Aachen: The U.S. Army's Battle for Charlemagne's City in World War II (11 page)

The 12th Infantry Division's
Oberst
Engel regarded 17 September as a success for his forces, although losses had been high for the 89th Grenadier Regiment. “The division expected counterattacks the next day, especially against Stolberg, the hills and dumps of Diepenlinchen and against Mausbach,” Engel remembered. “The order for 18 September was—with the approval of the Corps—to hold the line gained, to strengthen the front and to resume the attack as soon as possible, according to what chances of success were inherent in the situation.”
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The 27th Infantry Regiment was ordered to continue to capture the pillboxes at Munsterbusch. The hard pressed 89th Grenadier Regiment was to hold the line gained; the 48th Grenadier Regiment with one battalion was to occupy the corner pillar Schevenhuette at night.

Task Force Lovelady remained in essentially the same place on 18 September. His infantry retired to the area just southwest of Diepenlinchen, and simply formed a defensive position. The rain had let up but fog enveloped the area during the early morning hours. It was during this inauspicious period that the fates of war for Captain Ferry's Company C of the 26th Infantry Regiment took a dramatic turn for the worse.

Ferry's men had moved from their position west of Busbach to the southern tip of Stolberg the previous afternoon. Here his men mounted on trucks and traveled to Mausbach where Captain Ferry received a new mission directly from Lt. Col. John C. Welborn, a 1932 West Point
graduate and commander of the 33rd Armored Regiment. Company C was to move through Diepenlinchen, envelope the factory area on the edge of Weissenberg, and then seize the area near a pile of sand heaps. Ferry's secondary mission was to rescue as many of Captain Amborst's and Captain Emerson's wounded men as possible and recover any weapons abandoned on their positions. Welborn briefed Captain Ferry on what he knew about the enemy dispositions at the time; Diepenlinchen and Hill 287 north of Weissenberg harbored an unknown number of infantry-defended antitank guns.
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Unknown to either American officer, the 1st Battalion of Maj. Gerhard Lemcke's 89th Grenadier Regiment was also assembling in Werth for an attack. Commanded by
Hauptmann
(Captain) Gronbold, the 1st Battalion's mission for 18 September was to “take and hold the Weissenberg cluster along with the hillside and Diepenlinchen and, in the course of the attack Mausbach as well.”
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Certainly
Hauptmann
Gronbold could not have known it was Ferry's Company C he was destined to collide with.

Given that it was rainy on the night of 17 September, Captain Ferry only had time for a cursory map reconnaissance. At 1930 hours the company started forward with a platoon of tanks toward the east side of the factories in Diepenlinchen. A half hour later Ferry's 2nd Platoon suddenly encountered a strong enemy patrol of approximately thirty-five men. These forces quickly opened fire and completely disorganized the Americans. In order to keep the company from being wiped out, Captain Ferry ordered his men to withdraw to the road junction on the southwest edge of town. The company remained here for the rest of the night while Ferry rethought his plan; he determined that a sneak attack was more preferable, without tanks.

At 0430 hours the following morning, in dense fog, Captain Ferry again moved out with his men, this time planning to go around to the left of the factory, skirting Diepenlinchen. The tanks were left in a grove of trees to only cover the advance. Company C's men initially reached the gravel piles, then the foot of the slope immediately below Weissenberg. But here very heavy artillery, mortar, and machine-gun fire greeted them, all zeroed in.
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Their movement had been discovered.

The Germans had chosen to allow Ferry's men to advance to the piles before firing on them. When the fog lifted, a company of enemy
infantrymen came off a bluff some 50 feet high. In order to avoid an engagement with this force, survivors of the melee later recalled that Captain Ferry ordered his 2nd Platoon to withdraw first, followed by what he hoped would be the remainder of the company. At the same time the Germans came off the bluff, however, others came around the east side of the factory and counterattacked using rifle, machine-gun, and 20mm fire.

Some were fortunate. Most of the 2nd Platoon was able to withdraw to the woods southwest of Diepenlinchen where they formed a small perimeter defense. Others were not. Company C had started its mission with 6 officers and 120 enlisted men, but only 20 percent came back. Just 39 men were on hand when the company rejoined Task Force Hogan for a renewed attack against Weissenberg at 1600. Another dozen eventually met up with the company, but before 18 September ended, Company C's roster had shrunk to 2 officers and only 62 enlisted men. The rest were killed, wounded, or captured. Among the missing was Captain Ferry; he had been taken prisoner after enemy fire cut off the point squad he was with on the slag piles.
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Major Adams's remaining companies had originally been given the mission of bypassing Diepenlinchen on 18 September. This plan changed at 1130 hours because of Company C's situation. Instead, to keep progress moving northward, General Rose ordered Lieutenant Colonel Welborn to have Task Force Hogan move across the Inde River and then attack directly toward Hill 287, rather than going up through Donnerberg. At the time this task force consisted of only two companies of tanks and the rest of Adams's 1st Battalion. In this new mission Captain Simons's Company B was to protect Hogan's flank by retaking Diepenlinchen and eventually envelop the enemy positions in Weissenberg. This scheme of operations would have Anderson's Company A in support, attacking frontally against the factory area in the latter town.
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Hill 287 figured prominently in the Stolberg area, and its capture was essential to deny the Germans the advantage of controlling artillery fire from this vantage point. Occupation of the hill mass was required not just for the successful operations of Boudinot's CCB, but also for Brigadier General Hickey's CCA west of Stolberg. “This was believed necessary since this ground dominated Stolberg itself, and the north to
south ridgeline extending south from Munsterbusch in CCA's sector,” noted an American officer and an artillery observer. “The high ground to the east and northeast [of Stolberg on Hill 287] was like a balcony from which the enemy can observe the complete show.”
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The men of Captain Anderson's Company A began their advance toward Diepenlinchen after benefitting from a friendly artillery fire mission. They first worked their way along the edge of the woods to the southwest of town while their supporting tanks crossed the fields on their right. Enemy artillery fire increased as the troops moved up, and when they attacked at 1700 across the field toward the factory at Weissenberg, immediate casualties resulted. Five of Hogan's tanks and fourteen of Anderson's men fell from heavy combinations of enemy machine-gun, small-arms, mortar, 20mm antiaircraft gun, and artillery fire. Captain Simons's Company B had moved into Diepenlinchen against similar stubborn resistance where his men became engaged in house-to-house fighting throughout the afternoon; they were able to capture the slagheap on the northwest edges of the village, but not the factory itself.

Company B's attack, supported by mortars and artillery, had been more successful, if slow. It was dark before the town was cleared. Forty-nine German prisoners were taken, and the troops from Company C who had been captured in Diepenlinchen were liberated [these were the dozen who returned to the company]. During the day Company D's mortar platoon, commanded by Lieutenant Steven B. Phillips, expended all its ammunition; urgent requests for re-supply had to be submitted up the chain of command. Shortly after dark an enemy counterattack developed from the woods around Weissenberg, apparently seeking to turn Company A's exposed left flank. The battalion's Ammunition and Pioneer Platoon was thrown in to strengthen that flank, and the attack was beaten off.
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Sgt. Hans Martens was a platoon leader in 13Co of the 89th Grenadier Regiment's 1st Battalion. The company held full wartime strength on 18 September and his platoon supported the initial attack on
Captain Ferry's Company C with light infantry guns. He reported about this and the continuing action:

The attack was delayed by dense ground fog. All of a sudden shooting occurred in the slope area left of the battalion command post. In the cover of fog, an American patrol had advanced to the forward area of our marshalling position. US artillery started shelling the area behind the dumps—which was our marshalling area—with deliberate fire making use of phosphorous ammunition. A battery of the 12th Division Artillery Regiment was ordered at once to deliver time-on-target fire in the village of Diepenlinchen, the effect of which was to be exploited by the 1st Battalion of the 89th Grenadier Regiment to take its objective. Everything went well; I don't remember one single shot from the opposite.

In the course of the attack I was ordered by the CO of 1Co to set up my observation post just in front of Diepenlinchen and to cover the right open flank of the battalion against any harm that should come out of a small forest occupied by the enemy of unknown strength, possibly supported by tanks. By now the Americans had recovered from shock and fired from that woodland by means of heavy machineguns.

In the meantime 1Co had taken Diepenlinchen, and our own artillery fire was directed to the south of the village. 2Co led by Lieutenant Rix was ordered to follow up and to attack from Diepenlinchen to the right and to establish contact with the neighboring force. Initially this attack was successful and the company gained some terrain, but it failed in finding the contact. The enemy, recovered now, employed Sherman tanks in growing numbers. My platoon engaged targets at the edge of the small forest west of Diepenlinchen.
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Attacks during the day had bogged down repeatedly because the local civilian population had not been evacuated in an orderly fashion; they were running around between the towns. In the excitement the locals often got between the German and American lines, at times forcing the
commanders on both sides to hold their fire. Lt. Hans Zeplien, who commanded 14 Co—tank destroyers—recorded in his diary:

The 1 Co had taken the cluster of buildings, and the 2 Co the slag pile area of Weissenberg and taken numerous prisoners. The 1st RPzB [bazooka] Platoon followed the attacking 1st Battalion along the west side, and the 2nd RPzB Platoon along the east side of the road from Werth to Diepenlinchen. The individual bazooka groups advanced in the rear of the attacking combat companies from cover to cover and at a distance preventing their elimination by the American infantry fire directed at the combat companies.

As soon as the Americans had realized that they were being attacked by forces of a battalion size, they opened concentrated artillery fire. It seemed to me that several batteries were using shrapnel shells when firing into the battalion's sector. Due [to this], losses in that rather open area were extremely high. From the time of taking Weissenberg, the American artillery fire increased, and tanks on their move towards Diepenlinchen took up intervention in combat from distances which were well beyond bazooka reach.

About one hour following the attack I, along with the company headquarters unit and Major Lemcke, the commander of Grenadier Regiment 89, proceeded from Werth towards Weissenberg. When arriving at an area called “Am obersten Busch” and south of that area, we and other soldiers following the attack received shrapnel fire of such intensity that we had to take shelter in a nearby quarry. In spite of this dreadful defense fire, the 1st Battalion managed to take the foremost streets of Diepenlinchen on its first onset, but had to take cover here.
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Heavy mortar and small-arms fire had driven Task Force Mills back to Burgholzerhof during the morning. Later reports revealed, “The remnants of Company F were beginning to break under the extended strain; many were shocked and suffering from combat exhaustion.”
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At 1000 hours heavy enemy artillery fell and a large number of German infantry troops were suddenly sighted over the ridge formerly held by the
thoroughly exhausted company. When more forces were spotted to the northeast, Mills called for artillery fire, and the German attack fortunately went nowhere. An hour later, Company F made another attempt to take Hammerberg Hill with just six medium tanks. Artillery fire combined with Mills's mortar platoon for flank support on the left while assault guns provided cover on the right, at last permitting the weakened company to take the hill.

The 89th Grenadier Regiment had intended to capture nearby Mausbach and re-man the line north of the Vicht River on 18 September;
Oberst
Engel later assessed the day's progress in CCB's zone of operations:

At Stolberg, the enemy gained some terrain. The Hammerberg Hill east of Stolberg was lost. Further attacks over the Hammerberg in the direction of Donnerburg were unsuccessful. They were repelled with heavy losses for the enemy. Particularly heavy pressure made itself clear in the center where, from the direction of Mausbach [toward] Diepenlinchen attacks were carried out with many tanks. Diepenlinchen was lost at mid-day; the dumps at Weissenberg could not be held either. In the evening, attacks against [the Donnerberg fortress] north of Weissenberg failed, with heavy losses for the enemy. Weaker attacks from the southern part of Mausbach met with no success either. The loss of the dominating dumps of Weissenberg enforced the withdrawal to the north of Mausbach; only combat outposts were left there.
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Captain Dawson's Company G positions on the ridgeline outside of Verlautenheide came under attack again early on 18 September. At 0200 a company-strength force struck; some of these Germans succeeded in getting into Dawson's lines, but they could not penetrate it. The fighting was close and intense. “One machine gunner killed two Germans with his pistol, and they fell across the barrel of his weapon,” it was noted in an after-action report. “An enemy platoon was wiped out almost to a man. At about 0300 they withdrew, but the men were ‘jumpy’ and fired at any noise they heard for the rest of the night. Sniping continued on both sides, then at about 0530 an extremely heavy mortar and artillery barrage fell on Company E.”
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