Triumph and Tragedy (The Second World War) (95 page)

With regard to your reference to Greece and
Belgium, I recognise the consideration which you gave
me when we had to intervene with heavy armed forces
to quell the E.A.M.-E.L.A.S. attack upon the centre of
government in Athens. We have given repeated
instructions that your interest in Rumania and Bulgaria
is to be recognised as predominant. We cannot
however be excluded altogether, and we dislike being
treated by your subordinates in these countries so
differently from the kindly manner in which we at the top
are always treated by you. In Greece we seek nothing
but her friendship, which is of long duration, and desire
only her independence and integrity. But we have no
intention to try to decide whether she is to be a
monarchy or a republic. Our only policy there is to
restore matters to the normal as quickly as possible and
to hold fair and free elections, I hope within the next
four or five months. These elections will decide the
regime and later on the constitution. The will of the
people, expressed under conditions of freedom and
universal franchise, must prevail; that is our root
principle. If the Greeks were to decide for a republic it
would not affect our relations with them. We will use our
influence with the Greek Government to invite Russian
representatives to come and see freely what is going
on in Greece, and at the elections I hope there will be
Russian, American, and British commissioners at large
in the country to make sure that there is no intimidation
or other frustration of the free choice of the people
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between the different parties who will be contending.

After that our work in Greece may well be done.

As to Belgium, we have no conditions to demand,
though … we hope they will, under whatever form of
government they adopt by popular decision, come into
a general system of resistance to prevent Germany
striking westward. Belgium, like Poland, is a theatre of
war and corridor of communication, and everyone must
recognise the force of these considerations, without
which great armies cannot operate.

It is quite true that about Poland we have reached a
definite line of action with the Americans. This is
because we agree naturally upon the subject, and both
sincerely feel that we have been rather ill-treated …

since the Crimea Conference. No doubt these things
seem different when looked at from the opposite point
of view. But we are absolutely agreed that the pledge
we have given for a sovereign, free, independent
Poland, with a Government fully and adequately
representing all the democratic elements among Poles,
is for us a matter of honour and duty. I do not think
there is the slightest chance of any change in the
attitude of our two Powers, and when we are agreed
we are bound to say so. After all, we have joined with
you, largely on my original initiative, early in 1944, in
proclaiming the Polish-Russian frontier which you
desired, namely, the Curzon Line, including Lvov for
Russia. We think you ought to meet us with regard to
the other half of the policy which you equally with us
have proclaimed, namely, the sovereignty, independence, and freedom of Poland, provided it is a Poland
friendly to Russia….

Also, difficulties arise at the present moment
because all sorts of stories are brought out of Poland
which are eagerly listened to by many Members of
Parliament, and which at any time may be violently
raised in Parliament or the Press in spite of my
deprecating such action, and on which M. Molotov will
vouchsafe us no information at all in spite of repeated
requests. For instance, there is the talk of the fifteen
Poles who were said to have metthe Russian
authorities for discussion over four weeks ago, and of

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M. Witos, about whom there has been a similar but
more recent report; and there are many other
statements of deportations, etc.
1
How can I contradict
such complaints when you give me no information
whatever and when neither I nor the Americans are
allowed to send anyone into Poland to find out for
themselves the true state of affairs? There is no part of
our occupied or liberated territory into which you are not
free to send delegations, and people do not see why
you should have any reasons against similar visits by
British delegations to foreign countries liberated by you.

There is not much comfort in looking into a future
where you and the countries you dominate, plus the
Communist Parties in many other States, are all drawn
up on one side, and those who rally to the English-speaking nations and their associates or Dominions are
on the other. It is quite obvious that their quarrel would
tear the world to pieces and that all of us leading men
on either side who had anything to do with that would
be shamed before history. Even embarking on a long
period of suspicions, of abuse and counter-abuse, and
of opposing policies would be a disaster hampering the
great developments of world prosperity for the masses
which are attainable only by our trinity. I hope there is
no word or phrase in this outpouring of my heart to you
which unwittingly gives offence. If so, let me know. But
do not, I beg you, my friend Stalin, underrate the
divergences which are opening about matters which
you may think are small to us but which are symbolic of
the way the English-speaking democracies look at life.

The incident of the fifteen Poles mentioned in my telegram now requires to be recorded although it carries us somewhat ahead of the general narrative. At the beginning of March 1945 the Polish Underground were invited by the Russian Political Police to send a delegation to Moscow to discuss the formation of a united Polish Government along the lines of the Yalta agreement. This was followed by a Triumph and Tragedy

588

written guarantee of personal safety, and it was understood that the party would later be allowed, if the negotiations were successful, to travel to London for talks with the Polish Government in exile. On March 27 General Leopold Okulicki, the successor of General Bor Komorowski in command of the Underground Army, and two other leaders, had a meeting in the suburbs of Warsaw with a Soviet representative. They were joined the following day by eleven leaders representing the major political parties in Poland. No one returned from the rendezvous. On April 6

the Polish Government in exile issued a statement in London giving the outline of this sinister episode. The most valuable representatives of the Polish Underground had disappeared without a trace in spite of the formal Russian offer of safe-conduct. Questions were asked in Parliament, and stories have since spread of the shooting of local Polish leaders in the areas at this time occupied by the Soviet armies, and particularly of one episode at Siedlce in Eastern Poland. It was not until May 4 that Molotov admitted at San Francisco that these men were being held in Russia and an official Russian news agency stated next day that they were awaiting trial on charges of “diversionary tactics in the rear of the Red Army.”

On May 18 Stalin publicly denied that the arrested Polish leaders had ever been invited to Moscow, and asserted that they were mere “diversionists” who would be dealt with according to “a law similar to the British Defence of the Realm Act.” The Soviet Government refused to move from this position. Nothing more was heard of the victims of the trap until the case against them opened on June 18. It was conducted in the usual Communist manner. The prisoners were accused of subversion, terrorism, and espionage, and all except one admitted wholly or in part the charges against them. Thirteen were found guilty, and sentenced to

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terms of imprisonment ranging from four months to ten years, and three were acquitted. This was in fact the judicial liquidation of the leadership of the Polish Underground which had fought so heroically against Hitler. The rank and file had already died in the ruins of Warsaw.

To President Truman I said:

Prime

Minister

to

5 May 45

President Truman

I am most concerned about the fate of the fifteen
Polish representatives, in view of the statement made
by Molotov to Stettinius at San Francisco that they had
been arrested by the Red Army, and I think you and I
should consult together very carefully upon this matter.

If these Poles were enticed into Russian hands and are
now no longer alive one cannot quite tell how far such a
crime would influence the future. I am in entire
agreement with Eden’s views and actions. I hope that
he will soon pass through Washington on his
homeward journey, and that you will talk it all over with
him.

I now received a most disheartening reply from Stalin to the lengthy appeal I had made to him on April 29.

Marshal

Stalin

to

5 May 45

Prime Minister

I have received your message of April 29 on the
subject of the Polish question.

I am obliged to say that I cannot agree with the
arguments which you advance in support of your
position.

1. You are inclined to regard the suggestion that the
example of Yugoslavia should be taken as a model for
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Poland as a departure from the procedure agreed
between us for the creation of a Polish Government of
National Unity. This cannot be admitted. The example
of Yugoslavia is important … as pointing the way to the
most effective and practical solution of the problem of
establishing a new united Government there….