The Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Torture: Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program (78 page)

801.
May 27, 2004, letter from Assistant Attorney General Goldsmith to General Counsel Muller.

802.
May 24, 2003, Memorandum for the Record from ███████, subject: Memorandum of Meeting with the DCI Regarding DOJ’s Statement that DOJ has Rendered No Legal Opinion on Whether CIA’s Use of Enhanced Interrogation Techniques would meet Constitutional Standards. Memorandum for Deputy Director for Operations from Director of Central Intelligence, June 4. 2004, re: Suspension of Use of Interrogation Techniques.

803.
June 4, 2004, Memorandum for Deputy Director for Operations from Director of Central Intelligence, re: Suspension of Use of Interrogation Techniques. On June 2, 2004, George Tenet informed the President that he intended to resign from his position on July 11, 2004. The White House announced the resignation on June 3, 2004.

804.
June 4, 2004, Memorandum for the National Security Advisor from DCI George Tenet, re: Review of CIA Interrogation Program.

805.
June 2004, Memorandum for the Honorable George J. Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence from Condoleezza Rice, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, re: Review of CIA’s Interrogation Program.

806.
██████ 39254 ████████; ALEC ███ ███████;█████ 3121 ████ ████; ████ 3121 █████.

807.
The former chief of the CIA’s Bin Ladin Unit wrote in a March ██, 2004, email that the reporting was “vague” and “worthless in terms of actionable intelligence.” He suggested that the reporting “would be an easy way [for al-Qa’ida] to test” the loyalty of the source, given al-Qa’ida’s knowledge that leaked threat reporting “causes panic in Washington.” (See email from: ██████; to: ██████, █████, [REDACTED], ██████, █████; subject: could AQ be testing [ASSET Y] and [source name REDACTED]?; date: March ██, 2004, at 06:55 AM.) ALEC Station officer ██████ expressed similar doubts in response to the email. See email from: ██████; to: ██████; cc: ███████, ████ █████, [REDACTED], ███████ subject: Re: could AQ be testing [ASSET Y] and [source name REDACTED]?; date: March ██, 2004, at 07:52:32 AM).
See also
█████ 1411 (██████04).

808.
July 2, 2004, CIA Memorandum re Meeting with National Adviser Rice in the White House Situation Room, re: Interrogations and Detainee Janat Gul, July 2, 2004.

809.
At the time of this CIA representation, the CIA had held at least 109 detainees and subjected at least 33 of them (30 percent) to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.

810.
July 6, 2004, Memorandum from Condoleezza Rice, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, to the Honorable George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, re Janat Gul. CIA Request for Guidance Regarding Interrogation of Janat Gul, July 2, 2004.

811.
For additional details, see Volume III.

812.
July 6, 2004, Memorandum from Condoleezza Rice, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, to the Honorable George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, re Janat Gul.

813.
July 29, 2004, Memorandum for the Record from CIA General Counsel Scott Muller, “Principals Meeting relating to Janat Gul on 20 July 2004.”

814.
The one-paragraph letter did not provide legal analysis or substantive discussion of the interrogation techniques. Letter from Attorney General Ashcroft to Acting DCI McLaughlin, July 22, 2004 (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 4).

815.
See Volume III for additional details.

816.
█████ 1512 ██████ 04); ██████ 1519 ██████ 04); ████ 1521 ████ ███ 04); ██████ 1530 ███████ 04); █████ 1537 █████ 04); █████ 1541 ██████ 04); █████ 1542 █████ 04).

817.
██████ 1541 ██████ 04).

818.
██████ 1541 ██████ 04).

819.
██████ 1567 ██████ 04).

820.
██████ 1574 ██████ 04).

821.
HEADQUARTERS ████ █████████ 04).

822.
██████ 1603 ██████ 04).

823.
██████ 1603 ██████ 04).

824.
██████ 1622 ██████ 04).

825.
██████ 1622 ██████ 04).

826.
██████ 1622 ██████ 04).

827.
█████ 1411 ██████ 04). See Volume III for additional information.

828.
████ 3398 ██████; █████ 5492 █████.

829.
Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May Be Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees, at 11. See section of this summary and Volume II entitled, “The Assertion that CIA Detainees Subjected to Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Help Validate CIA Sources.”

830.
Letter from ██████, Assistant General Counsel, to Dan Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, ████, 2004.

831.
WASHINGTON ███ ██████ 04); ████ 19045 █████ MAR 04). See HEADQUARTERS ███ █████ 04); █████ 4267 █████ 04).

832.
See, for example, ████████████; ███████████████; ███ ████████████; ███████████; and ████ 24611 ████████.

833.
█████████ 3191 ██████; █████████ 3192 ██████.

834.
█████████ 3194 ██████; HEADQUARTERS ███ █████.

835.
█████████████ 3289 █████████████████. For more information, see Volume III, detainee report for Sharif al-Masri.

836.
HEADQUARTERS █████████████████; ██████████████████ 3802 █████████.

837.
See
letter from ██████████, Associate General Counsel, CIA, to Dan Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, August 25, 2004 (DTS #2009-1809). Note: At various times during this period █████ is identified as both CIA associate general counsel and █████CTC Legal).
See also
a letter from ██████, Assistant General Counsel, to Dan Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, September 5, 2004 (DTS #2009-1809). A CIA email sent prior to the CIA’s request for advice from the OLC indicated that the judgment that Ghailani had knowledge of terrorist plotting was speculative: “Although Ghailani’s role in operational planning is unclear, his respected role in al-Qa’ida and presence in Shkai as recently as October 2003 may have provided him some knowledge about ongoing attack planning against the United States homeland, and the operatives involved.” (
See
email from: ████████, CTC/UBLD ████████ (formerly ALEC█████; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: derog information for ODDO on Talha, Ghailani, Hamza Rabi’a and Abu Faraj; date: August 10, 2004.) Ghailani was rendered to CIA custody on September ██2004. (See ████████ 3072 ███████.) The CIA began using its enhanced interrogation techniques on Ghailani on September 17, 2004, as the CIA was initiating its counterintelligence review of the source who provided the false reporting on the pre-election threat. See ███████ 3189 (181558Z SEP 04); HEADQUARTERS ███ █████████ 04); ███████ 4267 ███████ 04).

838.
[REDACTED] 3221 ███████.

839.
[REDACTED] 22343 ████████.

840.
HEADQUARTERS █████ ███████.

841.
HEADQUARTERS █████ ███████.

842.
While CIA Headquarters offered $█ million to Country ██ for hosting a CIA detention facility, █████████ precluded the opening of the facility. Only $█ million was made available to the CIA Station for support to the ████████ although CIA Headquarters asked the CIA Station to “advise if additional funds may be needed to keep [the facility] viable over the coming year and beyond.” CIA Headquarters added, “we cannot have enough blacksite hosts, and we are loathe to let one we have slip away.” Country █ never hosted CIA detainees. See HEADQUAR ████ ███████; [REDACTED] 5298 ███████; HEADQUAR ███ ██████.

843.
ALEC ████ ███████ 03). In an interview on the CIA program, ████████ noted that the program had “more money than we could possibly spend we thought, and it turned out to be accurate.” In the same interview, he stated that “in one case, we gave ███████ $██,000,000 ██████████████. Myself and José [Rodriguez] ███████████████████████████████████. We never counted it. I’m not about to count that kind of money for a receipt.” The boxes contained one hundred dollar bills. ██████ did not identify the recipient of the $██ million. See transcript of Oral History Interview, Interviewee: █████████ (RJ) – October 13, 2006, Interviewer: [REDACTED] and [REDACTED].

844.
ALEC ████ ███████03).

845.
ALEC ████ ████████.

846.
See DTS #2010-2448.

847.
[REDACTED] 2498 ██████.

848.
April ██, 2003, Memorandum for Director, DCI Counterterrorist Center, from ████████, Chief Rendition and Detainees group, via ████████, Counterterrorist Center, Chief of Operations, ██████, Chief, ██████████████, Subject: Request to Relocate High-Value Detainees to an Interim Detention Facility at Guantanamo.
See
also
DIRECTOR ████ ████████. CIA detainees were held at two facilities at Guantanamo Bay, DETENTION SITE MAROON and DETENTION SITE INDIGO. (See Quarterly Review of Confinement Conditions for CIA Detainees, Coverage Period: █████████.) A third CIA detention facility, DETENTION SITE RED, ████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████. See ████ 3897 ███████████; ███████ 3445 █████████; ██████████████████████ 9754 ███████████████████████; █████ 8405 █████████████; ███████████ 8408 █████████████; and September 1, 2006, Memorandum of Agreement Between the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Concerning the Detention by DOD of Certain Terrorists at a Facility at Guantanamo Bay Naval Station.

849.
Email from: Scott W. Muller; to: ███████████, [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED]; subject: Detainees in Gitmo; date: January ██, 2004.

850.
See HEADQUARTERS █████ █████████; [REDACTED] 1845 █████████. The CIA’s long-term facility in Country ██, which the CIA Station in Country ██ had warned was a drain on the Station’s resources, had not yet been completed. See [REDACTED] 1785 ██████████.

851.
[REDACTED] 1679 ██████.

852.
Email from: Scott Muller; to: James Pavitt, ██████; cc: George Tenet, John McLaughlin, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], █████████, [REDACTED], █████████; subject: CIA Detainees at GITMO; date: February █, 2004.

853.
Email from: Scott Muller; to: James Pavitt, █████████; cc: George Tenet, John McLaughlin, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], ████████, [REDACTED], █████████; subject: CIA Detainees at GITMO; date: February █, 2004.

854.
Email from: Scott Muller; to: James Pavitt, █████████; cc: George Tenet, John McLaughlin, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], ████████, [REDACTED], █████████; subject: CIA Detainees at GITMO; date: February █, 2004. █████████████████████████████████████████████████████████. See ████████████ 10255 ███████; ALEC ████ ██████████; ██████ 13698 ████████████████; ALEC ███████████.

855.
████████ 11672 █████████; ███████████ 1674 ███████████; [REDACTED] 1898 ███████.

856.
See, for example, [REDACTED] 1679 ███████████. For additional details of the CIA’s interactions with Country ██,
see
Volume I.

857.
Among the detainees making this claim was Ibn Shaykh al-Libi, who had previously been rendered from CIA custody to █████████. A Libyan national, Ibn Shaykh al-Libi reported while in ████████ custody that Iraq was supporting al-Qa’ida and providing assistance with chemical and biological weapons. Some of this information was cited by Secretary Powell in his speech to the United Nations, and was used as a justification for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Ibn Shaykh al-Libi recanted the claim after he was rendered to CIA custody on February █, 2003, claiming that he had been tortured by the ██████, and only told them what he assessed they wanted to hear. For more details, see Volume III. While in Country █, al-Libi told CIA debriefers that the “sobbing and yelling” he heard reminded him of what he previously endured in ██████ custody and it sounded to him like a prisoner had been tied up and beaten. See [REDACTED] 1989 █████████.

858.
[REDACTED] 2010 █████████.

859.
[REDACTED] 2010 █████████.

860.
[REDACTED] 2317 █████████.The CIA’s June 2013 Response states that “[i]t was only as leaks detailing the program began to emerge that foreign partners felt compelled to alter the scope of their involvement.” As described above, the tensions with Country ██ were unrelated to press leaks.

861.
[REDACTED] 2602 █████████.

862.
See [REDACTED] 2318 █████████; [REDACTED] 31281 █████████; and [REDACTED] 2783 █████████. Country ██ officials refused to provide the CIA with counterterrorism information, including information obtained through CIA-funded █████████. See [REDACTED] 31281 █████████.

863.
HEADQUARTERS ████ █████.

864.
HEADQUARTERS ████ █████.

865.
[REDACTED] and CTC ████ RDG, “Evolution of the Program.”

866.
[REDACTED] 3706 ([REDACTED] [REDACTED]).

867.
CIA PowerPoint Presentation, CIA Detainees: Endgame Options and Plans, dated August 19, 2004.

868.
September 17, 2004, DRAFT Talking Points for the ADCI: Endgame Options and Plans for CIA Detainees.