A World at Arms (234 page)

100
On this see now the
Ugaki Diary,
5 Apr.-7 May 1945, pp. 572–76, 586; cf. Marder
Old Friends, New Enemies,
2: 429–39.

101
The relevant documents were first published in U.S. Department of Defense, “The Entry of the Soviet Union into the War against Japan: Military Plans, 1941–1945,” pp. 54–57, 80.

102
The text of the memorandum on this conference makes dramatic reading; it is in
FRUS, The Conference of Berlin (Potsdam)
1945, 1: 903–10. See also Herbert Feis,
Japan Subdued: The Atomic Bomb and the End of the War in the Pacific
(Princeton, N.].: Princeton Univ. Press, 1961), pp. 7–14; Bauer, “Amerikanische Plane,” pp. 140–41; Department of Defense, “The Entry of the Soviet Union,” pp. 76–85; Pogue,
Marshall,
4: 9, 18; Charles
F. Brower, IV, “Sophisticated Strategist: George A. Lincoln and the Defeat of Japan,”
Diplomatic History
15 (1991), 317–37; Brian L. Villa, “The U.S. Army, Unconditional Surrender, and the Potsdam Proclamation,”
Journal of American History
63 (1976), 66–92; Barton]. Bernstein, “Writing, Righting or Wronging the Historical Record: President Truman’s Letter on His Atomic Bomb Decision,”
Diplomatic History
16 (1992), 163–73. It must be noted that many of the U.S. military planners had not been initiated into the secret of the A-bomb (a point overlooked in some of the literature), see Ray S. Cline,
Washington Command Post: The Operations Division
(Washington: GPO, 1951), pp. 347–48 n 55.

103
Bauer, “Amerikanische Plane,” p. 143.

104
British Combined Operations Observers (Pacific), “Report on Operation ‘Olympic’ and Japanese Counter-Measures,” 4 Apr. 1945, PRO, WO 106/3528–29. For U.S. information on the planned use of suicide weapons, see “Magic Far East Summary,” No. 506, 8 Aug. 1945, NA, RG 457, SRS-506, annex “F-22’S Estimate of Japanese Intentions.” On the basis for the accurate Japanese intelligence assessment of the American landing plan for Olympic, see Alvin D. Coox in Hitchcock (ed.),
The Intelligence Revolution,
pp. 197–201.

105
A summary in Ehrman,
Grand Strategy,
6: 247–57. The Japanese military Attaché in Lisbon expected a British operation against Malaya already in July; see Lisbon to Tokyo No. 586, 2 July 1945, NA, RG 457, SRA 18033. See also Marder,
Old Friends, New Enemies,
2: 454–57.

106
Note the comments quoted in Bryant, 2: 353–54.

107
See the note by the Chief of the Air Staff for the Prime Minister of 4 July 1945 in PRO, CAB 120/291; Brooke to Montgomery, CIGS/2419846 of 20 July 1945, Liddell Hart Centre, Alanbrooke Papers 14/14/19.

108
This is one of the major assumptions of World War II Britain and the U.S. ignored in Barton J. Bernstein, “Roosevelt, Truman and the Atomic Bomb, 1941–1945: A Reinterpretation,”
Political Science Quarterly
90 (1975), 23–69.

109
Pogue,
Marshall,
3: 507.

110
Bernstein, “Roosevelt,” pp. 32–34, mentions the tenuous evidence that Roosevelt toyed ith the idea of a demonstration explosion before combat use but concludes that the operating assumption was that of employment on enemy targets. It is a conclusion that appears to me to be correct, especially when contrasted with the President’s absolute clarity on the non-use of chemical and biological weapons except in retaliation.

111
See Truman’s comments in Ferrell,
Off the Record,
p. 304. A recent review of the literature, J. Samuel Walker, “The Decision to Use the Bomb: A Historiographical Update,”
Diplomatic History
14 (1990), 97–114, is interesting but badly flawed by the absence of discussion of the fighting on Okinawa and the internal Japanese discussion as known to the Americans from intercepts. On the origins of some of the early literature, see B;arton J. Bernstein, “Seizing the Contested Terrain of Early Nuclear History: Stimson, Conant and their Allies Explain the Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb”
Diplomatic History 17
(1993), 35–72.

112
Coox, “The Rise and Fall,” p. 79. There is a detailed comparison of the American estimates with actual Japanese strength in Drea,
Mac Arthur’s Ultra,
pp. 2I8-23; the Japanese forces were, if anything, even larger than the Americans thought.

113
A particularly helpful document is the reporting on these to General Marshall, “‘Magic’ Diplomatic Extracts July 1945: Selected Items Prepared by MIS, War Department, for the Attention of General George C. Marshall,” NA, RG 457, SRH-040.

114
The earlier studies of this remain the most helpful: Butow,
Japan’s Decision;
USSBS,
Japan’s Struggle to End the War;
Feis,
Japan Subdued.

115
Even in this project the Japanese were very reluctant to make concessions, see Tokyo Nos. 889 of 10 July, 890, 891 of 11 July 1945, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 105771–72, 105662-
64. See also John A. Harrison, “The U.S.S.R., Japan, and the End of the Great Pacific War,”
Parameters
14, No.2 (Summer 1984), 76–87.

116
See the reports by Japanese Ambassador Sato from Moscow: Nos. 1330 of 5 July, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 105236–38; 1379 of 11 July, SRDJ 105707–14; 1381 of 12 July, SRDJ 105917–22; 1382 of 12 July, SRDJ 105923–27; 1386 of 13 July, SRDJ 105951–54; 1392 of 15 July, SRDJ 106079–83; 1416 of 18 July, SRDJ 106429; 1418 of 19 July, SRDJ 106473–74; 1427 of 20 July 1945, SRDJ 106558–77.

117
See Kase (Bern) Nos. 796 of 20 July and 802 of 21 July, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 106930–33, 106966–73; Okamoto (Stockholm) No. 489 of 21 July, SRDJ 106699–704.

118
Tokyo Nos. 893 of 12 July and 913 of 17 July 1945, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 105731–33, 106266–69.

119
The exchanges can be followed today–as they were followed by American leaders at the time - in Sato to Tokyo Nos. 1392 of 15 July and 1427 of 20 July, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 106079–83, 106564, on the one hand, and Tokyo’s Nos. 913 of 17 July, 932 of 21 July, 944 of 25 July, SRDJ 106266–69, 106637–39, 107041–45.

120
A U.S. assessment of 27 July 1945 of the Japanese dispute about surrender is in “Magic Far East Summary, Naval Section,” NA, RG 457, SRS 494.

121
Full text in
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry
S.
Troman 1945
(Washington: GPO, 1961 ), pp. 43–48.

122
The account in Feis,
Japan Subdued,
chaps. 3–4, remains most helpful. See also Robert J. Maddox,
From War to Cold War: The Education of Harry
S.
Troman
(Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1988), chaps. 4, 7.

123
A good review in Ehrman,
Grand Strategy,
6: 275–95; see also Pogue,
Marshall,
4: 9, 17–23

124
Ehrman, 6: 295–99.

125
Note Truman’s diary entry for 25 July 1945 in Ferrell,
Off the Record,
pp. 55–56. The relevant section of Brooke’s diary for 25 July has been omitted by Bryant; it refers to possible targets in the Soviet Union (Liddell Hart Centre, Alanbrooke Papers).

126
G. Patrick March, “Yanks in Siberia: U.S. Navy Weather Stations in Soviet East Asia, August 1945,”
Pacific Historical Review
57 (1988), 327–42, explains the great importance of weather reports for the invasion plans, the discussions ofthis issue at Yalta and Potsdam, and the establishment of two stations with Stalin’s approval for a few months in Aug. 1945.

127
Mountbatten, who was present at Potsdam, was briefed; MacArthur was not present and hence not informed (Ehrman,
Grand Strategy,
6: 255).

128
The Japanese were observing these negotiations with great concern: see Tokyo to Moscow No. 875 of 5 July, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 104922-23; Sato to Tokyo No. 1331 of 6 July, SRDJ 105239–40.

129
On the contacts in Switzerland, see Note 93, above; Bern to Tokyo No. 797 of 21 July, which contains a detailed review of the soundings, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 106748–58; Bern Nos. 798 of 20 July and 838 of 30 July, SRDJ 106925–29, 111612–14.

130
On the absence of second thoughts, see the Japanese Army General Staff Circular No. 352 of 4 Aug. 1945, NA, RG 457, SRA 18258–64.

131
Bernstein, “Roosevelt,” pp. 52–55.

132
The USSBS calculated after the war that it would have taken 210 B-29S each carrying a 1o-ton bomb load to produce the same damage and casualties at Hiroshima, and 120 at Nagasaki. In the case of the latter, hills limited the destructiveness of the bomb; in open terrain, 270 B-29S would have been needed to produce an effect similar to that of the potentially more powerful bomb dropped on Nagasaki (USSBS,
The Effects of Atomic Bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki
[Washington: GPO, 1946], p. 33).

133
There was some difference of opinion on what information should be put out, with the U.S. wanting to release more than the British. At that time, Field Marshal Wilson
anticipated that a second bomb would be dropped about five days after the first (see Wilson to Brooke, 6 Aug. 1945, PRO, CAB 127/47). There is no reference to the Hiroshima bomb in Brooke’s diary.

134
Glantz,
August Stonn.
For U.S. intelligence assistance to the Red Army, see NA, RG 457, SRH-198.

135
Edward J. Drea, “Misreading Intentions: Japanese Intelligence and the Soviet Invasion of Manchuria, 1945,”
Military Affairs
48, NO.2 (Apr. 1984), 66–73.

136
In addition to the accounts in Butow and Feis, there is now the translation of the
Kido Diary,
pp. 444ff. A recent article on the role of Hirohito argues that his part in putting down the 1936 military coup attempt in Tokyo was such an intervention, but there is a significant difference. In 1936, Hirohito responded to questions about the coup posed directly to him
without
a prior formal agreement or disagreement among his advisors. In other cases, questions had come to him after all his official advisors had reached agreement on a policy; in the 1945 situation, those who favored surrender and knew that Hirohito was on their side deliberately brought an evenly divided Council into the imperial presence to provoke an intervention by the Emperor. Peter Wetzler, “Kaiser Hirohito und der Krieg im Pazifik: Zur politischen Verantwortung des Tenno in der modernen Japanischen Geschichte,”
VjZ
37 (1989), 611–44.

137
The issue is reviewed in detail in Barton J. Bernstein, “The Perils and Politics of Surrender: Ending the War with Japan and Avoiding the Third Atomic Bomb,”
Pacific Historical Review
46 (1977), 1–27. The one major omission is any reference to the prior uproar over the deal with Darlan.

138
FRUS
1945, 6: 631–32.

139
There is a useful preliminary account in William Craig,
The Fall of Japan
(New York: Dial Press, 1967), chap. 13.

140
Shillony,
Wartime Japan,
p. 88.

141
There is an excellent discussion of this issue in the Burma theater of war, which may serve as a sample, in Allen,
Burma,
pp. 529–52.

142
Peter N. Davies,
The Man Behind the Bridge,
pp. 198–200; Marder,
Old Friends, New Enemies,
2: 575; cf. ibid., pp. 254–58.

143
The Japanese puppet government in China naturally now disappeared also; note Nanking to Tokyo Greater East Asia Ministry No. 525 of 11 Aug. 1945, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 108401–2.

144
The Japanese did try to keep the Allies from getting access to their codes by destroying secret documents and codes, see Japanese military Attaché Stockholm to Lisbon, No number of 10 Aug. 1945, NA, RG 457, SRA 18298; Tokyo to Bern Circular 666 of 14 Aug., SRDJ 108553. They did not realize that these instructions, like the codes they were trying to protect, were being read by the Americans.

145
Theodore Cohen,
Remaking Japan: The American Occupation as New Deal
(New York: Free Press, 1987), chaps. 1–3.

146
See footnote, p. 883.

CONCLUSIONS

1
There is a good summary of the different statistics on German losses, and the problematic character of all of them, in Rudiger Overmans, “Die Toten des Zweiten Weltkriegs in eutschland: Bilanz der Forschung unter besonderer Berucksichtigung der Wehrmachtund Vertreibungsverluste,” in Wolfgang Michalka (ed.),
Der Zweite Weltkrieg
, pp. 858–73. Useful for its statistics but not its text, Martin K. Sorge,
The Other Price of Hitler’s War: German Military and Civilian Losses Resulting from World War II
(Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1986).

2
A useful brief survey in Ulrich Herbert,
Fremdarbeiter: Politik und Praxis des “Ausländer-Einsatzes” in der Kriegswirtschaft des Dritten Reiches
(Bonn: Dietz, 1985), pp. 341–45. The issues as they developed in American planning and the American zone are dealt with in Ziemke,
The US. Army
.

3
Eden’s minute of 29 Nov. 1942: “I had always hoped that we could take a firm line at the Peace Conference that the bulk of the Jews should stay where they were in Europe. One hopes that the post-war Europe will not be a home of recurrent persecution, and there is anyway no room for these people in Palestine, even if every Arab were sent packing,” from FO 371/31380 is quoted in Richard Langhorne (ed.),
Diplomacy and Intelligence during the Second World War
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1985), p. 291 n 57.

4
The argument put forward retrospectively by Andreas Hillgruber in his 1986 book,
Zweierlei Untergang: Die Zerschlagung des Deutschen Reiches und das Ende des europäischen Judentums
(Berlin: Siedler) about the German army in the last year of the war fighting not only to enable the regime to continue murdering Jews but also to protect the Germans of the eastern provinces is a preposterous reversal of the realities. Had the Germans (like the Finns) pulled out of the war in September 1944, vast numbers of Germans who later lost their lives would have survived; had the German army “succeeded“ in holding out even longer than it did, the first atomic bombs would have been dropped on German cities. An earlier end of the war would have saved German as well as Jewish lives (to say nothing of the lives of Allied soldiers and civilians).