Triumph and Tragedy (The Second World War) (19 page)

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régime. Developments in small countries depended on relations between the Great Powers. Yugoslavia should be able to profit by the growing improvement in these relations and develop along democratic lines. The Russians had a mission with the Partisans, but its members, far from expressing any idea of introducing the Soviet system into Yugoslavia, had spoken against it.

I asked Tito if he would reaffirm his statement about Communism in public, but he did not wish to do this as it might seem to have been forced upon him. It was agreed that he should however discuss the suggestion with Dr.

Subaši, whom he was meeting for the first time that afternoon.

We then lunched together, and arranged that if the talks with Dr. Subaši made favourable progress we should meet again the following evening. In the meantime I undertook to draft a memorandum on Yugoslav affairs, and the Marshal promised to send me a letter on certain specific matters about supplies.

Early in the day Tito had met General Gammell, Chief of Staff to General Wilson, and been given an important memorandum on Allied projects in Istria and thereabouts. It read as follows:

In the event of Allied forces occupying Northern
Italy, Austria, or Hungary it is the Supreme Allied
Commander’s intention to impose Allied military
government in the area which was under Italian rule at
the outbreak of war, which automatically suspends
Italian sovereignty. The Military Governor will be the
General Officer Commanding the Allied armies in the
area. It is intended that the area shall remain under
direct Allied administration until its disposition has been
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determined by negotiation between the Governments
concerned.

2. This direct Allied military government is necessary
in order to safeguard the bases and lines of communication of the Allied troops of occupation in Central Europe.

3. As the Allied forces of occupation will have to be
supplied through the port of Trieste, it will be necessary
for them to have secure lines of communication
protected by British troops on the route through
Ljubljana-Maribor-Graz.

4. The Supreme Allied Commander looks to the
Yugoslav authorities to co-operate with him in carrying
out this policy, and he intends to maintain the closest
liaison with them.

Tito had grumbled at these proposals in a letter to me; and when we met again on the afternoon of August 13 Mr.

Stevenson, our Ambassador to Yugoslavia, and Dr. Subaši being present, I said that it was an operational question which needed careful study, and also close consultation with the American President. The status of Istria, which still remained Italian, could not be prejudged. It might be a good thing to remove it from Italian sovereignty, but this must be decided at the Peace Conference, or, if there were none, by a meeting of the principal Powers, at which Yugoslavia could state her claim. The United States Government was against territorial changes in time of war, and we ought not to discourage the Italians more than could be helped because they were now making a useful contribution to the war. The best solution might therefore be for the territory to be administered under Allied military government when it was freed from the Germans.

Tito said that he could not accept an Italian civil administration, and pointed out that his National Liberation Movement already controlled many of these areas, and should at least be associated in their administration. He and Triumph and Tragedy

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Subaši agreed to send us a joint memorandum on Istria, and there the matter rested for the moment.

We then discussed how to produce a united Yugoslav Navy, and how to send him light tanks, gunboats, and artillery. I said that we would do what we could, but I warned him that we should lose interest if the fighting in Yugoslavia developed into mere civil war and the struggle against the Germans became only a side issue.

I had referred to this in a note which I had sent to Tito on August 12. We now considered the wider implications of this document, which ran as follows:
Prime Minister to

12 Aug. 44

Marshal Tito

The desire of His Majesty’s Government is to see a
united Yugoslav Government, in which all Yugoslavs
resisting the enemy are represented, and a reconciliation between the Serbian people and the National
Liberation Movement.

2. His Majesty’s Government intend to continue, and
if possible to increase, the supply of war material to
Yugoslav forces now that an agreement has been
reached between the Royal Yugoslav Government and
the National Liberation Movement. They expect, in
return, that Marshal Tito will make a positive contribution to the unification of Yugoslavia by including in the
declaration which he has already agreed with the
Yugoslav Prime Minister to make, not only a statement
regarding his intention not to impose Communism on
the country, but also a statement to the effect that he
will not use the armed strength of the Movement to
influence the free expression of the will of the people
on the future regime of the country.

3. Another contribution which Marshal Tito could
make to the common cause is to agree to meet King
Peter, preferably on Yugoslav soil.

4. If it should turn out that any large quantities of
ammunition sent by His Majesty’s Government are

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used for fratricidal strife other than in self-defence, it
would affect the whole question of Allied supplies,
because we do not wish to be involved in Yugoslav
political differences.

5. We should like to see the Royal Yugoslav Navy
and Air Force working all out for national liberation, but
this cannot be agreed unless first of all due consideration is paid to the King, the constitutional flag, and the
closer unity of the Government and the Movement.

6. His Majesty’s Government, while regarding
Marshal Tito and his brave men with the utmost
admiration, are not satisfied that sufficient recognition
has been given to the power and rights of the Serbian
people, or to the help which has been given, and will be
continued, by His Majesty’s Government.

The Yugoslavs objected to my suggestion that the Partisan movement was divorced from the Serbian people. I did not press this point, particularly as Tito had said that he was prepared later on to make a public statement about not introducing Communism into Yugoslavia after the war. We then discussed a possible meeting between him and King Peter. I said that democracy had flowered in England under constitutional monarchy, and thought that Yugoslavia’s international position would be stronger under a king than as a republic. Tito said his country had had an unfortunate experience with her King, and it would take time for King Peter to live down his connection with Mihailovi. He had no objection in principle to meeting the King, but thought that the moment had not yet come. We therefore agreed to leave it to him and Dr. Subaši to decide on the most opportune occasion.

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Later I entertained Tito to dinner. He was still confined in his gold-lace strait-jacket. I was so glad to be wearing only a white duck suit.

I now reported the results of these talks to the President.

Prime Minister to

14 Aug. 44

President Roosevelt

I have had meetings during the last two days with
Marshal Tito and the Yugoslav Prime Minister. I told
both the Yugoslav leaders that we had no thought but
that they should combine their resources so as to weld
the Yugoslav people into one instrument inthe struggle
against the Germans. Our aim was to promote the
establishment of a stable and independent Yugoslavia,
and the creation of a united Yugoslav Government was
a step towards this end.

2. The two leaders reached a satisfactory agreement on a number of practical questions. They agreed
that all the Yugoslav naval forces will now be united in
the struggle under a common flag. This agreement
between the Yugoslav Prime Minister and Marshal Tito
will enable us with more confidence to increase our
supplies of war material to the Yugoslav forces.

3. They agreed between themselves to issue
simultaneously a statement in a few days’ time, which I
hope will strengthen and intensify the Yugoslav war
effort. They are going off together today to Vis to
continue their discussions.

4. I am informing Marshal Stalin of the result of
these meetings.

On all these three days at Naples I mingled pleasure with toil. Admiral Morse, who commanded the naval forces, took me each day in his barge on an expedition, of which the prime feature was a bathe. On the first we went to the island of Ischia, with its hot springs, and on the return we ran through an immense United States troop convoy sailing for the landing on the Riviera. All the ships were crowded

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with men, and as we passed along their lines they cheered enthusiastically. They did not know that if I had had my way they would be sailing in a different direction. However, I was proud to wave to these gallant soldiers. We also visited Capri. I had never seen the Blue Grotto before. It is indeed a miracle of transparent, sparkling water of a most intense, vivid blue. We bathed in a small, warm bay, and repaired to luncheon at a comfortable inn. I summoned up in my mind all I could remember about the Emperor Tiberius. Certainly in Capri he had chosen an agreeable headquarters from which to rule the world.

These days, apart from business, were a sunshine holiday.

On the afternoon of August 14 I flew in General Wilson’s Dakota to Corsica in order to see the landing of “Anvil”

which I had tried so hard to stop, but to which I wished all success. We had a pleasant flight to Ajaccio, in the harbour of which General Wilson and Admiral John Cunningham had posted themselves on board a British headquarters ship. The airfield was very small and not easily approached.

The pilot was excellent. He had to come in between two bluffs, and his port wing was scarcely fifteen feet from one of them. The General and the Admiral brought me aboard, and we spent a long evening on our affairs. I was to start at daylight in the British destroyer
Kimberley.
Itook with me two members of the American Administration, General Somervell and Mr. Patterson, the Assistant Secretary of War, who were on the spot to see their venture. Captain Allen, whose help in these volumes I have acknowledged, was sent by the Admiral to see that we did not get into trouble. We were five hours sailing before we reached the line of battleships bombarding at about fifteen thousand Triumph and Tragedy

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yards. I now learned from Captain Allen that we were not supposed to go beyond the ten-thousand-yard limit for fear of mines. If I had known this when we passed the
Ramillies,
which was firing at intervals, I could have asked for a picket-boat and gone ashore. As it was we did not go nearer than about seven thousand yards. Here we saw the long rows of boats filled with American storm troops steaming in continuously to the Bay of St. Tropez. As far as I could see or hear not a shot was fired either at the approaching flotillas or on the beaches. The battleships had now stopped firing, as there seemed to be nobody there. We then returned to Ajaccio. I had at least done the civil to