Triumph and Tragedy (The Second World War) (65 page)

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interests of Poland in favour of the interests of a
handful of Polish emigrants in London.

Mr. Roosevelt’s reply was reported in a message to myself.

President Roosevelt

30 Dec. 44

to Prime Minister

I have today sent the following to Stalin. You will see
that we are in step.

“I am disturbed and deeply disappointed over your
message of December 27 in regard to Poland, in which
you tell me that you cannot see your way clear to hold
in abeyance the question of recognising the Lublin
Committee as the Provisional Government of Poland
until we have had an opportunity at our meeting to
discuss the whole question thoroughly. I would have
thought no serious inconvenience would have been
caused your Government or your armies if you could
have delayed the purely juridical act of recognition for
the short period of a month remaining before we meet.

“There was no suggestion in my request that you
curtail your practical relations with the Lublin Committee, nor any thought that you should deal with or accept
the London Government in its present composition. I
had urged this delay upon you because I felt you would
realise how extremely unfortunate and even serious it
would be at this period in the war in its effect on world
opinion and enemy morale if your Government should
formally recognise one Government of Poland while the
majority of the other United Nations, including the
United States and Great Britain, continue to recognise
and to maintain diplomatic relations with the Polish
Government in London.

“I must tell you with a frankness equal to your own
that I see no prospect of this Government’s following
suit and transferring its recognition from the Government in London to the Lublin Committee in its present
form. This is in no sense due to any special ties or
feelings for the London [Polish] Government. The fact is
that neither the Government nor the people of the
United States have as yet seen any evidence either
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arising from the manner of its creation or from
subsequent developments to justify the conclusion that
the Lublin Committee as at present constituted
represents the people of Poland. I cannot ignore the
fact that up to the present only a small fraction of
Poland proper west of the Curzon Line has been
liberated from German tyranny; and it is therefore an
unquestioned truth that the people of Poland have had
no opportunity to express themselves in regard to the
Lublin Committee.

“If at some future date following the liberation of
Poland a Provisional Government of Poland with
popular support is established the attitude of this
Government would of course be governed by the
decision of the Polish people.

“I fully share your view that the departure of M.

Mikolajczyk from the Government in London has
worsened the situation. I have always felt that M.

Mikolajczyk, who, I am convinced, is sincerely desirous
of settling all points at issue between the Soviet Union
and Poland, is the only Polish leader in sight who
seems to otter the possibility of a genuine solution of
the difficult and dangerous Polish question. I find it
most difficult to believe from my personal knowledge of
M. Mikolajczyk and my conversations with him when he
was here in Washington and his subsequent efforts and
policies during his visit at Moscow that he had
knowledge of any terrorist instructions.

“I am sending you this message so that you will
know the position of this Government in regard to the
recognition at the present time of the Lublin Committee
as the Provisional Government. I am more than ever
convinced that when the three of us get together we
can reach a solution of the Polish problem, and I
therefore still hope that you can hold in abeyance until
then the formal recognition of the Lublin Committee as
a Government of Poland. I cannot from a military angle
see any great objection to a delay of a month.”

Stalin had answered:

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399

Marshal

Stalin

to

1 Jan. 45

President Roosevelt

I have received your message of December 30.

I greatly regret that I have not been able to convince
you of the correctness of the Soviet Government’s
attitude towards the Polish question. I nevertheless
hope that events will convince you that the Polish
National Committee has always rendered and will
continue to render to the Allies, and in particular to the
Red Army, considerable assistance in the struggle
against Hitlerite Germany, whereas the émigré
Government in London assists the Germans by
creating disorganisation in this struggle.

I naturally fully comprehend your suggestion that the
Soviet Government’s recognition of the Provisional
Government of Poland should be postponed for a
month. There is however a circumstance here which
makes it impossible for me to fulfil your wish. The
position is that as early as December 27 the Presidium
of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. informed the
Poles in reply to an inquiry on the subject that it
proposed to recognise the Provisional Government of
Poland as soon as the latter was formed. This
circumstance makes it impossible for me to fulfil your
wish. Permit me to send you my greetings for the New
Year and to wish you health and success.

I now received from Stalin a direct message on Poland.

Marshal

Stalin

to

4 Jan. 45

Prime Minister

You are of course already aware of the publication
by the Polish National Council in Lublin of the decision
to which it has come regarding the transformation of the
Polish Committee of National Liberation into the
National Provisional Government of the Polish
Republic. You are also well aware of our relations with
the Polish National Committee, which in our view has
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400

already acquired great authority in Poland and is the
lawful exponent of the will of the Polish nation. The
transformation of the Polish National Committee into a
Provisional Government seems to us entirely
opportune, especially since Mikolajczyk has ceased to
be a member of the émigré Polish Government and the
latter has thus ceased to possess any semblance of a
Government. I consider it impossible to leave Poland
without a Government. Accordingly the Soviet
Government has consented to recognise the Polish
Provisional Government.

I much regret that I was unable completely to
convince you of the correctness of the Soviet
Government’s attitude towards the Polish question. I
nevertheless hope that future events will show that our
recognition of the Polish Government in Lublin is in the
interests of the general Allied cause and will contribute
to hasten the defeat of Germany.

I attach for your information two messages from me
to the President on the Polish question.

I am aware that the President has your consent to a
meeting between us three at the end of this month or
the beginning of February. I shall be glad to see you
and the President on the territory of our country, and I
hope for the success of our joint labours.

I take this opportunity of sending you good wishes
for the New Year and wishing you the best of health
and success.

Further correspondence did not seem to me to be likely to do much good. Only a personal meeting gave hope.

Prime

Minister

to

5 Jan. 45

Marshal Stalin

I thank you for sending me your two messages to
the President on the Polish question. Naturally I and my
War Cabinet colleagues are distressed at the course
events are taking. I am quite clear that much the best
thing is for us three to meet together and talk all these
matters over, not only as isolated problems but in
relation to the whole world situation both of the war and

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the transition to peace. Meanwhile our attitude as you
know it remains unchanged.

The President was fully convinced of the need for another meeting of “the Three,” for which arrangements had been discussed for some time. The usual debate about meeting-places had followed. “If Stalin cannot manage to meet us in the Mediterranean,” the President said, “I am prepared to come to the Crimea and have the meeting at Yalta, which appears to be the best place available in the Black Sea, having the best accommodations ashore and the most promising flying conditions. My party will equal that of Teheran — about thirty-five. I still hope the military situation will permit Marshal Stalin to meet us half-way.”

I replied:

Prime Minister to

29 Dec. 44

President Roosevelt

I send you the Admiralty report on Yalta. If this place
is chosen it would be well to have a few destroyers on
which we can live if necessary. There would be no
difficulty in flying from the great air base and weather
centre at Caserta. I myself landed in a York at
Simferopol. I daresay however Stalin will make good
arrangements ashore. Our party will be kept to the
smallest dimensions. I think we should aim at the end
of January. I must bring Anthony and Leathers.

On the 30th Mr. Roosevelt cabled that he would leave the United States as soon as possible after his Presidential inauguration, and would travel by warship to the Mediterranean, and from there by air to Yalta. I agreed at once to this, and promised to send a passenger ship to Sevastopol to supplement our quarters on shore. I myself proposed to fly direct via Caserta. On December 31 I