The Grand Alliance (50 page)

After carefully considering the types of ship which
can be used, it has been decided that Barham and a

“C” Class cruiser should be used for the purpose.

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The use of Barham for this purpose will no doubt fill
you with the deepest regret, but it is considered far
preferable to sacrifice one ship entirely with the chance
of achieving something really worth while than to get
several ships damaged in bombardment the result of
which might be most disappointing.

This order was intended to convince the gallant Cunningham of the scale of events as we saw them in Whitehall, and of the almost desperate risks that should be run at this crisis. Admiral Cunningham vehemently protested against the suggestion that he should sacrifice a first-class battleship like the
Barham.

Commander-in-Chief

15 April 41

Mediterranean

to

Admiralty

I fully realise the grave consideration which must
have been given to the matter before their Lordships
and H.M. Government came to the decision to make
the sacrifice entailed by this operation, but I would
submit that such a price is only justified if first of all
success is reasonably assured, and, secondly, if,
having been successful, the result will be efficacious. I
do not consider either condition would be fulfilled. As
regards success, it seems to me doubtful if there is one
chance in ten of getting this large ship into the right
position.

Even if we are successful, we shall have lost a first-class fighting unit whose passing is liable to give an
inestimable fillip to Italian naval morale, and by this very
effort shall give the enemy the measure of how desperate we consider Cyrenaican situation to be.

If operation fails or is only partially successful, these
aspects will be intensified. We shall furthermore have to
replace the ship by taking another unit away from the
Battle of the Atlantic.

In return for all this at best we shall make the actual
harbour unusable, but unloading will still be possible,
and alternative French harbours are available.

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Nor in these considerations have I taken into
account the certain loss of nearly a thousand officers
and men from the two ships, who will have to be sent
recklessly into the operation, unaware of what they are
in for, and whom I see no prospect of being able to
bring away.
1

Rather than send in Barham without support and
with such slender chances of success, I would prefer to
attack with the whole battle fleet and to accept the risks.

For the above reasons I have seen fit to query their
Lordships’ decision, and most earnestly request that
reconsideration be given in light of these remarks.

It was not without relief that we received the news that the Fleet would bombard Tripoli, and the Admiralty hastened to concur and share from a distance the burden of responsibility. At daylight on April 21, Cunningham appeared off Tripoli with the battleships
Warspite, Barham,
and
Valiant,
the cruiser
Gloucester,
and destroyers, and bombarded the town for forty minutes. To the astonishment of all, complete surprise was achieved; the coastal batteries did not reply for twenty minutes, nor was there any opposition from the air. Much damage was done to shipping in the harbour, as well as to quays and to port installations.

Large fires were started in a fuel depot and the buildings surrounding it. The British fleet withdrew without loss. Not a ship was even hit.

Tripoli [reported Admiral Cunningham] was bombarded for 42 minutes at 5 A.M. today, Monday, at a range of between 14,000 and 11,000 yards. To my astonishment, surprise was achieved, probably owing to the preoccupation of the German Air Force in the other zones…. My remarks on the policy of this bombardment will follow in due course.

The Commander-in-Chief pursued this signal with another, in which he expressed his feelings strongly.

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C.-in-C.

23 April 41

Mediterranean

to

Admiralty

We are finding our present commitments rather
more than we can deal with efficiently.

I wish to make it quite clear that I remain strongly
opposed to this policy of bombardment of Tripoli by
Mediterranean Fleet. We have got away with it once,
but only because the German Air Force were engaged
elsewhere. Thus we achieved surprise. It has taken the
whole Mediterranean Fleet five days to accomplish
what a heavy flight squadron working from Egypt could
probably carry out in a few hours. The fleet has also run
considerable, and in my opinion unjustifiable, risks in
this operation, which has been at the expense of all
other commitments, and at a time when these commitments were most pressing….

I cannot see how Nelson and Rodney can be spared

[from the Atlantic] to join Mediterranean Fleet.

To me it appears that the Air Ministry are trying to
lay their responsibilities on Navy’s shoulders and are
not helping us out here on naval side of the war as they
should.

In my opinion this story reflects credit upon both the high Admirals concerned, and illustrates for the benefit of future naval readers the extraordinary pressures under which we were all acting in this crisis. It may well be that the Admiralty, with my cordial agreement, forced their Commander-in-Chief to run an unnecessary risk; and the fact that no loss was sustained is no absolute proof that they were right on the merits. On the other hand, we at home alone could measure the proportion of world events, and final responsibility lay with us. While remaining wholly convinced of the vigour and correctness of the First Sea Lord’s action, I thought it necessary to offer the The Grand Alliance

308

Commander-in-Chief the fullest explanation, and a wider view of the war scene than was possible from Alexandria.

Prime

Minister

to

24 April 41

Commander-in-

Chief, Mediterranean

There can be no departure from the principle that it
is the prime responsibility of the Mediterranean Fleet to
sever all communication between Italy and Africa.

2. I am sorry that the haze caused by the aircraft
attack hampered your firing at Tripoli. We ought to have
foreseen this, but it is no use repining, and after all
results

were

substantial

and

achieved

without

casualties in ships or men. Personally, I was not
surprised at this immunity, and certainly the fact that
the main batteries of the principal enemy base in Africa,
although under German control, were at twenty
minutes’ notice shows that the enemy cannot be always
ready everywhere at the same time. I suppose there is
no doubt that the blocking plan would, in these circumstances, have come off.

3. About your air support: you should obtain
accurate information, because no judgment can be
formed without it. The Chief of the Air Staff tells me that
the same weight of bombs as you fired of shells into
Tripoli in 42 minutes, namely, 530 tons, might have
been dropped: (a) by one Wellington squadron from
Malta in 10½ weeks, or (b) by one Stirling squadron
from Egypt in about 30 weeks….

5. The main disposition of forces between the
various theatres rests with the Defence Committee,
over which I preside, and not with the Air Ministry, who
execute our decisions. Ever since November I have
tried by every method and every route to pump aircraft
into the Middle East. Great risks have been run and
sacrifices made, especially when two-thirds of one
whole fighter squadron were drowned in trying to fly to
Malta, and when Furious was taken off her Atlantic
duties to make three voyages to Takoradi. I always try
hard here to sustain you in every way and acclaim your
repeated successes, and I earnestly hope you will also

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believe that we at the centre try to make sound and
bold decisions amid our many difficulties….

7. You wonder how I could have suggested that
Nelson and Rodney should be spared from the Atlantic
to join the Mediterranean Fleet. I thought they were
specially suitable because of their deck armour and the
apprehensions entertained of the dive-bomber attacks.

Whether they could be spared or not depends upon the
situation in the Atlantic. About this, in view of your high
position, I will now inform you. I have been for a long
time in constant intimate communication with President
Roosevelt. He has now begun to take over a great part
of the patrolling west of the twenty-sixth meridian West.

The whole American Atlantic Fleet, with numerous
flying-boats, entered into action in the first phase of this
plan at midnight of April 24. United States warships will
cruise along our convoy routes, shadow – or, as they
call it, “trail” – all raiders or U-boats observed, and
broadcast their positions in plain language to the world
at four-hourly intervals, or oftener if needed. It is
desired that this shall not be announced suddenly, but
become apparent as it develops. The matter is, therefore, confided to you in the highest secrecy. The
easement and advantage of it to the Admiralty is
enormous, and, of course, it may easily produce even
more decisive events. Therefore, you do not need at
this moment to be unduly concerned about the Atlantic,
and can devote your resources, which we are
increasing in so many ways, to the cutting-off of enemy
communication with Africa, whether by Tripoli or Cyrenaica. On this depends the Battle of Egypt.

8. I have taken the pains to give you this full account
out of my admiration for the successes you have
achieved, your many cares, my sympathy for you in the
many risks your fleet has to run, and because of the
commanding importance of the duty you have to
discharge.

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My supreme object continued to be a victory in the Western Desert to destroy Rommel’s army before he became too strong and before the dreaded new armoured division reached him in full strength. This would at any rate save our position in Egypt from the wreck. I must, therefore, recount an episode for which I took a more direct measure of responsibility than usual. The disaster which Wavell had sustained on his Desert flank had stripped him almost entirely of his armour. On Sunday, April 20, I was spending the week-end at Ditchley and working in bed, when I received a telegram from General Wavell to the C.I.G.S.

which disclosed his plight in all its gravity.

Though the situation in Cyrenaica has improved [he said], the future outlook will cause anxiety for some time, owing to my weakness in tanks, especially cruiser tanks. As you realise, this desert warfare depends very largely upon armoured strength…. The enemy has probably at least a hundred and fifty tanks, of which about half are medium, in the fighting line in Cyrenaica.

Most of these are now in the Bardia-Sollum area, and the enemy may be preparing further forward movements, if he can arrange supply. I have one weak unit in Tobruk of mixed cruiser, infantry, and light tanks, and in the Matruh area one squadron of cruisers…. The best I can hope for by the end of the month is one cruiser regiment less one squadron, and one infantry tank regiment less one squadron, to assist defence of Matruh. During May I may get another thirty or forty cruisers out of the workshops to make another weak unit, and some infantry tanks which will probably be required for the close defence of Alexandria against possible raids. I cannot count on getting any tanks back from Greece, and no more are in sight for some time.