissance Battalion on 21 September. Task Force Blanchard eventually held the line on the northeast side of Munsterbusch where his infantry and armor took up positions overlooking Stolberg.

“When the gap was made through the second line of defenses at England, the plan was revised,” Brigadier General Hickey noted as he looked back on the last few days of fighting.
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Two columns were to follow the road from England, northeast to Schneidmuhle. At this point they were to fork. Task Force X [Doan] on the left was to cut north in the woods, then east to the outskirts of Eschweiler, and then north again to the objective—Duerwiss. From the fork, Task Force Y [Blanchard] was to go to Steinfurth, and then take the main road northeast through Eschweiler to Duerwiss. The opposition in the Stolberg area disrupted all of the plans.

Major Adams's 1st Battalion of the 26th Infantry Regiment spent 21 September on the southern outskirts of Stolberg “cleaning out the area house-by-house, kicking in doors, lobbing grenades and fighting at close range amongst the snake-like structures in town.” By early the next morning Captain Anderson's Company A was advancing up the main street, Adolf Hitler Strasse, while the other companies held positions along parallel streets. Then at 1500 word came down that the battalion was being immediately relieved and returned to the 1st Division. During the time that his men were attached to the 3rd Armored Division, Adams experienced 27 enlisted men killed; 6 officers and 127 enlisted men wounded and evacuated; 3 other officers and 21 enlisted men with lesser wounds; and an additional officer and 43 enlisted men either injured or otherwise unable to engage in combat due to sickness or capture. On 22 September
Major General Huebner called the 26th Infantry's commanding officer, Colonel Seitz, and told him, “The 1st Battalion did a fine job, and I am proud of them.”
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Three months later, the battalion received a Presidential Unit Citation for its actions in breaching the Siegfried Line wherein it was noted that “over 300 prisoners were taken and twice as many enemy soldiers were killed or seriously wounded.”
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