A World at Arms (229 page)

55
Montgomery to Brooke, 7 Dec. 1944, Liddell Hart Centre, Alanbrooke Papers, 14/2/20. Other portions of this long letter are in Bryant, 2: 264–65.

56
Oshima to Tokyo No. 1298 of 16 Nov. 1944, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 78970–84.

57
The assertions in Guderian’s son’s 1974 correspondence with David Irving about this issue in Institut für Zeitgeschichte, Guderian Papers, are borne out by the Jodl Diary for 29 Dec. 1944 (Imperial War Museum, AL 930/3–4).

58
Ruppenthal,
The European Theater of Operations,
2: 124.

59
On a primitive device beginning to catch snorkel equipped submarines, see Comnavea to Cominch and CNO, NCR 7498 of 24 Jan. 1945, NA, RG 457, SRMN 46, pp. 84–85.

60
A helpful survey in Salewski,
Seekriegsleitung,
2: 496–528.

61
This is completely ignored in the account of John Ehrman,
Grand Strategy,
6: 16–18.

62
The JU-290 could fly 3800 miles (Enzio Angelucci,
Rand Mc Nally Encyclopedia of Military Aircraft, 1914–1980
[New York: Military Press, 1983], pp. 35 1, 356).

63
lung,
Die Ardennen-Offensive,
pp. 53–54.

64
Willi A. Boelcke (ed.),
Deutschlands Rüstung im Zweiten Weltkrieg: Hitlers Konferenzen mit Albert Speer 1942–1945
Frankfurt/M: Athenaion, 1969), pp. 368–69; cf. Wolfgang Birkenfeld,
Der synthetische Treibstoff
(Gottingen: Musterschmidt, 1964).

65
Boelcke,
Deutschlands Rüstung,
p. 370.

66
On the oil offensive and ultra, see Murray,
Luftwaffe,
pp. 258ff. The Americans could confirm the correctness of their strategy by reading Japanese Ambassador Oshima’s report on Speer’s explanation of this difference and its significance (Oshima to Tokyo No. 814 of 11 Aug. 1944, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 67653–59).

67
See Boelcke,
Deutschlands Rüstung,
pp. 416–18. For a balanced asessment of Speer’s views in the fall and winter of 1944, see Alfred C. Mierzejewski, “When Did Albert Speer Give Up?” Historical Journal 31 (1988), 391-97.

68
Murray,
Luftwaffe,
pp. 260–61.

69
See the excellent study by Mierzejewski,
Collapse of the German War Economy.

70
Hastings,
Bomber Command,
pp. 397–405; Saward,
“Bomber” Harris,
chap. 22. Evidently

71
Mierzejewski,
Collapse of the German War Economy,
pp. 105, 130. There is a picture in Jacobsen and Dollinger,
Zweite Weltkrieg
, 3: 145.

72
Mierzejewski, pp. 104–5, 128–30. This success of Bomber Command included the blocking of the key Rhine-Herne canal by dropping bridges into it.

73
Boe1cke,
Deutschlands Rüstung,
pp. 337–39.

74
Kreipe Diary for 2 Nov. 1944 in Jung,
Die Ardennen-Offensive,
pp. 228–29. Kreipe had been Chief of Staff since Aug. 1944 (on him see Boog,
Lufiwaffenführung,
pp. 299–301). Already on Sep. 23, 1944, the Japanese naval representatives in Germany had relayed to Tokyo their assessment that there would be no negotiated peace in Europe; an unconditional surrender on all fronts was most likely (Japanese naval attache Berlin to Tokyo “N” Serial 255 of 23 Sep. 1944, NA, RG 457, SRNA 2559–62).

75
Arno Rose,
Radikaler Lufikampf die Geschichte deutscher Rammjager
(Stuttgart: Motorbuch, 1977), is of some interest but neither comprehensive nor scholarly.

76
The suicide mission idea appears to have originated with Speer, developing out of earlier projects to bomb the Rybinsk hydro–electricdam north of Moscow at a time when such targets were still barely within the range of German long-range bombers (Boe1cke,
Deutschlands Rüstung,
6/7Dec. 1943, p. 319; 22/23 May 1944, p. 371; 19–22 June 1944, pp. 389–90 ).

77
Japanese naval attache No. 658 of 5 Nov. 1944, NA, RG 457, SRNA 3081–82, and Tokyo’s reply No. 021 of 18 Nov. 1944, SRNA 3154–55; Japanese naval attache No. 745 of 29 Nov. 1944, SRNA 3344–46.

78
By late Dec. 1944 the British troop diversion to Greece had reached 80,000. Brooke commented on this with disgust in his diary (Liddell Hart Centre, Alanbrooke Papers, 23–30 Dec. 1944), but never compared its impact on the war with the operation Anvil-Dragoon which he had opposed so vehemently. The realities in Greece surely validated Marshall’s earlier concern about the syphoning effect of operations in the Eastern Mediterranean on Allied strength.

79
At Marshall’s insistence, Dill was buried in Arlington National Cemetery, where President Truman dedicated the equestrian monument which marks his grave (Pogue,
Marshall,
3: 481–83). Dill’s position as head of the British Joint Services Mission was taken by Field Marshal Sir Henry Maitland Wilson; the latter never occupied the informal but central role in British-U.S. relations which Dill had held.

80
On Baffle, see PRO, WO 106/3286, 5693. There is an extraordinary resemblance to the 1942 project for a British-U.S.
air force
to assist the Russians on the southern portion of the Eastern Front, which had been agreed to by Stalin and then fell apart when it became clear that the Soviets wanted only the planes, not the units.

81
See note 24, above.

82
Note Alan J. Foster,
“The Times
and Appeasement: The Second Phase,”
JCH
16 (1981), 441-66.

1
Motter,
Persian Corridor,
p. 483. About another third each went the northern route and across the Pacific.

2
See the COMINCH U.S. Navy 17 Jan. 1945 “Summary of Radio Intelligence” comparison of the German Naval Attache Tokyo report to Berlin on Japanese naval losses with American estimates, in NA, RG 457, SRNS 1010.

3
The reports of the German Naval Attaché Tokyo of 19 and 23 Jan. 1945 are in War Dept. G-2 “Magic Far Eastern Summary,” Nos. 309 of 23 Jan., 310 of 24 Jan., 315 of 29 Jan. 1945, NA, RG 457.

4
Salewski,
Seekriegsleitung,
2: 448–56.

5
Note Kaufmann, “1m Bunker der Reichskanzlei März 1945,” Hamburg, Forschungsstelle für Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus, Krogmann Papers, I I k 2I.

6
A detailed report on July 20 with considerable information from a member of the conspiracy (perhaps Hans Bernd Gisevius) was sent by the Acting Director of the OSS to Roosevelt on 1 Feb. 1945, FDRL, PSF Box 171, OSS Reports, February 1945.

7
This is one of the major findings of the USSBS\ documented in its report,
The Effects of Strategic Bombing on German Morale,
2 vols. (Washington: GPO, 1946–47).

8
See Steinert,
Hitler’s War,
pp. 290–305, for a survey entitled: “The Last Winter of War.” A very good U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence analysis of 27 Feb. 1945 is in NA, RG 319, ID File, ID No. 121653.

9
Note the letters of the German Minister of Finance, Graf Lutz Schwerin von Krosigk, to Goebbe1s in Feb. and Mar. 1945, in BA, R 2/24242. A memorandum by Admiral Assmann of 3 Feb. 1945, asserting that the war was certainly lost, argued for unconditional ending of hostilities in the West; another form of trying to split the Allies but with the assumption that all of Germany would be occupied. The difference would be that the Oder river rather than the Elbe would provide the demarcation line between the Western and Soviet zones of occupation (BA/MA, III M 502/4).

10
Oshima’s reports to Tokyo Nos. 19 of 7 Jan., 24 of 8 Jan., 36 of 11 Jan. 1945, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 85803–15, 85746–50, 86207–8; but then see his No. 178 of 15 Feb. 1945, SRDJ 90893.

11
Joseph Goebbe1s,
Tagebücher
1945:
Die letzten Aufzeichnungen
(Hamburg: Hoffman & Campe, 1977),5 and 12 Mar. 1945, pp. 112–13, 204.

12
Hansjakob Stehle, “Deutsche Friedensfüler bei den Westmachten im Februar/Marz
1945,”
VjZ
30 (1982), 538–55; Joachim von Ribbentrop,
The Ribbentrop Memoirs,
trans. Oliver Watson (London: Weidenfe1d & Nicolson, 1954), pp. 171–72; Gustav Hilger and Alfred G. Meyer,
The Incompatible Allies: A Memoir History of German-Soviet Relations
, 1918–1941 (New York: Macmillan, 1953), p. 340; Reimer Hansen, “Ribbentrops Friedensfuhler im Fruhjahr 1945,”
Geschichte in Wissenschafi und Unterricht
18 (1967), 716–30; Werner von Schmieden, “Notiz betreffend den deutschen Friedensfuhler in der Schweitz Anfang 1945,” 30 June 1947, Institut fur Zeitgeschichte, Z.S. 604; Werner Dankwort, “Infernalische Reise,” AA, Dankwort Papers, f. 79–99; Fleischhauer,
Sonderfrieden
, pp. 267–75; Goebbe1s,
Tagebucher
1945, pp. 280, 287, 290–9 1, 339. British documents on the soundings of Fritz Hesse in Stockholm are in C
1000/45/18
, PRO, FO
371/46782
, C 1321,
1322/45/18
, FO
371146783
. Oshima reported on Ribbentrop’s preference for and thoughts about peace with the U.S.S.R. in his Nos. 362–64 of 3I Mar. 1945, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 95939–40, 95941–54, 96104–6, and his No. 375 of 6 Apr. 1945, SRDJ 96751–56. See also Stockholm to Tokyo No. 181 of 23 Mar. 1945, SRDJ 95647–50.

13
On this topic, see documents in BA, R 2/11602, 11609; Japanese military Attaché Berlin to Tokyo No. 915 of 19 Jan. 1945, NA, RG 457, SRA 15610–1 I; Volkmann, “Das Vlasov-Unternehmen,” p. 152. Note also the 1945 budget for Sofindus, the secret German organization for penetrating the Spanish economy, in BA, R
2/173
16c.

14
Muller, “Gaskriegsvorbereitungen,” p. 46; Gellermann,
Der Krieg der nicht stattfand,
pp. 175–77.

15
In the absence of access to Soviet archives, these issues are very difficult to reconstruct. The two best attempts appear to be Alexander Fischer’s
Sowjetische Deutschlandpolitik im Zweiten Weltkrieg
1941–1945 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1975), and the first chapter in Gregory W. Sandford,
From Hitler to Ulbricht: The Communist Reconstrnction of East Germany,
1945–1946 (Princeton, N.].: Princeton Univ. Press, 1983). An earlier study, Boris Meissner,
Russ/and, die Westmächte, und Deutschland: Die sowjetische Deutschlandpolitik
1943–1953 (Hamburg: Nolke, 1953), is still of interest.

16
An excellent account in Bruce R. Kuniholm,
The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East:
Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1980). For a brief background on the Kars and Ardahan areas, see ibid., p. 258 n 124. A map illustrating Soviet territorial claims on Turkey is on p. 289. This map also shows the Greek Aegean port of Dedeagatch (Alexandroupolis) which Stalin suggested as a possible Soviet base during the Potsdam meeting. See also Onder,
Turkische Aussenpolitik,
pp. 242–45.

17
A summary in Paul R. Magocsi,
The Shaping of a National Identity: Subcarpathian Rus’,
1848–1948 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1978), pp. 252–55. There is a more detailed account in Frantisek Nemec and Vladimir Moudry,
The Soviet Seizure of Subcarpathian Ruthenia
(Toronto: William R. Anderson, 1955). According to a report by the American ambassador in Moscow of 6 Jan. 1945, the issue of Ruthenia was still open at that time (Stettinius to Roosevelt and enclosure, 8 Jan. 1945, FDRL, PSF Box 68, Russia 1945), but in fact it had been resolved on the spot. There is a somewhat different account in Mastny,
Russia’s Road,
pp. 227–29.

18
Rather polemical but quite helpful, R.C. Raack, “Stalin Fixes the Oder-Neisse Line,”
JCH
25 (1990), 467–88.

19
Luza,
Transfer of the Sudeten Germans,
pp. 236, 240–41. The issue is reviewed in greater detail in Brandes,
Grossbritannien.

20
This is a major theme of Terry’s
Poland’s Place in Europe.

21
The American estimate was that at the time of the 1939 census about nine million Germans lived in the portion of pre-war Germany and Danzig that were to be incorporated into Poland. There is a helpful map in
FRUS,
1945,
Conferences at Malta and Yalta,
facing p. 233. When the British Cabinet agreed to the Curzon Line and vast increases in Poland at Germany’s expense in the west, Churchill made it clear that whatever territory was transferred should be cleared of its German inhabitants; WM(45) War Cabinet 7(45) Confidential Annex, 22 Jan. 1945, PRO, CAB 65/51.

22
See the document from FDRL cited in n. 17, above, and Cienciala, “The Activities of the Polish Communists.”

23
On the British, see S.F.V. Dornison,
Civil Affairs and Military Government
(London: HMSO, 1966), and
Civil Affairs and Military Government: North West Europe, 1944–1946
(London: HMSO, 1961) in the British official history series. On the American side there is a vast literature because of earlier access to the archives; an excellent introduction is Earl F. Ziemke,
The US. Army in the Occupation of Germany,
1944–1946 (Washington: GPO, 1975). There is now also a major collection of documents from the archives of both countries, published under the auspices of the Federal Republic of Germany, entided
Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik,
1 st series:
Vom
].
September
1939
bis
8.
Mai 1945
(Frankfürt/M: Metzner, 1984- ). Summaries of the perspectives of many countries may be found in Manfred Messerschmidt and Ekkhart Gulh (eds.),
Die Zukun Jt des Reiches: Gegner, Verbundete und Neutrale
(1943–1945) (Herford: Mittler, 1990).

24
The arguments within the British government are delineated in John E. Farquharson, “Hilfe für den Feind: Die britische Debatte urn Nahrungslieferungen an Deutschland,”
VjZ
(1989), 253–78. See also Ross,
Foreign Office Attitudes
, p. 527.

25
The memoirs of the chief British representative, Lord Strang,
Home and Abroad
(London: Deutsch, 1956) chap. 6, remain useful. See also Donald J. Nelson,
Wartime Origins of the Berlin Dilemma
(University, Alab.: Univ. of Alabama Press, 1978); William M. Franklin, “Zonal Boundaries and Access to Berlin,”
World Politics
16 (1963), 1–31; Tony Sharp,
The Wartime Alliance and the Zonal Division of Germany
(London: Oxford Univ. Press), 1975; Kettenacker, “Alliance,” pp. 450–54, and
Krieg zur Friedenssicherung,
pp. 270–302. See the War Cabinet Post Hostilities Planning Staffs memorandum, “Dismemberment of Germany,” 25 Aug. 1944, and related documents in PRO, CAB 119/134. On broader issues, see Anne Deighton,
Impossible Peace: The Division of Germany and the Origins of the Cold War
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), chaps. 1–2.