Triumph and Tragedy (The Second World War) (103 page)

That evening I telephoned the President, and then dictated the following note for the next meeting of the Cabinet.

Prime

Minister

to

25 Apr. 45

British Cabinet

I spoke to President Truman at 8.10 P.M. He knew
nothing of what had happened at Stockholm, except
that when I asked to speak to him he inquired what it
was about, and I told him about the important message
from Stockholm. He had not received any report from
the American Ambassador there. I therefore read him

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the full text of Mallet’s telegram. I also told him that we
were convinced the surrender should be unconditional
and simultaneous to the three major Powers. He
expressed strong agreement with this. I then read him
the telegram I had sent, in accordance with the
Cabinet’s decision, to Marshal Stalin, and he expressed
strong agreement with this also. He asked me to read it
out to him a second time, which I did, so that he could
send a similar message at once to the Russians. I gave
him the substance of the covering note which I had
prepared on our Stalin telegram, which I attach. An
hour and a half before this talk I had sent both the
Stalin message and my covering note, so that he
should have the written text of them by now.

2. He also stated to me that he hoped to see me
soon, to which I replied that we were telegraphing him
proposals for a meeting, preferably here. I also told him
that we strongly approved of the lead he was taking on
the Polish issue. These, together with compliments,
formed the whole of our conversation.

W.S.C. 25.4.45.

Here is the text of my covering message to Stalin:
Prime

Minister

to

25 Apr. 45

Marshal Stalin

The President of the United States has the news
also. There can be no question, as far as His Majesty’s
Government is concerned, of anything less than
unconditional surrender simultaneously to the three
major Powers. We consider Himmler should be told that
German forces, either as individuals or in units, should
everywhere surrender themselves to the Allied troops
or representatives on the spot. Until this happens the
attack of the Allies upon them on all sides and in all
theatres where resistance continues will be prosecuted
with the utmost Vigour….

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635

His reply was the most cordial message I ever had from him.

Marshal

Stalin

to

25 Apr. 45

Prime Minister

I thank you for your communication of April 25

regarding the intention of Himmler to surrender on the
Western Front.

I consider your proposal to present to Himmler a
demand for unconditional surrender on all fronts,
including the Soviet front, the only correct one. Knowing
you, I had no doubt that you would act in this way.
3
I
beg you to act in the sense of your proposal, and the
Red Army will maintain its pressure on Berlin in the
interests of our common cause.

I have to state, for your information, that I have
given a similar reply to President Truman, who also
addressed to me the same inquiry.

I answered:

Prime

Minister

to

27 Apr. 45

Marshal Stalin

I am extremely pleased to know that you had no
doubt how I would act, and always will act, towards
your glorious country and yourself. British and I am sure
American action on this matter will go forward on the
lines you approve, and we all three will continually keep
each other fully informed.

Count Bernadotte went back to Germany to convey our demand to Himmler. No more was heard of the Nazi leader till May 22, when he was arrested by a British control post at Bremervörde. He was disguised and was not recognised; but his papers made the sentries suspicious and he was taken to a camp near Second Army Headquarters. He then told the commandant who he was. He was put under armed guard, stripped, and searched for poison by a doctor.

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During the final stage of the examination he bit open a phial of cyanide, which he had apparently hidden in his mouth for some hours. He died almost instantly, just after eleven o’clock at night on Wednesday, May 23.

In the northwest the drama closed less sensationally. On May 2 news arrived of the surrender in Italy. On the same day our troops reached Lübeck, on the Baltic, making contact with the Russians and cutting off all the Germans in Denmark and Norway. On the 3d we entered Hamburg without opposition and the garrison surrendered unconditionally. A German delegation came to Montgomery’s headquarters on Luneburg Heath. It was headed by Admiral Friedeburg, Doenitz’s emissary, who sought a surrender agreement to include German troops in the north who were facing the Russians. This was rejected as being beyond the authority of an Army Group commander, who could deal only with his own front. Next day, having received fresh instructions from his superiors, Friedeburg signed the surrender of all German forces in Northwest Germany, Holland, the Islands, Schleswig-Holstein, and Denmark.

In the course of a telegram to Mr. Eden at San Francisco, dated May 5, I told him:

Prime Minister to Mr.

5 May 45

Eden (San Francisco)

In the north Eisenhower threw in an American corps
with great dexterity to help Montgomery in his advance
on Lübeck. He got there with twelve hours to spare.

There were reports from the British Naval Attaché at
Stockholm, which we are testing, that, according to
Swedish information, the Russians have dropped
parachutists a few miles south of Copenhagen and that
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Communist activities have appeared there. It now
appears there were only two parachutists. We are
sending in a moderate holding force to Copenhagen by
air, and the rest of Denmark is being rapidly occupied
from henceforward by our fast-moving armoured
columns. I think therefore, having regard to the joyous
feeling of the Danes and the abject submission and
would-be partisanship of the surrendered Huns, we
shall head our Soviet friends off at this point too.

You will by now have heard the news of the
tremendous surrender that has been made to
Montgomery of all Northwest Germany, Holland, and
Denmark, both as regards men and ships. The men
alone must be more than a million. Thus in three
successive days 2,500,000 Germans have surrendered
to our British commanders. This is quite a satisfactory
incident in our military history. Ike has been splendid
throughout. We must vie with him in sportsmanship.

Friedeburg went on to Eisenhower’s headquarters at Reims, where he was joined by General Jodl on May 6.

They played for time to allow as many soldiers and refugees as possible to disentangle themselves from the Russians and come over to the Western Allies, and they tried to surrender the Western Front separately.

Eisenhower imposed a time-limit and insisted on a general capitulation. Jodl reported to Doenitz: “General Eisenhower insists that we sign today. If not, the Allied fronts will be closed to persons seeking to surrender individually. I see no alternative; chaos or signature. I ask you to confirm to me immediately by wireless that I have full powers to sign capitulation.”

The instrument of total, unconditional surrender was signed by General Bedell Smith and General Jodl, with French and Russian officers as witnesses, at 2.41 A.M. on May 7.

Thereby all hostilities ceased at midnight on May 8. The formal ratification by the German High Command took

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place in Berlin, under Russian arrangements, in the early hours of May 9. Air Chief Marshal Tedder signed on behalf of Eisenhower, Marshal Zhukov for the Russians, and Field-Marshal Keitel for Germany.

The final destruction of the German Army has been related; it remains to describe the end of Hitler’s other fighting forces. During the previous autumn the German Air Force, by a remarkable feat of organisation, but at the cost of its long-range bomber output, had greatly increased the numbers of its fighter aircraft. Our strategic bombing had thrown it on to the defensive and 70 per cent of its fighters had to be used for home defence. Although greater in numbers their effectiveness was less, largely owing to fuel shortage caused by our attacks on oil installations, which it became their principal duty to prevent. German high-performance jet fighters perturbed us for a time, but special raids on their centres of production and their airfields averted the threat. Throughout January and February our bombers continued to attack, and we made a heavy raid in the latter month on Dresden, then a centre of communications of Germany’s Eastern Front. The enemy air was fading. As our troops advanced the airfields of the Luftwaffe were more and more squeezed into a diminishing area, and provided excellent targets.

I felt the time had come to reconsider our policy of bombing industrial areas. Victory was close and we had to think ahead. “If we come into control of an entirely ruined land,” I wrote, on April 1, “there will be a great shortage of accommodation for ourselves and our Allies. We must see to it that our attacks do not do more harm to ourselves than they do to the enemy’s immediate war effort.” Hitler felt Triumph and Tragedy

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differently, and wanted factories and utility installations of every kind to be destroyed, but the able Speer and the German generals ignored his order. Our Chiefs of Staff instructed Bomber Command on April 6: “No great or additional advantage can be expected from attacks on remaining industrial centres, since the full effects would not be likely to mature before hostilities ceased.” It soon became difficult to bomb ahead of our troops without risk to the Russians, but British and United States aircraft did much other useful work. Advancing troops were sustained from the air; Holland was saved from famine; our released prisoners of war and wounded were carried home.

In judging the contribution to victory of strategic air-power it should be remembered that this was the first war in which it was fully used. We had to learn from hard-won experience.