A World at Arms (230 page)

26
See Franklin, “Zonal Boundaries,)’ p. 17. A good survey in Ziemke,
The U.S. Army,
pp. 115–26

27
The map drawn by Roosevelt before the Cairo Conference has been reproduced in Ziemke,
The U.S. Army,
facing p. 116; it was earlier reproduced in Matloff,
Strategic Planning
1943–44, facing p. 341, where its origin is stated. See also the memorandum for Admiral Wilson Brown recounting the issue as of 31 Aug. 1944 in FDRL, Map Room 167, Naval Aide, Germany; and Roosevelt’s 20 Sep. 1944 map for a division of Germany after peace in PSF Safe File, Cont. 4, Germany.

28
On the origins of the Bremen enclave, see Gretchen Skidmore, “The American Occupation of the Bremen Enclave, 1945–47,” MA thesis, Univ. of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, 1989; and documents in PRO, CAB 119/134–35. On Roosevelt’s reversal of his insistence on the northwestern zone, see Matloff,
Strategic Planning
1943–44, p. 511.

29
Ziemke,
The U.S. Army,
chaps. I, 2, 6, 7.

30
John M. Blum (ed.),
From the Morgenthau Diaries,
3 vols. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1959–67) is very helpful; the original materials are in FDRL and make fascinating, if at times also a bit tedious, reading.

31
Warren F. Kimball,
Swords or Plowshares? The Morgenthau Plan for Defeated Germany,
1943–1946 (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1976); Mc Jimsey,
Harry Hopkins,
pp. 342–47.

32
The text of the document Morgenthau gave Roosevelt in the fall of 1944 is photographically reproduced at the front of Morgenthau’s book,
Germany is Our Problem
(New York: Harper, 1945). On his plan for the book, see Morgenthau to Roosevelt, 23 Mar. 1943, and Roosevelt to Morgenthau, 28 Mar. 1943, FDRL, OF 198. A more careful look at the issues surrounding Morgenthau’s proposals for Germany may also make it easier to understand his key role in pushing General Lucius D. Clay for the position of military governor of the American zone of occupation (see Jean E. Smith [ed.],
The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay: Germany
1945–1949, 2 vols. [Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana Univ. Press, 1974], I: xxxiii-iv).

33
See
FDR Letters,
2: 1534–35; Morgenthau Diary 19 Aug. and 2 Sep. 1944, FDRL, Morgenthau Presidential Diary, 6: 1386–88, 1422–26.

34
Roosevelt’s views of Germany and its future have not been examined with sufficient care. An excellent start for the period before 1933 is made in Michaela Honicke, “Franklin D. Roosevelt’s View of Germany before 1933: Formative Experiences for a Future President,” MA thesis, University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, 1989. Gietz’s
Die neue Alte Welt,
chap. 8, is of considerable help though like most others he has failed to look at the map accompanying the Morgenthau Plan and thus has missed both its nature and the main reason why it was abandoned.

35
Dallek,
Roosevelt and Foreign Policy,
p. 468; Morgenthau Diary 9 Sep. 1944, FDRL, Morgenthau Presidential Diary, 6: 1431–32.

36
Ibid., 15 Sep. 1944, 6: 1444–45; Kimball,
Swords or Plowshares?
pp. 39–40. it should be noted that British leaders were hardly surprised by the proposal; see, e.g., the 53 page memorandum of John Wheeler-Bennett of 31 May 1943, “On What to Do with Germany,” U
2703/2399/70,
PRO, FO 371/35453. See also Churchill’s enthusiastic report to the Cabinet-and the British Cabinet’s great satisfaction–in WM(44) War Cabinet 123, Conclusions Confidential Annex of 18 Sep. 1944, CAB 65/47.

37
Ziemke,
U.S. Army and the Occupation of Germany,
pp. 106ff.

38
The maps which accompany the 12 July 1944 War Cabinet Chiefs of Staff Committee report, “Occupation of Germany: Allotment of Zones,” assume that Germany would lose East Prussia, Upper Silesia, and the easternmost portion of Pomerania (PRO, CAB 119/134). Thinking begins to change during the winter of 1944–45, see C 15747, 16177/62/55, 14 and 24 Nov. 1944, FO 371/39436. By late Jan. 1945, when it was becoming obvious that the Soviet Union was installing the Lublin Poles in
liberated Poland, the British were considering going back to the earlier maps at least in theory rather than agree to what they recognized would be a transfer of 8–9 million rather than 5–6 million Germans (WM[45] War Cabinet 10 [45] Conclusions, Confidential Annex, 26 Jan. 1945, CAB 65/5 I). These shifts of opinion have to be connected with the plans for Germany, as opposed to a body of scholarship which has almost invariably assumed that everyone was always talking about the borders which were eventually adopted.

39
A useful introduction remains Anton W. De Porte,
De Gaulle’s Foreign Policy
1944–1946
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1968); now substantially up–dated by John W. Young,
France, the Cold War, and the Western Alliance,
1944–49:
French Foreign Policy and Postwar Europe
(New York: St. Martin’s, 1990), chaps. 1–2, which is based on extensive access to French archives..

40
The key work is still Marcel Vigneras,
Rearming the French
(Washington: GPO, 1957). The relationship of American equipment of French forces to the reestablishment of a major role for France in Europe awaits scholarly investigation.

41
Ziemke,
Stalingrad to Berlin,
pp. 383–86; Erickson,
Road to Berlin,
pp. 433–46.

42
Ziemke,
Stalingrad to Berlin,
pp. 432–37; Erickson,
Road to Berlin,
pp. 508–9. According to Albert Speer,
Spandauer Tagebucher,
(Frankfurtl M: Propyläien 1975), pp. 32–33, the

43
Ziemke,
Stalingrad to Berlin,
pp. 448–54.

44
On the Soviet January offensive, see ibid., chap. 19; Erickson,
Road to Berlin,
pp. 426–29, chap. 7; Glantz,
Soviet Military Deception,
pp. 471–99; Duffy,
Red Storm,
chaps. 5–8.

45
Erickson,
Road to Berlin,
pp. 428, 449.

46
The reports of Japanese observers are especially revealing; note Japanese military Attaché Italy No. 297 of 25 Jan. 1945, NA, RG 457, SRA 15854–64; Oshima to Tokyo No. 130 of 4 Feb. 1945, SRDJ 89327–31. There is a semi–fictional account which captures the atmosphere extraordinarily well in Gerhard Kramer,
We Shall March Again,
trans. Anthony G. Powell (New York: Putnam’s, 1955) (German ed.
Wir werden weiter marschieren
[Berlin: L. Blanvalet, 1952]). This book is in my opinion one of the best recreations of the atmosphere of war on the German side: the occupation of France, anti-partisa warfare in the East, and the great German retreats.

47
On the German fighting to break out of and to hold East Prussia, and the Soviet success in containing and eventually crushing the two German armies trapped there, see Erickson,
Road to Berlin,
pp. 468–70; Glantz,
Soviet Military Deception,
pp. 402–14; Duffy,
Red Storm,
chaps. 12–14, 17–18.

48
Ziemke,
Stalingrad to Berlin,
chap. 20; Erickson,
Road to Berlin,
pp. 463, 472–76, 517–26; Duffy,
Red Storm,
chaps. 9–12 (the Stargard offensive is described on pp. 181–85). Again the reports of the Japanese ambassador in Berlin are of interest, see his Nos. 198 of 19 Feb. and 207 of 21 Feb. 1945, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 91303–8, 91682–88.

49
Hopkins went to Europe ahead of Roosevelt to prepare some of the decisions (McJimsey,
Harry Hopkins,
pp. 342–47).

50
Lamb,
Montgomery,
chap. 13.

51
See Gaddis,
US and Origins,
pp. 157–65. An excellent summary of the literature and controversies, especially about Roosevelt’s role, in Klaus Schwabe, “Roosevelt und Jalta,” in Jürgen Heideking
et al.
(eds.),
Wege in die Zeitgeschichte
(Berlin - New York: de Gruyter, 1989), pp. 460–72. An early very thoughtful review of all the major conferences with the Russians in John Snell,
Illusion and Necessity: The Diplomacy of Global War,
1939–1945
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1963), chap. 4.

52
It appears that Hopkins played a major role in getting Roosevelt to change his mind on the role of France, see Mc Jimsey,
Harry Hopkins,
pp. 363–70.

53
Note Stettinius to Roosevelt, 18(?) Nov. 1944, FDRL, PSF Box 68, Russia 1944.

54
Churchill informed the Cabinet that this was a very good concession to make and a
doubtful Cabinet went along; War Cabinet 16(45) Conclusions, Confidential Annex, 8 Feb. 1945. See also Dallek,
Roosevelt and Foreign Policy,
pp. 466–67.

55
Gaddis,
US and Origins,
pp. 165–71; C. David Thompkins,
Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg: The Evolution of a Modern Republican,
1884–1945 (Lansing, Mich.: Michigan State Univ. Press, 1970), pp. 235–40.

56
See Fischer,
Sowjetische Deutschlandpolitik,
pp. 122–34; Ross,
Foreign Office and the Kremlin,
P.55.

57
Gaddis, pp. 126–29.

58
Ibid., pp. 78–79; McNeill,
America, Britain, and Russia,
pp. 544–47; Ross,
Foreign Office and the Kremlin,
p. 52.

59
Cathal J. Nolan, “Americans in the Gulag: Detention of U.S. Citizens by Russia and the Onset of the Cold War, 1944–49,”
JCH
25 (1990), 523–45; Russell D. Buhite, “Soviet-American Relations and the Repatriation of Prisoners of War,”
The Historian 35
(1973), 394–97.

60
The best account is Mark Elliott,
Pawns of Yalta: Soviet Refugees and America’s Role in their Repatriation
(Urbana, Ill.: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1982). The title of his Conclusion is: “The West-Inept; The East-Vindictive.”

61
Ibid., pp. 64–69, 72–73. At the same time, Soviet representatives were allowed all over Western Europe to look for Soviet citizens.

62
Ibid., pp. 86, 90, 102–4, 20 I.

63
See Montgomery to Nye, 14 Feb. 1945, Liddell Hart Centre, Alanbrooke Papers, 14/6/14; Brooke Diary, 20 Feb., 26 Feb., 8 Mar., 20 Mar. 1945, Alanbrooke Papers; Marshall to Roosevelt, 6 and 20 Mar. 1945, FDRL, PSF Box 66, Poland 1945; Keith P. Sword, “Their Prospects Will not be Bright: British Response to the Problem of the Polish ‘Recalcitrants’ 1946–49,”
JCH
21 (1986), 267–96. On 28 Mar. 1945 the British Cabinet decided that those who had fought under British command and could not return to Poland could stay in England and be naturalized as long as this procedure was not applied to others - like Jews (WM[45l War Cabinet 37[45], 28 Mar. 1945, PRO, CAB 65/49).

64
Jaime Reynolds, “‘Lublin’ versus ‘London’ - The Party and the Underground Movement in Poland, 1944–1945,”
JCH
16 (1981), 640.

65
Anderson,
The United States,
pp. 28–31.

66
See War Cabinet 22(45), Confidential Annex, 19 Feb. 1945, PRO, CAB 65/51. By the next meeting on Feb. 21 the tone was more cautious; all depended on free elections in Poland.

67
Donald C. Watt, “Die Sowjetunion im Urteil des Foreign Office 1945–1949,” in Gottfried Niedhart (ed.),
Der Westen und die Sowjetunion
(Paderborn: Schoningh, 1983), p. 241; Ross,
Foreign Office and the Kremlin,
p. 535; Pogue,
Marshall,
3: 577. The refusal of the Soviet Union to abide by the agreement on Poland had already been registered in the War Cabinet at its 26th 1945 meeting on March 6 (PRO, CAB 65/5 I). On the arrest of the sixteen Polish leaders, see the report on Dr. Stylpukowski in Imperial War Museum, MM 25.

68
Onder,
Turkische Aussenpolitik
pp. 240–41. The Americans wanted the Japanese observation post in Ankara closed down. The Turks subsequently routed their intelligence assistance for Japan through Madrid, something the Americans quickly learned from their decoding operation (see Kurihara [Ankara] to Madrid No. 1, 15 Jan. 1945, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 86955–56).

69
Wittmann,
Schwedens Wirtscha Jtsbeziehungen,
p. 339.

70
See Japanese embassy Madrid Nos. 299 of 23 Mar. and 360 of 12 Apr. 1945, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 95503–5, 98425–27.

71
On Eisenhower’s pressuring the Army Group commander, General Devers, see David
Eisenhower,
Eisenhower at War,
pp. 662–63; a recent account from the perspective of the U.S. 7th Army, Wyant,
Sandy Patch,
chap. 21.

72
“Veritable” is covered in the official histories; recent discussion in Eisenhower,
Eisenhower at War,
pp. 665ff.; Lamb,
Montgomery,
pp. 352–53. A good survey of “Veritable” and “Grenade” in Alan F. Wilt,
War from the Top: German and British Military Decision Making during World War II
(Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana Univ. Press, 1990), pp. 279–83.

73
Pogue,
Supreme Command,
p. 427.

74
Hastings,
Bomber Command,
pp. 411–12; Saward
“Bomber” Harris,
pp. 281ff; Diane D. Putney,
ULTRA and the Army Air Forces in World War II: An interview with Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
(Washington: GPO, 1987), pp. 55–58.

75
Saward, pp. 290–97.

76
Lamb,
Montgomery,
pp. 354ff; Pogue,
Supreme Command,
pp. 427ff.

77
Lothar Gruchmann,
Der Zweite Weltkrieg: Kriegführung und Politik
(Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1967), p. 424, refers to this as defending the “wrong” bank of the river.

78
There remains a major debate whether the airborne operation made any sense at all and was worth the losses incurred. Perhaps there is here a sad reversal of Arnhem: in the earlier case, intelligence on the
arrival
of German reserve formations close to the drop zone had been ignored; this time it was the
withdrawal
of German forces to the front around the Remagen bridgehead which was not taken into consideration. For a detailed report at the time, see Headquarters First Allied Airborne Army, “Report of Operation Varsity, 24 March 1945,” sent to SHAEF by General Brereton on 19 May 1945 (PRO, AIR 20/4314).