Read The Sword And The Olive Online
Authors: Martin van Creveld
The Sword And The Olive (62 page)
Talks in Geneva having failed to solve the crisis,
13
on the night of January 16-17 the Coalition forces attacked. Understandably most of the effort was concentrated against Iraqi strategic targets, such as command centers, communications nodes, radars, antiaircraft defenses, and airfields. However, a substantial number of sorties were also flown against western Iraq where the missiles threatening Israel were suspected to be hidden. Early reports originating in the headquarters of U.S. Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf seemed to indicate that all Iraqi missile launchers had been destroyed, though whether the Americans believed this or were deliberately attempting to mislead their Israeli (and Saudi) allies is not clear. In any case the mood in Israel during the first forty-eight hours tended to be confident if not self-congratulatory. At 2 A.M. during the night of Friday, January 18, however, the quiet was broken as the wail of sirens was heard in Israel for the first time since the opening minutes of the 1973 October War. Two minutes later five missiles landed in Tel Aviv and another three in Haifa, and the country found itself in what is best described as a one-sided war.
13
on the night of January 16-17 the Coalition forces attacked. Understandably most of the effort was concentrated against Iraqi strategic targets, such as command centers, communications nodes, radars, antiaircraft defenses, and airfields. However, a substantial number of sorties were also flown against western Iraq where the missiles threatening Israel were suspected to be hidden. Early reports originating in the headquarters of U.S. Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf seemed to indicate that all Iraqi missile launchers had been destroyed, though whether the Americans believed this or were deliberately attempting to mislead their Israeli (and Saudi) allies is not clear. In any case the mood in Israel during the first forty-eight hours tended to be confident if not self-congratulatory. At 2 A.M. during the night of Friday, January 18, however, the quiet was broken as the wail of sirens was heard in Israel for the first time since the opening minutes of the 1973 October War. Two minutes later five missiles landed in Tel Aviv and another three in Haifa, and the country found itself in what is best described as a one-sided war.
During the months immediately preceding the outbreak of hostilities the question as to what Israel should do in case it came under Iraqi attack was often debated.
14
As Arens later explained, a modern military unit can cover 500 miles in twenty-four hours ;
15
hence he considered the most serious threat to consist of an Iraqi invasion of Jordan
16
and set into motion a contingency plan for landing a complete airborne division in the eastern Jordanian desert. Supported from the air, the paratroopers were to occupy one of several ridges (apparently the operation was canceled before it was necessary to decide just which one). With other forces presumably standing by to ward off eventual threats from Egypt or Syria, an IDF ground corps would break loose. It would cross the River Jordan, climb the escarpment to the east, and link up with the paratroopers in forty-eight to seventy-two hours. Jordan’s air force with its handful of obsolescent aircraft was not seen as a serious threat, and its army was too small to do much more than show how bravely it could fight. Regarded from an operational point of view the plans were probably sound. Strategically, though, they rested on a gross overestimate of the ability of the Iraq army, already under some of the heaviest air attacks in history, to move and operate so far from its bases.
14
As Arens later explained, a modern military unit can cover 500 miles in twenty-four hours ;
15
hence he considered the most serious threat to consist of an Iraqi invasion of Jordan
16
and set into motion a contingency plan for landing a complete airborne division in the eastern Jordanian desert. Supported from the air, the paratroopers were to occupy one of several ridges (apparently the operation was canceled before it was necessary to decide just which one). With other forces presumably standing by to ward off eventual threats from Egypt or Syria, an IDF ground corps would break loose. It would cross the River Jordan, climb the escarpment to the east, and link up with the paratroopers in forty-eight to seventy-two hours. Jordan’s air force with its handful of obsolescent aircraft was not seen as a serious threat, and its army was too small to do much more than show how bravely it could fight. Regarded from an operational point of view the plans were probably sound. Strategically, though, they rested on a gross overestimate of the ability of the Iraq army, already under some of the heaviest air attacks in history, to move and operate so far from its bases.
Details concerning the Israeli plans for attacking Iraqi missile launchers are, understandably, even more scarce. Like the Coalition the Israelis intended to rely on their air force. More than the Coalition they would be operating at extreme range. Unlike the Coalition, they did not possess satellite reconnaissance of the area over which they would operate but depended on their own planes flying photo-intelligence missions (plus whatever the Americans would be kind enough to provide). Finally, and again like the Coalition, the IDF was planning to put teams of commandos on the ground. Whether the IAF would have been more successful in targeting launchers than the Coalition—who, it was later revealed, never hit even
one
launcher—is immaterial. At least one former IAF commander, the redoubtable Major General Peled, is on record as saying that it would not have.
17
one
launcher—is immaterial. At least one former IAF commander, the redoubtable Major General Peled, is on record as saying that it would not have.
17
As matters stood, Israel’s ability to retaliate against the Iraqi attacks by striking targets other than missile launchers was also in doubt. Unlike the USAF, the IAF is mainly an operational service and has never acquired strategic bombers capable of carrying heavy bomb loads over thousands of miles. To be sure, some of its fighters would be able to reach Baghdad and other strategic locations; operating at extreme range, however, their capacity to inflict damage would be limited. Compared to the rain of ordnance already coming down on Iraq it would almost certainly amount to mere pinpricks; the lack of bombers could not be compensated with precision-guided munitions with their relatively small warheads. To produce a real impression on a country of 170,000 square miles and almost 18 million inhabitants Israel would have to resort to weapons of mass destruction. Though not unimaginable, this course would have been considered only in retaliation if Saddam resorted to such weapons.
According to his published memoirs, Minister of Defense Moshe Arens was firmly in favor of retaliation. However, he was being held back by Prime Minister Shamir who for once took a more moderate line. In the event, each time the issue became urgent—meaning each time the Iraqis fired a salvo—some obstacle would come up and prevent the IAF from taking action.
18
At first it was lack of up-to-date photo intelligence. Then it was the Americans refusing to provide the necessary identification friendfoe codes, without which Israeli and U.S. aircraft risked getting in each other’s way (the Israelis could not know that had they attacked, the Americans planned to withdraw their aircraft from western Iraq to create a corridor for IAF forces).
19
The next several days were allegedly wasted while the United States sent over a two-star Air Force general, Tom Olson, to discuss the matter; then again when the weather over the theater of operations became cloudy and prevented the IAF from taking action on its own. Dispatched to Washington in order to tell the Americans that Israel was “determined to take military action even without coordinating with them,” Generals Barak and David Ivri (the latter as director general of the ministry of defense) returned without having persuaded Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney of the seriousness of the threat. Thus Arens, by his own account, was like an athlete going after an opponent on the field while shouting “Hold me back!” For weeks on end one excuse followed another until finally one day the war was over and the opportunity, if one ever existed, had passed.
18
At first it was lack of up-to-date photo intelligence. Then it was the Americans refusing to provide the necessary identification friendfoe codes, without which Israeli and U.S. aircraft risked getting in each other’s way (the Israelis could not know that had they attacked, the Americans planned to withdraw their aircraft from western Iraq to create a corridor for IAF forces).
19
The next several days were allegedly wasted while the United States sent over a two-star Air Force general, Tom Olson, to discuss the matter; then again when the weather over the theater of operations became cloudy and prevented the IAF from taking action on its own. Dispatched to Washington in order to tell the Americans that Israel was “determined to take military action even without coordinating with them,” Generals Barak and David Ivri (the latter as director general of the ministry of defense) returned without having persuaded Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney of the seriousness of the threat. Thus Arens, by his own account, was like an athlete going after an opponent on the field while shouting “Hold me back!” For weeks on end one excuse followed another until finally one day the war was over and the opportunity, if one ever existed, had passed.
Whatever Arens might do or say, Israel’s population was well aware of the IDF’s limitations. “Don’t we have an Army? An Air Force? An atomic bomb? Special Forces?” asks the heroine in a best-selling novel published soon after the war; “They cannot do nothing,” answers the paratrooper captain (res.), stretched out on the sofa .
20
But once the euphoria of the first two days wore off, Israelis resigned to life under threat of missile attack. Doing so was easier thanks to Coalition dominance of the skies over western Iraq, which permitted Saddam’s military to leave hideaways and operate only at night. During the day Israel was safe, and life, although considerably subdued by the fact that schools had been closed and mothers could not go to work, continued more or less as normal.
20
But once the euphoria of the first two days wore off, Israelis resigned to life under threat of missile attack. Doing so was easier thanks to Coalition dominance of the skies over western Iraq, which permitted Saddam’s military to leave hideaways and operate only at night. During the day Israel was safe, and life, although considerably subdued by the fact that schools had been closed and mothers could not go to work, continued more or less as normal.
The missiles being fired at Israel and Saudi Arabia were the El Hussein type, a stretched-out version of the Soviet Scud (itself based on the German World War II-vintage V-2) with a liquid-fuel engine and a high-explosive payload of 250-300 kg. Before the war there had been considerable speculation concerning Iraqi ability to launch them in rapid succession from mobile launchers while under attack by Coalition air forces; in the event, these difficulties appear to have been overcome. Arriving at several times the speed of sound, the missiles, provided they exploded (not all did), could cause considerable damage at the point of impact. Yet the effectiveness of their already primitive guidance systems had been further reduced by modifications the Iraqis introduced to increase range. Accordingly they did not have the accuracy to threaten anything but area targets the size of cities, and several hit unpopulated areas or, falling short, the West Bank.
Militarily, and from the point of view of the casualties that it caused, the Iraqi missile threat was negligible. Psychologically it was very considerable, however, the more so because it soon turned out that preparations by HAGA (Hagana Ezrachit, Civil Defense Organization) had been inadequate. When the war started it was discovered that not all areas had been provided with air-raid sirens and that some existing ones did not work. Dividing the country into regions in accordance with the extent of the threat (outlying rural areas were considered to be in less danger than central urban areas) proved crude and repeatedly caused hundreds of thousands of people to be confined to sealed rooms without any good reason and for longer than necessary. According to the state comptroller’s subsequent report, one-third of the gas masks distributed did not fit; had they been put to the test, the children’s incubators would have proved all but useless.
21
As if to emphasize that they did not know what they were doing, the IDF at first used codes (
nachash tsefa
, or “viper snake”) to refer to incoming missiles. Soon after, realizing that it was opening itself to ridicule by trying to conceal what everybody knew, it abandoned the practice.
21
As if to emphasize that they did not know what they were doing, the IDF at first used codes (
nachash tsefa
, or “viper snake”) to refer to incoming missiles. Soon after, realizing that it was opening itself to ridicule by trying to conceal what everybody knew, it abandoned the practice.
Above all, the longer the war lasted the clearer it became that the authorities had no answer to the high-explosive/gas dilemma—though in fairness it should be added that finding such an answer is all but impossible. At first each alarm was followed by orders to enter sealed rooms, don gas masks, and wait, the assumption being that a chemical attack could not be ruled out and that it was the more dangerous of the two. However, as the days went on and no chemical attack materialized, more and more people started wondering whether this was the right thing to do. Instead of improving with experience, HAGA’s instructions tended to become more confused. At one point it even recommended a “sealed stairwell,”
22
an oxymoron if ever one there was. Feeling they had been left unprotected, a growing number of people of Tel Aviv—which suffered more than any city—took matters into their own hands. Some went up to the sealed rooms, others down into their basement shelters, others first up and then down. Others remained in bed or defied officialdom by climbing atop roofs to watched the spectacular sight of antiballistic missiles being launched.
23
Apparently the largest number by far deserted their homes every night. They went to stay with relatives elsewhere in the country or took up residence in hotels; the mayor, Maj. Gen. (ret.) Shlomo Lahat, denounced them as “traitors” who had abandoned their posts.
22
an oxymoron if ever one there was. Feeling they had been left unprotected, a growing number of people of Tel Aviv—which suffered more than any city—took matters into their own hands. Some went up to the sealed rooms, others down into their basement shelters, others first up and then down. Others remained in bed or defied officialdom by climbing atop roofs to watched the spectacular sight of antiballistic missiles being launched.
23
Apparently the largest number by far deserted their homes every night. They went to stay with relatives elsewhere in the country or took up residence in hotels; the mayor, Maj. Gen. (ret.) Shlomo Lahat, denounced them as “traitors” who had abandoned their posts.
Prior to the war, calculations based on the Iran-Iraq War had led the IAF to speculate that three persons would be killed per missile fired .
24
In fact, whether because nightly migrations left the cities empty or due to pure luck, the number of casualties was very small. Throughout the war only one person was killed by a direct Iraqi hit, though two more later died of injuries and another ten of heart attacks following near-misses or of suffocation as they failed to unscrew the filters on their gas masks. The number of those requiring medical attention was slightly more than a thousand. Of those, about one-quarter visited the emergency rooms after having sustained actual physical injury; the rest either suffered from shock (one-half of the total) or because they had injected themselves with atropine (a poison-gas antidote provided with the masks) and had to be treated.
25
Some two hundred houses were demolished and up to two thousand more damaged. Though property losses were estimated at approximately $100 million, this was more than made up for by U.S. and West German aid.
24
In fact, whether because nightly migrations left the cities empty or due to pure luck, the number of casualties was very small. Throughout the war only one person was killed by a direct Iraqi hit, though two more later died of injuries and another ten of heart attacks following near-misses or of suffocation as they failed to unscrew the filters on their gas masks. The number of those requiring medical attention was slightly more than a thousand. Of those, about one-quarter visited the emergency rooms after having sustained actual physical injury; the rest either suffered from shock (one-half of the total) or because they had injected themselves with atropine (a poison-gas antidote provided with the masks) and had to be treated.
25
Some two hundred houses were demolished and up to two thousand more damaged. Though property losses were estimated at approximately $100 million, this was more than made up for by U.S. and West German aid.
Militarily speaking the IDF’s only weapon against the Iraqi missiles consisted of U.S. Patriot antiaircraft missiles. Hurriedly provided during the first days of the war, they were positioned in locations designed to cover Tel Aviv and Haifa and operated by U.S. crews; later, as additional batteries arrived, Israeli crews took over some. Not having been designed for antimissile work, the Patriots were almost useless for intercepting incoming warheads, though the precise reasons for this poor performance remain disputed. The Americans in Saudi Arabia claimed a much higher success rate against incoming missiles, thus indirectly blaming the Israelis for ineptitude in operating the missiles and modifying the software.
26
The Israelis in turn pointed out that the performance of the batteries in Saudi Arabia had never been subject to a systematic inquiry by an independent team, thus making it impossible to establish actual success rates. The failure of the Israeli Patriots was blamed on the Iraqi missiles wobbling or disintegrating during reentry into the atmosphere. Thus, even when a Patriot did score a hit—meaning that its warhead exploded near one of the Scud’s parts—the latter’s warhead was not necessarily affected but was capable of going on and hitting a target the size of a city. Furthermore, the Patriot is a short-range, close-defense weapon. As a result, Patriot parts could cause damage when they dropped from the sky.
26
The Israelis in turn pointed out that the performance of the batteries in Saudi Arabia had never been subject to a systematic inquiry by an independent team, thus making it impossible to establish actual success rates. The failure of the Israeli Patriots was blamed on the Iraqi missiles wobbling or disintegrating during reentry into the atmosphere. Thus, even when a Patriot did score a hit—meaning that its warhead exploded near one of the Scud’s parts—the latter’s warhead was not necessarily affected but was capable of going on and hitting a target the size of a city. Furthermore, the Patriot is a short-range, close-defense weapon. As a result, Patriot parts could cause damage when they dropped from the sky.
When everything was over and the time for a balanced assessment had come it was clear that whatever successes had been scored in the war against the missiles—that is, the fact that no more were launched against Israel—were due to the USAF patrolling the sky over western Iraq. By contrast, Israeli attempts to organize passive air defenses had been almost entirely useless, its active ones, if anything, even more so. Patriot’s poor performance apart, the most important reason for failure was the inability of HAGA to make up its mind whether chemical or conventional attacks formed the greatest danger; even after Israel’s alert system was linked up with U.S. satellites, warning times were often too short for those who did not have home shelters or lived in modern high-rises. As the IDF later admitted,
27
people took matters into their own hands. In the event, it was their spontaneous decision to desert homes during the night that prevented far larger casualties.
27
people took matters into their own hands. In the event, it was their spontaneous decision to desert homes during the night that prevented far larger casualties.
Once the war was over, the decision was made to change priorities and spend more on civil defense. As a first step overall responsibility was transferred from HAGA to the new Home Defense Command, headed by a major general.
28
Henceforward lookout and evacuation services were to be operated by the IDF, a most necessary change since during the war some parties that had been stationed on rooftops to identify the location of hits had deserted their posts.
29
Additional gas masks were purchased and the entire population was issued new ones in exchange for the old—although their quality remained in doubt and, six years later, 2 million people have not bothered to show up at the distribution stations.
30
New regulations required every new house and apartment building to be fitted with a room of reinforced concrete and rendered more or less blast- and gasproof by the addition of steel windows and doors. From time to time air alarm exercises are held to train police forces, municipal workers, operators of heavy equipment, fire brigades, medical evacuation parties, and the like.
28
Henceforward lookout and evacuation services were to be operated by the IDF, a most necessary change since during the war some parties that had been stationed on rooftops to identify the location of hits had deserted their posts.
29
Additional gas masks were purchased and the entire population was issued new ones in exchange for the old—although their quality remained in doubt and, six years later, 2 million people have not bothered to show up at the distribution stations.
30
New regulations required every new house and apartment building to be fitted with a room of reinforced concrete and rendered more or less blast- and gasproof by the addition of steel windows and doors. From time to time air alarm exercises are held to train police forces, municipal workers, operators of heavy equipment, fire brigades, medical evacuation parties, and the like.
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