The Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Torture: Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program (31 page)

The CIA representation that the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques on Abu Zubaydah was effective in producing critical threat information on terrorists and terrorist plotting against the United States is also not supported by CIA records. Abu Zubaydah did not provide the information for which the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques were justified and approved—information on the next attack and operatives in the United States.
1203
According to CIA records, Abu Zubaydah provided information on “al-Qa’ida activities, plans, capabilities, and relationships,” in addition to information on “its leadership structure, including personalities, decision-making processes, training, and tactics.”
1204
This type of information was provided by Abu Zubaydah prior to, during, and after the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.
1205
At no point during or after the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques did Abu Zubaydah provide information on al-Qa’ida cells in the United States or operational plans for terrorist attacks against the United States.
1206
Further, a quantitative review of Abu Zubaydah’s intelligence reporting indicates that more intelligence reports were disseminated from Abu Zubaydah’s first two months of interrogation, before the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques and when FBI special agents were directly participating, than were derived during the next two-month phase of interrogations, which included the non-stop use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques 24 hours a day for 17 days.
1207
Nonetheless, on August 30, 2002, the CIA informed the National Security Council that the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques were effective and “producing meaningful results.”
1208
Shortly thereafter, however, in October 2002, CIA records indicate that President Bush was informed in a Presidential Daily Brief (PDB) that “Abu Zubaydah resisted providing useful information until becoming more cooperative in early August, probably in the hope of improving his living conditions.” The PDB made no reference to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.
1209
Subsequently, the CIA represented to other senior policymakers and the Department of Justice that the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques were successfully used to elicit critical information from Abu Zubaydah.
1210
For example, in a March 2, 2005, CIA memorandum to the Department of Justice, the CIA represented that information obtained from Abu Zubaydah on the “Dirty Bomb Plot” and Jose Padilla was acquired only “
after
applying [enhanced] interrogation techniques.”
1211
This CIA representation was repeated in numerous CIA communications with policymakers and the Department of Justice.
1212
The information provided by the CIA was inaccurate. On the evening of April 20, 2002, prior to the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, Abu Zubaydah provided this information to FBI officers who were using rapport building interrogation techniques.
1213

2. Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM)

As described in more detail in the full Committee Study, the CIA provided significant inaccurate information to policymakers on the effectiveness of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques in the interrogation of KSM. These representations were provided by the CIA to the OIG,
1214
the White House,
1215
the Department of Justice,
1216
the Congress,
1217
and the American public.
1218
The representations include that: (1) KSM provided little threat information or actionable intelligence prior to the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques;
1219
(2) the CIA overcame KSM’s resistance through the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques;
1220
(3) the CIA’s waterboard interrogation technique was particularly effective in eliciting information from KSM;
1221
(4) KSM “recanted little of the information” he had provided, and KSM’s information was “generally accurate” and “consistent”;
1222
(5) KSM made a statement to CIA personnel—“soon, you will know”—indicating an attack was imminent upon his arrest; and (6) KSM believed “the general US population was ‘weak,’ lacked resilience, and would be unable to ‘do what was necessary.’ ”
1223
These representations are not supported by internal CIA records.

While the CIA represented to multiple parties that KSM provided little threat information or actionable intelligence prior to the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, CIA records indicate that KSM was subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques within “a few minutes” of first being questioned by CIA interrogators.
1224
This material fact was omitted from CIA representations.

The CIA represented that the CIA overcame KSM’s resistance to interrogation by using the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.
1225
CIA records do not support this statement. To the contrary, there are multiple CIA records describing the ineffectiveness of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques in gaining KSM’s cooperation. On March 26, 2003, the day after the CIA last used its enhanced interrogation techniques on KSM, KSM was described as likely lying and engaged in an effort “to renew a possible resistance stance.”
1226
On April 2, 2003, the Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism (IICT) produced an assessment of KSM’s intelligence entitled, “Precious Truths, Surrounded by a Bodyguard of Lies.” The assessment concluded that KSM was withholding information or lying about terrorist plots and operatives targeting the United States.
1227
During and after the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, the CIA repeatedly expressed concern that KSM was lying and withholding information in the context of CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear) programs,
1228
plotting against U.S. interests in Karachi, Pakistan,
1229
plotting against Heathrow Airport,
1230
Abu Issa al-Britani,
1231
as well as the “Second Wave” plotting against the “tallest building in California,” which prompted the CIA’s ALEC Station to note in a cable dated April 22, 2003, that it “remain[e]d concerned that KSM’s progression towards full debriefing status is not yet apparent where it counts most, in relation to threats to US interests, especially inside CONUS.”
1232

The CIA repeatedly represented that the CIA’s waterboard interrogation technique was particularly effective in eliciting information from KSM.
1233
This representation is not supported by CIA records. Numerous CIA personnel, including members of KSM’s interrogation team, expressed their belief that the waterboard interrogation technique was ineffective on KSM. The on-site medical officer told the inspector general that after three or four days it became apparent that the waterboard was ineffective and that KSM “hated it but knew he could manage.”
1234
KSM debriefer and Deputy Chief of ALEC Station
██████
told the inspector general that KSM “figured out a way to deal with [the waterboard],
1235
and she relayed in a 2005 Sametime communication that “we broke KSM . . . using the Majid Khan stuff . . . and the emails”; in other words by confronting KSM with information from other sources.
1236
████
CTC Legal,
██████
, told the inspector general that the waterboard “was of limited use on KSM.”
1237
A KSM interrogator told the inspector general that KSM had “beat the system,”
1238
and assessed that KSM responded to “creature comforts and sense of importance” and not to “confrontational” approaches.
1239
The interrogator later wrote in a Sametime communication that KSM and Abu Zubaydah “held back” despite the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, adding “I’m ostracized whenever I suggest those two did not tell us everything. How dare I think KSM was holding back.”
1240
In April 2003,
███
OMS told the inspector general that the waterboard had “not been very effective on KSM.” He also “questioned how the repeated use of the waterboard was categorically different from ‘beating the bottom of my feet,’ or from torture in general.”
1241

The CIA repeatedly represented that KSM had “recanted little of the information” he had provided, and that KSM’s information was “generally accurate” and “consistent.”
1242
This assertion is not supported by CIA records. Throughout the period during which KSM was subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, KSM provided inaccurate information, much of which he would later acknowledge was fabricated and recant. Specifically, KSM’s fabrications and recantations covered his activities immediately before his capture,
1243
the identity of an individual whom he described as the protector of his children,”
1244
plotting against a U.S. aircraft carrier, a meeting with Abu Faraj al-Libi, and the location of Hassan Ghul.
1245
KSM fabricated significant information, which he would later recant, related to Jaffar al-Tayyar, stating that al-Tayyar and Jose Padilla were plotting together,
1246
linking al-Tayyar to Heathrow Airport plotting
1247
and to Majid Khan’s plotting,
1248
and producing what CIA officials described as an “elaborate tale” linking al-Tayyar to an assassination plot against former President Jimmy Carter.
1249
KSM later explained that “he had been forced to lie” about al-Tayyar due to the pressure from CIA interrogators.
1250
KSM recanted other information about the Heathrow Airport plotting, including information regarding the targeting,
1251
additional operatives, and the tasking of prospective pilots to study at flight schools.
1252
KSM provided significant information on Abu Issa al-Britani (Dhiren Barot) that he would later recant, including linking Abu Issa al-Britani to Jaffar al-Tayyar and to the Heathrow Airport plot.
1253
Under direct threat of additional waterboarding,
1254
KSM told CIA interrogators that he had sent Abu Issa al-Britani to Montana to recruit African-American Muslim converts.
1255
In June 2003, KSM stated he fabricated the story because he was “under ‘enhanced measures’ when he made these claims and simply told his interrogators what he thought they wanted to hear.”
1256
KSM also stated that he tasked Majid Khan with recruiting Muslims in the United States,
1257
which he would later recant.
1258
On May 3, 2003, CIA officers recommended revisiting the information KSM had provided “during earlier stages of his interrogation process,” noting that “he has told us that he said some things during this phase to get the enhanced measures to stop, therefore some of this information may be suspect.”
1259

The CIA also repeatedly referred to a comment made by KSM while he was still in Pakistani custody as indicating that KSM had information on an imminent attack. In reports to the inspector general,
1260
the national security advisor,
1261
and the Department of Justice,
1262
among others, the CIA represented that:

“When asked about future attacks planned against the United States, he coldly replied ‘Soon, you will know.’ In fact, soon we did know—after we initiated enhanced measures.”
1263

Contrary to CIA representations, CIA records indicate that KSM’s comment was interpreted by CIA officers with KSM at the time as meaning that KSM was seeking to use his future cooperation as a “bargaining chip” with more senior CIA officers.
1264

Finally, the CIA attributed to KSM, along with Abu Zubaydah, the statement that “the general US population was ‘weak,’ lacked resilience, and would be unable to ‘do what was necessary’ to prevent the terrorists from succeeding in their goals.”
1265
There are no CIA operational or interrogation records to support the representation that KSM or Abu Zubaydah made these statements.

E. CIA Effectiveness Claims Regarding a “High Volume of Critical Intelligence”

The CIA represented that the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques resulted in the collection of “a high volume of critical intelligence
1266
on al-Qa’ida.”
1267
The Committee evaluated the “high volume” of intelligence collected by compiling the total number of sole source and multi-source disseminated intelligence reports from the 119 known CIA detainees.
1268

The CIA informed the Committee that its interrogation program was successful in developing intelligence and suggested that all CIA detainees produced disseminated intelligence reporting. For example, in September 2006, CIA Director Michael Hayden provided the following testimony to the Committee:

SENATOR BAYH
: “I was impressed by your statement about how effective the [CIA’s enhanced interrogation] techniques have been in eliciting important information to the country, at one point up to 50 percent of our information about al-Qa’ida. I think you said 9000 different intelligence reports?”

DIRECTOR HAYDEN
: “Over 8000, sir.”

SENATOR BAYH
: “And yet this has come from, I guess, only thirty individuals.”