The Sword And The Olive (64 page)
Read The Sword And The Olive Online
Authors: Martin van Creveld
To this purpose the Gaza Strip was divided into little squares, each one only a mile or so in size. Each was patrolled day and night; other troops were stationed for longer periods, taking up covert positions and simply waiting for something to happen. Troops carried ropes to measure the internal dimensions of houses against their external ones as well as ladders for climbing on roofs and taking inhabitants by surprise; on other occasions bulldozers were used to remove physical obstacles such as cactus fences and to destroy bunkers. The objective was always to force the terrorists into the open where they could be faced and destroyed by superior Israeli firepower. There were numerous firefights; the better-trained Israelis usually came out on top although there were often casualties on both sides.
Sharon’s measures, which also included razing as many as two thousand
4
houses in the refugee camps to make way for wider roads, were largely successful. Terror in the Gaza Strip abated to some extent, and the IDF’s ability to hold on to the Occupied Territories was never in doubt, even during the October War and its aftermath. Even as late as the early eighties it was not yet necessary to reinforce the forces to the point that occupation duties seriously interfered with the IDF’s preparations for waging large-scale war; though terrorism was never entirely put down, it was as if the Palestinians’ grievances had been put inside a pressure cooker, with occasional hissing sounds portending the great explosion to come.
4
houses in the refugee camps to make way for wider roads, were largely successful. Terror in the Gaza Strip abated to some extent, and the IDF’s ability to hold on to the Occupied Territories was never in doubt, even during the October War and its aftermath. Even as late as the early eighties it was not yet necessary to reinforce the forces to the point that occupation duties seriously interfered with the IDF’s preparations for waging large-scale war; though terrorism was never entirely put down, it was as if the Palestinians’ grievances had been put inside a pressure cooker, with occasional hissing sounds portending the great explosion to come.
The 1973 war over, the nature of Israel’s commitment to the West Bank in particular underwent a not so subtle change. So long as Eshkol and Ms. Meir had been in power, and with the exception of East Jerusalem, Jewish settlement of the Occupied Territories was driven mainly by strategic considerations. Accordingly it was carried out either by the
kibbuts
movement or directly by the IDF at the hands of NACHAL; either way, and with the partial exception of the Golan settlements, the decision had always been made at the top. Now, however, the balance shifted. Though Rabin also headed the Labor government, more and more he saw the initiative seized, and his own hand forced, by the movement Gush Emunim. Politically speaking, Gush Emunim was one of the organized expressions of the previously mentioned
kippot sruggot
, the other one being the MAFDAL Party, which backed it in the Knesset. Then and later its core was formed by a number of nationalist-minded
yeshivot.
Their rabbis, headed by one Tsvi Yehuda Kook, distinguished themselves by preaching a fanatical belief in the Jews’ divinely inspired
duty
to settle every inch of the holy land. Then and later the movement enjoyed considerable financial support from abroad, primarily the United States. It also exercised a powerful attraction on the kind of diaspora Jew (including, to name but two, Rabbi Meir Kahane and Dr. Baruch Goldstein)
5
who, perhaps because of anti-Semitism suffered during youth, hoped to act out aggressive fantasies on defenseless Arabs.
kibbuts
movement or directly by the IDF at the hands of NACHAL; either way, and with the partial exception of the Golan settlements, the decision had always been made at the top. Now, however, the balance shifted. Though Rabin also headed the Labor government, more and more he saw the initiative seized, and his own hand forced, by the movement Gush Emunim. Politically speaking, Gush Emunim was one of the organized expressions of the previously mentioned
kippot sruggot
, the other one being the MAFDAL Party, which backed it in the Knesset. Then and later its core was formed by a number of nationalist-minded
yeshivot.
Their rabbis, headed by one Tsvi Yehuda Kook, distinguished themselves by preaching a fanatical belief in the Jews’ divinely inspired
duty
to settle every inch of the holy land. Then and later the movement enjoyed considerable financial support from abroad, primarily the United States. It also exercised a powerful attraction on the kind of diaspora Jew (including, to name but two, Rabbi Meir Kahane and Dr. Baruch Goldstein)
5
who, perhaps because of anti-Semitism suffered during youth, hoped to act out aggressive fantasies on defenseless Arabs.
Already in April 1968 a small group of Gush Emunim forerunners led by Rabbis Nachum Waldman and Moshe Levinger had taken up residence in the old city of Hebron, seeking to repossess houses from which the Jewish population had been expelled during the 1929 Arab revolt. From then on the movement prospered, “putting new settlements on the ground” (as the saying went) in the face of government disapproval and insisting, usually with success, that they be allowed to stay put. Prime Minister Rabin tried to stop the settlers, but his coalition included MAFDAL and his efforts were hesitant and ineffective. Yet the settlements they set up were not seen as a major problem given that only a small minority of Israelis participated in the movement and that any kind of political agreement with Jordan or the PLO was still distant.
When Likud came to power in May 1977, the situation changed again. Like Rabin, Begin depended on MAFDAL for maintaining his majority in parliament. Although he personally was not religious, unlike Rabin he shared the belief that the whole of Erets Yisrael belonged to Israel as a matter of right and should be settled by Jews. Immediately after coming to power he announced that there would be “many Allon Morehs” (the name of a settlement Gush Emunim, evading IDF roadblocks, had established in 1974). With Sharon as chief executive for the Occupied Territories, Begin soon proved true to his word, engaging in a massive building program not only of rural settlements but of entire townships.
6
Nor was the population of these new settlements limited any longer to orthodox, right-wing fanatics. In a country where housing costs have traditionally been astronomical, the government promised cheap Palestinian land, generous loans, and various amenities such as shopping centers and country clubs. Consequently the program proved much more able than previously to attract secular, run-of-the-mill Israelis looking for a good deal.
6
Nor was the population of these new settlements limited any longer to orthodox, right-wing fanatics. In a country where housing costs have traditionally been astronomical, the government promised cheap Palestinian land, generous loans, and various amenities such as shopping centers and country clubs. Consequently the program proved much more able than previously to attract secular, run-of-the-mill Israelis looking for a good deal.
Ever since 1967, along with the establishment of a military government, Israel’s “security arms”—a term that includes the IDF, the police, the Frontier Guard, and Shin Bet—had perfected the instruments of repression. By world standards their rule may not have been of the harshest; never were hostages taken, or terrorists executed by formal court order, or entire villages demolished (as the French did in the Algerian War). Still, from the point of view of those affected it was bad enough. During the first months after the Six Day War the Israelis sought to rid themselves of as many Arabs as possible, pressuring them to migrate across the River Jordan and refusing reentry when they tried to return.
7
When that failed to produce any considerable results they built up an elaborate licensing system. Palestinians were required to obtain permission for virtually anything from opening a business to obtaining a telephone to working in Israel to traveling abroad; as Chief of Staff Eytan once put it in his blunt way, the objective of all this “chicanery” was to “make the Arabs run about like drugged bugs in a bottle.” Gradually roadblocks, curfews, searches, and arrests multiplied. Organizations that seemed to pose a threat were banned, strikes prohibited, demonstrations broken up, and the houses of people accused of sheltering terrorists sealed or demolished—all in addition to constant overt and covert surveillance for locating and breaking up terrorist cells.
7
When that failed to produce any considerable results they built up an elaborate licensing system. Palestinians were required to obtain permission for virtually anything from opening a business to obtaining a telephone to working in Israel to traveling abroad; as Chief of Staff Eytan once put it in his blunt way, the objective of all this “chicanery” was to “make the Arabs run about like drugged bugs in a bottle.” Gradually roadblocks, curfews, searches, and arrests multiplied. Organizations that seemed to pose a threat were banned, strikes prohibited, demonstrations broken up, and the houses of people accused of sheltering terrorists sealed or demolished—all in addition to constant overt and covert surveillance for locating and breaking up terrorist cells.
In 1974 the Rabat Summit of Arab leaders recognized the PLO as “the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian People,” a position that received the support of the world community when Yasser Arafat was later permitted to address the UN General Assembly. The Israelis, however, regarded the PLO as a terrorist organization and steadfastly refused to negotiate, leaving no partner for an eventual solution. Under Labor and Likud, from time to time feeble attempts were made to bypass the PLO by engaging the local Palestinian population in talks to leave occupation in place while relieving Israelis of the burden of day-to-day administration. In 1977, municipal elections were held; when they failed to produce a crop of “moderate” leaders the Israelis turned from the towns to the villages, feeling that villagers were more conservative (read: less well educated and therefore less susceptible to radical PLO propaganda) and that some kind of deal could be struck with them. Instigated by Sharon with the aid of a Hebrew University professor of Arab literature, Menachem Milson, the experimental “Rural Leagues” also ended in failure. Either the Israelis did not offer a sufficient measure of autonomy to satisfy even the most backward Arab, or their own leaders came under PLO pressure, quarreled among themselves, and, when they did not resign, often ended up being murdered.
These were the years of the Camp David Accords and, of course, the invasion of Lebanon. In Sharon’s view they formed two sides of the same coin. The peace accords were deliberately formulated to sever any “linkage” between peace with Egypt and the Occupied Territories, which still remained under Israeli control; the invasion was designed to “break” the PLO and secure that control for ever.
8
In the event the invasion misfired, exposing the IDF to effective guerrilla warfare for the first time and revealing the limits of its power. The spectacle of the mighty IDF with its thousands of tanks and vehicles reeling from Lebanon was not lost on the Palestinians. It was accompanied by intense frustration as more land in the West Bank and Gaza Strip continued to be expropriated for the purpose of settling additional Jews. Excluding East Jerusalem, its municipal boundaries vastly enlarged after 1967, the number rose from 4,200 in 1977 to little short of 100,000 ten years later. Add the severe economic downturn that started in 1983, and the background to the outbreak of the
Intifada
—literally, “a shaking off ”—becomes understandable.
8
In the event the invasion misfired, exposing the IDF to effective guerrilla warfare for the first time and revealing the limits of its power. The spectacle of the mighty IDF with its thousands of tanks and vehicles reeling from Lebanon was not lost on the Palestinians. It was accompanied by intense frustration as more land in the West Bank and Gaza Strip continued to be expropriated for the purpose of settling additional Jews. Excluding East Jerusalem, its municipal boundaries vastly enlarged after 1967, the number rose from 4,200 in 1977 to little short of 100,000 ten years later. Add the severe economic downturn that started in 1983, and the background to the outbreak of the
Intifada
—literally, “a shaking off ”—becomes understandable.
Throughout 1987 the writing was on the wall as incidents in which Palestinians clashed with Israeli troops—riots, tire burnings, rock throwings, and roadblocks—increased by leaps and bounds.
9
Yet the Israelis failed to realize the significance; according to a lecture delivered by the coordinator of activities in the Occupied Territories, Shmuel Goren, on the eve of the revolt, their rule had been “a brilliant success.”
10
The signal was given on December 8, 1987, when a road accident involving an Israeli truck killed four Gaza residents. The funeral was accompanied by the usual violent demonstrations; this time unlike previous occasions they did not die down when night fell. Instead the next morning saw renewed demonstrations on an even larger scale. By noon small parties of Israeli troops scattered all over the Gaza Strip came under attack from thousands who sought to burn or overturn vehicles and injure the men with steel rods, axes, rocks, and Molotov cocktails.
9
Yet the Israelis failed to realize the significance; according to a lecture delivered by the coordinator of activities in the Occupied Territories, Shmuel Goren, on the eve of the revolt, their rule had been “a brilliant success.”
10
The signal was given on December 8, 1987, when a road accident involving an Israeli truck killed four Gaza residents. The funeral was accompanied by the usual violent demonstrations; this time unlike previous occasions they did not die down when night fell. Instead the next morning saw renewed demonstrations on an even larger scale. By noon small parties of Israeli troops scattered all over the Gaza Strip came under attack from thousands who sought to burn or overturn vehicles and injure the men with steel rods, axes, rocks, and Molotov cocktails.
Israel’s minister of defense at the time was Yitschak Rabin. He was scheduled to leave for Washington, D.C., in order to discuss such vital issues as the sale of additional F-16s and the U.S. purchase of Israeli arms. In light of the uprising he did not see fit to change his schedule, so he took off as planned on December 10. The riots spread from Gaza to the West Bank, taking the Israeli authorities totally by surprise and leaving them without a prepared response. The PLO was equally surprised, although of course its activists had been organizing and carrying out propaganda for years. Now based in Tunis following its expulsion from Lebanon, the PLO also sought to gain control. It was only partly successful, however, as other Palestinian organizations took a hand, including the socialist-oriented People’s Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) as well as fundamentalist Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Moreover, some hurried Israeli research among detainees during the early days of the
Intifada
showed that many of the incidents were spontaneous. They did not involve an organization or centralized command but individual actions venting frustration at the continuing Israeli occupation or some other personal gripe.
11
Intifada
showed that many of the incidents were spontaneous. They did not involve an organization or centralized command but individual actions venting frustration at the continuing Israeli occupation or some other personal gripe.
11
As during the British mandate, when the boot was on the other foot, the fact that the
Intifada
was never completely subject to central control was both a strength and weakness. It was a weakness insofar as there was no question of widespread, coordinated violence in the territories against the Israelis, who of course controlled all the roads and most telecommunications. It was a strength insofar as it left the Israelis without a clear military target as well as a supreme Palestinian leadership with which to negotiate. The more activists were killed or arrested or incarcerated or deported, the more the ranks of the uprising were replenished from below; indeed, very often relatives of those killed or imprisoned took action against their tormentors.
Intifada
was never completely subject to central control was both a strength and weakness. It was a weakness insofar as there was no question of widespread, coordinated violence in the territories against the Israelis, who of course controlled all the roads and most telecommunications. It was a strength insofar as it left the Israelis without a clear military target as well as a supreme Palestinian leadership with which to negotiate. The more activists were killed or arrested or incarcerated or deported, the more the ranks of the uprising were replenished from below; indeed, very often relatives of those killed or imprisoned took action against their tormentors.
From the first the Israeli military authorities were at a loss in dealing with an uprising that had no central leadership and in which the “enemy” usually consisted of unarmed civilians, including many women as well as children as young as five. Although occasional demonstrations of force were held, especially during the early days, in this struggle 95 percent of the firepower it had often deployed against regular Arab armies was irrelevant ; neither the fighter-bombers nor the tanks nor the heavy artillery (let alone warships and submarines) were of any use when it came to controlling crowds or chasing small parties of teenagers over the limestone hills of Judaea or down the alleys of the Gaza Strip refugee camps. Perhaps a small fraction of the firepower in question
would
have been decisive if it had been deployed during the very first days in the way Napoleon used “a whiff of grapeshot” to disperse the mob that attacked the French National Assembly in 1795. In the event the IDF either did not have the stomach for such measures or (as likely) failed to implement them owing to a fundamental misunderstanding of the situation.
would
have been decisive if it had been deployed during the very first days in the way Napoleon used “a whiff of grapeshot” to disperse the mob that attacked the French National Assembly in 1795. In the event the IDF either did not have the stomach for such measures or (as likely) failed to implement them owing to a fundamental misunderstanding of the situation.
Within weeks a dreary routine established itself. Dozens of incidents took place daily (according to one source, at the end of three and a half months there had been no fewer than 6,840).
12
Although most were small they were punctuated by clashes in which hundreds and even thousands of people participated. Demonstrations were held in the vicinity of military installations, roadblocks, and settlements, often degenerating into riots as crowds threw or brandished every conceivable object that could inflict damage on their opponents. Israeli soldiers and civilians in the Occupied Territories were attacked, cars and other targets stoned, tires burned, and prohibited Palestinian flags displayed. Much of the violence took place at random; other incidents tended to cluster around special occasions such as “hero” funerals, a variety of Moslem and PLO-established memorial days, and visits from foreign dignitaries. Often it was accompanied by strikes, some protracted, some brief, but all instigated and enforced by the PLO or some other terrorist organization with the aim of demonstrating to the world that the general population sympathized with the uprising.
12
Although most were small they were punctuated by clashes in which hundreds and even thousands of people participated. Demonstrations were held in the vicinity of military installations, roadblocks, and settlements, often degenerating into riots as crowds threw or brandished every conceivable object that could inflict damage on their opponents. Israeli soldiers and civilians in the Occupied Territories were attacked, cars and other targets stoned, tires burned, and prohibited Palestinian flags displayed. Much of the violence took place at random; other incidents tended to cluster around special occasions such as “hero” funerals, a variety of Moslem and PLO-established memorial days, and visits from foreign dignitaries. Often it was accompanied by strikes, some protracted, some brief, but all instigated and enforced by the PLO or some other terrorist organization with the aim of demonstrating to the world that the general population sympathized with the uprising.
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