A World at Arms (227 page)

119
“Magic Far Eastern Summary,” Nos. 199 of 5 Oct. and 216 of 22 Oct. 1944, NA, RG 457, SRS 199, 216.

120
See Salewski,
Seekriegsleitung,
2: 491ff.

13: TENSIONS IN BOTH ALLIANCES

1
There is a survey of these problems, with added detail, in Hathaway,
Ambiguous Partnership,
chaps. 1–2. A different picture in Terry H. Anderson,
The United States, Great Britain, and the Cold War
(Columbia, Mo.: Univ. of Missouri Press, 1981).

2
Danchev,
Very Special Relationship,
chaps. 5–6, provides many examples. The file on the replacement for Dill on his death is in PRO, PREM 478/2.

3
A good introduction in William H. Mc Neill,
America, Britain and Russia: Their Cooperation and Conflict,
1941–1946 (1953, reprinted New York: Johnson Reprint, 1970), pp. 129ff.

4
The issue is reviewed in the preceding chapter. The relevant exchanges between Churchill and Roosevelt have been published by Loewenheim (
Roosevelt and Churchill
) and Kimball (
Churchill and Roosevelt
).

5
The best survey remains William Roger Louis,
Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire,
1941–1945 (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1978). See now also Kimball,
The Juggler,
chap. 7.

6
Note Stettinius to Hull, 15 Aug. 1944, FDRL, PSF 94, Phillips; Kenton J. Clymer, “The Education of William Phillips: Self-Determination and American Policy toward India,”
Diplomatic History
8 (1984), 13–35.

7
See the exchange in Loewenheim,
Roosevelt and Churchill,
pp. 526, 535 n I; Kimball,
Churchill and Roosevelt,
3: 176–77, 188–89. The monarchy issue also played a role to some extent in the problems of liberated Belgium.

8
Hathaway,
Ambiguous Partnership,
pp. 9<96.

9
EAM was the political leadership of ELAS, the largest resistance force.

10
Hathaway, pp. 93–111.

11
Ibid., p. 98.

12
Gietz,
Die neue Alte Welt,
pp. 141–78, is particularly good on this subject. Of considerable
interest is the report by Welles of 13 Aug. 1942 to Roosevelt on a talk with Alexis Leger, FDRL, PSF Box 96, State Welles, 1942.

13
See the references to Churchill’s requests of 3 Sep. 1941 and 24 Apr. 19421n Desmond Morton to Air Chief Marshal Sir Wilfred R. Freeman, Vice-Chief of the Air Staff, of 27 Apr. 1942, PRO, AIR 20/2782.

14
It would appear that General Eisenhower was the one senior American converted, at least for a while, to this approach (Arthur L..Funk, “Eisenhower and de Gaulle,” paper at the American Historical Association meeting, 29 Dec. 1990).

15
A summary in Hathaway,
Ambiguous Partnership,
pp. 72–88.

16
The issue is touched on in ibid., pp. 80–84. The relevant exchanges between Roosevelt and Churchill are printed in Kimball, Churchill and Roosevelt, 3: 402–8, 418–21, 423–25, 427–28. A recent discussion in Philip Cockrell, “International Civil Aviation and United States Foreign Policy,” Proceedings of the South Carolina Historical Association 1991, 29–46.

17
An introduction to the issue in Hathaway, chap. 2; a recent treatment in Kimball,
The Juggler,
chap. 3.

18
On the question of the Soviet-Polish border, note Jan Karski,
The Great Powers and Poland,
1919–1945:
From Versailles to Yalta
(Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1985), p. 411.

19
See esp. Karski, chap. 31.

20
Until new material is opened in Warsaw, the best examination of this issue is Cienciala, “The Activities of Polish Communists,” 129–45, which demonstrates that a new government for Poland was being recruited in late 1943 at the latest.

21
Karski,
The Great Powers and Poland,
chap. 32; Richard C. Lucas,
The Strange Allies: The United States and Poland,
1941–1945 (Knoxville: Univ. of Tennessee Press, 1978), chaps. 3–5. See the letter of 11 Mar. 1944 signed by many Americans who had supported aid to Russia before Pearl Harbor urging that the Soviet Union not antagonize the United States by running rough-shod over Poland (Lord Halifax’s copy in AN 1461/1271/45, PRO, FO 371/38674A).

22
Klaus Schwabe, “Roosevelt und Jalta,” Jürgen Heideking
et al.
(eds.),
Wege in die Zeitgeschichte
(Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1989), p. 466.

23
See the documents in PRO, AIR 20/2710–11. For fear of British aid to the Polish resistance, the Soviet Union also would not allow damaged British bombers to fly on to Russian airfields (AIR 8/1110). There is an account of the related issues in Karski, chap. 33. The military context of the Warsaw uprising is reviewed in the preceding chapter, but the impact of the events of Aug.-Sep. 1944 was so great that it has to be placed into the diplomatic context as well.

24
Joan Beaumont, “A Question of Diplomacy: British Military Mission in the U.S.S.R.
1941-1945,” Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies
118 (1973), 74–81; James R. Deane, The Strange Alliance (New York: Viking, 1946), passim; Mason-Macfarlane Papers, Imperial War Museum, MM 31; documents in PRO, AIR 20/2606–9, 5401. Stalin did, however, suggest a military committee, see 30 Mission (Moscow) No. MIL 1519 of 2 July 1944, PRO, CAB 119/128.

25
Craven and Cate,
Army Air Forces,
3: 476; Deane, pp. 132–33; Lukas,
Eagles East,
pp. 182–85; documents in PRO, AIR 20/796.

26
Note WM(44) War Cabinet 43(44) Conclusions, Confidential Annex, PRO, CAB 65/46; cf. R 7380/68/67, FO 371/43636.

27
Dallek,
Roosevelt and Foreign Policy,
pp. 468ff.

28
Donovan to Roosevelt, 23 and 24 Mar. 1944, FDRL, PSF Box 6, OSS. Note also the papers rejecting a proposal for a fake Hitler broadcast in June 1944 out of consideration for Soviet sensitivities, in PSF Box 125, J.F. Carter file.

29
F.C. Nano, “The First Soviet Double Cross: A Chapter in the Secret History of World
War II,”
Journal of Central European Affairs
12 (Oct. 1952), 236–58. A broad survey of the issues in Paul O. Quinlan,
Clash over Romania: British and American Policies toward
Romania,
1938–1947, American Romanian Academy of Arts and Sciences No. 2 (Oakland, Calif.: The Academy, 1977).

30
See R 4903/68/64, PRO, FO 371/43636. There is a detailed account in Woodward,
British Foreign Policy,
3: chap. 38. See also Erickson,
Road to Berlin,
pp. 331ff.

31
Albert Resis, “The Churchill-Stalin Secret ‘Percentages’ Agreement on the Balkans, Moscow, October 1944,”
American Historical Review
85 (1981), 368–87, and “Spheres of Influence in Soviet Diplomacy,”
Journal of Modern History
53 (1981 ), 417–39; Vojtech Mastny,
Russia’s Road to the Cold War: Diplomacy, Warjare, and the Politics of Communism
, 1941–1945 (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1979), pp. 207–11.

32
This is the basic point of Peter J. Stavrakis,
Moscow and Greek Communism, 1944–1949
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1989). The policy followed by the Soviet Union in 1944–45 did not, of course, keep it from hoping for gains from the post-1945 turmoil in Greece.

33
Edward M. Bennett,
Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Search for Victory: American-Soviet Relations
1939–1945 (Washington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1990), pp. 131–38. See also Edgar Snow to Roosevelt, 28 Dec. 1944, FDRL, PSF Box 68, Russia 1945.

34
See the entry for May 19441n the War Diary of M.1. 191n PRO, WO 165/41. A rather dubious account in Olaf Groehler, “Zur Geschichte eines britischen Antikomitees: Reaktion der beherrschended Kreise Grossbritanniens und der USA auf die Gründung des Nationalkomitees ‘Freies Deutschland’ 1943,”
Zeitschri Jt j Ur Geschichtswissenschafi 32
the Germans concerning a possible separate peace did nothing to improve relations; note the concerns in London in Aug. 1944 reflected in C 11893, 11895, 12686/190/18, FO 37 1/39088.

35
Thus the Americans allowed Victor Kravchenko to remain in the U.S. (Watson to Roosevelt, 18 May 1944, FDRL, PSF Box 66, Poland 1944, Jan.-July;
Bennett,American-Soviet Relations
p. 121); while the British turned down the request of Alexander Rado for asylum (N 11501/11501/38, PRO, FO 371/47991; N 16622/1622/38, FO 371/48006). On the long-term efffects of Soviet espionage on that country’s relations with the West, see John L. Gaddis, “The Intelligence Revolution’s Impact on Postwar Diplomacy,” in Hitchcock (ed.),
The Intelligence Revolution,
pp. 251–74.

36
See Eden to Kerr for Stalin, No. 331 of 4 Nov. 1942, and Kerr to Eden No. 1444 of 6 Nov. 1942, C 10635, 10418/61/18, PRO, FO 371/30920; Woodward,
British Foreign Policy,
2: 277, 278, 280.

37
The series “Geheime Erlasse, Berichte, Telegramme” in the files of the German embassy in Turkey provides numerous illustrations of these German efforts. On Roosevelt’s concern about such matters, see FDRL, PSF Box 146, Earle, George H.

38
The most recent account in Robert C. Hilderbrand,
Dumbarton Oaks: The Origins of the United Nations and the Search for Postwar Security
(Chapel Hill, N.C.: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1990). An excellent preliminary account in Mc Neill,
America, Britain and Russia,
pp. 501ff. The British record is summarized in Woodward,
British Foreign Policy,
5: chap. 43. For British Foreign Office hopes for future cooperation with the Soviet Union, see Graham Ross, “Foreign Office Attitudes to the Soviet Union 1941–45,”
JCH
16 (1981 ), pp. 528-29, 532.

39
Dallek,
Roosevelt and Foreign Policy,
pp. 466–67.

40
See Bennett,
American-Soviet Relations,
pp. 127–29.

41
Gaddis,
US and Origins,
pp. 26–31.

42
WM(44) War Cabinet 157(44) of 27 Nov. 1944, Conclusions, Confidential Annex, PRO, CAB 65/47. it will be noted that, except for Roosevelt’s belief that China should be treated as a great power, this corresponded closely with his views.

43
Mastny,
Russia’s Road,
pp. 218ff; see also Stalin’s speech of 6 Nov. 1944,
Current History
8, No. 41 (1945),57–64.

44
Mc Neill,
America, Britain and Russia,
p. 450. There is a short account in ibid., pp. 449–5 1. See also Milward,
War, Economy and Society,
pp. 362–64; David Rees,
Harry Dexter White: A Study in Paradox
(New York: Coward, Mc Cann & Geoghegan, 1973), pp. 221ff; John M. Blum (ed.), From the Morgenthau Diaries, Vol. 3: Years of War, 1941–1945 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967), pp. 426–36; Alfred E. Eckles, A Search for Solvency: Bretton Woods and the International Monetary System, 194I-1971 (Austin: Univ. of Texas Press, 1975), chaps. 1–7.

45
A striking example of Schacht’s devices is described in Weinberg,
Foreign Policy
1933–36, pp. 138–39.

46
There is a three–volumeofficial history by George Woodbridge (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1950). Roosevelt appointed Herbert Lehman (who gave up the governorship of New York a month early) to be the first head of the agency; much of its work remains unexplored by scholars (see FDRL, Morgenthau Presidential Diary, 12 Nov. 1942, Vol. 5: 1192).

47
Herring,
Aid to Russia,
pp. 160–62; Gaddis,
US and Origins,
pp. 22–23.

48
A lovely example in Martin,
Deutschland und Japan,
facing p. 176. A sample from the other extreme is the German decision that a proxy marriage in Japan had to be postponed because the bride’s records proving her German descent had been burned by enemy action (Berlin to German naval attache Tokyo, HA 1588 of 29 Dec. 1944, NA, RG 457, SRGL 2028)

49
There is a very thoughtful discussion of the Axis lack of committees and other structures as well as the importance of the disparagement of the virtues of compromise and cooperation, in
DRuZW,
6: 95–96.

50
This issue is discussed at length in the books by Schroder and Deakin (see Bibliographic Essay, p. 929). After the Italian surrender of 1943, the Germans seized many Italian archives and searched them for information on the efforts of Italy and Germany’s Southeast European satellites to leave the war.

51
Schreiber,
Italienische Militärinternierte,
is the best treatment of this subject.

52
Weinberg,
Foreign Policy
1937–39, pp. 281–82, 311. See also Steinberg,
All or Nothing.

53
See
ADAP,
E, 5, No. 158, on Ribbentrop’s visit to Rome in Feb. 1943. Bastianini gave a report to the Japanese ambassador in Rome, whose telegram to Tokyo No. 142 of 6 Mar. 19431s in NA, RG 457, SRDJ 32542–44.

54
Oshima to Tokyo No. 1306 of 14 Nov. 1942, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 28266–67; Martin,
Deutschland und Japan,
doc. 28.

55
ADAP,
E, 3, No. 278; German embassy Tokyo Nos. 683, 684 of 25 Feb. 1943, AA, St.S., “Japan,” Bd. I I, fr. 398514–17; Wiehl, “Aufzeichnung betr. Austausch von Rüstungslieferungen mit Japan,” 10 July 1943, ibid., Bd. 12, fr. 17301–4; Tokyo to Rome No. 610 of 27 Mar. 1942, NA, RG 457, SRA 03039; Japanese military attache Berlin to Tokyo No. 673 of 24 Sep. 1943, SRA 06750–55.

56
ADAP,
E, 6, No. 41; Rome to Tokyo No. 294 of 23 May 1943, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 37442–43; Tokyo to Berlin Circular No. 46 of 29 Jan. 1944, SRDJ 49742–43; Shigemitsu (Tokyo) to Oshima (Berlin) Nos. 612 of 28 Aug. and 618 of 29 Aug. 1944, SRDJ 69069–70, 69510–11.

57
On the Okamoto mission, see Martin, pp. 204–5. The German report on the May 19 conversation is in Ribbentrop to Stahmer No. 847 of 25 May 1943, AA, St.S., “Japan,” Bd. 12, fr. 17248–52; Oshima’s report No. 549 of 21 May 19431s in NA, RG 457, SRDJ 37447–52. See also Martin, p. 181;
ADAP,
E, 6, No. 41.