Triumph and Tragedy (The Second World War) (68 page)

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The discussion opened on the future of Germany. I had of course pondered this problem, and had addressed Mr.

Eden a month before.

Prime

Minister

to

4 Jan. 45

Foreign Secretary

Treatment of Germany after the war. It is much too
soon for us to decide these enormous questions.

Obviously, when the German organised resistance has
ceased the first stage will be one of severe military
control. This may well last for many months, or perhaps
for a year or two, if the German underground
movement is active.

2. We have yet to settle the practical questions of
the partition of Germany, the treatment of the Ruhr and
Saar industries, etc. These may be touched upon at our
forthcoming meeting, but I doubt whether any final
decision will be reached then. No one can foresee at
the present moment what the state of Europe will be or
what the relations of the Great Powers will be, or what
the temper of their peoples will be. I am sure that the
hatreds which Germany has caused in so many
countries will find their counterpart here.

3. I have been struck at every point where I have
sounded opinion at the depth of the feeling that would
be aroused by a policy of “putting poor Germany on her
legs again.” I am also well aware of the arguments
about “not having a poisoned community in the heart of
Europe.” I do suggest that, with all the work we have on
our hands at the present moment, we should not
anticipate these very grievous discussions and
schisms, as they may become. We have a new
Parliament to consider, whose opinions we cannot
foretell.

4. I shall myself prefer to concentrate upon the
practical issues which will occupy the next two or three
years, rather than argue about the long-term relationship of Germany to Europe. I remember so well last
time being shocked at the savage views of the House
of Commons and of the constituencies, and being
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indignant with Poincaré when he sent the French into
the Ruhr. In a few years however the mood of
Parliament and the public changed entirely. Thousands
of millions of money were lent to Germany by the
United States. I went along with the tolerant policy
towards Germany up to the Locarno Treaty and during
the rest of Mr. Baldwin’s Government on the grounds
that Germany had no power to harm us. But thereafter
a very swift change occurred. The rise of Hitler began.

And thereafter I once again found myself very much out
of sympathy with the prevailing mood.

5. It is a mistake to try to write out on little pieces of
paper what the vast emotions of an outraged and
quivering world will be either immediately after the
struggle is over or when the inevitable cold fit follows
the hot. These awe-inspiring tides of feeling dominate
most people’s minds, and independent figures tend to
become not only lonely but futile. Guidance in these
mundane matters is granted to us only step by step, or
at the utmost a step or two ahead. There is therefore
wisdom in reserving one’s decisions as long as possible
and until all the facts and forces that will be potent at
the moment are revealed. Perhaps our approaching
triple discussions will throw more light upon the problem.

Stalin now asked how Germany was to be dismembered.

Were we to have one Government or several, or merely some form of administration? If Hitler surrendered unconditionally should we preserve his Government or refuse to treat with it? At Teheran Mr. Roosevelt had suggested dividing Germany into five parts, and he had agreed with him. I, on the other hand, had hesitated and had only wanted her to be split into two, namely, Prussia and Austria-Bavaria, with the Ruhr and Westphalia under international control. The time had now come, he said, to take a definite decision.

I said that we all agreed that Germany should be dismembered, but the actual method was much too Triumph and Tragedy

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complicated to be settled in five or six days. It would require a very searching examination of the historical, ethnographical, and economic facts, and prolonged examination by a special committee, which would go into the different proposals and advise on them. There was so much to consider. What to do with Prussia? What territory should be given to Poland and the U.S.S.R.? Who was to control the Rhine valley and the great industrial zones of the Ruhr and the Saar? These were questions which needed profound study, and His Majesty’s Government would want to consider carefully the attitude of their two great Allies. A body should be set up at once to examine these matters, and we ought to have its report before reaching any final decision.

I then speculated on the future. If Hitler or Himmler were to come forward and offer unconditional surrender it was clear that our answer should be that we would not negotiate with any of the war criminals. If they were the only people the Germans could produce we should have to go on with the war. It was more probable that Hitler and his associates would be killed or would disappear, and that another set of people would offer unconditional surrender. If this happened the three Great Powers must immediately consult and decide whether they were worth dealing with or not. If they were, the terms of surrender which had been worked out would be laid before them; if not, the war would be continued and the whole country put under strict military government.

Mr. Roosevelt suggested asking our Foreign Secretaries to produce a plan for studying the question within twenty-four hours and a definite plan for dismemberment within a month. Here, for a time, the matter was left.

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Other questions were discussed, but not settled. The President asked whether the French should be given a zone of occupation in Germany. We agreed that this should certainly be done by allocating to them part of the British and American zones, and that the Foreign Secretaries should consider how this area was to be controlled.

At Stalin’s request M. Maisky then expounded a Russian scheme for making Germany pay reparations and for dismantling her munitions industries. I said that the experience of the last war had been very disappointing, and I did not believe it would be possible to extract from Germany anything like the amount which M. Maisky had suggested should be paid to Russia alone. Britain too had suffered greatly. Many buildings had been destroyed. We had parted with much of our foreign investments and were faced with the problem of how to raise our exports sufficiently to pay for the imports of food on which we depended. I doubted whether these burdens could be substantially lightened by German reparations. Other countries had also suffered and would have to be considered. What would happen if Germany were reduced to starvation? Did we intend to stand by and do nothing and say it served her right? Or did we propose to feed the Germans, and, if so, who would pay? Stalin said that these questions would arise anyway, and I answered that if you wanted a horse to pull your wagon you had to give him some hay. We eventually agreed that the Russian proposal should be examined by a special commission, which would sit in secret at Moscow.

We then arranged to meet next day and consider two topics which were to dominate our future discussions, namely, the Dumbarton Oaks scheme for world security and Poland.

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At this first meeting Mr. Roosevelt had made a momentous statement. He had said that the United States would take all reasonable steps to preserve peace, but not at the expense of keeping a large army in Europe, three thousand miles away from home. The American occupation would therefore be limited to two years. Formidable questions rose in my mind. If the Americans left Europe Britain would have to occupy single-handed the entire western portion of Germany. Such a task would be far beyond our strength.

At the opening of our second meeting on February 6 I accordingly pressed for French help in carrying such a burden. To give France a zone of occupation was by no means the end of the matter. Germany would surely rise again, and while the Americans could always go home the French had to live next door to her. A strong France was vital not only to Europe but to Great Britain. She alone could deny the rocket sites on her Channel coast and build up an army to contain the Germans.

We then turned to the World Instrument for Peace. The President said that in the United States public opinion was decisive. If it was possible to agree on the Dumbarton Oaks, proposals or something like them his country would be more likely to take a full part in organising peace throughout the world, because there was a large measure of support in the United States for such a World Organisation. But, as has been recorded in an earlier chapter,
1
the conference at Dumbarton Oaks had ended without reaching any agreement about the all-important question of voting rights in the Security Council.

On December 5, 1944, the President had made new suggestions to Stalin and myself. They were as follows:

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Each member of the Council should have one vote. Before any decision could be carried out seven members must vote in favour of it. This would suffice for details of procedure. All large matters, such as admitting or expelling States from the organisation, suppressing and settling disputes, regulating armaments, and providing armed forces, would need the concurring votes of all the permanent members. In other words, unless the “Big Four”

were unanimous the Security Council was virtually powerless. If the United States, the U.S.S.R., Great Britain, or China disagreed, then the country disagreeing could refuse its assent and stop the Council doing anything. Here was the Veto.

Mr. Roosevelt’s proposals had contained one other refinement. The dispute might be settled by peaceful methods. If so, this also would need seven votes, and the permanent members — that is to say, the “Big Four”—

would all have to agree. But if any member of the Council (including the “Big Four”) were involved in the dispute it could discuss the decision but could not vote on it. Such was the plan which Mr. Stettinius unfolded at this second meeting on February 6.

Stalin said that he would study the proposal and see if he could understand it, but at present it was not altogether clear. He said he feared that, though the three Great Powers were allies today, and would none of them commit any act of aggression, in ten years or less the three leaders would disappear and a new generation would come into power which had not experienced the war and would forget what we had gone through. “All of us,” he declared, “want to secure peace for at least fifty years. The greatest danger is Triumph and Tragedy

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conflict among ourselves, because if we remain united the German menace is not very important. Therefore we must now think how to secure our unity in the future, and how to guarantee that the three Great Powers (and possibly China and France) will maintain a united front. Some system must be elaborated to prevent conflict between the main Great Powers.”

He then expressed his regret that other business had hitherto prevented him from studying the American scheme in detail. As he understood it, the proposal was to divide all conflicts into two categories — first, those which required sanctions, whether economic, political, or military, and, secondly, those which could be settled by peaceful means.