32 Figures from Bar-Siman Tov, The Israeli-Egyptian War of Attrition , p. 92 (table 4.1) and p. 97 (table 4.4).
33 M. Peled, “Ech lo Hitkonena Yisrael Le-milchama” [How Israel Did Not Prepare for War], Maarachot 289/290 (October 1983): 25-28.
34 Cf. the calculations of Bar-Siman Tov, The Israeli-Egyptian War of Attrition , p. 91 ff., regarding the types of Egyptian fire and their relative effectiveness.
35 The operation is described in some detail in M. Eldar, Shayetet 11 [Flotilla 11] (Tel Aviv: Zmora Bitan, 1996), pp. 55-59.
36 Some additional operations of the same kind are briefly described in Eytan, Sippur shel Chayal , pp. 113-114.
37 Ch. Nadel, “Hafalat Ha-kochot Ha-meyuchadim shel TSAHAL Be-milchemet Hahatasha” [Israel’s Special Forces in the War of Attrition], M.A. thesis, Tel Aviv University, 1990. Nadel was a special forces officer who later rose to major general.
38 For Nasser’s plans during this period see Schueftan, Hatasha , chap. 5.
39 Y. Rabin, Pinkas Sherut [A Service Record] (Tel Aviv: Maariv), vol. 1, pp. 261-263. For quotes from other key Israeli decisionmakers see Schueftan, Hatasha , p. 120 ff.
40 Schueftan, Hatasha , p. 250 ff., using a variety of Egyptian sources.
41 Cf. A. Price, Instruments of Darkness: The History of Electronic Warfare (London: Macdonald’s, 1967).
42 Cf. E. O’Ballance, The Electronic War in the Middle East, 1968-1970 (London: Faber and Faber, 1974), pp. 123-124.
47 The best source is once again Schueftan, Hatasha , p. 267, which makes use of all the available Israeli, Egyptian, and U.S. sources.
48 For a blow-by-blow account of the way it was done see E. Zeira, Milchemet Yom Hakippurim, Mitos mul Metsiut [The Yom Kippur War: Myth Versus Reality] (Tel Aviv: Yediot Acharonot, 1993), p. 34 ff.
49 Ezer Weizman, On Eagles’ Wings (Tel Aviv: Steimatzky’s, 1979), p. 265.
CHAPTER 13
1 S. Rolbant, The Israeli Soldier: Profile of an Army (New York: Barnes, 1970), p. 244.
2 For a blow-by-blow account of terrorist activities and Israeli responses see E. O’Ballance, Arab Guerrilla Power, 1968-1972 (London: Faber and Faber, 1974).
3 Dayan lecture, August 9, 1973, quoted in N. Bar Tov, Dado : Arbaim U-smoneh Shanim Ve-esrim Yom [Dado: Forty-Eight Years and Twenty Days] (Tel Aviv: Maariv, 1978), vol. 1, p. 274.
4 Bar Tov, Dado , vol. 1, pp. 179, 202-203. There are some additional details of the plan in E. N. Luttwak, “Defense Planning in Israel: A Brief Retroperspective,” in S. G. Neuman, ed., Defense-Planning in Less-Industrialized States (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1984), p. 140.
5 Cf. the account in B. Kedar, Sippuro shel Gdud Machats [The Story of “Machats” Battalion] (Tel Aviv: Tamuz, 1975), p. 11.
6 Abdel Ghani el Gamasy, The October War (Cairo: American University Press, 1993), p. 148.
8 G. Yaakobi, Ke-chut Ha-seara [By a Hair’s Breadth] (Tel Aviv: Idanim, 1989), p. 170.
9 For the preparations that were made on this occasion see Bar Tov, Dado , vol. 1, pp. 238-248.
10 E. Haber, Ha-yom Tifrots Milchama [Today War Will Break Out] (Tel Aviv: Idanim, 1987), p. 17.
11 A. Sadat, In Search of Identity (New York: Collins, 1978), p. 237.
12 Cf. M. van Creveld, Nuclear Proliferation and the Future of Conflict (New York: Free Press, 1993), p. 109; also Levite, Be-einei Ha-aravim , pp. 42, 76, plus the sources quoted in both works.
13 See the sources quoted in Levite, Be-einei Ha-aravim, p. 43.
14 Cf. his own account in Saad el Shazly, The Crossing of the Suez (San Francisco: American Mideast Research, 1980), p. 27 ff.
15 For some figures see Bar Tov, Dado , vol. 1, pp. 282, 286.
16 M. Dayan, Avnei Derech [Memoirs] (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1976), p. 570.
18 Quotation from a GS meeting, September 17, 1973, in Bar Tov, Dado , vol. 1, p. 287.
19 For the details see Haber, Ha-yom Tifrots Milchama , pp. 15-16.
20 Cf. Meir, My Life (Jerusalem: Steimatzky, 1975, p. 347 ff.
21 Cf. M. Negbi, Namer shel Niyar [Paper Tiger] (Tel Aviv: Sifriyat Ha-poalim, 1985), pp. 87-88.
22 According to Brigadier General Shalev, head of IDF intelligence/research, and Zeira’s own office manager, a lieutenant colonel whose name was also Shalev; see Bar Tov, Dado, vol. 1, p. 305.
23 Shazly, The Crossing of the Suez , pp. 206-207.
33 For the lack of information affecting Gonen at this time cf. M. van Creveld, Command in War (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 205-206.
34 Brig. Gen. Emmanuel Shaked as quoted in Zeira, Milchemet Yom Ha-kippurim , p. 217. The verb li-dfok is normal IDF slang for “to kill” or “to fuck.”
35 In these attacks Adan lost twenty-seven killed, five tanks, and eight half-tracks. Lt. Col. Nachum and Lt. Col. Tsvi, “Lechima Be-kommando Mitsri Be-milchemet Yom Ha-kippurim” [Fighting Egyptian Commandos During the 1973 War], Maarachot 327 (November-December 1992): 23.
36 E. Shimshi, Seara Be-Oktober [Storm in October] (Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 1986), p. 14.
37 No record of this meeting has ever come to light. It is, however, described in A. Adan, On the Banks of the Suez (London: Arms and Armor, 1980), pp. 95-100; and Bar Tov, Dado , vol. 2, pp. 73-75.
38 Cf. van Creveld, Command in War , pp. 213-218, for a blow-by-blow account of IDF “staff work” during these hours.
44 The Egyptians later claimed that it was a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft that alerted the Israelis to the location of the seam; Gamasy, The October War , p. 278.
47 Cf. the detailed account in E. Rozen, “Lama Hufkera Chativat Barak?” [Why Was “Barak” Brigade Abandoned to Its Fate?” Maariv weekend magazine, September 24, 1993, pp. 32-33.
48 See his own account in R. Eytan, Sippur shel Chayal [A Soldier’s Story] (Tel Aviv: Maariv, 1991), p. 130.
49 Agranat Report (Jerusalem: Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 1035.
51 See M. Zak, Hussein Osse Shalom [Hussein Makes Peace] (Ramat Gan: Bar Illan University Press), pp. 130-134, for the details.
52 Personal communication by Lt. Col. David Chillion.
53 A. Kahalani, Oz 77 [Strength 77] (Tel Aviv: Schocken, 1977), p. 104 ff., is a blow-by-blow account of the battle.
54 Ch. Herzog, The War of Atonement (London: Futura, 1975), pp. 112-113.
55 For this interpretation see van Creveld, Nuclear Proliferation , pp. 101-102; S. Aronson, The Politics and Strategy of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East (New York: State University of New York, 1992), pp. 143-149.
56 Tamir, lecture, Hebrew University, December 1974.
57 Personal communication from one of Lanner’s battalion commanders, Lt. Col. Amram Lazar. The Iraqis have described this episode in Ts. Ofer, ed., Tsva Iraq Be-milchemet Yom Hakippurim [The Iraqi Army in the Yom Kippur War] (Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 1986), pp. 110-112; according to them it was this attack that saved Damascus.
63 E. Amber, “Chel Ha-avir Ha-yisraeli Bi-krav Ha-yabasha Be-milchemet Yom Hakippurim” [The IAF’s Participation in the Ground Battle in the Yom Kippur War], in U. Milstein, Ha-tslicha she-lo Hayta [The Crossing That Wasn’t] (Tel Aviv: Golan, 1992), p. 284 ff.
68 See Shazly’s own account in The Crossing of the Suez , p. 400 ff.
69 Cf. B. Telem, “Naval Lessons of the Yom Kippur War,” in L. Williams, ed., Military Aspects of the Israeli-Arab Conflict (Tel Aviv: University Publishing Projects, 1975), p. 231 ff.
CHAPTER 14
1 The most detailed account is S. Nakdimon, Svirut Nemucha (Tel Aviv: Revivim, 1982), chaps. 1-10; also Y. Ben Porat, Neila [Lock-In] (Tel Aviv: Idanim, 1991). In 1973 Brig. Gen. Ben Porat was the Israeli intelligence officer in charge of signals intelligence (SIGINT).