The Modern Middle East (78 page)

33.
Quoted in John Ruedy,
Modern Algeria: The Origins and Development of a Nation
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), p. 50.

34.
Ibid.

35.
Lisa Anderson,
The State and Social Transformation in Tunisia and Libya,
1830–1980 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 186.

36.
Ali Abdullatif Ahmida,
The Making of Modern Libya: State Formation, Colonization, and Resistance,
1830–1932 (Albany: SUNY Press, 1994), p. 104.

37.
S. N. Eisenstadt, “The Kemalist Regime and Modernization: Some Comparative and Analytical Remarks,” in
Atatürk and the Modernization of Turkey,
ed. Jacob Landau (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), pp. 7–9. As will be seen shortly, “revolutionism,” the translation for Atatürk’s
inkilabçilik,
was also one of the six “arrows,” or principles, on which the Kemalist ideology was based.

38.
Paul Dumont, “The Origins of the Kemalist Ideology,” in Landau,
Atatürk,
p. 35.

39.
See Niyazi Berkes,
The Development of Secularism in Turkey
(Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964), pp. 192–93.

40.
Quoted in Bernard Lewis,
The Emergence of Modern Turkey,
2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 257.

41.
Ibid., p. 353.

42.
Ibid., p. 354.

43.
Feroz Ahmad,
The Making of Modern Turkey
(London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 61–63.

44.
Ibid., p. 58.

45.
Lewis,
Emergence of Modern Turkey,
pp. 370–71.

46.
Quoted in Andrew Mango,
Atatürk
(Woodstock, NY: Overlook Press, 2000), p. 463.

47.
This was in contrast to similar prohibitions imposed on the veil at about the same time in Iran and Afghanistan. On hearing about the prohibition of veiling in Afghanistan, Kemal is said to have predicted the overthrow of the country’s King Amanullah as a result. Ahmad,
Making of Modern Turkey,
p. 87.

48.
Quoted in Lewis,
Emergence of Modern Turkey,
p. 278.

49.
Ibid., p. 289.

50.
Ahmad,
Making of Modern Turkey,
p. 97.

51.
Ibid., p. 98.

52.
Lord Kinross,
Ataturk: A Biography of Mustafa Kemal, Father of Modern Turkey
(New York: William Morrow, 1965), pp. 539–40.

53.
Khan
is a term of respect, the closest translation for which is “Lord,” although it does not necessarily have the latter’s feudal connotation.

54.
One of the most lucid and accessible accounts of this time period can be found in Ervand Abrahamian’s
Iran between Two Revolutions
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982), especially pp. 92–120.

55.
Donald Wilber,
Riza Shah Pahlavi: The Resurrection and Reconstruction of Iran,
1878–1944 (Hicksville, NY: Exposition Press, 1975), p. 75.

56.
The poetry of Mirza Abolqassem Aref Qazvini, who had earlier supported the constitutionalist cause, is most representative. An interesting example reads, in part:

Now that the banner of republic comes from afar,

Under its shadow, life will be blessed.

After the calamity of Qajar comes the festival of the republic.

Be certain that today is the best of times.

I’m happy that destiny’s hand placed in the royal court

The light of dynasty that the shah extinguished.

With one look toward Europe the shah lost his will,

In this costly gamble losing his throne.

Say a dying prayer for dynasty, Aref.

God forgive it for its evil harms.

It ruined our country all throughout.

From now on the country will prosper.

Whoever holds the republic’s reins,

There will always be noble men among the people.

Mirza Abolqassem Aref Qazvini,
Koliyyat-e Divan
[Complete works] (Tehran: Chapp-e Jadid, 1357/1978), p. 283.

57.
Shahrough Akhavi,
Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran: Clergy-State Relations in the Pahlavi Period
(Albany: SUNY Press, 1980), pp. 28–29.

58.
Abrahamian,
Iran between Two Revolutions,
p. 135.

59.
Reza Khan is said not to have been certain of the precise meaning of Pahlavi for a number of years after adopting it as his last name, and anecdotal evidence suggests he had thought about choosing Pahlavan (literally, “champion”) instead. Wilber,
Riza Shah Pahlavi,
p. 229.

60.
Ibid., pp. 157–58.

61.
Abrahamian,
Iran between Two Revolutions,
p. 141.

62.
Homa Katouzian,
The Political Economy of Modern Iran,
1926–1979 (New York: NYU Press, 1981), p. 116.

63.
Wilber,
Riza Shah Pahlavi,
p. 148.

64.
Katouzian,
Political Economy of Modern Iran,
p. 113.

65.
Abrahamian,
Iran between Two Revolutions,
pp. 136–37.

66.
The new civil code exemplified the less sweeping nature of state-sponsored social change in Iran as compared to Turkey; it continued to retain a number of
sharia
features, especially with regard to inheritance and family relations.

67.
Akhavi,
Religion and Politics,
p. 38.

68.
This restriction, which had the ironic effect of making many women prisoners in their own homes, was lifted in 1941.

69.
Wilber,
Riza Shah Pahlavi,
p. 185.

70.
Katouzian,
Political Economy of Modern Iran,
pp. 116–17.

71.
Abrahamian,
Iran between Two Revolutions,
pp. 162–63.

72.
Wilber,
Riza Shah Pahlavi,
p. 244.

73.
Two of these financial experts were William Morgan Shuster and Arthur C. Millspaugh, who later published their memoirs. See William M. Shuster,
The Strangling of Persia
(New York: Greenwood, 1939), and Arthur C. Millspaugh,
The American Task in Persia
(New York: Century, 1925).

74.
Wilber estimates the total number of Germans in Iran at this time, including their dependents, at around 1,200 to 2,000. Wilber,
Riza Shah Pahlavi,
p. 201.

75.
Frederick Anscombe,
The Ottoman Gulf: The Creation of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), pp. 143–44.

76.
For such accounts, see Leslie McLoughlin,
Ibn Saud: Founder of a Kingdom
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993); Mohammed Almana,
Arabia Unified: A Portrait of Ibn Saud
(London: Hutchinson Benham, 1980); and Gary Troeller,
The Birth of Saudi Arabia: Britain and the Rise of the House of Sa
ʿ
ud
(London: Frank Cass, 1976).

77.
Almana, a sympathetic chronicler, records at least twenty-two battles fought by Abdel Aziz (b. 1880) between 1900 and his death in 1953. For details, see Almana,
Arabia Unified,
pp. 271–73.

78.
Troeller,
Birth of Saudi Arabia,
pp. 83–91.

79.
Almana,
Arabia Unified,
p. 218.

80.
Ibid., p. 226.

81.
Troeller,
Birth of Saudi Arabia,
p. 241.

82.
Anthony Cave Brown,
Oil, God, and Gold: The Story of Aramco and the Saudi Kings
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1999), p. 139.

83.
“ARAMCO’s operations in the oil town,” writes the political scientist Robert Vitalis, “rested on a set of exclusionary practices and norms that were themselves legacies of earlier mining booms and market formation in the American West and Southwest. This was a system of privilege and inequality, which we know as Jim Crow in the United States, as Apartheid in South Africa, and as racism more generally.” The company, Vitalis goes on to argue, forbade Saudi employees to live with their families and deported those American employees who sought to have contacts with nearby Arab families. Robert Vitalis,
America’s Kingdom: Mythmaking on the Saudi Oil Frontier
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), p. xiii.

84.
Brown,
Oil, God, and Gold,
p. 150.

85.
Ralph Braibanti, “Saudi Arabia in the Context of Political Development Theory,” in
King Faisal and the Modernization of Saudi Arabia,
ed. Willard Beling (London: Croom Helm, 1980), p. 35.

3. THE AGE OF NATIONALISM

1.
There are numerous anthologies on nationalism. Two of the more recent and significant ones are John Hutchinson and Anthony Smith, eds.,
Nationalism
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), and Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny, eds.,
Becoming National: A Reader
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). A representative definition of nationalism in the current literature is offered by Guibernau: “By ‘nationalism’ I mean the sentiment of belonging to a community whose members identify with a set of symbols, beliefs and ways of life, and have the will to decide upon their common political destiny.” Montserrat Guibernau,
Nationalisms: The Nation-State and Nationalism in the Twentieth Century
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), p. 47.

2.
Eley and Suny,
Becoming National.

3.
Benedict Anderson,
Imagined Communities
(London: Verso, 1991), p. 46.

4.
Ernest Gellner,
Nations and Nationalism
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 40.

5.
Bernard Lewis,
The Emergence of Modern Turkey,
2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 354. For more on issues related to the construction of national identities after World War I, see Aviel Roshwald,
Ethnic Nationalism and the Fall of Empires: Central Europe, Russia and the Middle East,
1914–1923 (London: Routledge, 2001).

6.
Theodor Herzl, the founder of modern Zionism, was so determined to secure a national home for Jews that he considered locating it in Uganda. See Howard Sachar,
A History of Israel: From the Rise of Zionism to Our Time,
2nd ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1996), pp. 59–63.

7.
Ella Shohat, “The Invention of the Mizrahim,”
Journal of Palestine Studies
29 (Autumn 1999): 8.

8.
Rashid Khalidi, “The Origins of Arab Nationalism: Introduction,” in
The Origins of Arab Nationalism,
ed. Rashid Khalidi
et al.
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), pp. ix–xii.

9.
The case of the Hijaz illustrates the diverse nature of the beginnings of Arab nationalism. Whereas elsewhere Arabism rose in opposition to the centralizing policies of the Committee of Union and Progress, Hijazi nationalism was initially less a product of the confluence of an emerging nation and a state than a pragmatic tool employed by Hussein in achieving power. Mary C. Wilson, “The Hashemites, the Arab Revolt, and Arab Nationalism,” in Khalidi et al.,
Origins of Arab Nationalism,
p. 214.

10.
Following Stephen Krasner, Fred Lawson attributes this shift to the emergence of “Westphalian sovereignty”: nationalist leaders “came to recognize the territorial boundaries of one another’s domains, and to reject as inherently illegitimate any attempt by surrounding leaderships to interfere in the internal affairs of their respective polities. . . . Nationalist leaders consciously and deliberately restricted their political ambitions to specific geographical zones, and stopped trying, or even claiming, to exercise authority over the Arab world as a whole.” Fred H. Lawson,
Constructing International Relations in the Arab World
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006), p. 12.

11.
An accessible collection in English of some nationalist writings of the period can be found in Sylvia Haim, ed.,
Arab Nationalism: An Anthology
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962).

12.
Mark Tessler,
A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), p. 20.

13.
Ibid.

14.
The precise significance of the
haskala
for the development of the modern Zionist movement is a matter of scholarly debate. See, for example, Tessler,
History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,
pp. 26–36; Sachar,
History of Israel,
pp. 8–10. More conservative Jews speak of it disparagingly, as did David Ben-Gurion, one of Zionism’s most ardent advocates and the first prime minister of Israel, who wrote that because of the
haskala,
“adherence to traditional forms of faith and law was shaken . . . [as] the upper strata of Jews started to use the languages of the secular rulers and began to imitate the dress, customs, and education of the Gentiles.” David Ben-Gurion,
Israel: A Personal History
(New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1971), p. 8.

15.
In 1894, French authorities accused Captain Alfred Dreyfus of spying for Germany and court-martialed him; the charges were motivated largely by the accused’s Jewish background. After some twelve years of heightened anti-Semitism, Dreyfus was eventually found innocent of the charges. See Michael Burns,
France and the Dreyfus Affair: A Documentary History
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999).