The Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Torture: Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program (71 page)

416.
████ 10452 (121723Z FEB 03).

417.
ALEC ████ (131444Z FEB 03). Contrary to the statement in the CIA cable, as described, CIA officers in the country where Ramzi bin al-Shibh was held prior to being rendered to CIA custody wrote that Ramzi bin al-Shibh had provided information used in approximately 50 CIA intelligence reports, including information on potential future threats, to include a potential attack on London’s Heathrow airport and al-Nashiri’s planning for potential operations in the Arabian Peninsula. The ████ CIA officers in that country also noted that they found Ramzi bin al-Shibh’s information to be generally accurate, and that they “found few cases where he openly/clearly misstated facts.” The CIA officers in █████ concluded, “overall, [Ramzi bin al-Shibh] provided what was needed.” See █████ 22888 (240845Z FEB 03).

418.
ALEC █████ (131444Z FEB 03).

419.
See, for example, ███████ 10525 (200840Z FEB 03) and ██████10573 (241143Z FEB 03). For further detail, see the detainee review of Ramzi bin al-Shibh in Volume III.

420.
See detainee review of Ramzi bin al-Shibh in Volume III for additional information.

421.
See, for example, CIA ████ ████████████████████████ 20817 █████████████ (describing the foreign government’s interrogators’ “plan to ask Binalshibh to clarify his statements that Mohamed Atta, Marwan el-Shehhi, and Ziad Jarrah could not agree on the wisdom of targeting nuclear facilities”); ███████ 10568 (231514Z FEB 03); █████ 20817 ███████████; CIA █████ ██████████; CIA █████ ███████████.

422.
█████ 10582 (272026Z FEB 03); █████ 10627 (281949Z FEB 03).

423.
█████ 10521 (191750Z FEB 03). The cable referred to keeping bin al-Shibh in darkness as a “standard interrogation technique.” The same cable states that during the night of February 18, 2003, the light went out in bin al-Shibh’s cell and that “[w]hen security personnel arrived to replace the bulb, bin al-Shibh was cowering in the corner, shivering. Security personnel noted that he appeared relieved as soon as the light was replaced.”

424.
██████████ 1759 (021319Z OCT 04); HEADQUARTERS █████ (040023Z NOV 05); ██████ 1890 (171225Z NOV 04); █████ 1878 (140915Z NOV 04); █████ 1930 (061620Z DEC 04); █████ 2207 (111319Z APR 05); █████ (141507Z APR 05); █████ 2535 (051805Z JUL 05); █████ 2589 (120857Z JUL 05); █████ 2830 (291304Z AUG 05); █████ 1890 (171225Z NOV 04); █████ 1893 (200831Z NOV 04); CIA document entitled, “Detainee Talking Points for ICRC Rebuttal, ██████”; 2210 (141507Z APR 05); ██████ 2535 (0518005Z JUL 05); ██████ 2210 (141507Z APR 05); ██████ 2535 (051805Z JUL 05); ██████ 2830 (291304Z AUG 05); ██████ 1930 (061620Z DEC 04); ██████ 2210 (141507Z APR 05).

425.
██████ 2210 (141507Z APR 05).

426.
██████ 2210 (141507Z APR 05).

427.
HEADQUARTERS ████ (031945Z SEP 06).

428.
████ SITE DAILY REPORT – 24 MAY 07: ████ 8904 (182103Z APR 08).

429.
See Volume II for additional information.

430.
Ramzi bin al-Shibh was immediately subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques at DESTINATION SITE BLUE.

431.
ALEC █████ (302240Z JUN 05).

432.
For more details, see section of this summary on the capture of KSM and additional information in Volume II.

433.
████████ 41403 (020949Z MAR 03).

434.
████████ 41484 (031315Z MAR 03).

435.
██████████ 41564 (041307Z MAR 03); ███████ 41592 (051050Z MAR 03). For details on KSM’s detention in Pakistani custody, see the KSM detainee review in Volume III.

436.
Email from: [REDACTED]; to: ██████████, ███████; subject: Let’s Roll with the new guy; date: March 1, 2003, at 03:43:12 AM.

437.
DIRECTOR ████ (012240Z MAR 03).

438.
████████████████ 35354 (█████ MAR 03); DIRECTOR ████ (█████ MAR 03).

439.
████████████████ 34491 (051400Z MAR 03).

440.
████████████████ 34491 (051400Z MAR 03); Interview of ████████, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, 27 March 2003.

441.
████████████████ 34575 █████████.

442.
“Khalid Shaykh Muhammad’s Threat Reporting – Precious Truths, Surrounded by a Bodyguard of Lies,” IICT, April 3, 2003. KSM also named three individuals who, he said, worked on an al-Qa’ida anthrax program that was still in its “earliest stages.” They were led, he said, by “Omar” who had been arrested in the country of █████. The group also included Abu Bakr al-Filistini. (See ███████████████ 34475 ██████████.) KSM would later state that “Yazid” led al-Qa’ida’s anthrax efforts. (See █████ 10769 (120937Z MAR 03).) Yazid Sufaat, who had been in █████████ [foreign government] custody since 2001, had long been suspected of participating in al-Qa’ida chemical and biological activities. (See email from: [REDACTED]; to: ████████████████, ███████████, ████████████████ cc: ███████████, [REDACTED], █████████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: FOR COORD by noon please: Yazid Sufaat PDB; date: March 14, 2003, at 09:05 AM; email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; subject: Re: ████ RESPONSE – INDIVIDUALS CONNECTED TO USAMA BIN LADIN ASSOCIATE YAZID SUFAAT; date: March 6, 2003, at 12:50:27 PM; ████████; email from: █████████████; to: [REDACTED]; SUBJECT: Re: KSM on WMD; date: March 12, 2003, at 08:28:31 AM.) A draft PDB prepared on March 17, 2003, states that “Sufaat’s own claims to ██████ [foreign government] authorities and personal background tracks with KSM’s assertions.” (See “KSM Guarding Most Sensitive Information,” labeled “For the President Only 18 March 2003,” stamped 0319 ksmupdate.doc 17 March 2003.) On April 3, 2003, an IICT analysis stated that KSM “likely judges that information related to Sufaat already has been compromised since his arrest.” (See “Khalid Shaykh Muhammad’s Threat Reporting – Precious Truths, Surrounded by a Bodyguard of Lies,” IICT, April 3, 2003.) CIA analysis from 2005 stated that “██████████████ [a foreign government holding Sufaat] was likely to have known details of Yazid’s involvement in al-Qa’ida’s anthrax program by early 2002,” although that information was not provided at the time to the CIA. (See CIA Directorate of Intelligence; “Al-Qa’ida’s Anthrax Program; Cracks Emerge in a Key Reporting Stream; New Insights into Yazid Sufaat’s Credibility █████████████████” (DTS #2005-3264).) Al-Filistini was later captured and detained by the CIA. While being subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques he changed his description of al-Qa’ida’s anthrax efforts multiple times. On August 1, 2003, Abu Bakr al-Filistini, also known as Samr al-Barq, told CIA interrogators that “we never made anthrax.” At the time, he was being subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques and was told that the harsh treatment would not stop until he “told the truth.” According to cables, crying, al-Barq then said “I made the anthrax.” Asked if he was lying, al-Barq said that he was. After CIA interrogators “demonstrated the penalty for lying,” al-Barq again stated that “I made the anthrax” and then immediately recanted, and then again stated that he made anthrax. (See █████████ 1015 (012057Z AUG 03).) Two days later, al-Barq stated that he had lied about the anthrax production “only because he thought that was what interrogators wanted.” See ██████ 1017 (030812Z AUG 03).

443.
██████████████ 34573 ██████.

444.
Email from: ████████; to: [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED], ████████████; subject: Re: Departure; date: March 6, 2003, at 7:11:59 PM; email from: ███████; to: [REDACTED]; cc: ███████; subject: Re: Update; date: March 6, 2003, at 4:51:32 PM.

445.
███████████████ 34573 (061751Z MAR 03); ██████████ 34614 (071551Z MAR 03).

446.
███████████████ 34573 (061751Z MAR 03); ██████████ 34614 (071551Z MAR 03).

447.
In June 2004, KSM described his reporting as “all lies.” █████████ 34569 (061722Z MAR 03); ██████ 1281 (130801Z JUN 04).

448.
The two individuals, Sayed Habib and Shaistah Habibullali Khan, entered CIA custody in April and July 2003 respectively, and were released in August and February 2004, respectively. (See ████████████████ 5712 ██████████████; email from: ██████████; to: ████████████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: planned release of [DETENTION SITE ORANGE] detainee Syed Habib; ██████████████; and CIA document, “Additional Details for DCIA on Sayed Habib’s Arrest and Detention.”) The CIA’s June 2013 Response states that the detention of the two individuals “can only be considered ‘wrongful’ after the fact, not in the light of credible information available at the time and in a context in which plot disruption was deemed an urgent national priority.” The CIA’s June 2013 Response further states that KSM’s reporting on March 6, 2003, was “credible” because, at the time, “[CIA] assessed that Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM) had moved to a more cooperative posture as his interrogation progressed.” A review of CIA records indicates that the CIA subjected KSM to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques the following day. The use of the techniques continued until March 25, 2003, and included 183 applications of the waterboard. See ███████ 10711 ██████████████.

449.
Interview of ███████████, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] Office of the Inspector General, April 3, 2003. Email to: █████████, ████████; from: ████████; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], ███████, ███████, ████████, ████████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], ████████, [REDACTED]; subject: KSM planning; date: March 1, 2003, at 07:07:33 AM.

450.
██████ 10654 (030904Z MAR 03); DIRECTOR ████ (041444Z MAR 03). The initial approval was for SWIGERT and CIA interrogator ██████. The authorization was extended to DUNBAR on March █, 2003. DIRECTOR █████ █████████.

451.
Email from: [REDACTED]; to: ████████; cc: ██████████; subject: Technique; date: March █, 2003, at 3:51:09 AM.

452.
Email from: [REDACTED]; to: ████████; cc: █████████; subject: Re: Technique; date: March █, 2003, at 3:22:45 PM.

453.
██████ 10711 ██████.

454.
██████ 10705 ██████.

455.
DIRECTOR ████ ██████.

456.
██████ 107011 ██████.

457.
█████ 10711 ████████; █████ 10725 ████████; █████ 10732 ████████; █████ 10731 ████████; █████ 10741 (100917Z MAR 03).

458.
Interview of ████████, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, April 30, 2003. Interview of ████████ by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, October 22, 2003.

459.
CIA Inspector General, Special Review, Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program (2003-7123-IG), January 2004.

460.
██████ 10740 (092308Z MAR 03), disseminated as ████████; █████ 10741 (100917Z MAR 03).

461.
█████ 11377 (231943Z APR 03), disseminated as ██████.

462.
Interview of ███████, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, 30 April 2003.

463.
Interview of James Pavitt, by ███████ and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, August 21, 2003.

464.
Email from: ██████; to: ████████; cc: ████████; subject: More; date: April 10, 2003, at 5:59:27 PM.

465.
██████ 10752 (102320Z MAR 03).

466.
Email from: [REDACTED]; to: ██████; cc: ████████; subject: Re: MEDICAL SITREP 3/10; date: March 11, 2003, at 8:10:39 AM.

467.
██████ 10798 (131816Z MAR 03), disseminated as ████.

468.
██████ 10778 (121549Z MAR 03), disseminated as ████.

469.
██████ 10778 (121549Z MAR 03), disseminated as ████.

470.
██████ 12141 (272231Z JUN 03); █████ 22939 (031541Z JUL 04); ██████ 10883 (182127Z MAR 03), disseminated as ███████.

471.
██████ 10787 (130716Z MAR 03). The CIA would later represent that the information KSM provided on the Heathrow plotting was an example of the effectiveness of the waterboard interrogation technique, listing the Heathrow Plot as one of the “plots discovered as a result of ElTs” in a briefing on the waterboard for the President in November 2007. See document entitled, “DCIA Talking Points: Waterboard 06 November 2007,” dated November 6, 2007, with the notation the document was “sent to DCIA Nov. 6 in preparation for POTUS meeting.”

472.
██████ 10800 (131909Z MAR 03).

473.
Interview of ████████, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, May 15, 2003.

474.
██████ 10800 (131909Z MAR 03); Interview of ████████, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, May 15, 2003.

475.
Email from: ████████ to: ████████; cc: ████████; subject: More; date: April 10, 2003, at 5:59:27 PM. Emphasis in the original.

476.
██████ 10787 (130716Z MAR 03).

477.
██████ 10804 (140710Z MAR 03); ██████ 10790 (130946Z MAR 03).

478.
Interview of ████████, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, April 30, 2003. The interviewee was a CIA interrogator for KSM at the CIA detention site.

479.
██████ 10790 (130946Z MAR 03).

480.
██████ 10791 (131229Z MAR 03).

481.
Email from: [REDACTED]; to: ████████; cc: ████████, ████████, Jose Rodriguez; subject: re: Eyes Only – Legal and Political Quand[]ry; date: March 13, 2003, at 11:28:06 AM.