The Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Torture: Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program (65 page)

BOOK: The Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Torture: Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program
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60.
See detainee review of Abu Zubaydah in Volume III.
See also
CIA Intelligence Assessment, August 16, 2006, “Countering Misconceptions About Training Camps in Afghanistan, 1990-2001.” The document states: “Khaldan Not Affiliated With Al-Qa’ida. A common misperception in outside articles is that Khaldan camp was run by al-Qa’ida. Pre-11 September 2001 reporting miscast Abu Zubaydah as a ‘senior al-Qa’ida lieutenant,’ which led to the inference that the Khaldan camp he was administering was tied to Usama bin Laden. The group’s flagship camp, al-Faruq, reportedly was created in the late 1980s so that bin Laden’s new organization could have a training infrastructure independent of ‘Abdullah Azzam’s Maktab al-Khidamat, the nongovernmental organization that supported Khaldan. Al-Qa’ida rejected Abu Zubaydah’s request in 1993 to join the group and Khaldan was not overseen by bin Laden’s organization. There were relations between the al-Qa’ida camps and Khaldan. Trainees, particularly Saudis, who had finished basic training at Khaldan were referred to al-Qa’ida camps for advanced courses, and Khaldan staff observed al-Qa’ida training. The two groups, however, did not exchange trainers.”

61.
March 29, 2002, email from [REDACTED] to████████, cc: John Rizzo, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], subject, NEW INFO: A-Z Interrogation Plan (“I have thought about the 18 USC sect. 2340 issues we briefly discussed yesterday.”).

62.
Email from: [REDACTED]; to: ████████; subject: Torture Update; date: March 28, 2002, at 11:28:17 AM.

63.
███ 19595 (281106Z MAR 02). PowerPoint presentation, Options for Incarcerating Abu Zubaydah, March 27, 2002.

64.
PowerPoint presentation, Options for Incarcerating Abu Zubaydah, March 27, 2002. PowerPoint presentation, Options for Incarcerating Abu Zubaydah, March 28, 2002.

65.
ALEC ████ (282105Z MAR 02).

66.
PowerPoint presentation, Options for Incarcerating Abu Zubaydah, March 27, 2002.

67.
PowerPoint presentation. Options for Incarcerating Abu Zubaydah, March 28, 2002.

68.
Email from: [REDACTED] █████; James Pavitt; subject: DCI Decision on [DETENTION SITE GREEN] Briefing for Armitage; date: September 26 2002; DIRECTOR ████ (███ MAR 02).

69.
Email from: ████████; to: ██████; subject: A-Z Interrogation Plan; date: March 29, 2002. POTUS is an abbreviation for President of the United States.

70.
Email from: [REDACTED]; to: ████████; subject: NEW INFO: A-Z Interrogation Plan; date: March 29, 2002.

71.
Email from: [REDACTED]; to: █████████, ███████; subject: A-Z Interrogation Plan; email from: [REDACTED] █████; to: James Pavitt; subject: DCI Decision on [DETENTION SITE GREEN] Briefing for Armitage; date: September 26, 2002. After the PDB session, the assistant secretary of state ██████ was briefed. The assistant secretary indicated that he would brief the secretary and deputy secretary of state. An internal CIA email stated that at the NSC, only National Security Advisor Rice and Deputy National Security Advisor Hadley were briefed. See DIRECTOR ███ (████ MAR 02); email from: [REDACTED] ████; to: James Pavitt; date: September 26, 2002.

72.
[REDACTED] 69132 (███ MAR 02).

73.
[REDACTED] 69132 (███ MAR 02).

74.
For additional information on the rendition of Abu Zubaydah and the establishment of DETENTION SITE GREEN, see Volume I.

75.
HEADQUARTERS ███ [REDACTED]; HEADQUARTERS ███ ████████. CIA records indicate that the CIA had not informed policymakers of the presence of CIA detention facilities in Countries █, █, █ and █. It is less clear whether policymakers were aware of the detention facilities in Country █ and at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

76.
See, for example, [REDACTED] 70240 (300614Z APR 02); [REDACTED] 70112 (250929Z APR 02); [REDACTED] 70459 (080545Z MAY 02); Congressional Notification: Intelligence Support to ██████████████████████████████ Operation, ███, 2002 (DTS #2002-2932); and MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence; FROM: ██████████████████████████████; SUBJECT: Your meeting with ████████████████████████████, ██ 2002; cover page dated ██ 2002. |

77.
See, for example. [REDACTED] 74636 ████████.

78.
[REDACTED] 76975 ███████.

79.
[REDACTED] 77115 ███████.

80.
[REDACTED] 77281 █████████. The CIA’s June 2013 Response states that “[i]t was only as leaks detailing the program began to emerge that foreign partners felt compelled to alter the scope of their involvement.” As described, however, the tensions with Country █ were unrelated to public revelations about the program.

81.
[REDACTED] 69626 ███████.

82.
Email from: William Harlow, Director of the CIA Office of Public Affairs; to: John McLaughlin, Buzzy Krongard, John Moseman, John Rizzo, James Pavitt, [REDACTED], Stanley Moskowitz; subject: [REDACTED] call Re: Abu Zubaydah; date: April 25, 2002, 12:06:33 PM.

83.
[REDACTED] 701681 ███████.

84.
ALEC ███ ████████; April 6, 2006, Interview, ████████, Chief, Renditions and Detainees Group.

85.
DIRECTOR ███ ████████.

86.
████ 10005 (092316Z APR 02). See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume HI for additional information.

87.
See United States Court of Appeals, August Term, 2001,
U.S. v Ramzi Ahmed Yousef
, and DIRECTOR ██████ JAN 02).
See also
████████ CIA ████████ MAR 02).

88.
█████ 10022 (121216Z APR 02). CIA records include the variant spelling, “Muhktar.” KSM was placed on the FBI’s public “Most Wanted Terrorist” list on October 10, 2001.
See also
U.S. Department of Justice materials related to Ramzi Ahmed Yousef.

89.
████ 10022 (121216Z APR 02); ████ 18334 (261703Z MAR 02).

90.
See, for example. President Bush’s September 6, 2006, speech, based on CIA information and vetted by the CIA, which stated that Abu Zubaydah provided “quite important” information and “disclosed Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, or KSM, was the mastermind behind the 9/11 attacks and used the alias Mukhtar. This was a vital piece of the puzzle that helped our intelligence community pursue KSM.”

91.
See information later in this summary and Volume II for additional details.

92.
Attachment to email from: [REDACTED] [REDACTED]; to: ████████; subject: Interrogation Strategy, Powerpoint on ██████████ [Abu Zubaydah] Interrogation Strategy, 01 April 2002; date: March 31, 2002.

93.
Email from [REDACTED] to [REDACTED], cc: ████████, April 1, 2002, re: POC for [Grayson SWIGERT]- consultant who drafted al-Qa’ida resistance to interrogation backgrounder (noting that CTC/LGL would reach out to SWIGERT). According to the email, after the meeting, █████ CTC Legal, ████████, provided SWIGERT’s contact information to ALEC Station officers, noting that it was SWIGERT who composed an OTS assessment on al-Qa’ida resistance techniques.

94.
On the evening of April 1, 2002, “at the request of CTC/OPS and ALEC” Station, a cable from OTS with a proposed interrogation strategy was sent to Country █ (█████ 178955 (012236Z APR 02). The information in this cable was consistent with a subsequent cable, which was coordinated with SWIGERT, that proposed “several environmental modifications to create an atmosphere that enhances the strategic interrogation process.” The cable noted, “[t]he deliberate manipulation of the environment is intended to cause psychological disorientation, and reduced psychological wherewithal for the interrogation,” as well as “the deliberate establishment of psychological dependence upon the interrogator,” and “an increased sense of learned helplessness.” (See [REDACTED] 69500 (070009Z APR 02).) For detailed information, see Volume I and the Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III.

95.
DIRECTOR ███ █████ APR 02).

96.
CIA Sensitive Addendum “Update on the Abu Zubaydah Operation,” dated 12 April 2002, “1630 Hours.”

97.
CIA Sensitive Addendum “Update on the Abu Zubaydah Operation,” dated 12 April 2002, “1630 Hours.”

98.
Federal Bureau of Investigation documents pertaining “to the interrogation of detainee Zayn Al Abideen Abu Zabaidah” and provided to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence by cover letter dated July 20, 2010 (DTS #2010-2939).

99.
Federal Bureau of Investigation documents pertaining “to the interrogation of detainee Zayn Al Abideen Abu Zabaidah” and provided to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence by cover letter dated July 20, 2010 (DTS #2010-2939).

100.
████ 10026 (131233Z APR 02).

101.
████ 10026 (131233Z APR 02).

102.
████ 10026 (131233Z APR 02).

103.
████ 10029 (131505Z APR 02).

104.
████ 10029 (131505Z APR 02).

105.
Federal Bureau of Investigation documents pertaining “to the interrogation of detainee Zayn Al Abideen Abu Zabaidah” and provided to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence by cover letter dated July 20, 2010 (DTS #2010-2939).

106.
See Intelligence Science Board “Intelligence Interviewing: Teaching Papers and Case Studies” for additional details on the FBI’s interrogation of Mohamed Rashed Daoud al-Owhali.

107.
Federal Bureau of Investigation documents pertaining “to the interrogation of detainee Zayn Al Abideen Abu Zabaidah” and provided to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence by cover letter dated July 20, 2010 (DTS #2010-2939).

108.
████ 10043 (151614Z APR 02).

109.
████ 10047 (161406Z APR 02).

110.
████ 10116 (250731Z APR 02).

111.
████ 10053 (162029Z APR 02).

112.
████ 10116 (250731Z APR 02). CIA records indicate Abu Zubaydah was nude, but given a towel to cover himself when interrogated. See, for example ████ 10080 (200735Z APR 02).

113.
████ 10053 (162029Z APR 02); ████ 10094 (211905Z APR 02). As detailed in Volume III, the FBI Special Agents only questioned Abu Zubaydah when he was covered with a towel. Sleep deprivation during this period also differed from how sleep deprivation was implemented after the Department of Justice approved the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques in August 2002. Rather than being placed in a stress position during sleep deprivation, Abu Zubaydah was kept awake by being questioned nearly non-stop by CIA and FBI interrogators. Records further indicate that during breaks in the interrogations at this time, Abu Zubaydah was allowed to briefly sleep. See, for example, ████ 10116 (250731Z APR 02).

114.
████ 10047 (161406Z APR 02).

115.
████ 10058 (171904Z APR 02).

116.
Federal Bureau of Investigation documents pertaining “to the interrogation of detainee Zayn Al Abideen Abu Zabaidah” and provided to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence by cover letter dated July 20, 2010 (DTS #2010-2939).

117.
████ 10058 (171904Z APR 02).

118.
See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III for additional information.

119.
████ 10090 (210703Z APR 02). As described in more detail in Volume II, Abu Zubaydah did provide
kunyas
for the pair.

120.
████ 10063 (180515Z APR 02). As described in detail in Volume II and Volume III, as well as more briefly in this summary, Abu Zubaydah provided this information after being allowed to sleep.

121.
See information in this summary and Volume II for additional details on the CIA’s representations on the effectiveness of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques to policy makers and the Department of Justice.

122.
CIA email from: ███████; to: ███████; subject: AZ information; date: July 10, 2002, at 01:18:50 PM. The email states: “The only way we put this together is that Paki liaison mentioned to ████ the arrest of two individuals (one being an American) and ████ put two and two together. Therefore, AZ’s info alone would never have allowed us to find them.”
See also
SSCI Transcript “Detention of Jose Padilla,” dated June 12, 2002 (DTS #2002-2603), in which a CIA officer states, “the Pakistani liaison felt it was important to bring [Padilla] to our attention, given the recent raids . . . there was enough information indicating that his travel was suspicious, to put us on alert. This suspicion was enhanced during the debriefings of Abu Zubaydah, which occurred on 21 April.”

123.
See analysis provided to the Committee on April 18, 2011, by the CIA, based on CIA searches in 2011 of the ███ database. The titles of specific intelligence reports resulting from information provided by Abu Zubaydah are listed in the Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III.

124.
ALEC ███ ████ MAY 02).

125.
See email exchange from: [REDACTED]; to [REDACTED]; with multiple ccs; subject: Turning Up the Heat in the AZ Interrogations; date: April 30, 2002, at 12:02:47 PM.

126.
See email exchange from: [REDACTED]; to [REDACTED]; with multiple ccs; subject: Turning Up the Heat in the AZ Interrogations; date: April 30, 2002, at 12:02:47 PM.

127.
See analysis provided to the Committee on April 18, 2011, by the CIA, based on CIA searches in 2011 of the ██ database. The titles of specific intelligence reports resulting from information provided by Abu Zubaydah are listed in the Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III.

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