Triumph and Tragedy (The Second World War) (69 page)

Both kinds would be freely discussed. Sanctions could only be applied if the permanent members of the Council were unanimous, and if one of these members was itself a party to the dispute then it could both take part in the discussions and vote. On the other hand, if there was a dispute which could be settled peacefully, then the parties to it could not vote. The Russians, he said, were accused of talking too much about voting. It was true they thought it was very important, because everything would be decided by vote and they would be greatly interested in the results.

Suppose, for instance, that China as a permanent member of the Security Council demanded the return of Hong Kong, or that Egypt demanded the return of the Suez Canal, he assumed they would not be alone and would have friends and perhaps protectors in the Assembly or in the Council.

I said that, as I understood it, the powers of the World Organisation could not be used against Britain if she was unconvinced and refused to agree.

Stalin asked if this was really so, and I assured him it was.

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Mr. Eden then explained that in such a case China or Egypt could complain, but that no decision involving the use of force could be taken without the concurrence of His Majesty’s Government, and Mr. Stettinius confirmed that no sanctions could be imposed unless the permanent members of the Security Council were unanimous. Steps for a peaceful settlement — for instance, by arbitration —

might be recommended.

Stalin said he feared that disputes about Hong Kong or Suez might break the unity of the three Great Powers.

I replied that I appreciated the danger, but the World Organisation in no way destroyed normal diplomatic intercourse between States, great or small. The World Organisation was separate and apart, and its members would continue to discuss their affairs among themselves. It would be foolish to raise subjects in the World Organisation if they might break up the unity of the Great Powers.

“My colleagues in Moscow,” said Stalin, “cannot forget what happened in December 1939, during the Russo-Finnish War, when the British and the French used the League of Nations against us and succeeded in isolating and expelling the Soviet Union from the League, and when they later mobilised against us and talked of a crusade against Russia. Cannot we have some guarantees that this sort of thing will not happen again?”

Mr. Eden pointed out that the American proposal would make it impossible.

“Can we create even more obstacles?” asked Stalin.

I said that special provision had been made about the unanimity of the Great Powers.

“We have heard of it today for the first time,” he replied.

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I admitted there was a risk of an agitation working up against one of the Great Powers — say, the British — and I could only say that normal diplomacy would be playing its part at the same time. I should not expect the President to start or to back an attack on Great Britain, and I felt certain that everything would be done to stop it. I felt equally certain that Marshal Stalin would not make an attack —

verbally, of course — on the British Empire without talking to us first and trying to find some way of coming to a friendly arrangement.

“I agree,” he answered.

Mr. Roosevelt said that of course there would be differences between the Great Powers in future. Everybody would know about them, and they would be discussed in the Assembly. But it would not promote disunity to permit their discussion in the Council as well. On the contrary, it would show the confidence which we all had in each other and in our ability to solve such problems. This would strengthen our unity, not weaken it.

Stalin said that this was true, and promised to study the plan and continue the discussion next day.

When we met again on the following afternoon Molotov accepted the new scheme. At Dumbarton Oaks, he explained, the Russians had done all they could to preserve the unity of the three Powers after the war, and they thought that the plans which had emerged from the Conference would secure collaboration between all nations, great and small. They were now satisfied with the new voting procedure, and with the provision that the three Great Powers must be unanimous. There was only one Triumph and Tragedy

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thing to be settled. Should the Soviet Republics be members of the World Organisation with votes in the Assembly? This had been discussed at Dumbarton Oaks, but now he was going to ask for something different. The Soviet delegation would be content if three, or at any rate two, of their republics became original members, namely, the Ukraine, White Russia, and Lithuania. All were important, all had made great sacrifices in the war; they were the first to be invaded and had suffered greatly. The Dominions of the British Commonwealth had approached independence gradually and patiently. This was an example to Russia, and they had therefore decided on this much narrower proposal. “We fully agree,” he ended, “with the President’s proposal about voting, and we ask that three, or at any rate two, of our republics should be founder members of the World Organisation.”

This was a great relief to us all, and Mr. Roosevelt was quick to congratulate Molotov.

The next thing, said the President, was to invite the nations to come together. When should this be, and whom should we ask? The U.S.S.R. had great masses of people organised in separate republics; the British Empire had large independent groups living a long way from each other; the United States was a single unit, with a single Foreign Minister and no colonies. Then there were other countries, like Brazil, which had less territory than Russia but more than the United States, and at the other end of the scale a number of very small States. Could we stick to one vote for each nation, or should the larger nations have more than one vote in the World Assembly? He suggested referring all this to the three Foreign Ministers.

I also thanked Stalin for his great step in accepting the President’s plan for voting, and said that the agreement Triumph and Tragedy

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which we had reached would give relief and satisfaction to people all over the world. Molotov’s suggestion was also a great advance. President Roosevelt was quite right in saying that the position of the United States differed from that of the British Empire in this matter of voting. We had four self-governing Dominions, who during the last twenty-five years had played a notable part in the international organisation of peace which had broken down in 1939. All four had worked for peace and democratic progress. When the United Kingdom had declared war against Germany in 1939 all of them had sprung to arms, although they knew how weak we were. We had had no means of compelling them to do this. They had done it freely, of their own accord, on a matter about which it had only been possible to consult them very partially, and we could never agree to any system which excluded them from the position they had held and justified for a quarter of a century. For these reasons I could not but hear the proposals of the Soviet Government with a feeling of profound sympathy. My heart went out to mighty Russia, bleeding from her wounds but beating down the tyrants in her path. I recognised that a nation of a hundred and eighty millions might well look with a questioning eye at the constitutional arrangements of the British Commonwealth, which resulted in our having more than one voice in the Assembly, and I was glad therefore that President Roosevelt had given an answer which could in no way be regarded as a refusal of M. Molotov’s request.

I pointed out however that I must not exceed my personal authority. I should like time to discuss M. Molotov’s proposal with Mr. Eden, and perhaps send a telegram to the Cabinet, and I asked to be excused from giving a final answer that day. We thereupon agreed to refer the whole matter to our Foreign Ministers. Mr. Roosevelt had also suggested that the nations should meet in March to set up

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the World Organisation. I said I was doubtful about this, because the battle against Germany would then be at its height, but for the time being I let it pass.

Late that night I telegraphed to Mr. Attlee.

Prime Minister to

8

Feb.

45

Deputy

Prime

(2.49 A.M.)

Minister

Today has been much better. All the American
proposals for the Dumbarton Oaks constitution were
accepted by the Russians, who stated that it was
largely due to our explanation that they had found
themselves in a position to embrace the scheme
wholeheartedly. They also cut down their demand for
sixteen membership votes of the Assembly to two,
making the plea that White Russia and the Ukraine had
suffered so much and fought so well that they should
be considered for inclusion among the founder
members of the new World Organisation. The President
by no means rejected this idea, though obviously
visualising difficulties from the American standpoint. He
suggested that it should be submitted to a conference
of the United Nations which he seeks to convene in
America during March.

Our position appears to me to be somewhat
different. For us to have four or five members, six if
India is included, when Russia has only one is asking a
great deal of an Assembly of this kind. In view of other
important concessions by them which are achieved or
pending I should like to be able to make a friendly
gesture to Russia in this matter. That they should have
two besides their chief is not much to ask, and we will
be in a strong position, in my judgment, because we
shall not be the only multiple voter in the field.

At the present moment all I ask is that we should be
authorised by the Cabinet to give to the Russians the
undertaking that when this matter comes up for

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decision, whether here or at the conference in America
in March, we shall favour their view. I trust the Cabinet
will grant us this authority to use or not to use as
circumstances may dictate. The undertaking would be
in the nature of a gentleman’s agreement, and would
be no different from that which we gave them long ago
about supporting them on the Curzon Line.

If this increased representation is conceded or
virtually conceded to Russia the whole business
relating to Dumbarton Oaks is settled by unanimous
agreement, and anyhow I think it will go through. This
must be regarded as a considerable advantage, and
one to which the Americans will attach great value for
the purposes of politics, predominance, and publicity. It
also forms a part of our main scheme for the World
Organisation….