Triumph and Tragedy (The Second World War) (99 page)

It is thought most important that Montgomery should
take Lübeck as soon as possible, and he has an
additional American Army Corps to strengthen his
movements if he requires it. Our arrival at Lübeck
before our Russian friends from Stettin would save a lot
of argument later on. There is no reason why the
Russians should occupy Denmark, which is a country to
be liberated and to have its sovereignty restored. Our
position at Lübeck, if we get it, would be decisive in this
matter.

Thereafter, but partly concurrent, it is thought well to
push on to Linz to meet the Russians there, and also by
an American encircling movement to gain the region
south of Stuttgart. In this region are the main German
installations connected with their atomic research, and
Triumph and Tragedy

610

we had better get hold of these in the interest of the
special secrecy attaching to this topic.

Mr. Eden replied:

Foreign

Secretary

21 Apr. 45

(Washington)

to

Prime Minister

I strongly share the view that Montgomery should
take Lübeck. A Russian occupation of Denmark would
cause us much embarrassment. The fears of
Scandinavian countries would be greatly increased,
and I seem to remember that one of the causes of
dissension between the Russians and Germans in their
honeymoon period in 1940 arose out of certain Russian
demands for control of the Kattegat.

I am sure that you still have Prague in mind. It might
do the Russians much good if the Americans were to
occupy the Czech capital, when no doubt they would be
willing to invite the Soviet Ambassador to join the
United States and ourselves, in contrast to the
behaviour the Russians have shown to us….

Mr. Truman’s reply however carried us little further. He proposed that the Allied troops should retire to their agreed zones in Germany and Austria as soon as the military situation allowed and sought my opinion on a draft telegram to Stalin to this effect.

To this I answered:

Prime

Minister

to

24 Apr. 45

President Truman

I thank you for your answer to my telegram. I agree
with the preamble, but later paragraphs simply allow
the Russians to order us back to the occupational
zones at any point they might decide, and not
necessarily with regard to the position of the fronts as a
whole. It is your troops who would suffer most by this,
Triumph and Tragedy

611

being pushed back about a hundred and twenty miles
in the centre and yielding up to the unchecked Russian
advance an enormous territory. And this while all
questions of our spheres in Vienna or arrangements for
triple occupation of Berlin remain unsettled.

On April 27, after discussion with the President, I sent this telegram to Stalin:

Prime

Minister

to

27 Apr. 45

Marshal Stalin

The Anglo-American armies will soon make contact
in Germany with Soviet forces, and the approaching
end of German resistance makes it necessary that the
United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union
decide upon an orderly procedure for the occupation by
their forces of the zones which they will occupy in
Germany and in Austria.

2. Our immediate task is the final defeat of the
German Army. During this period the boundaries
between the forces of the three Allies must be decided
by commanders in the field, and will be governed by
operational considerations and requirements. It is
inevitable that our armies will in this phase find
themselves in occupation of territory outside the
boundaries of the ultimate occupational zones.

3. When the fighting is finished the next task is for
the Allied Control Commissions to be set up in Berlin
and Vienna, and for the forces of the Allies to be
redisposed and to take over their respective occupational zones. The demarcation of the zones in Germany
has already been decided upon, and it is necessary
that we shall without delay reach an agreement on the
zones to be occupied in Austria at the forthcoming
meeting proposed by you in Vienna.

4. It appears now that no signed instrument of
surrender will be forthcoming. In this event Governments should decide to set up at once the Allied
Control Commissions, and to entrust to them the task of
making detailed arrangements for the withdrawal of the
forces to their agreed occupational zones.

Triumph and Tragedy

612

5. In order to meet the requirements of the situation
referred to in paragraph 2 above, namely, the
emergency and temporary arrangements for the tactical
zones, instructions have been sent to General
Eisenhower. These are as follows:
(a) To avoid confusion between the two armies and
to prevent either of them from expanding into areas
already occupied by the other, both sides should halt as
and where they meet, subject to such adjustments to
the rear or to the flanks as are required, in the opinion
of the local commanders on either side, to deal with any
remaining opposition.

(b) As to adjustments of forces after cessation of
hostilities in an area, your troops should be disposed in
accordance with military requirements regardless of
zonal boundaries. You will, in so far as permitted by the
urgency of the situation, obtain the approval of the
Combined Chiefs of Staff prior to any major adjustment,
in contrast to local adjustments for operational and
administrative reasons.

6. It is requested that you will issue similar
instructions to your commanders in the field.

7. I am sending this message to you and to
President Truman simultaneously.

The reply was guarded.

Marshal

Stalin

to

2 May 45

Prime Minister

I have received your message of April 27 on the
subject of procedure for the occupation of Germany
and Austria by the Red Army and the Anglo-American
armed forces.

For my part I should inform you that the Soviet High
Command has issued instructions that when the Soviet
and Allied forces meet the Soviet Command should
immediately establish contact with the Command of the
American or English forces, and that they should in
agreement together

(a)define

a

provisional

tactical

demarcation

boundary line, and

Triumph and Tragedy

613

(b) take measures to suppress any opposition by the
German forces within their provisional demarcation line.

The Russians had not been long in Vienna before we got a foretaste of what would happen in a zone of their occupation. They announced that a Provisional Austrian Government had been formed, and they refused to let our missions fly in. All this made me fear that they were deliberately exploiting their arrival to “organise” the country before we got there. On April 30 I accordingly telegraphed to Mr. Truman as follows:

It seems to me that unless we both take a strong
stand now we shall find it very difficult to exercise any
influence in Austria during the period of her liberation
from the Nazis. Would you be willing to join me in
sending Marshal Stalin a message in the following
terms:

We have been much concerned to hear from our
Charge d’Affaires in Moscow that, despite the invitation
you extended to Mr. Harriman on April 13, the Soviet
Government will not now agree to the Allied missions
proceeding to Vienna until agreement has been
reached in the European Advisory Commission
regarding the respective zones in Vienna and the
provisional control machinery. We have also been
disagreeably surprised by the announcement of the
setting up in Vienna of a Provisional Austrian
Government, despite our request for time to consider
the matter.

It has been our understanding that the treatment of
Austria, as of Germany, is a matter of common concern
to the four Powers who are to occupy and control those
countries. We regard it as essential that British,
American, and French representatives should be
allowed to proceed at once to Vienna in order to report
on conditions there before any final settlement is
reached in the European Advisory Commission on

Triumph and Tragedy

614

matters affecting the occupation and control of the
country, and especially of Vienna itself. We hope you
will issue the necessary instructions to Marshal
Tolbukhin, in order that the Allied missions may fly in at
once from Italy.

On May 3 President Truman replied that he entirely agreed with my telegram and was himself sending a protest to the Soviet Government. This protest reminded the Russians of Stalin’s suggestion that American, British and French representatives should go to Vienna at once and settle the zones of occupation. Plans had been made for their journey and now the Soviet Government were saying that their arrival would be “undesirable” until after the zones had been agreed by the European Advisory Commission. The Commission had been unable to agree, partly through lack of information. The only way was to study the problem on the spot and Soviet unwillingness to let us do so was holding up the Commission’s work. Mr. Truman concluded his message by asking the Soviet Government to let the Allied representatives fly to Vienna at once.

These representations were quite ineffectual.

Meanwhile the advance of the Allied armies continued with increasing momentum. The Seventh U.S. Army of General Devers’ Army Group passed through Munich on April 30, and reached Innsbruck on May 3. The First French Army, after skirting the north shore of Lake Constance, turned south and also crossed the Austrian frontier. From Innsbruck a force was sent to the Brenner Pass, and on May 4, a few miles to the south, met the head of the U.S.

Fifth Army which had driven up from Italy as an aftermath of Alexander’s victorious campaign. And so all three “fronts,”

Triumph and Tragedy

615

Western, Eastern, and Southern, once thousands of miles apart, at last came together, crushing the life out of the German armies. Their encirclement had been completed by Montgomery in the north. The head of the VIIIth Corps, which led the advance of the Second British Army, reached the Elbe thirty miles above Hamburg on April 19. On their left the XIIth Corps was strongly resisted by hastily organised detachments drawn principally from the officer cadet schools near Rheine, but they took Soltau on April 18