Triumph and Tragedy (The Second World War) (66 page)

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cabled: “Have you a name for this operation? If not I suggest ‘Argonaut,’ which has a local but not deducible association.”

The President’s circle however produced an alternative to flying from Caserta. His advisers, medical and otherwise, considered it inadvisable for him to fly at high altitudes over the mountains between Italy and Yalta. Admiral Hewitt recommended going by sea to Malta and flying on thence. I liked this.

Prime

Minister

to

1 Jan. 45

President Roosevelt

We shall be delighted if you will come to Malta. I
shall be waiting on the quay. You will also see the
inscription of your noble message to Malta of a year
ago. Everything can be arranged to your convenience.

No more let us falter! From Malta to Yalta! Let nobody
alter!

I elaborated this for private use:

No more let us alter or falter or palter.

From Malta to Yalta, and Yalta to Malta.

Perhaps it was as well I did not cable it.

President

Roosevelt

2 Jan. 45

to Prime Minister

We plan to arrive by ship at Malta early forenoon
February 2, and hope to proceed at once by plane
without faltering.
1
It will be grand to meet you on the
quay.

Your suggestion of “Argonaut” is welcomed. You
and I are direct descendants.

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Lord Halifax reported from Washington that he had seen the President on the day before and did not think he

“looked too good.” Mr. Roosevelt however told him he was very well and much looking forward to our meeting. He said he thought our action in Greece had been of immense value, and he was full of regret at not being able to visit England on the way. He was concerned at Japanese suicide aircraft attacks in the Pacific, which meant constantly losing forty or fifty Americans for one Japanese, and he was not very hopeful about an early end of either war.

This remark and other considerations made me anxious to arrange a meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, at which both of us could either preside or be available before our meeting with Stalin. I therefore sent the following telegram:

Prime

Minister

to

5 Jan. 45

President Roosevelt

Would it not be possible for you to spend two or
three nights at Malta and let the Staffs have a talk
together unostentatiously? Also, Eisenhower and
Alexander could both be available there. We think it
very important that there should be some conversation
on matters which do not affect the Russians — e.g.,
Japan — and also about future use of the Italian
armies. You have but to say the word and we can
arrange everything.

2. We are very sorry indeed you will not come to our
shores on this journey. We should feel it very much and
a very dismal impression would be made if you were to
visit France before you came to Britain; in fact, it would
be regarded as a slight on your closest ally. I gather
however that you will only go to the Mediterranean and
Black Sea, in which case it is merely a repetition of
Teheran.

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3. The C.I.G.S. and I have passed two very
interesting days at Eisenhower’s headquarters at
Versailles. Quite by chance de Gaulle arrived at the
same time on the business about which he has sent
you and me, as heads of Governments, a telegram
concerning the Southern Sector [Strasbourg]. We had
an informal conference and the matter has been
satisfactorily adjusted so far as he is concerned.

Eisenhower has been very generous to him.

4. I am now in Eisenhower’s train going to visit
Montgomery, the weather having made flying
impossible. The whole country is covered with snow. I
hope to be back in England Saturday. Every good wish.

The President did not at first think it possible for us to have a preliminary conference at Malta. He said that with favourable weather at sea he could arrive there by February 2, and would have to go on by air the same day in order to keep our date with Stalin. “I regret,” he cabled, “that in view of the time available to me for this journey it will not be possible for us to meet your suggestion and have a British-American Staff meeting at Malta before proceeding to

‘Argonaut.’ I do not think that by not having a meeting at Malta any time will be lost at Yalta. I am envious of your visits to the great battle-front, which are denied to me by distance.” Nevertheless I pressed my proposal. The reader will remember the anxieties which I had expressed about our operations in Northwest Europe in my telegram to the President of December 6.
2
These still weighed with me.

The British and American Chiefs of Staff had great need for discussion before we reached Yalta, and I hoped that their principal members might arrive at Malta two or three days before us and go over the military ground together, and that the President would invite Eisenhower, if the battle could spare him. I wanted Alexander to come too. It seemed consonant with this idea of a preliminary military conference that there should be a similar meeting of Foreign Triumph and Tragedy

405

Secretaries. I did not know whether the President would bring Stettinius, recently appointed, with him, nor whether Molotov would come, but I should have liked a conference between Eden, Stettinius, and Molotov at Alexandria or the Pyramids about a week before the President and I reached Yalta.

I therefore telegraphed again on January 8, and, after setting forth this proposal, continued:
Prime

Minister

to

8 Jan. 45

President Roosevelt

I am still thinking it of high importance that our
military men should get together for a few days before
we arrive at Yalta. There will no doubt be opportunities
for them to confer together at Sevastopol on days when
we are engaged in politics and do not require technical
advice. All the same, there are a tremendous lot of
questions which should be looked at beforehand, and
our agenda ought really to be considered.

What are your ideas of the length of our stay at
Yalta? This may well be a fateful Conference, coming
at a moment when the Great Allies are so divided and
the shadow of the war lengthens out before us. At the
present time I think the end of this war may well prove
to be more disappointing than was the last.

The President replied that he had directed Marshall, King, and Arnold, with their assistants, to arrive in Malta in time for a conference with the British Staffs in the forenoon of January 30, but explained that he could not spare Mr.

Stettinius for a preliminary meeting of Foreign Secretaries.

He himself would be at sea, and his Secretary of State ought not to be out of the country so long at the same time.

He would join us instead at Malta and accompany our party to the Triple Conference.

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“My idea,” he concluded, “of the length of stay at Yalta is that it should not be more than five or six days. I am very desirous of keeping our date with Uncle Joe if it can possibly be done.”

This was better than nothing, but it seemed to me that we might run very short of time, and I therefore persisted.

Prime Minister to

10 Jan. 45

President Roosevelt

Thank you very much about the Combined Chiefs of
Staff’s preliminary meeting.

2. Eden has particularly asked me to suggest that
Stettinius might come on forty-eight hours earlier to
Malta with the United States Chiefs of Staff, so that he
(Eden) can run over the agenda with him beforehand.

Even though Molotov were not invited, I am sure this
would be found very useful. I do not see any other way
of realising our hopes about World Organisation in five
or six days. Even the Almighty took seven. Pray forgive
my pertinacity.

3. I have now read very carefully your message to
Congress, and I hope you will let me say that it is a
most masterly document. Every good wish.

But the President replied that there was too much business in Washington for Mr. Stettinius to reach Malta before January 31. He promised however to send Harry Hopkins to England to talk things over with Eden and myself. On January 21 Hopkins flew to London in the “Sacred Cow” to discuss some of the topics which would confront us at the triple meeting, and the differences which had arisen between us in the previous month over Greece, Poland, and Italy. We had a number of very frank conversations during these three days. Hopkins records that I was

“volcanic” in my remarks, but that the visit was “very satisfactory.” I am said to have told him that from all the

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reports I had received about conditions at Yalta we could not have found a worse place for a meeting if we had spent ten years in looking for it. At any rate, it seems that the President’s advisers were not without misgivings, for on the day of my departure I received the following telegram:
President Roosevelt

29 Jan. 45

to Prime Minister

The approaches to “Argonaut” appear to be much
more difficult than at first reported. I will have my
advance party make recommendations as to how I shall
travel after Malta.

I agree that we must notify Uncle Joe as soon as we
can fix our schedule in the light of present information.

Mr. Roosevelt was by now at sea and there was little on could do about it, but his forebodings were soon to be justified.

On January 29 I left Northolt in the Skymaster given to me by General Arnold. My daughter Sarah and the official party, together with Mr. Martin and Mr. Rowan, my private secretaries, and Commander Thompson, travelled with me.

The rest of my personal staff and some departmental officials travelled in two other planes. We arrived at Malta just before dawn on January 30, and there I learnt that one of these two aircraft had crashed near Pantelleria. Only three of the crew and two passengers survived. Such are the strange ways of fate.

During the journey I developed a high temperature, and under Lord Moran’s orders I stayed in bed on the plane until noon. I then took up my quarters in H.M.S.
Orion,
where I rested all day. In the evening I felt better, and both the Governor of Malta and Mr. Harriman dined with me.

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On the morning of February 2, the Presidential party, on board the U.S.S.
Quincy,
steamed into Valletta harbour. It was a warm day, and under a cloudless sky I watched the scene from the deck of the
Orion.
As the American cruiser steamed slowly past us towards her berth alongside the quay wall I could see the figure of the President seated on the bridge, and we waved to each other. With the escort of Spitfires overhead, the salutes, and the bands of the ships’

companies in the harbour playing “The Star-spangled Banner” it was a splendid scene. I thought I was well enough to lunch on board the
Quincy,
and at six o’clock that evening we had our first formal meeting in the President’s cabin. Here we reviewed the report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the military discussions which had been taking place in Malta during the previous three days. Our Staffs had done a remarkable piece of work. Their discussions had centred principally round Eisenhower’s plans for carrying his forces up to and across the Rhine. There were differences of opinion on the subject, which are related in another chapter.
3
The opportunity was of course taken to review the whole span of the war, including the war against the U-boats, the future campaigns in Southeast Asia and the Pacific, and the Mediterranean situation. We reluctantly agreed to withdraw two divisions from Greece as soon as they could be spared, but I made it clear that we should not be obliged to do this until the Greek Government had built up its own military forces. Three divisions were also to be withdrawn from Italy to reinforce Northwest Europe, but I stressed that it would be unwise to make any significant withdrawal of amphibious forces. It was very important to follow up any German surrender in Italy, and I told the President that we ought to occupy as much of Austria as possible, as it was “undesirable that more of Western Europe than necessary should be occupied by the Triumph and Tragedy