The Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Torture: Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program (67 page)

179.
See April 16, 2008, CIA “Backgrounder: Chronology of Interrogation Approvals, 2001–2003” (noting that “CIA documentation and discussions with Presidential briefers and individuals involved with the interrogation program at the time suggest that details on enhanced interrogation techniques (EITs) were not shared with the President” in the 2001–2003 timeframe); CIA Q&A, Topic: Waterboarding (“The information we have indicates the President was not briefed by CIA regarding the specific interrogation techniques until April 2006, and at that time DCIA Goss briefed him on the seven EITs proposed at that time for the post-Detainee Treatment Act CIA interrogation program.”). As described, in the April 2006 briefing the President “expressed discomfort” with the “image of a detainee, chained to the ceiling, clothed in a diaper, and forced to go to the bathroom on himself.” See email from: Grayson SWIGERT; to: [REDACTED]; cc: █████; subject: Dr. SWIGERT’s 7 June meeting with DCI; date: June 7, 2006.

180.
Email from: Grayson SWIGERT; to: [REDACTED]; cc: █████; subject: Dr. SWIGERT’s 7 June meeting with DCI; date: June 7, 2006.

181.
Increased Pressure in the Next Phase of the Abu Zubaydah Interrogations, Attachment to email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; cc: █████, [REDACTED], █████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Increased Pressure Phase – for DCI Sensitive Addendum; date: July 10, 2002.

182.
███ 10586 (041559Z AUG 02).

183.
See email from: [REDACTED]; to: ████; subject: Subject detainee allegation—per our telcon of today; date: March 28, 2007, at 04:42 PM, which states Abu Zubaydah claims “a collar was used to slam him against a concrete wall. While we do not have a record that this occurred, one interrogator at the site at the time confirmed that this did indeed happen. For the record, a plywood
‘
wall’ was immediately constructed at the site after the walling on the concrete wall.”

184.
███ 10644 (201235Z AUG 02).

185.
███ 10586 (041559Z AUG 02).

186.
███ 10586 (041559Z AUG 02); ███ 10644 (201235Z AUG 02).

187.
███ 10644 (201235Z AUG 02).

188.
███ 10586 (041559Z AUG 02). CIA contractor DUNBAR later told the CIA OIG that “[t]heir instructions from [chief of Base] were to focus on only one issue, that is, Zubaydah’s knowledge of plans to attack the U.S.” According to the OIG’s record of the interview, “[DUNBAR] and [SWIGERT] could ask that question in a number of ways, but it was the only theme they were authorized by [chief of Base] to use with [Abu] Zubaydah.” (See February 10, 2003, interview report of Hammond DUNBAR, Office of the Inspector General.) The acting chief of Station in Country ██, in an interview with the CIA OIG, stated that “there were days at [DETENTION SITE GREEN] when the team had no requirements from Headquarters,” and that CTC did not give the chief of Base (COB) the “flexibility as COB to ask other questions” besides those related to threats to the United States. (See May 28, 2003, interview report of ██████, Office of the Inspector General.) The chief of Support Services at the CIA Station stated that “[SWIGERT] and [DUNBAR] were frustrated that they kept beating Zubaydah up on the same question while getting the same physiologic response from him.” (See May 21, 2003, interview report of ██████, Office of the Inspector General.) Other interviewees described how analytical assumptions about Abu Zubaydah drove the interrogation process. (See May 22, 2003, interview report of █████, Office of the Inspector General; and February 27, 2003, interview report of █████, Office of the Inspector General.) Chief of CTC, Jose Rodriguez, told the OIG that “CTC subject matter experts” pointed to intelligence that they said indicated that Abu Zubaydah knew more than he was admitting and thus disagreed with the assessment from DETENTION SITE GREEN that Abu Zubaydah was “compliant.” According to the OIG’s record of the Jose Rodriguez interview, “disagreement between the analysts and interrogators can be healthy, but in this case Rodriguez believes that the analysts were wrong.” (See interview of Jose Rodriguez, Office of the Inspector General, March 6, 2003.).

189.
Emphasis in the original. Email from: [REDACTED]; to: ████ and [REDACTED]; subject: Re: So it begins; date: August 4, 2002, at 09:45:09 AM. CIA Director Hayden informed the Committee in 2007 that “in the section [of the ICRC report] on medical care, the report omits key contextual facts. For example, Abu Zubaydah’s statement that he was given only Ensure and water for two to three weeks fails to mention the fact that he was on a liquid diet quite appropriate because he was recovering from abdominal surgery at the time.”

190.
████ 10644 (201235Z AUG 02). For the first 17 days, the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques were used against Abu Zubaydah in “varying combinations, 24 hours a day.” The “aggressive phase,” as defined by the CIA, continued for an additional three days. The CIA continued to use its enhanced interrogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah until August 30, 2002.

191.
████ 10644 (201235Z AUG 02).

192.
████ 10672 (231206Z AUG 02); ████ 10667 (240229Z AUG 02).

193.
████ 10615 (120619Z AUG 02).

194.
████ 10644 (201235Z AUG 02).

195.
████ 10604 (091624Z AUG 02).

196.
████ 10607 (100335Z AUG 02).

197.
████ 10607 (100335Z AUG 02). On August █, 2002, a video-conference between DETENTION SITE GREEN and CIA Headquarters occurred, which included an interrogation video described by the interrogation team as “quite graphic” and possibly “disturbing to some viewers.” After the video-conference, CIA Headquarters instructed DETENTION SITE GREEN to continue the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah, but agreed to send two CIA Headquarters officers to the detention site to observe the interrogations first-hand. On August █, 2002, a team from CIA Headquarters, including ███ CTC Legal ██████ and Deputy Chief of ALEC Station █████, visited DETENTION SITE GREEN and observed the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, including waterboarding. The “aggressive phase of interrogation” ended ██ days after the arrival of the officers from CIA Headquarters. See ███ 10616 (██ AUG 02); ALEC ██ (███ AUG 02); ███ 10643 (██ AUG 02); ███ 10667 (231206Z AUG 02); and ████ 10672 (240229Z AUG 02).

198.
████ 10607 (100335Z AUG 02).

199.
Email from: Jose Rodriguez; to: [REDACTED]; subject: [DETENTION SITE GREEN]; date: August 12, 2002, with attachment of earlier email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED].

200.
████ 10614 (111633Z AUG 02).

201.
████ 10614 (111633Z AUG 02).

202.
See, for example, ALEC ███ (101728 AUG 02); ALEC ███ (130034Z AUG 02); ALEC █████ AUG 02); and ████ 10700 (280820Z AUG 02).

203.
████ 10644 (201235Z AUG 02).

204.
████ 10643 (191518Z AUG 02).

205.
████ 10643 (191518Z AUG 02).

206.
The description of the episode stated that “on being righted, he failed to respond until the interrogators gave him a xyphoid thrust (with our medical folks edging toward the room).” This passage was included in multiple emails, to include emails from the ███ OMS, █████. See email from: █████; to: [DETENTION SITE BLUE] and [REDACTED]; subject: Re: Departure; date: March 6, 2003, at 7:11:59 PM; email from █████, OMS; to: [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] subject: Re: Acceptable lower ambient temperatures; date: March 7, 2003, at 8:22 PM; email from: ██████ OMS; to: [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]; subject: Re: Talking Points for review and comment; date: August 13, 2004, at 10:22 AM; and email from ██████; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED]; subject: Discussion with Dan Levin – AZ; date: October 26, 2004, at 6:09 PM.

207.
Email from: █████, OMS; to: [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]; subject: Re: Acceptable lower ambient temperatures; date; March 7, 2003, at 8:22 PM; email from: █████ OMS; to: [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]; subject: Re: Talking Points for review and comment; date: August 13, 2004, at 10:22 AM; email from: █████; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED]; subject: Re: Discussions with Dan Levin—AZ; date: October 26, 2004, at 6:09 PM.

208.
CIA Inspector General’s Special Review on Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities issued on May 7, 2004.

209.
Email from: [REDACTED]; to: █████ and [REDACTED]; subject: Re: Monday; date: August 5, 2002, at 05:35AM.

210.
Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], █████, and [REDACTED]; subject: Update; date: August 8, 2002, at 06:50 AM.

211.
Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], █████, and [REDACTED]; subject: Update; date: August 8, 2002, at 06:50 AM.

212.
Email from: [REDACTED]; to: █████ and [REDACTED]; subject: Re: August 9, 2002, at 10:44:16 PM.

213.
Email from: [REDACTED]; to: █████ and [REDACTED]; subject: Greetings; date: August 11, 2002, at 09:45AM.

214.
See, for example, ████ 10672 (240229Z AUG 02).

215.
See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III for details on Abu Zubaydah’s intelligence production. As noted, Abu Zubaydah was taken into CIA custody on March █, 2002, and was hospitalized until April 15, 2002. During the months of April and May 2002, which included a period during which Abu Zubaydah was on life support and unable to speak, the interrogations of Abu Zubaydah produced 95 intelligence reports. Abu Zubaydah spent much of June 2002 and all of July 2002 in isolation, without being asked any questions. The CIA reinstituted contact with Abu Zubaydah on August 4, 2002, and immediately began using the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques—including the waterboard. During the months of August and September 2002, Abu Zubaydah produced 91 intelligence reports, four fewer than the first two months of his CIA detention. CIA records indicate that the type of intelligence Abu Zubaydah provided remained relatively constant prior to and after the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. According to CIA records, Abu Zubaydah provided information on “al-Qa’ida activities, plans, capabilities, and relationships,” in addition to information on “its leadership structure, including personalities, decision-making processes, training, and tactics.”
See also
CIA paper entitled “Abu Zubaydah,” dated March 2005, as well as “Abu Zubaydah Bio” Document, “Prepared on 9 August 2006.”

216.
On August 30, 2002, ████ CTC Legal, ██████ met with NSC Legal Adviser John Bellinger to discuss Abu Zubaydah’s interrogation. See email from: John Rizzo; to: John Moseman; subject: Meeting with NSC Legal Adviser; date: August 30, 2002; ALEC ███ (052227Z SEP 02). In his email documenting the meeting, ████ “noted that we had employed the walling techniques, confinement box, waterboard, along with some of the other methods which also had been approved by the Attorney General,” and “reported that while the experts at the site and at Headquarters were still assessing the product of the recent sessions, it did appear that the current phase was producing meaningful results.” (See email from: John Rizzo; to: John Moseman; subject: Meeting with NSC Legal Adviser; date: August 30, 2002.) The email did not provide any additional detail on what was described to Bellinger with respect to either the use of the techniques or the “results” of the interrogation. It is unclear from CIA records whether the CIA ever informed the NSC Legal Adviser or anyone else at the NSC or the Department of Justice that Abu Zubaydah failed to provide information about future attacks against the United States or operatives tasked to commit attacks in the U.S. during or after the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. According to CIA records, on September 27, 2002, the CIA briefed the chairman and the vice chairman of the Committee, Senators Graham and Shelby, as well as the Committee staff directors, on Abu Zubaydah’s interrogation. The CIA’s memorandum of the briefing indicates that the chairman and vice chairman were briefed on “the enhanced techniques that had been employed,” as well as “the nature and quality of reporting provided by Abu Zubaydah.” See (DIRECTOR ███ (252018Z OCT 02).

217.
████ 10644 (201235Z AUG 02).

218.
████ 10644 (201235Z AUG 02).

219.
████ 10644 (201235Z AUG 02).

220.
The Committee uses sole-source intelligence reporting in this summary. While CIA multi-source intelligence reports are included in the full Committee Study, the focus of the Committee analysis on sole-source intelligence reporting, as these reports were deemed to more accurately reflect useful reporting from individual CIA detainees. As background, multi-source intelligence reports are reports that contain data from multiple detainees. For example, a common multi-source report would result from the CIA showing a picture of an individual to all CIA detainees at a specific CIA detention site. A report would be produced regardless if detainees were or were not able to identify or provide information on the individual. As a specific example, see HEADQUARTERS ███ (202255Z JUN 06), which states that from January 1, 2006–April 30, 2006, information from Hambali was “used in the dissemination of three intelligence reports, two of which were non-recognitions of Guantanamo Bay detainees,” and the third of which “detailed [Hambali’s] statement that he knew of no threats or plots to attack any world sporting events.” Sole-source reports, by contrast, are based on specific information provided by one CIA detainee.

221.
CIA paper entitled, “Abu Zubaydah,” dated March 2005. Same information included in an “Abu Zubaydah Bio” document “Prepared on 9 August 2006.”