Triumph and Tragedy (The Second World War) (22 page)

was a good opportunity. Still, he would drive forward to his utmost on the British left and keep the whole front blazing.

It was late and I was thoroughly tired out when I got back to the château at Siena, where Alexander came again to dine.

When one writes things on paper to decide or explain large questions affecting action there is mental stress. But all this bites much deeper when you see and feel it on the spot.

Here was this splendid army, equivalent to twenty-five divisions, of which a quarter were American, reduced till it was just not strong enough to produce decisive results against the immense power of the defensive. A very little more, half what had been taken from us, and we could

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have broken into the valley of the Po, with all the gleaming possibilities and prizes which lay open towards Vienna. As it was our forces, about a million strong, could play a mere secondary part in any commanding strategic conception.

They could keep the enemy on their front busy at any cost and risk of a hard offensive. They could at least do their duty. Alexander maintained his soldierly cheerfulness, but it was in a sombre mood that I went to bed. In these great matters failing to gain one’s way is no escape from the responsibility for an inferior solution.

As Alexander’s offensive could not start till the 26th I flew to Rome on the morning of the 21st. Here another set of problems and a portentous array of new personages to meet awaited me. Brooke had arrived, and also Peter Portal. Walter Moyne, so soon to die from an assassin’s bullet, had come from Cairo, and Mr. Leeper was also present.
1
Again the issue was in most cases not what ought to be done — that would have been too easy — but what was likely to be agreed to not only at home but between Allies.

First I had to deal with the impending Greek crisis, which had been one of the chief reasons for my Italian visit. On July 7 the King of Greece had telegraphed from Cairo that after two months of “cunning and futile arguments” the E.A.

M. extremists had repudiated the Lebanon agreement which their leaders had signed in May.
2
He begged us to declare once again that we would support the Government of M. Papandreou, because it represented most of the Greek nation except the extremists and was the only body which could stop civil war and unite the country against the Germans. He also asked us to denounce E.L.A.S. and Triumph and Tragedy

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withdraw the military missions which we had sent to help them fight against Hitler. The British Government agreed to support M. Papandreou, but after a long talk on July 15 with Colonel Woodhouse, a British officer who was serving with the missions in Greece, I consented to let them remain for the time being. He argued that they were a valuable restraint on E.A.M. and that it might be difficult and dangerous to get them out, but I feared that one day they would be taken as hostages and I asked for them to be reduced.

Rumours of the German evacuation of Greece raised intense excitement and discord in M. Papandreou’s Cabinet, and revealed the frail and false foundation upon which common action stood. This made it all the more necessary for me to see Papandreou and those he trusted.

Before I left London the following telegrams had passed:
Prime

Minister

to

6 Aug.44

Foreign Secretary

Surely we should tell M. Papandreou he should
continue as Prime Minister and defy them all. The
behaviour of E.A.M. is absolutely intolerable. Obviously
they are seeking nothing but the Communisation of
Greece during the confusion of the war, without
allowing the people to decide in any manner understood by democracy.

2. We cannot take a man up as we have done
Papandreou and let him be thrown to the wolves at the
first snarlings of the miserable Greek [Communist]

banditti. Difficult as the world is now, we shall not make
our course easier by abandoning people whom we
have encouraged to take on serious jobs by promises
of support….

4. Should matters go downhill and E.A.M. become
master we should have to reconsider keeping any of
our mission there and put the Greek people bluntly up
against Bolshevism. The case seems to me to have

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reached the following point: either we support
Papandreou, if necessary with force as we have
agreed, or we disinterest ourselves utterly in Greece.

I also warned our Chiefs of Staff

Prime Minister to C.I.

6 Aug. 44

G.S.

It may be that within a month or so we shall have to
put 10,000 or 12,000 men into Athens, with a few
tanks, guns, and armoured cars. You have a division in
England which has above 13,000 troops. Such a force
could be embarked now, and would probably be in time
for the political crisis, which is of major consequence to
the policy of His Majesty’s Government. Such a force
could be supported by troops from the airfields of the
Delta, and by scrapings and combings from the
200,000 tail we have in Egypt.

2. I repeat there is no question of trying to dominate
Greece or going outside the immediate curtilage of
Athens, but this is the centre of government, and, with
the approaches to it, must be made secure. Bren gun
carriers would be very useful. If you have a better plan
let me know it.

3. It is to be presumed that the Germans have gone
or are streaking away to the north, and that the force
landed at the Piræus would be welcomed by the great
majority of the population of Athens, including all
notables. The utmost secrecy must enwrap this project.

The whole matter will be debated in a Staff conference,
with Ministers present, on Tuesday or Wednesday.

4. You should note that time is more important than
numbers, and that 5000 men in five days is better than
7000 men in seven days. The force is not of course
expected to be mobile. Pray speak to me at the first
opportunity.

Matters were arranged accordingly.

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After reaching Naples I began to make the necessary arrangements.

Prime Minister (Italy)

16 Aug. 44

to Foreign Secretary

I am not aware of, and certainly never consciously
agreed to, any British Cabinet decision that the King of
Greece should be advised not to return to Greece until
after the plebiscite has taken place, but to come to
London. It would be much better to see how events
develop, particularly as it may not be possible for a
plebiscite to be held under orderly conditions for many
months. Perhaps Papandreou’s new Government, once
safely installed in Athens, may be prepared to invite the
King, who would not of course start for Greece at once,
but would stay behind in Cairo awaiting developments. I
can meet Papandreou in Rome on 21st, when Mr.

Leeper
3
should be present.

Regarding our expedition to Greece, General Wilson
and his staff are already taking action on the Chiefs of
Staff telegram which I have read …. I have strongly
emphasised that the operation must be regarded as
one of reinforced diplomacy and policy rather than an
actual campaign, and that it is to be confined to Athens,
with possibly a detachment at Salonika.

As soon as the landing-ground has been secured by
the 1500 British parachutists the Greek Government
would follow almost immediately, and within a very few
hours should be functioning in Athens, where the
people would probably receive the British parachutists
with rapture. The arrival of the parachutists in the
neighbourhood of Athens could be effected with
complete surprise, and might well be effected before E.

A.M. had taken any steps to seize the capital. It might
be possible to rely on the two Greek aviation squadrons
as part of the air force mentioned, but this can be
settled at a later date.

Our small expedition, not exceeding 10,000 men,
should start from Alexandria or from the heel of Italy, at
about the same time that the parachute landing took
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place, and, after entering the Piraeus when the mines
were out of the way, relieve the parachutists, who will
be needed elsewhere. Most careful consideration will
need to be given to the date. We should however be
there first, and another unopposed landing might thus
be ensured.

Providing the minesweepers were available, and
especially if there was a friendly Government installed
in Athens, the considerable process of sweeping the
mined approaches to the Piraeus, on which the C.-in-C.

Mediterranean dwelt a great deal, could no doubt be
effected in a few days. The C.-in-C. would like about a
month’s notice to carry out all the necessary preparations.

It is of course necessary in an integrated Anglo-American Staff that the Americans should share in
planning such a movement. They have up to now
shared fully in post-war planning for Greece in common
with the rest of the Mediterranean. American carrying
aircraft will be needed for the operation, and we shall
have to detach a portion of the minesweepers from

“Dragoon.” With the large naval resources available this
should not be difficult.

I had also telegraphed to the President.

Prime Minister to

17 Aug. 44

President Roosevelt

We have always marched together in complete
agreement about Greek policy, and I refer to you on
every important point. The War Cabinet and Foreign
Secretary are much concerned about what will happen
in Athens, and indeed in Greece, when the Germans
crack or when their divisions try to evacuate the
country. If there is a long hiatus after German
authorities have gone from the city before organised
government can be set up it seems very likely that E.A.

M. and Communist extremists will attempt to seize the
city and crush all other forms of Greek expression but
their own.