A World at Arms (228 page)

58
On Oshima, see Carl Boyd,
The Extraordinary Envoy: General Hiroshi Oshima and Diplomacy in the Third Reichs,
1934–1939 (Washington: University Press of America, 1980); on the
Anti-Comintern Pact, see Weinberg,
Foreign Policy
1933–36, pp. 342–48; Krebs,
Japans Deutschlandpolitik,
pp. 15ff.

59
The point is made by the sub–titleof Johanna M. Meskill’s book:
Hitler and Japan: The Hollow Alliance.

1
On the financing of these and other similar regimes, see BA, R 2/271 .

2
On the Brazilian army contingent, see McCann,
Brazilian-American Alliance,
chap. 12; on the air force contingent, see David M. Todd, “Flight of the Ostrich-The Brazilian Air Force in World War II,”
Air Power History
37, NO.4 (Winter 1990), 30–41.

3
Note the German navy study of Oct. 29, 1944 showing that, if Sweden joined Germany’s enemies, Germany was now too weak to occupy her (OKM, Skl, 1. “Studie: Lagebetrachtung für den Fall eines Kriegseintritts Schwedens auf der Seite unserer Gegner," BA/MA, RM 7/163, f. 266-316, 355ff).

4
See the reports of 7, 13, 14 July 1944 in Boberach (ed.),
Meldungen aus dem Reich,
17: 6630–36, 6636–40, 6645–51.

5
BA/MA, Nachlass Weichs, N 19/3, f. 205–1944. One possible supporter of any new regime, Field Marshal Rommel, had been injured shortly before. Until July 20, the British had assumed that the German military would dump Hitler at the right moment to get a better peace and that there would, therefore, be a central government in place through which Germany could be administered (Kettennacker, “Die alliierte Kontrolle,” p. 57). The British clearly did not have a realistic picture of the devotion of the higher German military to the Hitler regime.

6
A collection of pictures from trials of individuals involved in the July 20 plot is in the Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, Lot. No. 3675.

7
Steinert,
Hitler’s War,
pp. 264–73.

8
Orlow,
History of the Nazi Party,
pp. 462ff.

9
The Japanese were naturally most concerned about the upheaval in Germany. Reports by Oshima are in his Nos. 722 and unnumbered, 20 July 1944, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 65 115–16, 728 of 21 July, 65222–24, 738 and 741 of 25 July, 65739–47 and 65636–42 (a German report on this Oshima-Ribbentrop meeting of 23 July in
ADAP,
E, 8, No. 133), 779 of 2 Aug., 66941–46; Japanese military attache reports: Berlin No. 304 of 26 July, SRA 10078, Madrid No. 304 of 26 July, SRA 12890–92; Japanese naval attache reports Berlin Nos. 273 of 24 July, SRNA 2017, 293(?) of 3 Aug., SRNA 2070–72, report of 28 Aug., SRNA 2254–58. An American analysis of the Japanese materials is in CinC U.S. Fleet and CNO, Pacific Strategic Intelligence Section, “Japanese Estimates Regarding Germany’s Ability to Continue the Struggle (August-December 1944),” 22 Jan. 1945, SRH-068.

10
See Donovan’s memoranda on the plot for Roosevelt of 22 and 29 July 1944, FDRL, PSF Box 168, OSS Reports July 1944. Roosevelt, who was leaving to meet his Pacific commanders in Hawaii, noted on July 21 that he might have to come back if “German revolt gets worse! I fear though that it won’t”
(FDR Letters,
2: 1525).

11
Wolfgang Bleyer (ed.), “Plane der faschistischen Führung zum totalen Krieg,”
ZeitschriJt für Geschichtswissenschafi
27 (1969), 1312-29.

12
Peter Longerich (ed.), “Joseph Goebbels und der Totale Krieg: Eine unbekannte Denkschrift des Propagandaministers vom 18. Juli 1944,”
VjZ
35 (1987), 289–314.

13
A comprehensive study in David Yeltsin, “The Volkssturm,” PhD diss., Univ. of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, 1989.

14
An introductory survey in Ursula von Gersdorff,
Frauen im Kriegsdienst
1914–1945
(Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1969), pp. 60–76, 138ff. See also Franz W. Seidler,
Blitzmädchen: die Geschichte der Helferinnen der deutschen Wehrmacht im
2.
Weltkrieg
(Munich: Bernard & Graefe, 1979).

15
On the Flakhelfer, see Ludwig schätz,
schüler-Soldaten: Die Geschichte der Luftwaffenhelfer im zweiten Weltkrieg
(Darmstadt: Thesen-Verlag, 1974), an introduction greatly in need of revision; and Roman Bleistein, “Hitlers jüngste Soldaten,”
Stimmen der Zeit
200, No. 1 (1982), 61–63, a summary of the existing literature.

16
Steinert,
Hitler’s War,
p. 280. An interesting, though very pro-Nazi, account written right after the war by a true believer, of some of these young women who ended up in a Waffen-SS anti-aircraft unit near Prague, is in Jutta Rüdiger (ed.),
Zur Problematik von Soldatinnen: Der Kampfeinsatz von Flakhelferinnnen im Zweiten Weltkrieg, Berichte und Dokumentationen
(Lindhorst: Askania, 1987).

17
Hans-Erich Volkmann, “Das Vlasov-Unternehmen zwischen Ideologie und Pragmatis
MGM
12 (1972), 130; “Vertrauliche Informationen Nr. 206/44,” 19 Sep. 1944, BA, Oberheitmann, ZSg. 109/51, f. 116, Nr. 253/44 of 14 Nov., f. 80, Nr. 260/44 of 22 Dec., f. 90; Oshima to Tokyo No. 1147 of 10 Oct. 1944, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 74486–88

18
Volkmann, “Das Vlasov-Unternehmen,” p. 149 n 107.

19
Dallin,
German Rule in Russia,
pp. 613ff; Oshima to Tokyo No. 1298 of 28 Nov. 1944, NA, RG 457. SRDJ 80493–94.

20
Japanese military attache to Italy Nos. 145 of 10 June and 241 of 24 Oct. 1944, NA, RG 457, SRA 11659–62, 13089–91; Hidaka (Venice) to Tokyo No. 280 of 1 Sep. 1944, SRDJ 70053–61.

21
There is extensive documentation on the Manfred Weiss question in
ADAP,
E, 8. Most of the relevant documents are published in facsimile in Braham (ed.)
Destruction of Hungarian Jewry,
2: chap. 8. The German pretence that these were wartime measures was quickly penetrated by the Hungarians when they saw that the contracts were for 25 years. Hitler’s approval of the arrangement is referred to in Braham, 2, No. 428.

22
Boog,
Luftwaffenführung,
pp. 147–48.

23
The most important single work on this topic, that by Macartney, is entitled
October Fifteenth
because this was the date of Horthy’s failed attempt to take Hungary out of the war. For Hitler’s ideas about a Szalasi coup in late Sep. 1944, see Jodl Diary transcript for 23 Sep. 1944, Imperial War Museum. On the fighting, see Ziemke,
Stalingrad to Berlin,
pp. 378–86; Erickson,
Road to Berlin,
pp. 384–97; Glantz,
Soviet Military Deception,
pp. 440–67.

24
This is from Szalasi’s report to Oshima on 4 Dec. right after seeing Hitler; see Oshima to Tokyo No. 1375 of 5 Dec. 1944, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 81524. The
German
reports on the two Hitler-Szalasi talks are in Andreas Hillgruber (ed.),
Staatsmänner und Diplomaten bei Hitler,
2 vols. (Frankfürtl M: Bernard & Graefe, 1967–70), 2: 520–36; only the second one is printed in
ADAP,
E, 8, NO.313. Note that the German reports are dated 7 and 8 Dec. so that the discrepancy between Szalasi’s comments to Oshima and the German record prepared by Schmidt cannot simply be resolved in favor of the German record. There are no useful details in the relevant portion of Schmidt’s memoirs,
Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne
(Bonn: Athenaum, 1950), pp. 574–75. On German relations with the Szalasi government in general, see Szollosi-Janze,
Die Pfeilkreuzlerbewegung in Ungarn,
pp. 301-23, 413ff .

25
Ziemke,
Stalingrad to Berlin,
pp. 340–42, 344, 416.

26
Ibid., pp. 408–9; Erickson,
Road to Berlin,
pp. 421–22.

27
Grier, “Hitler’s Baltic Strategy”; Erickson,
Road to Berlin,
pp. 420–2 I; note Dönitz’s comment of 24/25 Aug. 1944 in Salewski,
Seekriegsleitung,
2: 648.

28
There is a detailed account of the planning for the great Soviet winter offensive in Erickson,
Road to Berlin,
pp. 422–30, but the map which accompanies this text is filled with errors in both the borders and the front lines shown. There is now a good account
with much better maps in Christopher Duffy,
Red Storm on the Reich: The Soviet March on Germany,
1945 (New York: Atheneum, 1991), chap. 3. The very effective Soviet deception projects for their offensive are described by David Glantz in Hitchcock (ed.),
The Intelligence Revolution,
pp. 132–86.

29
The most useful study of the impact of logistics on strategy in the West remains Ruppenthal’s two volumes,
The European Theater of Operations,
in the U.S. Army in World War II series; see also van Creveld,
Supplying War,
chap. 7.

30
Ruppenthal, 2: 507.

31
Ibid., pp. 134–39. This account also covers the other truck supply routes.

32
Very helpful is the discussion in the memoirs of the British officer in charge of intelligence on Eisenhower’s staff, Sir Kenneth Strong,
Intelligence at the Top: The Recollections ofan Intelligence Officer
(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1969), pp. 197ff.

33
See Churchill’s Personal Minute 1159/4 of 3 Dec. 1944, PRO, WO 259/79.

34
Brooke to Montgomery, tel. 1450A/3 of 3 Oct. 1944, Liddell Hart Centre, Alanbrooke Papers 14/33.

35
There are some details in Ruppental,
European Theater of Operations,
2: chap. I I; there is a biting and rather excessive critique in Martin van Creveld,
Fighting Power: German
and U.S. Army Performance,
1939–1945 (Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1982). The whole issue was greatly complicated by the fact that the commander of the rear area (Com Z), General J.C.H. Lee, was a rather controversial figure.

36
Note David Eisenhower’s assertion
(Eisenhower at War,
p. 499) that in October the Germans outnumbered the Allies in combat troops. The Allied situation was not helped by the fact that Brooke was as negative in his evaluation of Tedder as he was of Eisenhower (note the full text of his diary for 12 Dec. 1944).

37
Jeffrey Ethell,
Mustang: A Documentary History of the
P-51 (London: Jane’s, 1981), pp. 97–99.

38
A short history of the ME 262 is in Eugene M. Emme,
Hitler’s Blitzbomber,
Air University Documentary Research Study (Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 195 I); a summary in Hermann Jung,
Die Ardennen-Offensive 1944/45
(Gottingen: Musterschmidt, 1971), pp. 68–72. Murray,
Luftwaffe,
pp. 238–39, comes to a conclusion very similar to that given here. In any case, Hitler had little faith in the Luftwaffe by the fall of 1944; from Sep. 17 to Oct. 28 its Chief of Staff was forbidden to attend the situation conference at headquarters!

39
For the Ardennes offensive, as the Germans called it, or the Battle of the Bulge as the Americans named it, see Hugh M. Cole,
The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge
(Washington: GPO, 1965); lung, Die Ardennen-Offensive; Lamb, Montgomery, chap. 12. The account in Eisenhower, Eisenhower at War, is most interesting.

40
Jung, pp. 31–34.

41
Ibid., chap. 5, gives a good account. A key piece of evidence is the diary of General Kreipe, Chief of Staff of the German air force, for 16 Sep. 1944, published in ibid., p. 218.

42
Weinberg,
World in the Balance,
pp. 53–74.

43
It can be seen that I do not share Jung’s view (pp. 97–100) that Hitler had a serious political objective with the offensive .

44
Jung, chap. 6.

45
A brief summary in Weigley,
Eisenhower’s Lieutenants,
pp. 475–76, 495–96. In detail, James J. Weingartner,
Crossroads of Death: The Story of the Malmedy Massacre and Trial
(Berkeley, Calif.: Univ. of California Press, 1973). Jung never mentions the event.

46
On this unit, the 150th SS Panzer Brigade, see lung, pp. 126–28. In U.S. Army trials, 16 Germans were executed and 3 were acquitted; see First U.S. Army,
Report of Operations (August
1944–22
February
1945) (Washington: GPO, 1945), 2: 51 and 4: 229. There was also a small German parachute unit which had no impact on the fighting Oung, pp. 12829, 146–47).

47
It is worth noting that Brooke and Montgomery, who despised most American generals, wanted to have Patton transferred to command the 9th Army north of the Ardennes (Brooke to Montgomery, 1 Dec. 1944, Liddell Hart Centre, Alanbrooke Papers 14/2/15; Simpson to Brooke, 3 Dec. 1944, Alanbrooke Papers 14/3). See also Paul G. Munch, “Patton’s Staff and the Battle of the Bulge,”
Military Review
70, NO.5 (1990), 46–54.

48
A good account in Eisenhower,
Eisenhower at War,
pp. 567–73.

49
Montgomery to Brooke, M2 388 of 22 Dec. 1944, Liddell Hart Centre, Alanbrooke Papers, 14/36.

50
Montgomery to Simpson, 25 Dec. 1944, ibid., 14/2/36. The relevant passages have been omitted in Bryant, 2: 278–79.

51
A balanced assessment, rather favorable to Montgomery, in Eisenhower,
Eisenhower at War,
pp. 575ff.

52
Years later, on June 8, 1959, General Ismay, who had been Churchill’s immediate military assistant and representative, wrote to General (then President) Eisenhower, “If only someone would muzzle, or better still chloroform Monty, I should be spared the constant danger of blood pressure. I have come to the conclusion that his love of publicity is a disease, like alcoholism or taking drugs, and that it sends him equally mad.” Liddell Hart Centre, Ismay Papers IVl Eis/13 I.

53
Wyant,
Sandy Patch,
chap. 20, is the most recent account.

54
See Jung,
Die Ardennen-Offensive,
pp. 186–87, for a summary; Horst Boog, “1. Januar 1945: Operation ‘Bodenplatte’,”
Luftwaffe
16, No. 1 (1975), 32–34, is more detailed.