The Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Torture: Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program (51 page)

“UBL’s security apparatus would be minimal, and that the group likely lived in a House with a family somewhere in Pakistan. Ghul commented that after UBL’s bodyguard entourage was apprehended entering Pakistan following the fall of Afghanistan, UBL likely has maintained a small security signature of circa one or two persons. Ghul speculated that Abu Ahmed likely handled all of UBL’s needs, including moving messages out to Abu Faraj [al-Libi] . . .”
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The next day, January ██, 2004, Hassan Ghul was transferred to the CIA’s DETENTION SITE BLACK.
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Upon arrival, Ghul was “shaved and barbered, stripped, and placed in the standing position against the wall” with “his hands above his head” for forty minutes.
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The CIA interrogators at the detention site immediately requested permission to use the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques against Ghul, writing that, during the forty minutes, Ghul did not provide any new information, did not show the fear that was typical of other recent captures, and “was somewhat arrogant and self important.” The CIA interrogators wrote that they “judged” that Ghul “has the expectation that in U.S. hands, his treatment will not be severe.”
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The request to CIA Headquarters to use the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques further stated:

“The interrogation team believes, based on [Hassan Ghul’s] reaction to the initial contact, that his al-Qa’ida briefings and his earlier experiences with U.S. military interrogators have convinced him there are limits to the physical contact interrogators can have with him. The interrogation team believes the approval and employment of enhanced measures should sufficiently shift [Hassan Ghul’s] paradigm of what he expects to happen. The lack of these increasd [
sic
] measures may limit the team’s capability to collect critical and reliable information in a timely manner.”
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CIA Headquarters approved the request the same day, stating that the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques would “increase base’s capability to collect critical and reliable threat information in a timely manner.”
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During and after the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques Ghul provided no other information of substance on al-Kuwaiti.
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Hassan Ghul was ████████████████████████ later released.
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███████████████████████████████.
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The fact that Hassan Ghul provided the detailed information linking Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti to UBL prior to the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques was omitted from CIA documents and testimony.
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While CIA documents and testimony highlighted reporting that the CIA claimed was obtained from CIA detainees—and in some cases from CIA detainees subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques—the CIA internally noted that reporting from CIA detainees—specifically CIA detainees subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques—was insufficient, fabricated, and/or unreliable.

A September 1, 2005, CIA report on the search for UBL states:

“Bin Ladin Couriers: Low-level couriers who wittingly or unwittingly facilitate communications between Bin Ladin and his gatekeepers remain largely invisible to us until a detainee reveals them.
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“ Even then,
detainees provide few actionable leads, and we have to consider the possibility that they are creating fictitious characters to distract us or to absolve themselves of direct knowledge about Bin Ladin.
We nonetheless continue the hunt for Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti—an alleged courier between Bin Ladin and KSM—and Abu ‘Abd al Khaliq Jan, who[m] Abu Faraj identified as his go-between with Bin Ladin since mid-2003, in order to get one step closer to Bin Ladin.”
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A May 20, 2007, CIA “targeting study” for Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti states:

“Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM)
described Abu Ahmad as a relatively minor figure and Abu Faraj al-Libi
denied all knowledge of Abu Ahmad. Station assesses that KSM and Abu Faraj’s reporting is not credible
on this topic, and their attempts to downplay Abu Ahmad’s importance or deny knowledge of Abu Ahmad are likely part of an effort to withhold information on UBL or his close associates. These denials, combined with reporting from other detainees”
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indicating that Abu Ahmad worked closely with KSM and Abu Faraj, add to our belief that Abu Ahmad is an HVT courier or facilitator.”
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Additional CIA documents contrasted the lack of intelligence obtained from CIA detainees subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques with the value of intelligence obtained from other sources. A November 23, 2007, CIA intelligence product, “Al-Qa’ida Watch,” with the title, “Probable Identification of Suspected Bin Ladin Facilitator Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti,” details how a:

“review of 2002 debriefings of a [foreign government] detainee who claimed to have traveled in 2000 from Kuwait to Afghanistan with an ‘Ahmad al-Kuwaiti’ provided the breakthrough leading to the likely identification of Habib al-Rahman as Abu Ahmad. The [foreign government] subsequently informed [the CIA] that Habib al-Rahman currently is living in Pakistan, probably in the greater Peshawar area—according to our analysis of a body of reporting.”
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This CIA intelligence product highlighted how reporting from Abu Faraj al-Libi, who was subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques and denied knowing Abu Ahmad, differed from that of Hassan Ghul, who—prior to the application of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques—stated that “Bin Ladin was always with Abu Ahmad,” and that Abu Ahmad had delivered a message to senior al-Qa’ida leaders in late 2003, “probably through Abu Faraj.” The document further states that KSM “has consistently maintained that Abu Ahmad ‘retired’ from al-Qa’ida work in 2002.” The CIA document states that the CIA will be working with ████████████ and the ██████ government, as well as utilizing a database of ████████ to follow-up on an individual traveling within Pakistan with a similar name and date of birth.
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CIA cable records from early 2008 highlight how the discovery and exploitation of phone numbers associated with al-Kuwaiti
██████
had been critical in collecting intelligence and locating the target,
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and state:

“. . .
debriefings of the senior most detainees who were involved in caring for bin Ladin have produced little locational information
, and it is the final nugget that detainees hold on to in debriefings (over threat info and even Zawahiri LOCINT) given their loyalty to the al-Qa’ida leader. We assess that Abu Ahmad would likely be in the same category as Khalid Shaykh Muhammad and Abu Faraj al-Libi, so we advocate building as much of a targeting picture of where and when Habib/Abu Ahmad travels to flesh out current leads to bin Ladin.”
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On May 1, 2008, a CIA Headquarters cable entitled, “targeting efforts against suspected UBL facilitator Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti,” documents that the CIA had a number of collection platforms established to collect intelligence on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti in order to locate UBL. The cable closes by stating:

“although we want to refrain from addressing endgame strategies, HQS judges that detaining Habib should be a last resort, since we have had no/no success in eliciting actionable intelligence on bin Ladings location from any detainees.”
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While the aforementioned CIA assessments highlight the unreliability of reporting from senior al-Qa’ida leaders in CIA custody, specifically “that KSM and Abu Faraj’s reporting” was assessed to be “not credible”—and that their denials “add[ed] to [the CIA’s] belief that Abu Ahmad is an HVT courier or facilitator”
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—the CIA assessments also highlight that “reporting from other detainees indicating that Abu Ahmad worked closely with KSM and Abu Faraj” was useful.
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As documented, the initial detainee-related information linking Abu Ahmad to UBL and KSM did not come from CIA detainees, but from detainees who were not in CIA custody.
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A. The CIA Provides Information on the Still-Classified Detention and Interrogation Program to Journalists Who Then Publish Classified Information; CIA Does Not File Crimes Reports in Connection with the Stories

In seeking to shape press reporting on the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program, CIA officers and the CIA’s Office of Public Affairs (OPA) provided unattributed background information on the program to journalists for books, articles, and broadcasts, including when the existence of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program was still classified.
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When the journalists to whom the CIA had provided background information published classified information, the CIA did not, as a matter of policy, submit crimes reports. For example, as described in internal emails, the CIA’s
████████████████████████████████
never opened an investigation related to Ronald Kessler’s book
The CIA at War
, despite the inclusion of classified information, because “the book contained no first time disclosures,” and because “OPA provided assistance with the book.”
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Senior Deputy General Counsel John Rizzo wrote that the CIA made the determination because the CIA’s cooperation with Kessler had been “blessed” by the CIA director.
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In another example, CIA officers and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence raised concerns that an article by Douglas Jehl in the
New York Times
contained significant classified information.
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████████
CTC Legal wrote in an email that “part of this article was based on ‘background’ provided by OPA. That, essentially, negates any use in making an unauthorized disclosure [report].”
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Both the Kessler book and the Jehl article included inaccurate claims about the effectiveness of CIA interrogations, much of it consistent with the inaccurate information being provided by the CIA to policymakers at the time. For example, Kessler’s book stated that the FBI arrest of Iyman Faris was “[b]ased on information from the CIA’s interrogation of [KSM],” and that the arrest of Khallad bin Attash was the “result” of CIA interrogations of KSM.
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The Jehl article stated that a “secret program to transfer suspected terrorists to foreign countries for interrogation has been carried out by the Central Intelligence Agency . . . according to current and former government officials.” The article stated that a “senior United States official” had “provid[ed] a detailed description of the program,” and quoted the official as claiming that “[t]he intelligence obtained by those rendered, detained and interrogated ha[d] disrupted terrorist operations.” The senior official added, “[it] has saved lives in the United States and abroad, and it has resulted in the capture of other terrorists.
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B. Senior CIA Officials Discuss Need to “Put Out Our Story” to Shape Public and Congressional Opinion Prior to the Full Committee Being Briefed

In early April 2005, ████████████, chief of ALEC Station, asked CTC officers to compile information on the success of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program preparation for interviews of CIA officers by Tom Brokaw of NBC News.
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As ████████ remarked in a Sametime communication with Deputy CTC Director Philip Mudd, during World War II, the Pentagon had an Office of War Information (OWI), whereas the CIA’s predecessor, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), did not. █████ then noted that “we need an OWI, at least every now and then . . .”
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According to Mudd, concerns within the CIA about defending the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program in the press were misplaced:
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“maybe people should know we’re trying to sell their program, if they complain, they should know that we’re trying to protect our capability to continue, we’re not just out there to brag . . . they don’t realize that we have few options here. we either get out and sell, or we get hammered, which has implications beyond the media. congress reads it, cuts our authorities, messes up our budget. we need to make sure the impression of what we do is positive . . . we must be more aggressive out there. we either put out our story or we get eaten. there is no middle ground.”
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Mudd counseled not to “advertise” the discussions between CIA personnel and the media with the CIA “workforce,” because “they’d misread it.”
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After ██████ promised to keep the media outreach “real close hold,” Mudd wrote:

“most of them [CIA personnel] do not know that when the w post/ny times quotes ‘senior intel official,’ it’s us . . . authorized and directed by opa.”
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██████
sent a draft compilation of plot disruptions to
███████
CTC Legal to determine whether the release of the information would pose any “legal problems.”
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According to CIA attorneys, information on Issa al-Britani posed no problems because it was sourced to the 9/11 Commission. They also determined that information about lyman Faris and Sajid Badat that was sourced to press stories posed no legal problems because Faris had already pled guilty and Badat was not being prosecuted in the United States.
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On April 15, 2005, a CIA officer expressed concerns in an email to several CIA attorneys about the CIA releasing classified information to the media. There are no CIA records indicating a response to the CIA officer’s email.
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That day, April 15, 2005, the National Security Council Principals Committee discussed a public campaign for the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program. After the meeting, ALEC Station personnel informed ██████ CTC Legal that scheduled interviews with NBC News of Director Porter Goss and Deputy CTC Director Philip Mudd should not proceed so that “we don’t get a head [
sic
] of ourselves . . .”
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On June 24, 2005, however,
Dateline NBC
aired a program that included on-the-record quotes from Goss and Mudd, as well as quotes from “top American intelligence officials.”
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The program and
Dateline NBC
’s associated online articles included classified information about the capture and interrogation of CIA detainees and quoted “senior U.S. intelligence analysts” stating that intelligence obtained from CIA interrogations “approaches or surpasses any other intelligence on the subject of al-Qaida and the construction of the network.”
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The
Dateline NBC
articles stated that “Al-Qaida leaders suddenly found themselves bundled onto a CIA Gulfstream V or Boeing 737 jet headed for long months of interrogation,” and indicated that Abu Zubaydah, KSM, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, and Abu Faraj al-Libi were “picked up and bundled off to interrogation centers.” The articles also stated that the capture of bin al-Shibh led to the captures of KSM and Khallad bin Attash.
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This information was inaccurate.
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There are no CIA records to indicate that there was any investigation or crimes report submitted in connection with the
Dateline NBC
program and its associated reporting.

C. CIA Attorneys Caution that Classified Information Provided to the Media Should Not Be Attributed to the CIA

After the April 15, 2005, National Security Council Principals Committee meeting, the CIA drafted an extensive document describing the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program for an anticipated media campaign. CIA attorneys, discussing aspects of the campaign involving off-the-record disclosures, cautioned against attributing the information to the CIA itself. One senior attorney stated that the proposed press briefing was “minimally acceptable, but only if not attributed to a CIA official.” The CIA attorney continued: “This should be attributed to an ‘official knowledgeable’ about the program (or some similar obfuscation), but should not be attributed to a CIA or intelligence official.” Referring to CIA efforts to deny Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests for previously acknowledged information, the attorney noted that, “[o]ur Glomar figleaf is getting pretty thin.”
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Another CIA attorney noted that the draft “makes the [legal] declaration I just wrote about the secrecy of the interrogation program a work of fiction . . .”
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██████CTC Legal urged that CIA leadership needed to “confront the inconsistency” between CIA court declarations “about how critical it is to keep this information secret” and the CIA “planning to reveal darn near the entire program.”
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D. The CIA Engages with Journalists and Conveys an Inaccurate Account of the Interrogation of Abu Zubaydah

In late 2005, the CIA decided to cooperate again with Douglas Jehl of the
New York Times
, despite his intention to publish information about the program. A CIA officer wrote about Jehl’s proposed article, which was largely about the CIA’s detention and interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, “[t]his is not necessarily an unflattering story.”
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Jehl, who provided the CIA with a detailed outline of his proposed story, informed the CIA that he would emphasize that the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques worked, that they were approved through an inter-agency process, and that the CIA went to great lengths to ensure that the interrogation program was authorized by the White House and the Department of Justice.
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CIA records indicate that the CIA decided not to dissuade Jehl from describing the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques because, as ████CTC Legal
███████
noted, “[t]he EITs have already been out there.”
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The CIA’s chief of ALEC Station, ████████, who wondered whether cooperation with Jehl would be “undercutting our complaint against those leakers,” nonetheless suggested informing Jehl of other examples of CIA “detainee exploitation success.”
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While the
New York Times
did not publish Jehl’s story, on September 7, 2006, the day after President Bush publicly acknowledged the program, David Johnston of the
New York Times
called the CIA’s OPA with a proposed news story about the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah. In an email with the subject line, “We Can’t Let This Go Unanswered,” the CIA’s director of public affairs in OPA, Mark Mansfield, described Johnston’s proposed narrative as “bullshit” and biased toward the FBI, adding that “we need to push back.”
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While it is unclear if Mansfield responded to Johnston’s proposed story, Mansfield later wrote in an email that there was “[n]o need to worry.”
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On September 10, 2006, the
New York Times
published an article by Johnston, entitled, “At a Secret Interrogation, Dispute Flared Over Tactics,” that described “sharply contrasting accounts” of the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah. The article cited officials “more closely allied with law enforcement,” who stated that Abu Zubaydah “cooperated with F.B.I, interviewers,” as well as officials “closely tied to intelligence agencies,” who stated that Abu Zubaydah “was lying, and things were going nowhere,” and that “[i]t was clear that he had information about an imminent attack and time was of the essence.” The article included the frequent CIA representation that, after the use of “tougher tactics,” Abu Zubaydah “soon began to provide information on key Al Qaeda operators to help us find and capture those responsible for the 9/11 attacks.”
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This characterization of Abu Zubaydah’s interrogation is incongruent with CIA interrogation records.
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CTC stated that the article resulted in questions to the CIA from the country
██████████████████
, and assessed that “[disclosures of this nature could adversely [have an] impact on future joint CT operations with . . . █████ partners.”
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There are no indications that the CIA filed a crimes report in connection with the article.
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In early 2007, the CIA cooperated with Ronald Kessler again on another book. According to CIA records, the purpose of the cooperation was to “push back” on Kessler’s proposed accounts of intelligence related to the attacks of September 11, 2001, and the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah,
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which a CIA officer noted “give undue credit to the FBI for CIA accomplishments.”
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After another CIA officer drafted information for passage to Kessler,
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████CTC Legal, █████, wrote, “[o]f course being the lawyer, I would recommend not telling Kessler anything.” █████ then wrote that if, “for policy reasons,” the CIA decided to cooperate with the author, there was certain information that should not be disclosed. █████ then suggested that “if we are going to do this,” the CIA could provide information to Kessler that would “undercut the FBI agents,” who █████ stated had “leaked that they would have gotten everything anyway” from Abu Zubaydah.
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After Kessler provided a draft of his book to the CIA and met with CIA officers, the CIA’s director of public affairs, Mark Mansfield, described what he viewed as the problems in Kessler’s narrative. According to Mansfield, Kessler was “vastly overstating the FBI’s role in thwarting terrorism and, frankly, giving other USG agencies—including CIA—short shrift.” Moreover, “[t]he draft also didn’t reflect the enormously valuable intelligence the USG gleaned from CIA’s interrogation program” and “had unnamed FBI officers questioning our methods and claiming their own way of eliciting information is much more effective.” According to Mansfield, the CIA “made some headway” in its meeting with Kessler and that, as a result of the CIA’s intervention, his book would be “more balanced than it would have been.”
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