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Authors: Martin van Creveld

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The basic training that most troops receive is pared down to one month or less, which at one time was not even considered sufficient for women; while it lasts, they might fire perhaps one hundred rounds from small arms. Next they take assignments in a very large variety of slots, such as administrative or guard duty. Many of these positions probably could be better filled by regulars who stay longer on the job and can master it thoroughly. Others, such as construction, dental treatment, psychological testing, and looking after medical stores, could and should be civilianized as in other countries around the world .
20
From 1994 on, the surplus has been so great that some recruits are transferred into the police and the border guard, thereby making those services younger and less professional—just the opposite required for coping with the
Intifada
, where self-control and discipline count for everything.
21
Had it been up to that great democrat, Yitschak Rabin, conscripts would have fulfilled active duty working for either the Frontier Guard or for Shin Bet, without their consent. Only protests in parliament prevented him from instituting such an arrangement.
Once completing conscript service, IDF soldiers are assigned to reserve units. Here the surplus of second-echelon troops is even greater than in the standing army; as much as 40 percent of those on the rolls never serve .
22
Yet those who
are
called up for their annual stint often find themselves assigned to low-level “current security” tasks such as patrolling the border and mounting guard, even though they are not really suited for combat duty. As long as nothing untoward happens these assignments pass without comment; the men, having spent time with comrades in something like a holiday camp, go home happily enough. From time to time, however, some unexpected incident takes place. For instance, in February 1992 three Arab terrorists armed with knives and axes entered a base in the center of the country, killing three soldiers and wounding three others before making good their escape. In July 1996 a patrol of reservists was ambushed along the Jordan border, losing three killed and two wounded. This time reinforcements were summoned but failed to arrive on time; the guerrillas escaped with the squad’s .50-caliber machine gun .
23
Each time a
fashla
(blunder) occurs a furor arises, and the troops’ low state of training, particularly refresher training, is blamed. The incident is soon forgotten—until the next one.
Traditionally the IDF avoided assigning women to combat areas and evacuated women serving in field units as soon as hostilities flared up. However, during the later stages of the Lebanese adventure the IDF confronted growing unwillingness among male reservists to serve in a conflict with neither purpose nor end. To prevent discontent from spreading, female conscripts were sent into the breach. For the first time since the days of PALMACH, women could be found serving in combat zones as communicators, medical orderlies, and administrators; the IDF, aware of the public-relations disaster that could ensue, ensured that none became casualties, and in fact no woman is known to have been killed or wounded .
24
To CHEN proponents the experiment constituted more proof that the army had been underutilizing women all along.
25
Perhaps a more correct interpretation would be to say that when morale began to falter the IDF, with the connivance of its female commanders—who remained safely in the rear—took the path of least resistance. It turned to its pool of defenseless girls, making them do work older men were increasingly reluctant to perform.
Reaching Israel a decade or so late, feminist pressures started during the eighties, a possible reason being that as
en brera
faded away, society felt it could engage in all kinds of experiments. From 1980 to 1991 the number of MOS formally open to female soldiers was increased by an additional 60 percent, from 296 to 500.
26
The number of those working in intelligence, communications, military police, the medical professions, and training rose, though each of these fields separately only accounted for less than 10 percent of all women. The number of women working as secretaries dropped, though at 39 percent secretaries still remained by far the largest group of female soldiers .
27
As before, using women who would never see combat to instruct men expected to do so gave rise to problems. In some instances it created a situation whereby commanders no longer knew how to instruct, or instructors to command .
28
In practice, as of 1991, women occupied only 234 out of the 500 MOS open to them. Feminist commanders steered females away from such jobs as truck driving, which, partly because of their low prestige and partly because they required physical force, were supposed to be more suited to males.
29
The discrepancy led to a vast surplus of female recruits. Efforts to solve the problem by cutting the period of service (now around twenty-one months) tend to make it worse; understandably the army is reluctant to train personnel who will spend only a brief period applying skills before being released.
30
The upshot is that many female conscripts are even more underemployed than male counterparts; a chief of manpower/planning put the surplus at 50 percent.
31
Many acquire no useful skills and spend the better part of two years marking time. Others are used as cheap labor in civilian-type jobs, controlling passports, minding pilots’ children, and serving under what has been called “semiservile” conditions.
32
The increased presence of female soldiers also changed the face of the officer corps. Whereas from 1983 to 1993 the number of male officers increased by only 29 percent, that of female ones doubled. Rank by rank, the percentage of female captains rose from 14 percent to 23 percent of the total; that of majors, from 13 to 18 percent; and that of lieutenant colonels, from 6 to 11 percent.
33
Many of these newly promoted women were said to be overqualified for their jobs.
34
Take the lieutenant colonel who acts as secretary to the Command and General Staff College. Factoring in benefits, separation pay, and pension, the cost of filling the slot must be three or four times as high than if the IDF, following the example of other armies around the world, had filled it with a civilian.
The IDF’s use—or, depending on one’s point of view, abuse—of female personnel stands out more strongly against the background of Israeli labor law and the experience of Western armed forces. At least on paper, Israel’s labor law is among the world’s most advanced; it prohibits discrimination (except for some forms that work in women’s favor, such as tax breaks and shorter hours for working mothers) and imposes near-complete equality on the sexes.
35
Western armed forces have gone far to integrate women in the various MOS, including use aboard ships and as combat pilots. Not so the IDF, which had to be forced in court to accept women pilot trainees. The IDF also retains CHEN as a separate women’s corps, though recently its significance has been reduced as commanders, in what is officially described as a sign of trust, were given greater disciplinary authority over female subordinates. Although some women who are assigned to the border guard now receive combat training, they are assigned to such rear echelon duties as patrolling the streets of Israeli cities, guarding shopping centers, and the like. The result is to unfairly increase the burden on men; women who run the risk of contacting the enemy (such as those policing Jewish settlers in Hebron) remain sufficiently exceptional to be known as “the eleven viragoes.”
36
The IDF’s tendency to fall behind civilian society is not limited to its treatment of women. To cite just two examples: In Israel as in many other Western countries public education is slowly giving way to private schooling. Teachers in private schools are paid more, and attendance is voluntary; since there are virtually no disciplinary problems, often they are able to provide a superior education and even to pass students through the staterun exams ahead of public-school counterparts. Perhaps because Israel has been a socialist country for so long, however, the IDF manpower division adheres to the old idea that “public” is good and “private” is bad, a fallback for those who could not make it under ordinary circumstances. When they join the army the graduates of so-called extramural schools automatically lose points in the exam that determines a recruit’s KABA (
kvutsat echut
, or “quality group”); this results not only in discrimination but also inefficient use of manpower.
The second example, which took place at the end of 1996, is even more interesting. In Israel as in many other developed welfare states the institution of marriage has been losing ground in favor of other forms of cohabitation, formal and informal. Thus, when an Israeli woman decided to marry her non-Jewish boyfriend by means of a so-called Paraguay wedding—in fact the only way in which she could have done so, given that Israel’s rabbinate would have refused to perform the ceremony—she was doing nothing very exceptional. The IDF manpower division refused to recognize the marriage, however, so when the young woman in question claimed to be exempted from service she found herself behind bars. She was released within twenty-four hours after the matter became public, but the IDF’s inability or unwillingness to adapt to changing social norms had been put on display for all to see.
37
The most flagrant failure to adapt to new social realities concerns the education of officers. Unlike armed forces elsewhere, the IDF never maintained a military academy; a few special groups apart, the great majority of future commanders enter officer training school straight from the ranks without benefit of higher education. As long as officers were regarded as an elite and Israeli society at large remained comparatively backward, this did not present a disadvantage. For example, as late as 1969 only 10 percent of Israelis twenty to twenty-four years old studied, far behind the United States (43 percent) and Japan (36 percent).
38
As in other developed countries, though, Israeli higher education has exploded. By 1992 the percentage of high-school graduates who went on to some kind of higher education stood at 47.1 percent (Israel), 64.8 percent (United States), and 54.9 percent (Japan).
39
During most of the IDF’s history, only those officers who went through the Academic Reserve received a full university education before being commissioned. The rest either attended an institution of higher learning during their period of
keva
service or, particularly if they were members of the combat arms, remained without. Now it can be argued that as far as military qualifications are concerned a lieutenant in command of a platoon does not really need a college degree.
40
After all, as victories have proved, the quality of Israel’s junior officers has been superb. However, by and large the higher that one rises the more difficult the problems. This is even more so in the IDF than elsewhere, for its professional officers are much less well educated than reservist comrades. Almost all of the latter attend university after the end of their conscript service. Regardless of whether they work for government or for business or in the professions, they will represent the flower of Israeli society.
Possibly because it trusted to its own high prestige—after all, nowhere else are the armed services so vital to the state’s very existence—the IDF has been extremely slow to respond to these developments. As far back as 1957, Ben Gurion (who studied law at Constantinople but never received his degree) argued that every officer needed a higher education and that it should be provided by the army as a matter of right.
41
His call went unheeded, and for decades thereafter “professor” was a derogatory reference in the IDF. Although some outstanding officers studied abroad, the quality and prestige of the army’s Command and General Staff College remained low. Some officers, notably Lt. Gen. Ehud Barak (chief of staff, 1992-1994), managed to avoid the staff college altogether, evidently regarding it as a waste of time, intended for those less bright than himself; he preferred to study systems analysis at Stanford University instead.
It was not until the second half of the eighties that the army woke up to the educational deficiencies of its officer corps, not least because the officers often found they were unemployable after being discharged. Efforts to bring them up to civilian standards were made. However, from the beginning it was not a question of serious education so much as finding ways to issue degrees (which in turn resulted in significant pay raises).
42
Seeking to increase student intake, which formed the basis for allocation of government funds, most of Israel’s universities closed an eye and cooperated.
Ironically, some of the officers who became university students did not even have their high school diplomas.
43
Others, despite scoring poorly on the “psychometric” entrance test governing civilian admissions, were admitted nevertheless. Still others, having spent careers rushing from one incident to the next, might not have read a book in years; the great majority did not have a sufficient command of English to get along in a country where, owing to its small size, almost all readings at the university level are in that language. To get around these difficulties universities often crammed officers through courses specifically designed for them. Alternatively, they granted accreditation for some staff college courses.
Though officers had the road thus smoothed, problems remained. Many who attended university classes en bloc would not take them seriously; instead of learning from teachers they tended to conspire against them. Meanwhile employers, knowing the score, frequently continued to treat discharged soldiers as second-class applicants. After years of halfmeasures, in 1997 every company-grade officer who signs up for the required number of years of continued service in the standing army is given the right to attend the university of choice,
44
spending two and a half years studying for a bachelor of arts degree. This should lead to a corresponding rise in the age of commanders at all levels from battalion up.
BOOK: The Sword And The Olive
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