The Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Torture: Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program (66 page)

128.
███ 10424 (070814Z JUN 02).

129.
See analysis provided to the Committee on April 18, 2011, by the CIA, based on CIA searches in 2011 of the ██ database. The titles of specific intelligence reports resulting from information provided by Abu Zubaydah are listed in the Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III of the Committee Study.

130.
See Presidential Speech on September 6, 2006, based on CIA information and vetted by CIA personnel.
See also
ODNI September 2006 Unclassified Public Release: “During initial interrogation, Abu Zubaydah gave some information that he probably viewed as nominal. Some was important, however, including that Khalid Shaykh Mohammad (KSM) was the 9/11 mastermind and used the moniker ‘Mukhtar.’ This identification allowed us to comb previously collected intelligence for both names, opening up new leads to this terrorist plotter—leads that eventually resulted in his capture. It was clear to his interrogators that Abu Zubaydah possessed a great deal of information about al-Qa’ida; however, he soon stopped all cooperation. Over the ensuing months, the CIA designed a new interrogation program that would be safe, effective, and legal.”
See also
CIA Director Michael Hayden, Classified Statement for the Record, Hearing on the Central Intelligence Agency Detention and Interrogation Program, April 12, 2007 (DTS #2007-1563) (“. . . FBI and CIA continued unsuccessfully to try to glean information from Abu Zubaydah using established US Government interrogation techniques . . . .”).

131.
See reporting charts in Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III, as well as CIA paper entitled “Abu Zubaydah,” dated March 2005. The same information is included in an “Abu Zubaydah Bio” document “Prepared on 9 August 2006.”

132.
See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III for additional details.

133.
See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III for additional details.

134.
See CIA document dated, July 3, 2002, 1630 Hours, titled, “CIA Operational Update Memorandum for CIA Leadership, SENSITIVE ADDENDUM: Update on the Abu Zubaydah Operation and ███ Raid ███.”

135.
For more information on the SERE program, see the Senate Armed Services Committee Inquiry into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody, December 2008.
See also
statement of Senator Carl Levin on the inquiry, December 11, 2008; “SERE training is intended to be used to teach our soldiers how to resist interrogation by enemies that refuse to follow the Geneva Conventions and international law. In SERE school, our troops who are at risk of capture are exposed in a controlled environment with great protections and caution—to techniques adapted from abusive tactics used against American soldiers by enemies such as the Communist Chinese during the Korean War. SERE training techniques include stress positions, forced nudity, use of fear, sleep deprivation and, until recently, the Navy SERE school used the waterboard. These techniques were designed to give our students a taste of what they might be subjected to if captured by a ruthless, lawless enemy so that they would be better prepared to resist. The techniques were never intended to be used against detainees in U.S. custody. As one [Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA)] instructor explained, SERE training is based on illegal exploitation (under the rules listed in the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War) of prisoners over the last 50 years.”

136.
Email from: ████; to: ████; subject: Description of Physical Pressures; date: July 8, 2002, at 04:15:15 PM.

137.
ALEC ██ (051724Z JUL 02).

138.
See Resume, Hammond DUNBAR, submitted to the CIA in March 2003. In a section on “Interrogation and Debriefing Experience,” DUNBAR’s 2003 resume noted that he had been a “debriefer for all USG DOD and Civilian ████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████.).” All other experience in the section related to his interrogation experience as a contractor for the CIA beginning in 2002. DUNBAR’s resume did state that he had participated in an interrogation training course in █████ in 1992, and that he had taken a one-week Defense Interrogation Course at some point in 2002, although his resume does not indicate whether this was prior to, or after, the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah. The CIA’s June 2013 Response states that the Committee Study was “incorrect . . . in asserting that the contractors selected had no relevant experience.” The CIA’s June 2013 Response notes SWIGERT and DUNBAR’s experience at the Department of Defense SERE school, and SWIGERT’s “academic research” and “research papers” on “such topics as resistance training, captivity familiarization, and learned helplessness—all of which were relevant to the development of the program.” The CIA’s June 2013 Response does not describe any experience related to actual interrogations or counterterrorism, or any relevant cultural, geographic, or linguistic expertise. The CIA’s June 2013 Response provides the following explanation: “Drs. [SWIGERT] and [DUNBAR] had the closest proximate expertise CIA sought at the beginning of the program, specifically in the area of
non-standard means of
interrogation
. Experts on traditional interrogation methods did not meet this requirement. Non-standard interrogation methodologies were not an area of expertise of CIA officers or of the US Government generally. We believe their expertise was so unique that we would have been derelict had we
not
sought them out when it became clear that CIA would be heading into the uncharted territory of the program” (italics and emphasis in original). As noted above, the CIA did not seek out SWIGERT and DUNBAR after a decision was made to use coercive interrogation techniques; rather, SWIGERT and DUNBAR played a role in convincing the CIA to adopt such a policy.

139.
Interview of █████, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, October 22, 2003. The senior interrogator had participated in the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques with SWIGERT and DUNBAR.

140.
Email from: █████; to: █████; subject: EYES ONLY – DRAFT; date: July 8, 2002.

141.
Email from: █████; to: █████; subject: EYES ONLY – DRAFT; date: July 8, 2002.

142.
Email from: █████; to: █████; subject: EYES ONLY – DRAFT; date: July 8, 2002.

143.
DIRECTOR ██ (031357Z AUG 02).

144.
DIRECTOR ██ (031357Z AUG 02).

145.
DIRECTOR ██ (031357Z AUG 02).

146.
July 13, 2002, Letter from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General to John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, CIA.

147.
Memorandum for the Record from John H. Moseman, Chief of Staff, re: NSC Weekly Meeting, July 17, 2002.

148.
July 19, 2002, 1630 Hours, CIA Operational Update Memorandum for CIA Leadership, SENSITIVE ADDENDUM: Update on the Abu Zubaydah Operation and ██ Raid ██.

149.
July 21, 2002, 1630 Hours, CIA Operational Update Memorandum for CIA Leadership, SENSITIVE ADDENDUM: Update on the Abu Zubaydah Operation and ██ Raid ██.

150.
█████ 10536 (151006Z JUL 02).

151.
█████ 10536 (151006Z JUL 02).

152.
█████ 10536 (151006Z JUL 02).

153.
█████ 10536 (151006Z JUL 02).

154.
ALEC ████ (182321Z JUL 02).

155.
ALEC ████ (182321Z JUL 02).

156.
Email from: █████; to: [REDACTED]; subject: Request for JPRA information; date: July 19, 2002; July 24, 2002, fax from ████ to John Yoo and [REDACTED] providing information from the OTS/OAD psychologists; email from: ████; to: ████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], ████; subject: Discussion with JPRA Chief of Staff; date: July 24, 2002.

157.
Email from: █████; to: [REDACTED]; subject: Request for JPRA information; date: July 19, 2002. Records indicate that ███’s notes were not provided to the Department of Justice. In November 2002, ███ along with Chief of Interrogations ████, led the first CIA interrogator training course.

158.
[REDACTED] 73208 (231043Z JUL 02).

159.
███ 10568 (261101Z JUL 02).

160.
[REDACTED] 73208 (231043Z JUL 02).

161.
DIRECTOR ██ (251609Z AUG 02).

162.
Email from: █████; to: Jose Rodriguez, [REDACTED], █████, [REDACTED], subject: EYES ONLY—Where we stand re: Abu Zubaydah; date: July 26, 2002.
See also
███ 10568 (261101Z JUL 02).

163.
DIRECTOR ██ (031357Z AUG 02).

164.
DIRECTOR ██ (031357Z AUG 02).

165.
[REDACTED] 73208 (231043Z JUL 02) and email from: █████; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and ████; subject: Addendum from [DETENTION SITE GREEN], [REDACTED] 73208 (231043Z JUL 02); date: July 23, 2002, at 07:56:49 PM.

166.
███ 10644 (201235Z AUG 02).

167.
Memorandum for the Record from John Moseman, Chief of Staff, re: NSC Weekly Meeting, July 31, 2002.

168.
July 26, 2001, DCI Talking Points with the President- Next Phase of the Abu Zubaydah Interrogation; July 31, 2001, DCI Talking Points with the President- Next Phase of the Abu Zubaydah Interrogation. Note that the draft document lists the incorrect year.

169.
CIA records do not indicate who informed National Security Advisor Rice “that there would be no briefing of the President on this matter.”

170.
Email from: John Moseman; to: John McLaughlin, Jose Rodriguez, [REDACTED], John Rizzo, [REDACTED]; subject: Abu-Z Interrogation; date: August 2, 2002.

171.
Email from: John Rizzo; to: █████; subject: Rump PC on interrogations; date: July 31, 2003.

172.
See Volume II for additional information on congressional briefings.

173.
An email from CIA Senior Deputy General Counsel John Rizzo stated that “the President will be briefed as part of the regular annual [covert action] review. Briefing (by Rice or VP or Counsel to the President or some combination thereof) will describe the interrogation program, the fact that some aggressive but AG-approved techniques have been used, but will not apparently get into the details of the techniques themselves.” See email from: John Rizzo; to: ████; subject: Rump PC on interrogations; date: July 31, 2003.

174.
Office of General Counsel Comments on Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program Special Review, at 23 (“[i]n August 2003, the DCI advised OIG . . .”); CIA Office of Inspector General, Interview of George Tenet, memorandum dated 8 September 2003, subject: 2003-7123-IG, Review of Interrogation for Counterterrorism Purposes.

175.
Inspector General, Special Review, Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 2001–October 2003), May 7, 2004 (DTS #2004-2710).

176.
Letter from George J. Tenet to Chairman Pat Roberts, June 22, 2004 (DTS #2004-2710).

177.
Helgerson then added, “Additionally, public disclosure of many of these activities ensured wide awareness. In light of these developments, I consider the matter closed.” The Helgerson letter does not indicate to whom Directors Tenet and Goss, who met regularly with the President, submitted requests to brief the President about the program. See letter from John L. Helgerson to Vice Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV, April 5, 2006 (DTS #2006-1564). The CIA’s June 2013 Response does not dispute these records. It states, however, that “[w]hile Agency records on the subject are admittedly incomplete, former President Bush has stated in his autobiography that he discussed the program, including the use of enhanced techniques, with DCIA Tenet in 2002, prior to application of the techniques on Abu Zubaydah, and personally approved the techniques.” A subsequent memoir by former CIA Acting General Counsel John Rizzo (published January 7, 2014) states, “The one senior U.S. Government national security official during this time—from August 2002 through 2003—who I did not believe was knowledgeable about the E.I.T.s was President Bush himself. He was not present at any of the Principal Committee meetings . . . and none of the principals at any of the E.I.T. sessions during this period ever alluded to the President knowing anything about them.”

178.
Included in the packet of CIA information was the following: “Question: ‘What role did the President play in authorizing this program? Did he select detainees held by CIA or direct their interrogation? Was he briefed on the interrogation techniques, and if so when?’ Answer: ‘In the days after 9/11, the President directed that all the instruments of national power, including the resources of our intelligence, military, and law enforcement communities, be employed to fight and win the war against al Qaeda and its affiliates, within the bounds of the law. This included important, new roles for CIA in detaining and questioning terrorists. [He was periodically updated by CIA Directors on significant captures of terrorists, and information obtained that helped stop attacks and led to capture of other terrorists.] [The President was not of course involved in CIA’s day to day operations—including who should be held by CIA and how they should be questioned—these decisions are made or overseen by CIA Directors].”’ See Draft Questions and Proposed Answers, attached to Memorandum from National Security Advisor Stephen J. Hadley; for: the Vice President, Secretaries of State and Defense, the Attorney General, Director of National Intelligence and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; cc: chief of staff to the President, Counsel to the President, Assistant to the President for National Security, White House Spokesman, dated September 2, 2006. Brackets in the original.