Triumph and Tragedy (The Second World War) (79 page)

The defenders of the renowned and dreaded Siegfried Line were thus cut off, and in a few days all organised resistance came to an end. As a by-product of victory the 5th U.S.

Division made an unpremeditated crossing of the Rhine fifteen miles south of Mainz, which soon expanded into a deep bridgehead pointing towards Frankfurt.

Thus ended the last great German stand in the West. Six weeks of successive battles along a front of over two hundred and fifty miles had driven the enemy across the Rhine with irreplaceable losses in men and material. The Allied Air Forces played a part of supreme importance.

Constant attacks by the tactical air forces aggravated the defeat and disorganisation and freed us from the dwindling Luftwaffe. Frequent patrols over the airfields containing the

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enemy’s new jet-propelled fighters minimised a threat that had caused us anxiety. Continuing raids by our heavy bombers had reduced the German oil output to a critical point, ruined many of their airfields, and so heavily damaged their factories and transportation system as to bring them almost to a standstill.

While the Americans farther south were closing on the Rhine Montgomery had made ready to cross it. Planning and assembling of material had begun several months before. Great quantities of stores, amphibious vehicles, assault craft, and bridging material were now brought up to the fighting zone and troops concentrated on the near bank, behind constant smokescreens.

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Crossing-places were good, the Ruhr was threatened, and Kesselring, who had replaced Rundstedt in the chief Triumph and Tragedy

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command, had no doubt about where the blow would fall.

Seven divisions of the First Parachute Army, his best remaining corps, dug themselves into the eastern bank, but, except for the perimeter defences at Wesel and Rees, their field works could not compare with those which the Allies had already overcome. Their artillery however was strong, and anti-aircraft guns had been drawn from the powerful air defences of the Ruhr. The sooner we could strike the better, and the plight of Northern Holland, still in the German grip, heightened the urgency.

Prime

Minister

to

8 Mar. 45

General Ismay, for C.

O.S. Committee

This frightful letter from Dr. Gerbrandy and Sir
Desmond Morton’s comment thereupon require your
immediate attention.

Late on Monday night General Bedell Smith
volunteered to me at Reims the statement that he
hoped that two divisions might be available to clear
Holland immediately after the passage of the Rhine. I
understand he contemplated American divisions. I am
of opinion that a military plan should now be concerted
to prevent the horrors which will befall the Dutch, and
incidentally to extirpate the rocket-firing points in
Holland at the earliest moment. I consider that if it were
inevitable, which I doubt, a certain delay might be
accepted in the main advance on Berlin. I am prepared
to telegraph to the President on these lines, but I
should like first of all to hear your views. Considering
how the D.U.K.W.s, Buffaloes, etc., carried forward our
northern movement, I do not think too much ought to be
made of the water problem. If it be true that the German
forces in Holland are now almost entirely static and that
all the effective fighting units have left, there is no need
to dwell upon the military task and overweight it.

Montgomery pressed forward his preparations and the Allied Air Forces brought all their power to bear. In the last

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week of February they began a bombardment from Bremen to Koblenz to deny to the enemy the arsenals of the Ruhr and isolate the battle area. As the days passed the attacks intensified. In the fortnight before the assault heavy bombers of the R.A.F. and the 8th and 9th U.S. Air Forces dropped nearly 50,000 tons of bombs. Medium and fighter bombers and an overwhelming force of fighter aircraft joined in to cut off the battlefield and bring chaos and ruin to Western Germany.

Under Montgomery were the First Canadian, the Second British and the Ninth U.S. Armies. The two latter would seize bridgeheads north and south of Wesel, while the 1st British Commando Brigade, in the centre, captured Wesel itself. We would cross by night after an hour’s bombardment by 2000 guns, while the Canadians protected the left flank and themselves crossed later to drive northward. Next morning two airborne divisions, the 6th British and 17th American, would drop behind the enemy’s lines north of the town to disrupt his defences from the rear.

This arrangement promoted their early junction with the other troops, which had played us false at Arnhem. In support were our heavy bombers and no fewer than 3000

fighters under Air Marshal Coningham.

I desired to be with our armies at the crossing, and Montgomery made me welcome. Taking only my secretary, Jock Colville, and Tommy with me, I flew in the afternoon of March 23 by Dakota from Northolt to the British headquarters near Venlo. The Commander-in-Chief conducted me to the caravan in which he lived and moved.

I found myself in the comfortable wagon I had used before.

We dined at seven o’clock, and an hour later we repaired Triumph and Tragedy

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with strict punctuality to Montgomery’s map wagon. Here were displayed all the maps kept from hour to hour by a select group of officers. The whole plan of our deployment and attack was easily comprehended. We were to force a passage over the river at ten points on a twenty-mile front from Rheinberg to Rees.

All our resources were to be used. Eighty thousand men, the advance-guard of armies a million strong, were to be hurled forward. Masses of boats and pontoons lay ready.

On the far side stood the Germans, entrenched and organised in all the strength of modern fire-power.

Everything I had seen or studied in war, or read, made me doubt that a river could be a good barrier of defence against superior force. In Hamley’s
Operations of War,
which I had pondered over ever since Sandhurst days, he argues the truth that a river running parallel to the line of advance is a much more dangerous feature than one which lies squarely athwart it; and he illustrates this theory by Napoleon’s marvellous campaign of 1814. I was therefore in good hopes of the battle even before the Field-Marshal explained his plans to me. Moreover, we had now the measureless advantage of mastery in the air. The episode which the Commander-in-Chief particularly wished me to see was the drop next morning of the two airborne divisions, comprising 14,000 men, with artillery and much other offensive equipment, behind the enemy lines.

Accordingly we all went to bed before ten o’clock.

I telegraphed to Stalin:

Prime Minister to

23 Mar. 45

Marshal Stalin

I am with Field-Marshal Montgomery at his H.Q. He
has just ordered the launching of the main battle to
force the Rhine on a broad front with Wesel at the

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centre. The operation will be supported by about two
thousand guns and by the landing of an airborne corps.

It is hoped to pass the river tonight and tomorrow
and to establish bridgeheads. Once the river has been
crossed a very large reserve of armour is ready to
exploit the assault.

Field-Marshal Montgomery has asked me to present
his respects to you. Tomorrow I shall send you another
message.

The honour of leading the attack fell to our 51st and 15th Divisions and the American 30th and 79th. Four battalions of the 51st were the first to set forth, and a few minutes later they had reached the far side. Throughout the night the attacking divisions poured across, meeting little resistance at first, as the bank itself was lightly defended. At dawn bridge-heads, shallow as yet, were firmly held, and the Commandos were already at grips in Wesel.

In the morning Montgomery had arranged for me to witness from a hill-top amid rolling downland the great fly-in. It was full daylight before the subdued but intense roar and rumbling of swarms of aircraft stole upon us. After that in the course of half an hour over 2000 aircraft streamed overhead in their formations. My view-point had been well chosen. The light was clear enough to enable one to see where the descent on the enemy took place. The aircraft faded from sight, and then almost immediately afterwards returned towards us at a different level. The parachutists were invisible even to the best field-glasses. But now there was a double murmur and roar of reinforcements arriving and of those who had delivered their attacks returning.

Soon one saw with a sense of tragedy aircraft in twos and threes coming back askew, asmoke, or even in flames.

Also at this time tiny specks came floating to earth.

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Imagination built on a good deal of experience told a hard and painful tale. It seemed however that nineteen out of every twenty of the aircraft that had started came back in good order, having discharged their mission. This was confirmed by what we heard an hour later when we got back to headquarters.

The assault was now in progress along the whole front, and I was conducted by motor on a long tour from one point to another, and to the various corps headquarters. It was late in the evening when I returned. My private secretary, Jock Colville, had work to do for me, and could not come with me in the car. He had however made a plan of his own, and actually crossed the Rhine in one of the boats during the morning. There was no opposition to the passage, but the lodgments on the other side were under artillery fire. A shell burst near him and an officer with whom he was talking. A soldier of our airborne division standing beside them was severely wounded, and Jock was drenched in his blood. He naturally would have said nothing about this incident but for the fact that he arrived back at headquarters at precisely the same time as Montgomery and I. His blood-stained tunic caught the Field-Marshal’s eye, and he asked what had happened. He then complained that a civil servant should have crossed the river without his personal permission having been obtained. I protected Jock from his wrath, and promised to rebuke him myself, which I did in suitable terms learning what had passed, and pointing out how much inconvenience he would have caused to the work of my Private Office if he had been killed. Who would have decoded and presented to me the secret telegrams that came in every few hours? He expressed his contrition, and I advised him to keep as far away from the Field-