The Sword And The Olive (63 page)
Read The Sword And The Olive Online
Authors: Martin van Creveld
With U.S. financial support, Israel also speeded development of its Chets (Arrow) antiballistic missile. Unlike the hapless Patriot, the Chets is designed to bring down ballistic missiles rather than aircraft. Unlike the hapless Patriot, too, its range—approximately fifty miles—is long enough to prevent remnant parts of incoming or outgoing missiles from falling anywhere near protected zones; indeed, assuming the next attack comes from Iraq or Iran the endangered areas would probably be well east of the Jordan Valley. To provide maximum security it was planned to fire the Chets in salvos of three. This, its designers claim, should result in a better than 99-percent chance of hitting the target.
31
31
Not only is it unclear whether the Chets will be able to identify the warhead and destroy it
32
(which is more than the Patriots did); designing countermeasures that will mislead the defense ought not to be too difficult.
33
Even if the enormous investment in early warning radar, fire-control radar, and command and control is discounted, each Chets is expected to cost ten times more than a Scud. To obtain 99-percent probability of obtaining a hit, the cost-exchange ratio would be 30:1. Hence a determined attacker should always be able to get through the defense simply by increasing the number of missiles; as of late 1997 there were signs that the Syrians were preparing to put additional missiles in position.
34
In other words so long as it is a question of countering a conventional attack the Chets appears extremely wasteful. Yet the Gulf War points to the lesson that the best response to a potential chemical attack is probably not to spend billions on antimissile defenses but to threaten retaliation of a similar kind.
35
A fortiori the same applies to a nuclear threat, which may one day emerge. Indeed so large is the nuclear threat that any attempt to build a “reliable” defense against it would almost certainly represent an oxymoron.
32
(which is more than the Patriots did); designing countermeasures that will mislead the defense ought not to be too difficult.
33
Even if the enormous investment in early warning radar, fire-control radar, and command and control is discounted, each Chets is expected to cost ten times more than a Scud. To obtain 99-percent probability of obtaining a hit, the cost-exchange ratio would be 30:1. Hence a determined attacker should always be able to get through the defense simply by increasing the number of missiles; as of late 1997 there were signs that the Syrians were preparing to put additional missiles in position.
34
In other words so long as it is a question of countering a conventional attack the Chets appears extremely wasteful. Yet the Gulf War points to the lesson that the best response to a potential chemical attack is probably not to spend billions on antimissile defenses but to threaten retaliation of a similar kind.
35
A fortiori the same applies to a nuclear threat, which may one day emerge. Indeed so large is the nuclear threat that any attempt to build a “reliable” defense against it would almost certainly represent an oxymoron.
Given the many failures attending development of the Chets,
36
clearly the deployment of an antimissile defense system capable of providing full protection—whatever that may mean—is still some years in the future (the same for other systems being planned or developed). According to newspaper reports, among the latter are a long-range UAV known as Moav that will loiter over the area and locate and destroy missiles at the launching phase, as well as a laser gun known as Nautilus jointly developed with the United States and recently brought to Israel for operational tests.
37
Unless and until these projects materialize, should another war take place any time soon, the IDF will be able to do precious little to protect the country and its population against missile attack. Even then it will be risky business.
36
clearly the deployment of an antimissile defense system capable of providing full protection—whatever that may mean—is still some years in the future (the same for other systems being planned or developed). According to newspaper reports, among the latter are a long-range UAV known as Moav that will loiter over the area and locate and destroy missiles at the launching phase, as well as a laser gun known as Nautilus jointly developed with the United States and recently brought to Israel for operational tests.
37
Unless and until these projects materialize, should another war take place any time soon, the IDF will be able to do precious little to protect the country and its population against missile attack. Even then it will be risky business.
Judging from past performance and barring an attack with weapons of mass destruction, the mortality and physical damage resulting from such an eventuality ought not to be so large as to seriously interfere with the country’s ability to wage war. What
does
appear serious is the psychological aspect of the matter. During World War II, English and German cities regularly absorbed thousands of tons of bombs and suffered tens of thousands of casualties without ceasing to function for longer than was necessary to repair the worst damage.
38
During Israel’s War of Independence Ben Gurion felt encouraged by the population’s apparent determination to cope with air attacks and carry on life as usual.
39
In 1991, however, and as Rabin later noted,
40
Israelis did not take well to missile attacks. A total of thirty-nine—some say forty—Iraqi missiles were fired during a period of six weeks. Even counting those that completely missed their targets, the total payload of around ten tons was less than the combined payloads of two modern fighter-bombers. Yet initially this small-scale attack was enough to bring civilian life to a halt. Even later, though the economy recovered somewhat, semiparalysis prevailed.
does
appear serious is the psychological aspect of the matter. During World War II, English and German cities regularly absorbed thousands of tons of bombs and suffered tens of thousands of casualties without ceasing to function for longer than was necessary to repair the worst damage.
38
During Israel’s War of Independence Ben Gurion felt encouraged by the population’s apparent determination to cope with air attacks and carry on life as usual.
39
In 1991, however, and as Rabin later noted,
40
Israelis did not take well to missile attacks. A total of thirty-nine—some say forty—Iraqi missiles were fired during a period of six weeks. Even counting those that completely missed their targets, the total payload of around ten tons was less than the combined payloads of two modern fighter-bombers. Yet initially this small-scale attack was enough to bring civilian life to a halt. Even later, though the economy recovered somewhat, semiparalysis prevailed.
Although luck played its part, Israel in 1991 had the dubious distinction of becoming the first country in history to go through a war in which the number of those who had died of fear exceeded those who had been killed by enemy action by a ratio of 10:1 (or 3: 1, if one includes those who later died of injuries). It was also the first war in history to produce a hero who was not a soldier but rather a baby-faced public relations man, Nachman Shai. A journalist who had been drafted for the occasion and festooned with the rank of an IDF brigadier general, he became the darling of the Israeli public. In the manner of Hollywood stars, he would be flooded with letters from female admirers proposing anything from marriage down.
During the years between 1956 and 1982 the armed forces of the Western world in particular often stood by and watched, not without muted envy, as the Israelis proved their military prowess by smashing the Arabs. Now the roles were reversed, and the IDF watched helplessly as others did the job, deploying firepower that Israel could never hope to match. Not only were they helpless; judging from the signs, the war gave the first clear warning that the people of Israel were losing courage in the face of adversity and turning into a nation of cowards who no longer had what it takes to endure and fight. For anyone with a rudimentary understanding of military psychology, that lesson should not have come as a surprise but followed as a natural result of years of trying to cope with the Palestinian uprising. Therefore, we turn our attention to the IDF’s experience with the
Intifada
.
Intifada
.
CHAPTER 20
COPING WITH
Intifada
Intifada
D
URING THE Gulf War the West Bank and Gaza Strip were almost absolutely quiet. For several months before January 15, 1991, the number of incidents had been declining sharply; whereas in July 1990 the wail of police sirens could be heard about every thirty minutes on Jerusalem’s Mount Scopus, now entire days and even weeks passed without a single case of rock-throwing or tire-burning along the road to Jericho. When Iraqi Scud missiles started coming down on Israeli cities during the war itself, the population of the Occupied Territories registered its approval by climbing to their roofs to watch and cheer. At the same time, however, the Palestinians were clearly aware that any careless move on their side might well lead to a repeat of events of 1948 and 1967 when hundreds of thousands were expelled or simply fled. For this reason, and also because the border between Israel and the Occupied Territories had been closed, an eerie calm prevailed. Armed and unarmed clashes between Israelis and Palestinians all but ceased.
URING THE Gulf War the West Bank and Gaza Strip were almost absolutely quiet. For several months before January 15, 1991, the number of incidents had been declining sharply; whereas in July 1990 the wail of police sirens could be heard about every thirty minutes on Jerusalem’s Mount Scopus, now entire days and even weeks passed without a single case of rock-throwing or tire-burning along the road to Jericho. When Iraqi Scud missiles started coming down on Israeli cities during the war itself, the population of the Occupied Territories registered its approval by climbing to their roofs to watch and cheer. At the same time, however, the Palestinians were clearly aware that any careless move on their side might well lead to a repeat of events of 1948 and 1967 when hundreds of thousands were expelled or simply fled. For this reason, and also because the border between Israel and the Occupied Territories had been closed, an eerie calm prevailed. Armed and unarmed clashes between Israelis and Palestinians all but ceased.
Since 1967, when it first became an occupation force, the IDF’s involvement in the Occupied Territories had been gradually expanding. During the early weeks it had been a question of setting up a military government and helping civilian life back on its feet by restoring such services as electricity and water, ensuring food was available, reopening schools, and the like. At the same time it was necessary to look after Israel’s own security by eliminating dozens of known PLO members, a task that was left to the Israeli Shin Bet and carried out with ruthless efficiency. No plans having been made for a permanent occupation, at first these and other arrangements bore a makeshift character. Unable to envisage a political settlement with the Jordanians or the Palestinians, the Israelis apparently hoped to postpone the need for it by creating a tolerable day-to-day life. This led Dayan in particular to insist that Israel should limit its interference with the population’s life to the indispensable minimum.
1
1
As weeks lengthened into months and years, however, Israel’s involvement in policing and governing the population deepened. Functioning as the government, army officers built roads and assumed control over natural resources such as water. They licensed every kind of business and exercised censorship over newspapers and schools, determining what could be published (and not seldom closing newspapers and arresting editors) and what could be studied. Others took control over the bridges that crossed the Jordan, supervising the movement of people and goods in both directions as well as attempting to prevent sabotage, terrorism, and smuggling. Army personnel were used to levy customs and to force the population to pay taxes; since there was a growing tendency to import goods and services (including energy and electricity) from Israel, in case of a default in payment IDF soldiers acted as the collectors. Army units provided security when the authorities carried out activities such as confiscating land and demolishing unauthorized houses; indeed the bulldozers used were painted in IDF colors.
Coping with
Intifada
: Israeli trooper and Palestinian Woman, 1994.
Intifada
: Israeli trooper and Palestinian Woman, 1994.
The inhabitants of the Occupied Territories certainly never resigned themselves to Israeli rule. Still, and as also happened in other countries that were conquered, during the years immediately after the Six Day War their resistance tended to be muted. Early on, the efficient operations of Shin Bet had destroyed terrorist bands that might have emerged, killing potential leaders or forcing them to take refuge across the borders. Yet in Gaza and the West Bank the early period of Israeli occupation often came as a relief to populations long accustomed to the brutally repressive methods previously employed by the Jordanian and Egyptian governments. To this must be added economic prosperity. From 1967 to 1973 the Israeli boom tended to spill over into the Occupied Territories; later they benefited from the oil crisis as Palestinian workers abroad sent their remittances home. With tens of thousands working in Israel unemployment dropped; tourism increased. The gangs of barefoot, runny-eyed children who used to infest the streets of Jerusalem during the early years of the occupation disappeared and have not returned. Finally, the Palestinians during these years were as much under the impression of Israeli military might as anybody else. They were, literally, paralyzed by shock.
Under these circumstances armed resistance—other manifestations of it, such as political organization and literary activity, do not concern us here—to occupation differed from one area to the other. The principal regions to be discussed here are the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The former had been integrated into Jordan for nineteen years. It still contained numerous supporters of King Hussein—the more so since he continued to pay the salaries of administrators and teachers. Accordingly, although there were always occasional strikes, demonstrations, knifings, and bombings, on the whole indigenous resistance to the occupation was relatively unimportant, and the population kept waiting for external help and guidance. During the first years of the occupation the PLO and other Palestinian guerrilla movements did their best to provide that guidance and that help by sending parties of heavily armed men across the River Jordan (see Chapter 12). Most of them were intercepted, however, with the result that resistance remained sporadic and a true people’s war never got off the ground.
Compared to the West Bank, the Gaza Strip was much more densely populated (although the population was probably only half as large), economically less developed, and with a less well-educated population. It was also much smaller, virtually devoid of natural obstacles, and bordered by the Mediterranean on the west and the Sinai Desert on the southwest. These factors made it easy to cut it off from the external world, yet the combination of poverty and religious extremism made for an explosive mixture that soon translated into a vicious war of Arab versus Arab. The war’s objective was not so much to combat the Israeli security forces as to prevent the population from cooperating with the occupation by dealing with the military government or going to work in Israel. Among the densely populated slums so-called action committees, many of them self-appointed and not belonging to any larger organization, were organized. Armed mainly with knives and axes but also with firearms left behind by Egypt’s army, they sought out “collaborators” of both sexes. If the latter refused to comply, they were subjected to forms of torture as ingenious as they were horrible.
The Israeli man on the spot at the time was CIC South, Maj. Gen. Ariel Sharon. In his memoirs he describes how he went about pacifying the Gaza Strip.
2
His first step, as he tells us, was to walk every inch of the territory to get to know it as well as the terrorists did. After a few weeks of doing this a plan emerged, the idea being that the terrorists depended on movement for their operations; it was a question of communicating between central headquarters, local headquarters, hideouts, arms depots, and of course the places where the actual acts of terror occurred. Elite infantry units, some in uniform and some in Arab dress,
3
could, given time, learn the area and population well enough to distinguish “ordinary” movements from suspicious ones. Having done so, they could ambush the terrorists.
2
His first step, as he tells us, was to walk every inch of the territory to get to know it as well as the terrorists did. After a few weeks of doing this a plan emerged, the idea being that the terrorists depended on movement for their operations; it was a question of communicating between central headquarters, local headquarters, hideouts, arms depots, and of course the places where the actual acts of terror occurred. Elite infantry units, some in uniform and some in Arab dress,
3
could, given time, learn the area and population well enough to distinguish “ordinary” movements from suspicious ones. Having done so, they could ambush the terrorists.
Other books
Marysvale by Jared Southwick
Dark Steel: A Motorcycle Club Romance Novel by Jones, Olivia
Lost in the Wilderness - The Forest of Evergreen Book 1 by Teresa May B. Bandiola
Gifted by Michelle Sagara
Donut Days by Lara Zielin
The Law of Loving Others by Kate Axelrod
Guinea Pig Killer by Annie Graves
Stowaway Slaves by David Grimstone
