Triumph and Tragedy (The Second World War) (75 page)

When a Polish Provisional Government of National
Unity has been properly formed in conformity with the
above, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, which now maintains diplomatic relations
with the present Provisional Government of Poland,
and the Government of the United Kingdom and the
Government of the United States will establish
diplomatic relations with the new Polish Government of
National Unity, and will exchange Ambassadors, by
whose reports the respective Governments will be kept
informed about the situation in Poland.

The three heads of Governments consider that the
eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon
Line, with digressions from it in some regions of five to
eight kilometres in favour of Poland. They recognise
that Poland must receive substantial accessions of
territory in the north and west. They feel that the
opinion of the new Polish Provisional Government of
National Unity should be sought in due course on the
extent of these accessions, and that the final
delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should
thereafter await the Peace Conference.

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4

Yalta: Finale

America, Russia, and the Far East — A Secret
Agreement — My Private Talk with Stalin,
February
8 —
My Telegram to the Dominion Prime
Ministers of July
5
— Our Final Dinner at the
Vorontzov Palace, February
10 —
Stalin and the
Toast to the King — My Toast to Stalin — Stalin’s
Views on the British General Election —“Uncle
Joe”— End of the Conference — We Drive to
Sevastopol — A Visit to Balaklava — Return to
Saki — A Flying Visit to Athens — MySpeech in
Constitution Square — We Leave for Egypt,
February
15 —
Family Lunch with the President
and an Affectionate Farewell — I Meet King Ibn
Saud — An Interchange of Gifts — I Stay at the
Casey Villa — We Fly to England, February
19 —

The Yalta Debate — Deep Anxieties about Poland.

T
HE FAR EAST played no part in our formal discussions at Yalta. I was aware that the Americans intended to raise with the Russians the question of Soviet participation in the Pacific war. We had touched on this in general terms at Teheran, and in December 1944 Stalin had made certain specific proposals about Russia’s post-war claims in these regions to Mr. Harriman in Moscow. The American military authorities estimated that it would take eighteen months after the surrender of Germany to defeat Japan. Russian help would reduce heavy American casualties. The Triumph and Tragedy

462

invasion of the Japanese home islands was at this time still in the planning stage, and General MacArthur had entered Manila only on the second day of the Yalta Conference.

The first experimental explosion of the atomic bomb was not to take place for another five months. The large Japanese army in Manchuria could, if Russia still remained neutral, be thrown into the battle for Japan itself.

With all this in mind President Roosevelt and Mr. Harriman discussed the Russian territorial demands in the Far East with Stalin on February 8. The only other person present apart from the Russian interpreter was Mr. Charles E.

Bohlen, of the State Department, who also interpreted. Two days later the conversation was continued, and the Russian terms were accepted, with certain modifications, which Mr.

Harriman mentioned in his testimony before the United States Senate in 1951. In return Russia agreed to enter the war against Japan within two or three months after the surrender of Germany.

During the same afternoon, in a private talk with Stalin, I asked him about Russian wishes in the Far East. He said that they wanted a naval base, such as Port Arthur. The Americans would prefer the ports to be under international control, but the Russians wanted to have their interests safeguarded. I replied that we would welcome the appearance of Russian ships in the Pacific, and were in favour of Russia’s losses in the Russo-Japanese War being made good. The following day, February 11, I was shown the agreement which had been drafted the previous afternoon by the President and Stalin, and I signed it on behalf of the British Government. This document was kept secret until negotiations were completed between the Soviet Union and the Nationalist Chinese Government, which Stalin categorically agreed to support. There the matter rested until just before we met again at Potsdam.

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My record of these negotiations is preserved in the following extract from a telegram which I sent to the Dominion Prime Ministers on July

Prime

Minister

to

5 July 45

Dominion

Prime

Ministers

In the most rigid secrecy Stalin informed Roosevelt
and myself at the Crimea Conference of the Soviet
Government’s willingness to enter the war against
Japan two or three months after Germany’s surrender,
on the conditions stated below:

(a) Preservation of the status quo in Outer Mongolia.

(b) Restoration of the Russian rights lost in the year
1904, viz.:

(i) Recovery of Southern Sakhalin and the islands
adjacent to it.

(ii) Internationalisation of the commercial port of
Dairen, with safeguards for the pre-eminent interests of
the U.S.S.R. and restoration of the lease of Port Arthur
as a Soviet naval base.

(iii) Joint operation by a Soviet-Chinese company of
the Chinese Eastern Railway and the South Manchuria
Railway, providing an outlet to Dairen, on the
understanding that the preeminent interests of the U.S.

S.R. will be safeguarded and that China will retain full
sovereignty in Manchuria.

(c) Acquisition by the U.S.S.R. of the Kurile Islands.

2. These conditions were embodied in a personal
agreement between Roosevelt, Stalin, and myself. The
agreement

recognised

that

Chiang

Kai-shek’s

concurrence to the conditions would be required, and
Roosevelt undertook to obtain this concurrence on
advice from Stalin. We all three agreed to see that the
Soviet claims were fulfilled without question following
the defeat of Japan. The agreement contained nothing
else, except an expression of Russian readiness to
enter into a treaty of alliance with China with the object
of helping the latter to throw off the Japanese yoke.

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I must make it clear that though on behalf of Great Britain I joined in the agreement, neither I nor Eden took any part in making it. It was regarded as an American affair and was certainly of prime interest to their military operations. It was not for us to claim to shape it. Anyhow we were not consulted but only asked to approve. This we did. In the United States there have been many reproaches about the concessions made to Soviet Russia. The responsibility rests with their own representatives. To us the problem was remote and secondary. It would have been wrong for us to get in their way unless we had some very solid reason.

It was my turn to preside at our final dinner on February 10.

Several hours before Stalin was due to arrive a squad of Russian soldiers came to the Vorontzov villa. They locked the doors on either side of the reception rooms which were to be used for dinner. Guards were posted and no one was allowed to enter. They then searched everywhere — under the tables and behind the walls. My staff had to go outside the building in order to get from their offices to their own quarters. All being in order, the Marshal arrived in a most cordial mood, and the President a little later.

At the Yusupov dinner Stalin had proposed the King’s health in a manner which, though meant to be friendly and respectful, was not to my liking. He had said that in general he had always been against kings, and that he was on the side of the people and not that of any king, but in this war he had learnt to honour and esteem the British people, who honoured and respected their King, so he would propose the health of the King of England. I was not satisfied with this treatment of the toast, and I asked Molotov to explain that Stalin’s scruples might be avoided by proposing on Triumph and Tragedy

465

future occasions the health of “the three heads of States.”

This having been agreed, I now put into practice the new procedure:

I propose the health of His Majesty the King, the
President of the United States, and President Kalinin of
the U.S.S.R., the three heads of the three States.

To this the President, who seemed very tired, replied. “The Prime Minister’s toast,” he said, “recalls many memories. In 1933 my wife visited a school in our country. In one of the classrooms she saw a map with a large blank space on it.

She asked what was the blank space, and was told they were not allowed to mention the place — it was the Soviet Union. That incident was one of the reasons why I wrote to President Kalinin asking him to send a representative to Washington to discuss the opening of diplomatic relations.

That is the history of our recognition of Russia.”

It was now my task to propose the health of Marshal Stalin.

I said:

I have drunk this toast on several occasions. This
time I drink it with a warmer feeling than at previous
meetings, not because he is more triumphant, but
because the great victories and the glory of the Russian
arms have made him kindlier than he was in the hard
times through which we have passed. I feel that,
whatever differences there may be on certain
questions, he has a good friend in Britain. I hope to see
the future of Russia bright, prosperous, and happy. I
will do anything to help, and I am sure so will the
President. There was a time when the Marshal was not
so kindly towards us, and I remember that I said a few
rude things about him, but our common dangers and
common loyalties have wiped all that out. The fire of
war has burnt up the misunderstandings of the past.

We feel we have a friend whom we can trust, and I
hope he will continue to feel the same about us. I pray
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he may live to see his beloved Russia not only glorious
in war, but also happy in peace.

Stalin replied in the best of tempers, and I had the feeling that he thought the “heads of States” procedure was well adapted to our triple meetings. I have no record of his actual words. Including interpreters, we were less than a dozen, and after the formalities we talked together in twos and threes. I had mentioned that there would be a General Election in the United Kingdom after the defeat of Hitler.

Stalin thought my position was assured, “since the people would understand that they needed a leader, and who could be a better leader than he who had won the victory?”

I explained that we had two parties in Britain, and I belonged to only one of them. “One party is much better,”

said Stalin, with deep conviction. I then thanked him for his hospitality to the British Parliamentary delegation which had recently visited Russia. Stalin said that it had been his duty to show hospitality, and he liked young military fighters like Lord Lovat. Of late he had acquired a new interest in life, an interest in military affairs; in fact, it had become almost his sole interest.