9 Perhaps the best analysis of the Israeli deployment is T. N. Dupuy, Elusive Victory : The Arab-Israeli Wars, 1947-1974 (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), p. 338.
10 Dayan, Avnei Derech , p. 430. The actual quote is from N. Bar Tov, Dado : Arbaim U-smoneh Shanim Ve-esrim Yom [Dado: Forty-Eight Years and Twenty Days] (Tel Aviv: Maariv, 1978), vol. 1, p. 125.
11 Rabin, Pinkas Sherut , vol. 1, pp. 156, 161, 169; Laqueur, The Road to War , p. 147.
12 E. Haber, Ha-yom Tifrots Milchama [Today War Will Break Out] (Tel Aviv: Idanim, 1987), p. 203.
14 M. Gilboa, Shesh Shanim Ve-shisha Yamim: Mekoroteah Ve-koroteah shel Michlemet Sheshet Ha-yamim [Six Years and Six Days: The Origins and Course of the Six Day War] (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1969), p. 75.
15 For these efforts cf. Zak, Hussein Osse Shalom , p. 112 ff.
16 For the details cf. Laqueur, The Road to War , chap. 5.
17 Dayan, Avnei Derech , pp. 426-430, and Haber, Ha-yom Tifrots Milchama , p. 216, describe the meeting that led to the decision.
19 Apparently the departing Israeli squadrons were detected by one radar, stationed in Jordan, but defective communications prevented it from sounding the alarm; Gamasy, The October War , p. 58.
20 A list of Egyptian losses was given by Brigadier General Hod on Israel Radio, June 6, 1967.
21 Ezer Weizman, On Eagle’s Wings (Tel Aviv: Steimatzky’s, 1979), p. 216.
22 Cf. his own account in R. Eytan, Sippur shel Chayal [A Soldier’s Story] (Tel Aviv: Maariv, 1991), p. 92 ff.
23 The best analysis of the Egyptian dispositions is G. W. Gawrych, Key to the Sinai: The Battles for Abu Ageila in the 1956 and 1967 Arab-Israeli Wars (Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1990), pp. 82-86.
24 See Sharon’s own account in A. Sharon, Warrior (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), p. 188 ff.
26 Y. Dayan, Israel Journal: June 1967 (New York: McGraw Hill, 1967), pp. 65-70.
27 See the account in M. van Creveld, Command in War (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 201, which is based on an interview with General Gavish.
28 The battle is described in M. Naor and Z. Enar, eds., Yemei Yuni: Teurim min Ha-milchama, 1967 [June Days: Episodes from the 1967 War] (Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 1967), p. 132 ff.
29 S. Ali El-Edroos, The Hassemite Arab Army, 1909-1979 (Amman: The Publishing Committee, 1980), p. 374. For Hussein’s reasons for entering the war see also Zak, Hussein Osse Shalom , p. 111; Hussein of Jordan, My “War” with Israel (London: Owen, 1969), pp. 125-126; and J. Lunt, Hussein of Jordan (London: MacMillan, 1989), p. 143.
30 For a blow-by-blow account of these battles see U. Narkis, Achat Yerusahalayim [Jerusalem Is One] (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1975); also M. Gur, Har Ha-bayit Be-yadenu [Mount Temple Is in Our Hands] (Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 1974).
32 E. N. Luttwak and D. Horowitz, The Israeli Army (London: Allen Lane, 1975), p. 267; Bar Tov, Dado , vol. 1, p. 128; M. Bar Kochva, Merkevot Ha-plada [Steel Chariots] (Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 1989), p. 170.
46 E. Shor, ed., Derech Ha-mitla [By Way of the Mitla] (Ramat Gan: Massada, 1967), p. 127, recounts the experiences of Yoffe’s brigade; Bar Kochva, Merkevot Ha-plada , p. 219, recounts the experiences of his armored brigade against the Syrians.
48 Cf. the analysis of “war for existence” in M. van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: Free Press, 1991), pp. 142-149.
49 S. Peres, Battling for Peace (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1995), p. 167.
50 For an analysis of American press attitudes in particular see M. W. Suleiman, “American Mass Media and the June Conflict,” in I. Abu Lughod, ed., The Arab-Israeli Confrontation of June 1967: An Arab Perspective (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1970), pp. 146-147, table 4.
59 R. S. and W. S. Churchill, The Six Day War , p. 191.
CHAPTER 12
1 For this and the following paragraphs see R. Pedatsur, Nitschon Ha-mevucha: Mediniyut Memshelet Eshkol Ba-sthachim Le-achar Milchemet Sheshet Ha-yamim [The Triumph of Embarrassment: The Eshkol Government and the Territories After the Six Days’ War] (Tel Aviv: Zmora Bitan, 1996), p. 30 ff.
2 For some figures on the distances between Israel’s major centers and the new and old borders see A. Levite, Offense and Defense in Israeli Military Doctrine (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), p. 71.
3 For the complex processes that were involved in the decisionmaking process see Pedatsur, Nitschon Ha-mevucha , esp. pp. 145 ff., 177 ff., and 221 ff.
4 A later version of the so-called Allon Plan is Y. Allon, “The Case for Defensible Borders,” Foreign Affairs 55:1 (October 1976): 38-55. A full-length discussion is Y. Cohen, Tochnit Allon [The Allon Plan] (Efal: Ha-kibbuts Ha-meuchad, 1973).
5 Cf. M. Brecher, The Foreign Policy System of Israel (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 213 ff.
6 N. Safran, From War to War: The Arab-Israeli Confrontation, 1948-1967 (New York: Pegasus, 1969), p. 158.
7 Figures from G. Yaakobi, Otsmatah shel Echut (Haifa: Shikmon, 1972), p. 120.
8 According to the order of battle in T. N. Dupuy, Elusive Victory : The Arab-Israeli Wars, 1947-1974 (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), pp. 181., 612-613.
9 Cf. Y. Greenberg, “Ha-hachlata al Kitsur Sherut Ha-chova Be-TSAHAL Bi-shnat 1963” [The Decision to Cut Conscript Service in 1963], Medina, Minhal Ve-yechasim Ben-leumiyim 40 (Summer 1995): 67-77.
10 E. Haber, Ha-yom Tifrots Milchama [Today War Will Break Out] (Tel Aviv: Idanim, 1987), p. 125.
11 Ibid., p. 138. In contrast, Major General Meron once told this author that the decision resulted from the fact that the Chieftain’s suspension system was too delicate for the rough terrain of the Middle East.
12 M. Dayan, Avnei Derech [Memoirs] (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1976), p. 563.
14 S. Rolbant, The Israeli Soldier: Profile of an Army (New York: Barnes, 1970), p. 172.
15 Between 1976 and 1973 there were only nine, of whom four later changed their mind: R. Gal, A Portrait of the Israeli Soldier (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1986), p. 256, n. 4.
16 On the link between unit cohesion and psychiatric casualties see M. van Creveld, Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939-1945 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982), pp. 91-97.
18 The raid is described in detail in R. Eytan, Sippur shel Chayal [A Soldier’s Story] (Tel Aviv: Maariv, 1991), pp. 114-117; also Haber, Ha-yom Tifrots Milchama , pp. 322-334.
20 According to Eytan, Sippur shel Chayal , p. 108, the guerrillas’ escape was due to the fact that the IDF had dropped leaflets to warn the civilian population.
21 Different, and much larger, figures are given by S. Ali El-Edroos, The Hassemite Arab Army, 1909-1979 (Amman: The Publishing Committee, 1980), p. 440.
22 The Jordanian-Syrian clash, as well as Hussein’s operations agaisnt the Palestinians, is analyzed in some detail by Rooshdi, The Hassemite Arab Army , pp. 449-460.
23 For the details see M. Zak, Hussein Osse Shalom [Hussein Makes Peace] (Ramat Gan: Bar Illan University Press), pp. 141-142, n. 2.
24 P. Seale, Assad: The Struggle for the Middle East (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), p. 166.
26 For figures see International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1968-1969 (London: IISS, 1968), pp. 33-37.
27 See on this subject the Egyptian minister of defense, Muhammad Fawzi, as discussed in D. Schueftan, Hatasha: Ha-astretegia Ha-medinit shel Mitsrayim Ha-natserit Be-ikvot Milchemet 1967 [Attrition: Egypt’s Post-1967 Political Strategy] (Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 1989), pp. 107-109.
28 This episode has been analyzed at length in Y. Shoshan, Ha-krav Ha-acharon shel Hamaschetet Elat [The Last Battle of the Destroyer Elat] (Tel Aviv: Maariv, 1984).
29 Cf. A. Sadat, In Search of Identity (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), p. 197.
30 Dayan, Avnei Derech , p. 515; A. Sharon, Warrior (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), pp. 220-221.
31 For Egypt’s war aims see Schueftan, Hatasha , p. 201 ff.; also Y. Bar-Siman Tov, The Israeli-Egyptian War of Attrition, 1969-1970 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), p. 47 ff.